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This study examines British-Indian relations

Canada between 1783 and 1812 and focuses on

in the

Great Lakes and Upper

intercultural frontier relations

and Native

responses to Britain's actions and imperial Indian policies as Native Americans explored

ways

to preserve their lands

their relationship with their

and cultures while simultaneously attempting
former British

allies.

Specifically, the project

British-Indian interaction and diplomacy in three regions throughout

the

Old Northwest. These three

to redefine

compares

Upper Canada and

locales correspond roughly to the areas served

Britain's three principal Indian agencies in

Upper Canada

at the

by

time -namely Fort

St.

Joseph, Fort Amherstburg, and Fort George. The Natives of each of these three areas

developed unique relationships with the

British,

and as a

result, Britain

establish a single Indian policy that applied everywhere in

borderlands.

Government

leaders and Indian agents in

its

could not

North American

Canada and

the Great Lakes

were

forced to adapt Whitehall's policies to conditions and circumstances that were prevalent

in

each of the sectors in which British agents and leaders dealt

w ith

indigenous peoples.

Several factors affected the evolution of British-Indian relations from region to region.

viii

These included the

fur trade, Indian relations

and warfare with the United

States,

geographical position, the influence of British-Indian agents, intertribal relations
between
various Native groups, the degree of Indian acculturation with whites, Native cultural
revitalization,

and the constitutional issues of Native sovereignty and

result, Britain

was unable

to preserve the unity

among

its

legal status.

confederated tribal

As

a

allies that

it

had enjoyed during the American Revolution, and by the War of 1812, the old "Chain of
Friendship" had devolved into a collection of smaller alliances.

ix
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INTRODUCTION

The

latter

years of the eighteenth century

uncertainty in both Europe and North America.

American

frontier,

marked

Nowhere was

where Native Americans struggled

against the rapidly expanding United States.

a period of

this

change and

more so than along

to preserve their lands

The ongoing

struggle in the

and cultures

West

represented a continuing phase of the American Revolution that did not cease

American powers made peace

at Paris in

policy and the Crown's relations with

its

the

when Euro-

1783. Consequently, Great Britain's frontier

Native

allies

underwent several changes during

these postwar years. This study focuses specifically on British Indian relations in the

Great Lakes and Upper Canada (present-day Ontario) between 1783 and 1812. The
period begins with Britain's involvement

among

the Indians of the

the latter's attempt to retain possession of the Old Northwest,' and

the final British-American war, a struggle

American expansion

in the

which

virtually

Ohio Valley during
it

ends

at

ended Native resistance

its

to

Great Lakes.

This crucial twenty-nine-year period had three distinct phases. The
1795, saw Britain enjoy

the outset of

greatest influence over the confederated tribes

first,

1783-

of the Ohio

Valley, as this quasi-alliance inflicted two significant defeats on American forces before

suffering

its

own demise

against

Anthony Wayne's

victorious United States Legion in

1794, followed by the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. Then, between 1796 and 1807
British-Indian policy

was wholly transformed, and

British officials, both in

Canada and

at

Whitehall in London, implemented a policy of retrenchment in an effort to vastly reduce
the government's financial obligations and diplomatic ties to their former allies,

1

particularly those Natives dwelling in United States territory.
During this decade of
relative calm,

Anglo-American

wartime coalition tended
relations

were

relations appeared stable,

to fade.

from 1807

Finally,

in part revived as the

to

and the former British-Indian
1812 close Bntish-Indian

United States expansionist policy continued

to

and provoke the Natives and as Britain's relations with the Americans continued

to

deteriorate as a by-product of British maritime policies pnmarily

aimed

alarm

at crippling

Napoleonic France. In other words, when Great Britain and the Natives of the Old

Northwest again became

allies, this

common enemy than

of sharing a

allegiances. Thus, after 1807,

restored relationship

was formed more

in the context

out of a sense of devotion and respect for traditional

when

British agents attempted to restore their

government's former "Chain of Friendship" or past alliance with the Indians of the Great
Lakes, the Native responses were often varied and lukewarm. The British-Indian alliance

which was reformed on the immediate eve of the War of 1812 was a matter of necessity
for both Britishers

A

and Natives

alike.

handful of scholars have touched upon aspects of this subject.

have written diplomatic studies pertaining

American Revolution, including Samuel
Jay's Treaty:

and revised

A

Study

in 1962.

in

to the

F.

American

,

least

'

acknowledged the

common

The Old Northwest encompassed

originally published in 1923

the significance of the frontier in influencing

British policy, linking the latter to events in Europe.

relations crudely and failed to elucidate

frontier directly after the

Bemis, of whose well-known monograph,

Commerce and Diplomacy was

Bemis highlighted

A few of them

Although he handled British-Indian

any of the nuances of that relationship, Bemis

interest that the British

at

and Indians had in protecting the

the present-day states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,

and parts of Minnesota.

2

Old Northwest from

the

Amencans, and

the importance of a potential Native buffer state

between British and .Ajnencan temtonal possessions. This alone greatly affected
Whitehall's policy. Throughout this period the British always viewed their Indian
as vital for the protection of Upper

in spite

years,

of his recognizing the

Bemis

vital

Canada and

Britain's interest in the Great Lakes.

dunng

that the Cro\^'n's retention

the

Yet

importance of the western countr>^ during the postwar

failed to appreciate the Indians' right to theu"

successfully defended

allies

homelands, which they had

Amencan Revolution. The

of the British posts on

violation of the Anglo- Amencan peace, and that

Amencan

author further maintained

soil afler the

Bntam, not the Umted

the pnncipal belligerent in threatemng diplomatic relations

between the United States and the Indians who dwelled

between the

in its

western

Bemis's interpretation was indicative of a broader paradigm

war was

a gross

States, stood as

t\*'o

countries and

territories.

that held

sway

in the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one which tended to portray Native Americans
as savage

In this

impediments

to the enlightened expansion of the tledgling

vem, Jeffersoman Repubhcans were depicted

as the defenders

American
of true

republic.

liberty,

and

the Jeffersonians' anti-British sentiments said to represent the proper diplomatic

philosophy. With this understandmg,

America

in the late eighteenth

all

of Britain's

the survival of .American democracy.

the Bntish

government the

Britain's right to insure

to

North

.\mencan

were seen as the principal

threat to

Such a skewed perception justified .American

expansiomst prmciples and disregarded Native

demed

pertainmg

and early nineteenth century were deemed potentially

nefarious, and AngIo-.\merican disputes of that era

also

activities

Amencan territorial and cultural

right to protect its trade,

treaty

comphance

3

claims;

temtonal mterests, and

after the war.

Fmally, and most

it

importantly for the purposes of this study, this view does not
acknowledge the necessity
for a continuation

of British-hidian relations

in the Great Lakes,

and

understand

fails to

it

the complexities of that relationship.

More

new

look

in his

recently, other diplomatic studies have countered this paradigm,
taking a

at the frontier, its inhabitants,

and the British role

Charles R. Ritcheson,

there.

Aftermath of Revolution: British Pohcy Toward the United

States,

1783-1795

(1969), directly challenges the older interpretation of Bemis. Ritcheson not only views
the

American Jeffersonian perspective

early

American leaders
and

Britain,

for its

for the persistence

continued frontier

interests to maintain

as flawed, but he

peace

in the

blames

this mentality

among

of the nation's poor relations with Great

difficulties.

Arguing

that

it

was

in Britain's best

Old Northwest between the Americans and

the hidians,

the author largely legitimizes Britain's frontier role, implicitly suggesting that British-

Indian relations in the Great Lakes were far more complex than an American nationalist
interpretation

would allow.

In another work, Britain and the

Wright,

Jr.

American

Frontier,

1783-1815 (1975),

expands on the subject of British policy and activity on the

the central focus of his

monograph. This work encompasses the

covered

and Wright successfully demonstrates

in this project,

North America tliroughout

this period,

on Bntain's greater concern
directly

its

at

aimed

at

fomenting

efforts to thwart its

to defeat

strife

European

while inconsistent

frontier,

J.

Leitch

making

it

entire time frame

that British Indian policy in

at times,

France and Spain. Although

was
its

principally based

policy was not

with the Americans, Whitehall, often as a byproduct of

rivals, usually

sought to limit American expansion and

times would even have welcomed an opportunity to dismember the

4

new

republic.

Wright's interpretation, then, while presenting a British perspective
for the necessity of
the

Crown's involvement with

fears

of British intrigue on the

the Indians, simultaneously demonstrates that
Jeffersonian
frontier

were not completely unfounded. However,

contrary to American claims, British policy makers never devised a consistent,
overall
plan for the Crown's frontier role, nor was America their primary concern. The lack
of a
clear,

comprehensive

and influence of the
British

frontier policy

activities

who

mixed-bloods

from Whitehall tended

of the numerous independent

to heighten the significance

loyalists, agents,

continued to attempt to rally and unite the Natives under the

British standard, while claiming to represent the King. Therefore, while

Indians, loyalists, and even

Americans believed

frontier represented direct instructions

particularly at a time

Crown's

conditions

at

The

forming a specific policy.
demonstrating

on British motives behind the

do not adequately inform the reader on prevailing

British

Regime

in

how much

home government.

studies, while shedding light

the time, nor do they sufficiently

her classic work.

in

loyalist activities,

diverged from that of the

frontier policy,

on the

from home, such was often not the case,

Wright emphasizes the importance of the

These diplomatic

numerous

that partisan British activity

when Whitehall was noncommittal

their interests at times

and pro-

frontier

convey Native American perspectives.

In

Wisconsin and the Northwest (1935), Louise

Phelps Kellogg provided a rich narrative history of the Great Lakes and the Upper
Mississippi Valley,

making

the activity of key figures there, rather than government

policy, her central focus. Kellogg's story unfolds as traders, agents, Indians, and field
officers established a diplomatic landscape of common interests, based

on the

and military alliances. People of multiple ethnicities and nationalities formed

5

fur trade

connections in order to achieve their community of interests; by
paying homage to Native

customs and conventional diplomacy

in the northern country, the British

maintain Indian allegiance throughout the
an early form of Richard White's

War of 1812.

later ethnohistorical

managed

to

hi a sense, Kellogg's study

was

monograph. The Middle Ground:

Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region. 1650-1815
(1992), a

benchmark work

that

emphasized an

intercultural society

between indigenous peoples and Euro-Americans

based on mutual interests

in the eighteenth century.

According

to

White, neither Indians nor Europeans could fully impose their customs and ideologies on
other peoples in the region of the Old Northwest, but instead, an entirely

milieu emerged. The effects of this cultural interplay

studying the lives of British Indian agents

among

their

who

is

cultural

seen on a personal level

when

served and fought on the frontier, living

adopted Native kinsmen and often taking Indian wives. The best scholarly

biographies in this area include Reginald Horsman's Matthew

Agent (1964) and Larry

McKee

new

L.

Nelson's

Elliott, British

A Man of Distinction Among Them:

Indian

Alexander

and British-Indian Affairs along the Ohio Country Frontier, 1754-1799 (1999).

Two

other related works are worthy of mention, since they focus primarily on

British-Indian relations in the Great Lakes during the era covered

Crown and Calumet:

by

this study.

In

British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815 (1987), Colin Calloway

provides an ethnohistorical approach to understanding both British and Native
perspectives of this relationship as these cultures interacted in the contexts of trade, war,

and diplomacy. Calloway deemphasizes policy
cultural

and

racial conceptions

history, concentrating

more on

and misunderstandings. More pertinent and

issues of

useftil to this

dissertation is Robert S. Allen's His Majesty's Indian Allies: British hidian Policy in the

6

Defence of Canada, 1774-1815

(

1

993), a policy history that lucidly demonstrates

Britain's Indian policy effectively slowed

how

American expansion and saved Upper Canada,

but failed to preserve Native lands and cultures.

The
that, as

it

present study

made

British policy

its

is

also a policy history, though

way down from

became

elastic

it

takes into account the fact

Whitehall to the actual setting in which

and even protean

in virtually

it

was

applied,

every respect save one, the

issue of Native sovereignty. In other respects, the rational coherence and long-term
stability

seemingly implicit

relations with

its

Native

in the

allies

term "policy" was frequently lacking

in Britain's

on both sides of the Canadian-United States border. At the

center of policy-making in Whitehall relations with indigenous peoples on the Empire's

North American periphery was

at best

a tertiary concern

compared

bureaucracy's primary focus on Britain's powerful European

to the imperial

rivals, especially

Revolutionary France, and to a secondary focus on whether the United States would take

an antagonistic or a neutral posture toward British
distracted

by these more pressing

interests.

Whitehall

officials,

crises, often issued directives to their

North American

subordinates without devoting the necessary time and energy needed to constmct a

cohesive long-term plan for imperial relations with Britain's Native

allies in

Canada and

the United States.

By acknowledging

and

illustrating this protean aspect

applied to British-Native diplomacy, the present study

understanding precisely

how

of the term "policy" when

makes an important

British-Indian relations evolved in North

contribution to

America between

1783 and 1815. This dissertation incorporates more Native perspectives than previous

monographs on Euro-American

frontier policy,

7

whether British or American.

Furthermore, this study emphasizes the fact that Whitehall
for the most part did not
achieve a unified, long-term hidian policy, and that Bntain's
diplomatic mitiatives did
not have a uniform effect

American borderlands.

when implemented

in different regions

In practice, British Indian agents

of the Empire's North

were compelled

to tailor

Whitehall's directives to conform to the unique circumstances and conditions
of each of
the separate geographical areas in

which Britain conducted

its

with indigenous

affairs

peoples. Moreover, the Native peoples in each of these regions, with their diverse
histories

and varied

political

and military goals, often played key roles

in shaping local

variations in British policies. Factors affecting these bonds included: the fur trade,

geographical position, Indian relations and warfare with the United States, the influence

of British-Indian agents,

intertribal relations

between various Native groups, degree of

Indian acculturation, and the constitutional issues of Native sovereignty and legal status.

This study specifically compares British relations with Indians living in both the United
States

and Canada from the Crown's three principal Indian agencies

Forts Amherstburg

(i.e.,

Maiden),

Prior to 1796, these three agencies

St.

in

Upper Canada

Joseph, and George between 1783 and 1812.'^

were located

at

adjacent sites on the

Forts Detroit, Mackinac, and Niagara, respectively.

8

American

side of the border at

at

CHAPTER

1

THE QUEST FOR A JUST PEACE: BRITISH-INDIAN RELATIONS,
The twelve years immediately
Treaty of Paris

in

after the

1783 were marked by great

Crown's wartime Native

allies in

Quebec, and London struggled

1783-1795

United States and Great Britain signed the

volatility in British relations with the

North America. British

to find a balance

officials in

western

territories,

between competing and often

contradictory aims: restoring the Indians' faith in British friendship and maintaining
strong trade ties with them, while avoiding a general conflict between the U.

western tribes that might draw Britain into another unwanted war with
colonies. Meanwhile, Indians

who

lived in parts of western

New

S.

and

former

its

York, the upper Ohio

River Valley, and the Great Lakes region that Britain had ceded to the United States
labored to construct military, cultural, and political alliances that would enable them to
retain their lands

and

their sovereignty in the face

newly established United

of expansionist pressure from the

States.

This chapter traces

how

these themes played out in three brief periods between

the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Greenville (1795), the latter negotiated between the

United States and the Ohio Valley

tribes.

The

first

period, 1783-1789,

saw

Britain retain

possession of its forts in the trans- Appalachian west and witnessed Native efforts to build

an intertribal coalition capable of resisting U.

1

792, produced a

number of successes

encouragement from the Bntish,
and dealt defeats

to

S.

expansion. The second period, 1789-

for the Natives as they developed, with

intertribal village

two major American

communities along the

military expeditions.

The

third

Maumee

and

River

final secfion

covers the years from 1793-1795, a period during which Brifish diplomatic and military

9

leaders largely stood aside as their Native allies went

down

to defeat at the

hands of the

United Slates.

Growth of the

Intertribal

Confederacy, 1783-1789

After having ceded most of the territory south of the Great Lakes to
the United
States in the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Britain continued to maintain a presence
within the

northern borders of the

new

republic

by garrisoning

Moreover, the Indian inhabitants continued
conquest over

their

homelands. Nevertheless,

unsettled. Evacuation of the upper country'

taken,

how would

to

it

American

soil.

defy the exaggerated American claims of

many

was

affect the British fur trade

eight posts on

long-term policy choices remained

still

a possibility, but if that step

was

and the future of the British-Indian

alliance? Furthermore, Whitehall also pondered the security of its possessions north of

the Lakes, the region soon to be partitioned off as the Province of Upper Canada.^

Eventually Britain would have to demonstrate the extent of its resolve to defend these
interests.

These issues arose due

government had been so eager
it

terms of the Treaty of Paris. The British

to extricate itself

from

its

problems

in

North America that

signed an agreement that neither restored British honor nor protected the sovereign

territory

of its Indian

realized the

'

to the

The term

full

allies.

When

the French commissioner

Count de Vergennes

extent of the proposed British territorial cession, he remarked,

'"upper country"

was used

to collectively describe the region

of higher

altitude

"You

will

which

encompassed the area of the Great Lakes, the Old Northwest, and the region of Upper Canada, or presentday Ontario. At the highest elevations of this upper region, a natural watershed south of the Great Lakes
separated the two principal river systems which either flowed southwest toward the Mississippi River, or
northeast, emptying into the Great Lakes.
^

Parliament created the Province of Upper Canada in 1791.
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notice that the

all that

I

political

Enghsh buy

the peace

more than they make

it.

Their concessions. .exceed
.

should have thought possible."^ Realistically, Britain merely needed
to grant

independence to

concessions.

its

thirteen rebelling colonies, without

By retaining possession

government could have

making

further territorial

of the Upper Country and Great Lakes, the British

better protected the rights of its Native allies and

possessions north of the Great Lakes.

its

Canadian

A majority in Pariiament also thought the treaty far

more generous than anything they had imagined. When news of the terms reached them,
the government of Lord

Shelbume and

his liberal ministry collapsed under a storm of

protest.

As

a result of this diplomatic snafu, British leaders in

British Indian

Department faced the

difficult

from the war while somehow convincing
rather than disastrous.

allies fell

The unenviable

Canada and

assignment of simultaneously withdrawing

their

Native

allies that the

Alexander McKee, the Department's second-highest ranking

May

peace was honorable

task of actually addressing Britain's Iroquois

upon John Johnson, the Superintendent General of Indian

western nations with the news. In

officers in the

Affairs, while

officer,

was

to acquaint the

1783, Sir Frederick Haldimand, Governor-

General of Quebec, ordered Johnson to "repair immediately to [Fort] Niagara" to address
the Six Nations and other tribes of the Covenant Chain regarding the peace.'* Johnson

and

McKee would

addresses.

^

Vergennes

need

to strike a fine balance

They must convince

to

their late allies that the

Raymond, 4 December 1782,

Correspondence of the United States 6
.

between

vols.

truth

and grace

in their crucial

King had not abandoned them,

The Revolutionary Diplomatic
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), VI:
in Francis

Wharton,

ed.,

107.

Haldimand to Johnson, 22 May 1783, Canadian National Archives (hereafter CNA), Haldimand Papers,
MG 21, Bl 15, 106; Earle Thomas, Sir John Johnson. Loyalist Baronet (Toronto: Dundum Press, Ltd.,
"

1986), 105-07.
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that the treaty

was just,

would continue

in the future

Johnson,

among

that the

known

Americans would recognize

their rights,

and

that the

in his role as their protector.

as "Owassighsishon"

("He

Who Makes the Roof to

his h-oquois brethren, delivered his long-awaited speech

on 23

July.

Tremble")

He

reassured

the Six Nations' leaders that nothing had changed in their relationship to the King,
still

regarded them "as his children" and "faithful

molest, or claim any part of our country,

father."

King

we

allies,"

and "should the Americans

shall then ask assistance

But Johnson "could not harbor the idea

that the

who

of the King our

United States [would ever] act so

unjustly or unpolitically as to endeavour to deprive [them] of any part of [their] country

under the pretense of having conquered

boundary

line

agreed upon.

received.^ Similarly,

sentiments

when he

.

.to

it."

Finally, the Superintendent affirmed "the

be just."^ Johnson's reassurances were generally well

McKee, an adopted Shawnee

later

British interests in the

knov^'n as

White Elk,

addressed the nations further west, hi an effort to preserve

Upper Country, McKee gathered

representatives from the western

nations and tribes from the northern Lakes and addressed them

Sandusky

in

*

at

a council held at

August and September of 1783. Like Johnson, McKee argued

Americans would recognize
that the

reiterated these

King

fridian sovereignty north

"will continue to

"Johnson's Speech

at

North America: From

Lower

that the

of the Ohio River, and promised

promote your happiness by his protection."

Niagara, July, 1783," in A. L. Burt, The United States. Great Britain, and British
the Revolution to the Estabhshment of Peace after the War of 1812 (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1940), 89-90; speech ongmally taken fi-om

CNA,

MG

1

1,

Q21, 433-35.

must be remembered that Johnson, like his Iroquois friends and allies, also lost his home and
inheritance as a result of the war. This included die mansions at Johnson Hall and Fort Johnson, and

^

It

vast land

holdmgs stretching throughout much of the

Mohawk

River

the

V alley.

Sandusky, 26 August to 8 September," Histoncal Collections of the
Michigan Pioneer and Histoncal Society (hereafter MPHC), XX: 174-83. Also see Larry B. Nelson. A
Man of Distinction among Them: Alexander McKee and British-Indian Affairs along the Ohio Country
^

"Transactions with the Indians

at
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Allhough leery
shaken

ap|)earetl less

ol the

proposed peace setlleiueiU and

aller Johiisoifs aiul

about rmure relations

witii whites, the hulians certainly

United States would attempt
their intertribal alliances

past three years alone:

to

extend

reassurances.

had no reason

huhans

Incertain

I

to suspect thai the

sovereignty over then hinds, particularly aller

its

Mohawk

Valley

(

(

1

7S()

Ivither," the Natives nutially

and

1

78

1

Schoharie Valley

),

782), and lilue Licks

1

and an a|)parent continuation

feats

ranufieatioiis, the

had achieved a string of victories against American armies

Lochry's Defeat (1781), Sandusky

wartime

MeKec's cahning

ils

had no reason

in

(

1

782).**

(

1

in the

780),

Thus, based on then

then relationship with then ^Miritish

to interpret the

war\s end as anything more

than a truce, and certainly did not believe themselves bound by a treaty they had not

signed to relinquish territories that they had defended so successfully/^
Shortly aller Johnson and

(icneral lialdimand

liritish fidelity

made two

McKcc

delivered their respective speeches, (lovernor

crucial decisions to help bolster Native confidence in

towards them, f irst, he

del'icil

evacuate the northern posts within American

this

l

by refusing

to

The Ciovernor General made

territory.'**

determination on ins own, belore knowing that the Americans wouUi renege on then

ioalici,

llie

the terms of the peace

I

/^-l

MeKee's

/W

I

(Kent, Oil;

Kent

State*

I

liuvt isily l*u'ss,

IW>), l.U-32.

A

tew lioquois also attended

council hekl at l.owci Saiulusky.

"

Koheit S Allen,

(

roionlo:

Ilis

Duiuluin

Majesty's Indian Allies

l*iess, 1*>'>3), 54.

puhlicalions, including',:

l.

Hntish Indian l\>liey

in the

Deleiue

t)l

(

anaila,

Ciood accounts ol'these actions are lounil scattered

A. Cruikshank, Hullers Rani;,eis:

ON: Renown Pnntmg Co

I

//l ISl^

in several

The Revolutionary Peruul (Wellaiui.

ON,

td.,

I^)KH);

Harbaia (irayinonl. The lioquois

llie

Aineiican Revolution (Syracuse; Syracuse Uiuveisily Riess,

1^)72);

William

the

l

1S^)3;

repiint,

.V''

iontici

Niagara

l*alls,

The King's Regiment

m

the Revoluluinaiy

liom the ust ami Second (ieoige Rogeis
(Vincennes Vincennes Univeisily Riess,
l

Revolution,"
"

in

MIMIC,

III:

laik

l*>K>),

I

War/'

in

Robert

lans Appalachian

-11

00, and Chailes

l

J

l\>ltei,

I

llohlen, ed

ionliei llistoiy
I.

Walkei,

"

I

.

Selected Rapeis

Conleiences

he Noithvvest Duiing the

hulians, l-mpues, ami Republics in the (iieat

(Cambiidge, UK: Cainbrulge University Press, IWI), 434.
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in

"Redcoats on

12-36.

Richaiii White, The Middle (iiound:

JUnI.S

(

l

I

akes Region,

l()^()

part

of the

treaty.**

Haldimand's decision aimed

at

achieving multiple goals: to placate

the Indians, protect British fur trade interests, reduce the
threat of a general Indian war

against the Americans, and

Appalachians.

To

hamper American expansion

the degree that

into lands

Haldimand simply sought

west of the

to maintain a status

quo

in

the western country, his actions were consistent with Britain's wartime Indian
policies,

but he also initiated policy changes in response to postwar conditions. At the request
of

John Johnson and
lands in

Mohawk

leader Joseph Brant, the Governor General

Canada along the Grand River,

Iroquois) and their dependencies

moved

to set aside

specifically for the British-allied Six Nations

who had

lost their

(i.e.

homelands during the war.'^

Haldimand's actions temporarily brought about the desired continuity he sought,
bolstering the confidence of both the Iroquois and western tribes that had fought for the

Crown.

The Governor General's

pivotal decision to resettle the loyal Iroquois in

indicated that the British leaders there

indigenous

Haldimand

A

allies,

regardless of the

to North,

would attempt

to act in

home government's

27 November 1783,

CNA,

MG

1

1,

good

faith

toward

Canada
their

betrayal at Paris the year before.'"^

CO 42, 46.

compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Paris would have required the American government to
pay its nation's outstandmg prewar debts to British merchants, and the separate state governments needed
to cither restore confiscated loyalist property to its owoiers, or to at least compensate these loyal refugees
full

for their losses.

Far from regaining their property, most loyalists

physical harm, and sometimes even death

when attempting

still

suffered harassment, ridicule,

to collect their property in the

colonies after the war. These violations represented breaches of Articles V
Burt, 95-98; Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy

& VI

former American

of the Treaty of Paris.

Toward

the United States,

1783-1795 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969; reprint. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
1971), 59-69, 80-87. The entire Treaty of Paris, 1783, including a non-ratified article of the Treaty, is
3'"*
ed. (Bloomington: Indiana
found in Samuel F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution
University Press, 1957), Appendix, 259-64.

"Haldimand Grant," in Graymont, Appendix B, 299; Isabel Thompson Kelsay, Joseph Brant 1743-1807:
Man of Two Worlds (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 363.
,

Lord Shelbume, Prime Minister during the preliminary peace negotiations in Paris, defended his
remitted
government's actions arguing, *'the Indian nations were not abandoned to their enemies; they were
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Moreover, by receiving Crown

lands, the refugee Iroquois

believe that their British Father cared for them as

much

as

would be encouraged

he did for his white children,

the

American Loyalists who

the

Bahamas. The motivations underiying both the Haldimand Grant and the

Britain's western posts

also received

seemed

parallel.

new

tracts

of land

in

Canada, Nova Scotia, and

The two measures sought

retention of

to protect the rights

and preserve the sovereignty of both the western Indians and Britam's Iroquois
British postwar Indian policy, a basis for continuity and unity

tribes,

contained another traditional feature.

Haldimand made

As primary

League's alleged supremacy over the western

controlling the nations throughout the Great Lakes.
the frontier diplomacy practiced

colonial government of New

known

as the

among

allies.^"^

the allied

architect of that policy,

his decisions compatible with past British policy,

utilize the Iroquois

to

which attempted

tribes as the

key

to

to

This rationale was in keeping with

by English colonial leaders since 1677, when the

York established a loose

Covenant Chain.

alliance with Iroquois

In 1761, after the British conquest

League

of Canada and

was as much ours to cultivate friendship with them, and who
were certainly the best qualified for softening and humanizing their hearts." Quoted in Graymont, 262;
Colin G. Calloway also alludes to this excerpt in Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-181 5
to the care

of neighbors, whose

interests

(Norman: University of Oklahoma

it

Press, 1987), 8.

The reader can compare the "Haldimand Grant" in Graymont, 299, to Haldimand's initial intention to
retain the posts in the Upper Country in his letter to North, 27 November 1783, CNA, MG 11, CO 42, 46.
by preventing "such a disastrous event as an Indian war," the
"allowing the posts in the upper country to remain as they are for sometime.'

In his attempts to protect the Indians

Governor saw

the necessity in

The Iroquois League consisted of the Mohawk, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, Seneca, and Tuscarora
nations.

Francis Jennings cleverly disassembles the myth of a perpetual Iroquois empire in The Ambiguous
Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its

&

Co., 1984), especially chapter 2.
beginnings to the Lancaster Treatv of 1744 (New York: W. W. Norton
Jennings also provides an overview of the history of the Covenant Chain in "Iroquois Alliances in
American History," in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy eds. Jennings, William N. Fenton,
,

Mary A. Druke, and David

R. Miller (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 37-65.

An

important

neighbors
eighteenth-century perspective supporting the notion of Iroquois dominance over their western
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is

eviction of French civil authority, Sir

Wilham Johnson, Supenntendent of Indian

in the North, continued to recognize Iroquois leadership over
the

Affairs

western tribes in an

extended "Chain of Friendship" which included the nations of the Great Lakes
and upper
country.

Despite the tumultuous changes brought by the American Revolution, Haldimand

saw no need

to

abandon the Covenant Chain approach, and

the

Governor General

continued to envision a general Indian policy carried out under the auspices of the
Iroquois, particularly the

Mohawks, who most

ardently favored British interests. Late in

1783 he reassured Indian agent Daniel Claus, son-in-law

have always considered the Mohawks as the

Government and

I

first

The Governor

also

saw

little

tailored specifically to the interests of the Great

[t]he

William Johnson,

"I

Nation deserving of the attention of

have been particularly interested for

reestablishment."'^

to the late

need

their

Welfare and

for a separate Indian policy

Lakes nations. Haldimand predicted,

conduct of the Western Indians (tho' infinitely a more numerous people) will

always be governed by that of the Six Nations, so nice a management of them
may not, therefore, be necessary -some presents and marks of ftiendship are
nevertheless due to them for their past services, and should ft^om time to time be

dispersed

By naming

Sir

among

them.'^

William Johnson's son John as Superintendent of Indian Affairs

followed by the declaration of the Haldimand Grant two years

later,

in 1782,

the Governor

Cadwallader Colden's History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada which are Dependent upon the
Province of New York... 2 vols. (1727-1747; reprint, New York: Williams-Barker Co. 1904).

Haldimand

to Claus, 17

December 1783, CNA,

MG

19 F

1,

Claus Papers,

III:

277.

Respecting the Public Matters in the Province of Quebec submitted for the consideration
1 1, CO 42, 48,
of the Right Honourable Lord Sydney by General Haldimand," 16 March 1785, CNA,

"Memorandum

MG

251.
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General hoped

to recreate the

prewar British Indian pohcy

continuation of British imperial interests

among

that

would assure a

the nations of the interior.

Haldimand's continuation of the fonner Indian policy had
succeeding
losing

in the

sort

of influence

chance of

confused geo-political setting of the post-Revolution years. After

most of their homeland during

League's council

little

fire at

that

Onondaga

the war, and witnessing the extinguishing of the

in 1777, the Iroquois

were

m no position to wield the

Haldimand and William Johnson had once imagmed. Two of the

League's six nations, the Tuscaroras and Oneidas, had sided with the Americans
war, and before the League could recover and reunite

commissioners quickly negotiated a new

The commissioners demanded
Six Nations were present, and

cession of virtually

all

of Paris) outside of the

at

the war's conclusion,

treaty with the Iroquois in

at

American

Fort Stanwix.

Iroquois compliance based on a claim of conquest. All

all

grudgingly acquiesced

in the

American demands

for

Iroquois territory on American soil (acknowledged by the Treaty

state

of New York.'*^ In contrast

American govemment attempted

to

to the British strategy, the

reduce Iroquois prestige, hoping to terminate

whatever vestige of Iroquois suzerainty remained over the western
In spite

1784

in the

of the Six Nations' decline

after the Revolution,

tribes.

Mohawk

leader Joseph

Brant attempted to assume a position of intertribal leadership over the confederated tribes

in the

Great Lakes that continued to

authority

among

his

own

resist

American expansion.

Without any hereditary

people, Brant's claim to authority rested on his record as a war

"

Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political
Uniyersity of California Press, 1994), 46-48.

Anomaly

(Berkeley:

American expansion after the Revolution
Potawatomis. The latter
included the Shawnees, Wyandots, Delawares, Miamis, Ottawas, Ojibwas, and
collectively referred to as the Three Fires.
three are thought to have a common origin, and are sometimes
^°

The most important western

nations that continued to resist
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leader.

Warriors

in the

West

recalled Brant's participation in

their recent struggle against the Americans.

brilliant victory

key

frontier actions during

The Mohawk sachem had

led

them

to

a

over a sizable portion of George Roger Clark's army on the Ohio River

m the summer of

1

and his presence a year

78 1 ,

later at the

overwhelming defeat of

William Crawford's American forces along the Sandusky marked Brant as a leader who
always fought

Mohawk

for the

western confederacy's best

interests.

In addition to these feats, the

warrior also held additional influence by virtue of his status as the late Sir

William Johnson's brother-in-law and

his rank as a Captain in the British Indian

Department.

Although Brant, Haldimand, John Johnson, and others shared the expectation of
future Iroquois leadership

against this policy.

Haldimand

as

Guy

among

the Great Lakes tribes, several developments worked

Carleton (recently

Governor General of Quebec

named Lord
late in

Dorchester),

who

replaced

1786, did not attempt to sustain

Haldimand's outdated theory of Iroquois leadership over the western nations. Moreover,

when Dorchester

arrived in 1786, only a year after

Haldimand predicted permanent

Iroquois hegemony, occurrences in the West foreshadowed a

for the western nations.

the principal

in

1

Shawnee

era and a separate path

Brant, hoping to reestablish the old wartime alliance, traveled to

villages

of Mackachak and Wapatomica

in southwestern

786. Shortly after his arrival there, a Kentucky militia under the

Benjamin Logan invaded the region, destroying both

^'

new

villages.^^

Ohio

late

command of

Although Brant and

Lochry's Defeat; Kelsay, 312-13.

Sword, President Washington's Indian War: The Strueele for the Old N orthwest. 1790-1795
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 37-40; White, The Middle Ground, 433. This
their
expeditionary force included Daniel Boone and Simon Kenton. John Mack Faragher covers
(New York:
involvement in the campaign in Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer

" Wiley

Henry Hoh

& Co.,

1992), 251-55.
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numerous others were absent hunting when
all

of the

hold a council

River

delegations to seek a

tribal

at the

Wyandot

new

village

the Kentuckians attacked, the raid

site for a

known

as

general council

Brownstown,

fire.

prompted

They agreed

situated along the

to

Huron

west end of Lake Erie, roughly sixteen miles south of Detroit.

at the

The move

On

Northwest.

to

Brownstown marked

a key turning point in kidian affairs

m the Old

Christmas Eve, 1786, the leaders of the newly established Confederacy

Brownstown formally met with

the Bntish at Detroit and requested direct intervention

and continuing support." From

their location close to Detroit, the intertribal councils

would now come more heavily under

at

army and Indian

the influence of the British

Department, and especially Alexander McKee. American Indian agent Thomas Forsyth
later asserted that the British led the

members

ft-om

among

Confederacy

Brownstown, which drew

its

Native

the "Shawanoes, Delawars, Mingoes, Wyandots, Miamies,

Chipeways, Ottawas and Pottawatimies."
official belt

at

of wanipum

that

the British at the head. At

symbolized

According

to Forsyth, there existed

of the nations

all

in the

an

Confederacy and placed

Brownstown, Forsyth continued, 'The

British

government

is

always represented by their Indian Agent, and most generally accompanied by a military
officer."^^ Forsyth's information

was based on

his long career in the Great Lakes.

his contact with

He compared

the

numerous Indians during

new western Confederacy's meeting

Kelsay, 404.

Emma

Helen

Blair, ed., Indian Tribes

vols. (Cleveland:

of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes 2

Arthur H. Clark Co., 1912),

,

II:

188.

Histonan Richard White contradicts Forsyth, arguing, "official Bntish representatives were
not present at Brownstovra." In The Middle Ground 434. In spite of this disagreement between White and
Forsyth (and probably an oversight by White), White agrees that the Confederacy leaders at Brownstown
maintained close ties with the British at Detroit and that the Confederacy grew increasingly dependent upon
Ibid., 189.

,

the British after the initial council at

Brownstown

in

1

786.
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Brownstown

place

at

at Sir

William Johnston's [Johnson's] place of residence."^^ The geographical

to the old Iroquois

paralleled a shift in leadership, since the
States

hegemony depended on

were

in fact largely

Turtle,

led

in

Wyandot, but

Red

on military cooperation with

by

either a

stature

he

that

mixed-blood or "an English
at

why

the

the Confederacy at his council

of Brant, or of other war leaders such as Blue Jacket,

Adam Brown was

Jacket, or Buckongahelas,

was

Adam

a pro-British chief,

1755." His very obscurity partially hints

would so soon wield so much influence among

Lacking the

resistance to United

British in the Confederacy's reconfiguration

The Wyandots were

a full-blooded

boy" from Virginia captured

fire.

shift

and origins remain largely a mystery. Some sources suggest

was probably not even

British

River

under British influence.

also attributable to other factors.

life

Mohawk

nation, nominally the Confederacy's Native leaders,

The growing importance of the

Brown, whose

Brownstown Confederacy's

British assistance rather than

The host Wyandot

the Six Nations.

League's gathering place "on the

Little

merely a village chief who

gained what influence he did have by consistently supporting British interests

in the

West. The appeal to the British of working with a relatively weak leader

Brov/n was

that they

were ensured a key position

Britain's

it

relationship with the

might involve the British government

Blair,

"

new

in the

II:

Confederacy.

Brownstown Confederacy had

in a

like

renewed

its risks.

First,

conflict with the Americans. Also,

188.

and early twentieth-century historian, described Brown as
of Lieut. Governor .lobji
"[a] half-breed chief of the Wyandots," in Cruikshank, ed., The Correspondence
Graves Simcoe. with Allied Documents Relating to His Administration of the Go vernment of Upper
Canada 5 Vols. (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1923-1931), III: 183, footnote 1. However, Emma
E. A. Cruikshank, a late nineteenth-century,

,

contemporary of Cruikshank, noted Brown's English colonial origins in Vugmia,
War of 1812. ibid.
189, footnote 67. According to Blair, Brown died sometime after the

Helen

Blair, a
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raid,

Shawnee

in

in the

began nngrating

reliigees

Wyandot, and Delaware nations
it

region of the Great

to

Miami Kiver

new homes along

also held claims.

The

the

move

convenient for the Indian Department from Detroit

villagers; several <lepartmental onicers

among

sounded very dilTereiU when agents

alter

Maumee

Logan's

River, situated

northwestern portion of present-day Ohio, a region over which the Miami,

in the far

made

Wlutcliall ollcn

council to the Indians."^'

unsafe to remain

it

at

their clientele

and adopted families,

diverse intertribal enclaves along the

headwaters of the Maumee, the

Maumee

Rivers;

and

furtliei

to

Maumee

River Valley

maintain contact with these

once again made

their

homes

contributing to the formation of

Maumee. These

(ilai/e, located at the

Roche de Hout; and

In Ihc latter l7K()s

fur traders

to the

included Kekionga

sites

the

at

conlluence of the Auglai/e and

of the Rapids.

the Foot

Kekionga became the most

im|M)rtanl of these intcrli ibal

communities. Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee villages thronged the banks of the

Maumee,

St.

Joseph's, and St Mary's Rivers

Old Northwest.

confluence and portage

in the

who

once referred

all

lived near this site,

the giuul

words of our chiefs had

RcginaKmoisnian,

''

Vhc

UuUsh

1793-1795/' Mississippi Valley

Iiulian

llisloiieal

to

what was probably the most important

Little Turtle,

Kekionga as

to pass

"that glorious gate.

from the north

IVpailinnil ami

Review 49(2)

(

tlic

one of the Miami leaders

to the south,

.

.through which

and from the

east

Resistance lo Ccncrol Anlhony Wayne,

l%2): 270-7 L Calloway. Ciown and

(

aluinet.

70-74.

5L
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Ihe

at

l
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At no time was Kekionga more important

to the west."

than those years

(1

786-90) during which

addition to Little Turtle, other prominent

it

Miami and Shawnee

of operations.

The
beliefs

this cluster

1

leaders

-Le Gros, Pacanne,

Kekionga's proximity

at the time.^"*

As

Kekionga became a primary center

786 no fewer than twenty-six war

parties

of villages.^^

nations that gathered at Kekionga did not need to alter their customs and

when they

consolidated their communities. During the 1820s C. C. Trowbridge,

Secretary to Michigan

studies

in

escalated,

one six-month period during

In

embarked from

war leaders

Confederacy's interests

existed as an intertribal community. In

Blue Jacket, Snake, and Captain Johnny- lived
the military activities of these

to the

among

territorial

Governor Lewis Cass, carried out ethnographic

field

the Miamis, Delawares, and Shawnees, conducting interviews with a few

of the former militant leaders who had resided

in the

Maumee

Valley during the

1

780s

and 1790s, including Lc Gros (Miami), Black Hoof (Shawnee), and Captain Pipe
(Delaware). Trowbridge found that these tribes spoke similar Algonquin dialects.^^

Furthermore,
succession

all

three groups generally observed

when determining

Excerpt from

Little Turtle's

Charles Poinsatte, Outpost
Historical Society, 1976),
^*

chiefs and, according to Trowbridge, the

speech

in the

some form of patrilineal,

at the

hereditary

Miamis

Treaty proceedings of Greenville, August, 1795, quoted

in

Wilderness: Fort Wayne. 1706-1828 (Fort Wayne: Allen County

1.

Le Gros and Pacanne were Miami

leaders,

and the other

three,

Shawnee.

Leonard Helderman, "Danger on the Wabash, Vmcennes Letters of 1786-87," Indiana Magazine of
History

XXXIV(4) (December

1938): 459.

The Miami Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 12; C. C. Trowbridge,
ShawTiese Traditions eds. Vernon Kinietz and Erminie W. Voegelin; Occasional Contributions from the
Bert Anson,

,

Museum of Anthropology of the University of Michigan, No. 9 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
Maumee at this time is Helen
1939), 67. A good study pertaining to the intertribal communities along the
Hombeck Tanner's "The Glaize in 1792: A Composite Indian Community," Ethno history 25(1) (Winter
1978):

15-39.
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established both war and village chiefs by patrilineal descent.^^ In the
case of the

Shawnees, Trowbridge indicated
in matters

that the village chiefs also

descended

patrilineally,

and

of war, Shawnees based leadership qualifications on merit, requiring a

prospective war chief to "have led
successively, that he should

at least

4 war parties into the enemies country

each time take one or more scalps

at

his followers unhurt to their villages.""**^

The Delawares practiced

paralleling that of the Shawnees, choosing leaders

and leadership

& that he should return

who

a tradition closely

possessed valuable experience

skills."''^

Trowbridge's findings and more

modem

studies indicate that these three tribal

groups also shared similar clan and kinship systems. Shawnee and Miami children

always belonged

to their father's clan, but in spite

of patrician identification, Miami

children developed stronger ties to their mother's family, indicating a matrilocal

community/^ Later

in the nineteenth century, the

Shawnees

also developed matrilocal

kinship systems, but possibly not until after their final defeat and removal. However, the

Delaware nation consisted of clans, or
matrilocal."^'

Consequently, the

phratries, that

women

were both matrilineal and

of all three societies occupied key positions

in

Trowbridge, Meearmeear Traditions ed. Vernon Kinietz; Occasional Contributions from the Museum of
Anthropology of the University of Michigan, No. 7 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938), 13,

14.

Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions 11-12.
,

Delaware Manuscripts (MS/14d), Trowbridge Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public
Library.

Anson, 18-19; Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent Peo ple. 1654-1994
Ceremonialism
(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1996), 17-18; James H. Howard, Shawnee!: The
87-90.
of a Native American Tribe and its Cultural Background (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981),
Trigger,
James Howard, 100-01; For Delaware social organization, see Goddard, "Delaware" in Bruce
Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 225.
ed. Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 15 (Washington:
^'
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the social organizations of their respective tribes,
notwithstanding patrician structures in

two of them and
acknowledged

patrilineal leadership in all three.

rare occasions

Furthermore, Trowbridge

on which the Shawnees and Miamis appointed

women

leaders."*^

Perhaps most importantly, the Shawnees, Miamis, and Delawares adhered
similar spiritual convictions and cosmological beliefs.

Maumee

considered sacred power

attain this

to

The

three nations along the

be of paramount importance, and they strove

through similar methods of ritual and ceremony.

to

to

A pantheon of deities or

manitous loomed as either a potential source of power, or a labyrinth of destruction.
1

824 and

1

Shawnee Prophet (Tecumseh's

825, the

respectively, both explained to Trowbridge

lies

''that

"a vast body of water, and that the earth

Turtle,

swimming

in

it,

and placed there

[i.e.

for that

questioned a Delaware, asking, "What supports
"they shrewdly answer, 'The Turtle
resting place."'

is

The aged Delaware

the earth and destroy

brother) and Captain Pipe,

we

live

upon an

the "island"]

is

island," under

purpose by the Great
this Turtle?/'

which

supported by a great

Spirit." If

anyone

Captain Pipe explained that

Monaatwau [manitou,

or deity] and requires no

leader also ascribed "earthquakes to the

this supporter, and. .suppose[d] that
.

a

In

moving of

he [the Turtle] will one day dive so deeply as to sink

''^'^

its

inhabitants.

James Howard, 109; Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions 12-13; Trowbridge, Meearmeear Traditions 1415, 26. According to Trowbridge, the Delawares have "[n]o female Chiefs;" Delaware Manuscnpts
(MS/I4d), Trowbndge Papers, Burton Histoncal Collection.
,

,

Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions 37; Delaware Manuscripts (MS/I4d), Trowbridge Papers, Burton
Histoncal Collection; Howard, 182. The Wyandots, an integral member of this Confederacy, also
subscribed to the legend of the giant Turtle. See Elisabeth Tooker, "Wyandot," in Trigger, ed. Handbook
,

of North American Indians, vol.

15, 402.
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In the depths of this watery underworld there existed a

manitous and

evil spirits that

way of rivers,

lakes,

were believed

sacred

to frequently ascend to the earth's surface

and springs. The most powerful of these

form of great homed serpents, and

power of these

beings."^"*

tribal

number of powerful

evil

by

manitous took the

shamans constantly attempted

to harness the

The most potent medicine bags were thought

to contain

small fragments taken from the body of one of these serpents; such concentrated power

could guarantee victory over one's enemies and unlimited success in the

hunt."*^

Shawnee Prophet informed Trowbridge, "On

expected to be

the eve of a battle which

is

The

severely contested,"

Shawnee warriors "address

supreme

and "[w]ar parties sometimes leave a small quantity of tobacco by

evil spirit]"

the side of a Spring. .praying at the
.

a similar practice

Maumee

Valley

among

same time

their prayers to

Motshee Monitoo

to the deity inhabiting

it."

[the

Le Gros noted

the Miamis."^ Thus, the militant nations that gathered in the

in order to resist

American encroachments enjoyed

similar patterns in

language, government, and kinship, and they practiced like methods of gaining sacred

power.

These

common

traits fostered a large

nations of the western Confederacy.

degree of cooperation among the Ohio

By 1 790

the communities along the

Maumee, when

supported by groups from Brownstown, could muster more than two thousand warriors.

This concourse of nations cohabiting the same region began to alter Native conceptions

Gregory Dowd,
(Baltimore: Johns

A

Spinted Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity. 1745-1815

Hopkms

University Press, 1992), 10-1

1;

James Howard, 176-78.

James Howard explains that the legend of the Giant Homed Snake is a dual myth shared by the
Shawnees and Delawares, and he relates the Delaware account of how that tribe managed to kill one of
took the form
these deities; James Howard, 1 89-90. For the Miamis, this most feared underwater manitou
*^

of a panther, called Lennipinja; Rafert,

15.

Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions 42; Trowbridge, Meearmeear Traditions, 56.
,
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of tribal possession and sovereignty. The various nations consciously
attempted

to

speak

with one voice and were not tolerant of an individual nation seeking
to cede territory that
all

of the Confederacy's members now deemed

instance (prior to 1795) in which a

territorial

common

member of the Confederacy

sovereignty to the exclusion of another

a land dispute occurred

threat to defect,

member came

last

attempted

the

at

known

to assert its

end of 1789, when

between some Miamis and Delawares, during which the

Del aware faction Ihrcalcncd
Mississippi Valley.''^

The

property.

No

to delect

from the Confederacy and join the Spanish

records indicate that this group of Delawares carried out

hi fact, just the opposite occurred, as additional factions

and Delawares continued

in the

to settle at the intertribal

community.^"

In the

its

of Shawnees

winter of 1 789-

90, the Confederacy's leaders met in council and affimied pan-tribal unity, declaring their

plight

''a

public grievance, in which

man, ought and should

all

were concerned

that therefore

turn out, to assist in repelling the

every able bodied

enemy, who had come

into their

country, to take their land from them.""**^ Keenly aware of the threat they laced from the

United States, the Confederacy recognized the need
land possession as essential

Mad

River in 1786,

if

for

mutual

tribal

support and joint

they were to avoid future debacles such as those on the

when Logan's

raiders easily destroyed the principal

Shawnee

villages

of Mackachak and Wapatomica.

Milo M. Quaife, ed. "A Narrative of Life on the Old Frontier; Henry Hay's Journal from Detroit
Miami River," m Proccedmgs of the Wisconsin Historical Society (Madison, 1915), 226.
Ibid.,

"^

225.

John Heckewelder,

Indians.

to the

From

& Davis,

its

A

Delaware and Mohcgan
Close of the Year 1808 (Philadelphia: McCarty

Narrative of the Mission of the United Brethren

Commencement

in the

Year 1740.

to the

1820), 396-97.
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among

the

The continued development of intertribal

Maumee was

facilitated

by

the pro-British sentiments shared

The presence of white

inhabitants.

unity at Kekionga and along the

traders

by these commumties'

and Indian agents, namely George Ironsides,

Alexander McKee, the Girty brothers, John Kinzie, and a number of loyal
French
all

helped to cultivate these

Detroit and

ties.^^

As

a result, the British sphere of influence from

Brownstown remained strong along Maumee during

the period from 1786 to

1794, and most of the inhabitants near Kekionga were British partisans.

Hay, a British trader from

traders

Detroit, wintered at

Kekionga

in

When Henry

1789-90, he noted that one of

the leading French traders, Antoine Lasselle, "is a good loyalist and

is

always for

supporting his King."^'

The group of traders with whom Hay lodged
prominent war leaders, including Le Gris (not
Blue Jacket, Captain Johnny, and Snake.
to

move

his people to a site near

When

Spanish territory

defection.

The

in

and

1

789,

was most

it

Shawnee

leader "the

Wolfe" sought

all

the disaffected Delawares threatened to

likely

George Girty had informed Hay

three Girty brothers

families,

the

Little Turtle,

Kekionga, Snake solicited the opinion of "the Principal

Shawnee newcomers.^^ Furthermore, when

'°

be confused with Le Gros),

& Inhabitants of the place" to aid in determining whether or not to invite the

Traders

to

to

more

dealt constantly with the

Alexander

that if "Capt.

McKee who

prevented their

McKee would

Immediately

-Simon, James, and George- were captured as youths and adopted

three later served as agents

and

move

interpreters in the British Indian Department.

into Indian

They gamed

infamous reputations among white Americans who viewed them, especially Simon, as savage renegades.
Yet, Jonathan Alder, a young captive among the ShawTiees, had a high regard for Simon Girty, who at
times interceded on behalf of captives. See Larry L. Nelson, ed., A History of Jonathan Alder: His
Captivity and Life with the Indians (Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 2002), 52-55, 171-76; Colin
G. Calloway, "Simon Girty: Interpreter and Intermediary," in Being and Becoming Indian: Biographical
Studies of North American Frontiers ed. James A. Clifton (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989), 38-58.
,

Quaife,

"

"Hay

Journal," 237.

Ibid., 255.
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send in a String of wampum

to hinder

them from taking such a

step

it

would no doubt

immediately stop them."" Girty's brief statement speaks volumes, for
the

minds of the Natives

become

the British influence rose to

Kekionga, Hay and his cohorts showed
their

growing involvement

McKee, had

Confederacy as eariy as 1789.

new

heights within the multi-tribal

little

community

at

concern over the possible consequences of

m the escalating war between the Confederacy and the

War parties went

Americans.

suggests that in

living at Kekionga, the British agents, especially

influential in the reconstructed

As

it

out regulariy, often returning with prisoners and scalps; of

one such occasion Hay wrote:

was shown this morning the heart of the white Prisoner I mentioned
Indians had killed some time ago. .it was quite drye, like a piece of dryed
I

the

.

venison, with a small stick run from one end of it to the other

& fastened behind

the fellows bundle that killed him, with also his scalp.

The whites

living in Kekionga, both British and French, often hosted these Indian guests

and even "billetted" members of war
in

parties "like soldiers."

from war" the same day, they "danced with a

"[s]ome of the warriors came over

The
the

the time.

leading

stick in. .hand

in the evening, to

.

The

reflects the

intertribal residents at

member of the Confederacy,

& scalp flying," before

our [Hay's] House."^^

position of the British traders and agents at

American Revolution

When "[a]nother party came

Kekionga

in the period following

ambiguity of British-Indian relations

Kekionga considered the British
particularly after

1

in general at

as brethren and a

786. Yet Governor General

Frederick Haldimand and his successor Lord Dorchester never intended to increase the

"

"

Ibid.,

226.

Ibid.,

222-23.

Ibid.,

221-22, 223.
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British presence

among

the tribes within

United States, whether

at

Dorchester issued a

of orders

set

Brownstown

or

tlie

tenitorial boundaries

of the newly fornied

on the Maumee. For example,

to the Indian

in

1787

Department, hoping "to diminish the

enormous expense" of the government's Indian budget, while simultaneously
demonstrating "the King's paternal care and regard" for Britain's former
Dorchester's instructions included a restrictive clause, stating,
or employed

in the

Indian Department,

or to have any share profit, or concern

such trader/agents along the
continued

Maumee

is

to

"No

allies.

persons belonging

to,

be permitted to trade, directly or indirectly,

thcrin."'^^'

Apparently the injunction did not faze

as Ironsides and the Girty brothers,

to participate in the British fur trade

during this period.

all

of whom

Lord Dorchester had

recognized the potential dangers of unmonitored trade, authorizing post commandants
intervene: "In

all

matters of trade where the Indians are concerned.

interference of the Officer

utmost

commanding may be

.histice" for the Indians, but

.

.at

to

any time the

necessary." Lord Dorchester sought "the

he also worried that anything less could undermine

"the safety of the Post, and the security of the Trade/'*
Althougli Dorchester's fears were not unfounded, Britain

on
the

was compelled

to rely

the fur trade in order to maintain strong ties with the hidians. After withdrawing from

American wai and ceding much hidian

land, the British

had

to turn to the fur trade as

"Dorchester's Instructions for the good Government of the Indian Department. To Sir John Johnson.
Baronet, Supenntendant (sic.] General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs, 27 March 1787," CNA,
10, 789,

"

6759-01.

and Indian agents shared living quarters at the Glaize, the new location of the
collection of villages that replaced those at Kekionga. See Helen Hombeck Tanner, "The Glaize

In 1792, the British traders

intertribal
in

RG

1792," 30.
Dorchester's histructions, 27

March 1787, CNA,

RG

30

10, 789,

6760-61.

the only

means

Company was

available to soothe Native discontent.^^ Moreover,
the North

West

organized immediately after the close of the American
Revolution (1783-

84) and represented British efforts to bring greater structure and stability to both the
fur
trade and the

Crown's

frontier Indian relations.

The company enhanced

the careers of the

McGillivray family and the famed Alexander Mackenzie. More importantly,
such a
pooling of resources among the traders and merchants brought about greater cooperation

among men who had once been
in the first

bitter rivals.

The company's

sales escalated dramatically

two years of operation, and the reported overall revenues remamed high

throughout the 1780s.^^

The expansion of the

Company throughout

British

this period

fiir

trade and the activities of the North

West

brought about vast changes in Indian communities. The

expanding fur trade not only bolstered the

traders' influence, but

it

accelerated the

process of limited acculturation for the Indians and a growing interdependence between
traders

and Indians.

When the trade

manufactured goods, which

economy and augment
liquor abuse

among

in turn

grew, Natives became ever more reliant on

compelled them to continue

their bounties

still

further.^'

to

Moreover, the

engage
fiir

in a

market

trade fostered

the Indians and probably hastened the spread of disease.

Such a

destabilization of tribal social infrastructures, coupled with a rapid depletion of game,

Colin G. Calloway, "Foundations of Sand: The Fur Trade and British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815" in
Le Castor Fait Tout: Selected Papers of the Fifth North Amencan Fur Trade Conference. 1985 ed. Bruce
G. Tngger, Toby Morantz, and Louise Dechene (Montreal; St. Louis Historical Society, 1987), 147-49.
.

*°

Charles Gordon Davidson, The North West

*'

Calloway, "Foundations of Sand," 157-58.

Company (New York:
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Russell

& Russell,

1967), 17-18, 272.

eventually led to a greater economic, political, and
military reliance on Britain.^^ Yet

Whitehall and leaders in Canada certainly did not want the
close attachment to the
Indians that the fur trade would bring, particularly
for

war with

time

when

Indians were preparing

the Americans.

Considering
fur trade as a

at a

this inherent contradiction, Britain

means of cultivating good

relations with the

while simultaneously trying to keep them

at

persisted, Whitehall could never develop a

fully satisfy the tribes in the Great

Anglo-American

relations

Department reflected

this

could not indefinitely employ the

Crown's former hidian

allies

arm's length." As long as these conditions

sound and consistent hidian policy

that

would

Lakes and upper country, and also maintain amiable

and peace on the

frontier.

Dorchester's orders to the Indian

ambiguity. In striving to reduce expenses and decrease the

Indian budget, the Governor General regarded the Indians as "free and Independent

people," but he simiultaneously instructed the agents to inform the Indians that they would

continue to "merit" the King's friendship only "by acting as good and obedient Children

ought to

do."^''

In seeking to pacify the Indians, cut costs,

and prevent the potential

threats to the upper province, Dorchester's policy reflected the sentiments of his superiors

at

Whitehall; in theory, the measure encouraged greater Indian autonomy, while in

actuality

it

fostered heavier Native reliance on British support. British leaders could not

vacillate indefinitely,

and with the Confederacy already in a

the United States, the British government

resolve to support

its

former

allies

would be forced

of intermittent war with

state

to

determine the extent of its

with both material and militarily assistance.

Calloway, Crown and Calumet 160, 188. Calloway refers to the fur trade as
,

Indians, "unleashing catastrophic forces at the
63

Ibid., 188,

same time

and Calloway, "Foundations of Sand,"

159,
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as

it

a

"Trojan horse" to the

delivered desirable gifts."

The Confederacy 's

The Native and

British residents of

Zenith. 1789-1792

Kekionga thought

little

of the long-term

repercussions of Bntish-lndian trade relations as the continued British presence

community's

more complex.

infrastructure even

matters internally, but on other occasions

In

some

tribal leaders

to

move

when

Captain Snake called a meeting "of the Principal Traders

potential

newcomers

cases, Indians chose to handle

a

in

&

village inhabitants as "Fathers

Snake's courtesy on

permanent participation

order to determine whether or not to

in

&

this

Brothers.

at

Ridout

sat

Kekionga's councils, nor was

Kekionga

as his

own

it

traders

who

Simon

lived

to the

"Hay

the

Girty, probably barred

on the other side of a

Thomas

acknowledgement of

all

.

RG

Journal," 255.
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Ridout's harrowing experience in

Kekionga. During his brief captivity,

all

traders,

and with the exception of

whites. Ridout recalled,

river. .had

March 1787, CNA,

& Brothers," Snake

white residents. In stark contrast to the

traders' limited influence at

Dorchester's Instructions, 27

Quaife,

welcome

an indication of Native

relations, but an

before an Indian tribunal that excluded

the interpreter

1790,

occasion did not entitle the traders to the privilege of

concede authority

788 demonstrated the

in

"^^

courtesy shown white traders in 1790, captive

1

Kekionga

Inhabitants of the place,"

deference to British authority. In asking the advice of "Fathers

familial ties did not

leader, "the

Kekionga; the Shawnee leader addressed the traders and other

to

considered the whites

Shawnee

his entire village near to the other villages at

seeking their advice and support

the

sought the advice and dnect

intervention of British traders and agents. For instance,

Wolfe," wished

made

"The Indian

long expected me, but dared not

10, 789, 6759.

me whilst my

intercede for

after

having

sat in council

life

was

at issue."^'

The

traders' exclusion in Ridout's case,

on previous occasions, indicates much about how the

Kekionga and along the Maumee understood
their British friends as brothers in

their relationship to Britam.

commerce and

allies in

tribes at

They viewed

war, but certamly not as

possessing sovereign authority in Native councils.

The Natives'

belief in their

unchallenged for long. Existing

and

in a

attack.

When

in a local

torch, despite

the primary

Kekionga would not go
that lacked

to

Kekionga

autumn of 1790,

same day, October

bum

Kekionga were vulnerable

to

the leaders there could not even

defend their homes or protect their crops from the invaders'
the outset.^^

Miami town themselves and evacuated

proceeded to
find.

to

in the

at

complete unanimity

American army commanded by Josiah

knowing of Harmar's advance from

arrived on the

15'^.

The

inhabitants burned

shortly before the army's vanguard

]n the ensuing days, the regular

and destroy any of the remaining Indian towns and

army and

all

militia

of the crops they

Despite suffering the loss of their homes and crops, the warriors of Kekionga

Harmar a

serious drubbing, as

orchestrated multiple

Little Turtle's

Matilda Edgar,

ed.,

Miami war chief Little

ambushes against Harmar's

Turtle successfully

ill-prepared army.

68

successes notwithstanding, Harmar's raid was a psychological blow

Kekionga's inhabitants. Unable

to

at

community

a poorly-trained and ill-equipped

muster enough warriors

dealt

sovereignty

confederacy that had no clear leader, the tribes

Harmar marched

could

own

to

defend their homes and crops against a poorly

Ten Years of Upper Canada

in

Peace and War, 1805-1815; Being the Ridout Letters

with Annotations (Toronto: William Briggs, 1890), 367.

Sword, 102-03.
Ibid., 106-08.
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disciplined army, the Confederacy's warriors pondered
the future, realizing they
face

more capable

adversaries. Moreover, tribal differences and disagreements

Confederacy leaders caused them

to

would

among

squander an opportunity to crush Harmar's battered

army. While Blue Jacket and the Shawnees wanted to deliver the coup
de grace against
the retreating Americans, a total lunar eclipse of a full

among some of the

phenomenon

interpreted the

to pursue the

allied warriors preparing to

as an

Still

understood

caused

Americans. The Ottawas simply packed up and

Americans

until

left,

and

to

The Confederacy could not hope

lost

Blue Jacket's
to

win a war

opportunity to destroy Harmar's amiy. Blue Jacket

too well that he needed British aid if the Indians were to achieve the unity

he sought. Losing no time, the Shawnee leader journeyed

to Detroit to plead for direct

support, arriving there even before the remnants of Harmar's

march back

disaster if they attempted

they became a united force.

smarting from the

all

much constemation

pursue Harmar's men. Several

ominous warning of certain

chagrin, other groups soon followed.^^

against the

moon

On November 4^^,

to Cincinnati.

addressed Major John Smith, commandant
confederated tribes held a

common

Father" was indebted to the

with

McKee

amiy had completed

as translator, Blue Jacket

arguing that Britain and the

at Detroit,

cause against the Americans, and that the ''Great

Shawnee people, who had

faithfully served their Father, the

King. Blue Jacket also appealed to Britain's vested interest in protecting trade

Ibid.,

their

v/ith her

117-19. According to Trowbridge, the Shawnees and Ojibwas held differing cosmological views

Shawnees understood them
as ^'precursors of war." See Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions 37; Chippewa Manuscripts, MS/I4C, Col.
Boyd's Account, Trowbridge Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library. The Ottawas
who withdrew from the battle against Harmar most likely interpreted the eclipse as the Ojibwas generally
what was known as
did. The two tribes shared a number of common links; they and the Potawatomis form
regarding eclipses.

The Ojibwas

interpreted eclipses as calamitous, while the
,

the alliance of the

Three

Fires,

and the three nations are thought
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to

have a

common

origin.

former

allies, asserting that that trade

was

the

common

bond, as he put

it,

"which Imks us

at

Detroit also did

together in amity and interest."^^

Though

not wanting another American war, the British officers

not wish to completely spurn Blue Jacket's pleas for support.

was one of the most
the

Maumee,

influential chiefs

among

The Shawnee war

leader

the intertribal coalition developing along

and, as son-in-law to Jacques Baby, a Detroit-based British
Indian agent,

Blue Jacket was also a British partisan. The British authorities had previously
honored
the

Shawnee

Oliver

leader with an officer's commission, which, according to white captive

M. Spencer,

entailed "the half pay of a brigadier general from the British crown."

Spencer also recalled an occasion when Snake and Simon Girty visited the

Shawnee,

whom

illustrious

the captive youth described as

dressed in a scarlet frock coat, richly laced with gold and confined around his
waist with a party-colored sash, and in red leggings and moccasins ornamented
the highest style of Indian fashion.
epaulets, and

massive

The

on

his

anns broad

silver gorget

British influence

On

his shoulders he

silver bracelets; while

wore a

pair of gold

from his neck hung

and a large medallion of His Majesty, George

on Blue Jacket and, conversely, the

in

latter's reliance

reached their zeniths about the time the Shawnee war chief had gained his

a

III.^'

on

Britain's aid

maximum

influence within the coalition's leadership ranks.

In council at Detroit, British

commandant Major Smith

listened attentively to

Blue Jacket's pleas, and responded with assurances of friendship and words of

compassion, but he promised nothing other than to seek his superiors' counsel on the
matter.

He immediately wrote

to

Lord Dorchester, and

™

in the

meantime he did

his best to

Speech of Blue Jacket, 4 November 1790; quoted in John Sugden, Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 106-07.
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supply his Shawnee delegation with

and food. Smith's

gifts

gifts

helped temporarily

sustain the homeless inhabitants of Kekionga, and his
promises to place the Natives'

appeals before Lord Dorchester gave Blue Jacket, Little Turtle,
and Kekionga's other

refugees a glimmer of hope. But in truth, neither Smith nor Lord
Dorchester could do

much

to offer further protection to the hidians,

suggest

was

further

down

that the intertribal villagers

the

Maumee, which would

who

By the summer of

1

,

McKee

homes

in

could could

Harmar's

raid

later

move

place them nearer to Detroit and shorten the
in

1

that, relocating at "the

791 the community

all that

lost their

supply line of the Indian Department.^^ Early

Kekionga began doing just

and

at the

79 1 therefore,
,

many

refugees from

Glaize" (present-day Defiance, Ohio).

Glaize included almost

prominent figures of whom Hay had written during his stay

at

all

Kekionga

of the
a

little

more than

a year earlier. Blue Jacket, Captain Johnny, Snake, Little Turtle, Buckongahelas, and

those in their villages

all

built

new homes

or near the Glaize. Nearly 2,000 people

at

resided at the Glaize by 17927^

Oliver

M. Spencer's memoir of his

offers a glimpse into

spirituality

played

in

the Glaize, Spencer

life in this intertribal

was placed

Miami, and Delaware

—

that

in the

to

S.

predominated numerically

have worn a red coat

M. Spencer (New York:
.

at the

Upon

his arrival at

Ibid., 108.

in 1792," 16.
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tribes

Glaize,

-Shawnee,

Coocoochee

Citadel Press, 1968), 90-1. Blue Jacket

in the action against St. Clair.

.

Tanner, "The Glaize

at the time.

member of any of the

Jacket 123.

"

expansion

into the role that

household of his captor's mother, Coocoochee, a

she was not a

Quaife, ed.. The Indian Captivity of O.

was even thought

community, especially

Native resistance to U.

Mohawk prophetess. Though

^'

captivity at the Glaize during the early 1790s

See Sword, 179, and Sugden, Blue

nevertheless

was

treated as a revered

member of the

intertribal village

respected position was based on her reputation as a medicine

numerous

spirits

and accurately forecast the

results

community. Her

woman who

conversed with

of raids7^ For example, when more

than fifty Shawnee warriors from the villages of Blue Jacket and Snake
sought her out in
1792, she prophesied the success of their raid, and after they subsequently
significant victory, they returned to the Glaize with

Coocoochee by giving her a share of their

much

Among

spoils.^^

whom

Mohawk war chief who
Mingoes already

On

had migrated

dwelling

at the

into the

Ohio region

Dead

Glaize.

death, his

in the spring

widow removed

Buried in a

of 1792, a

sitting position

Quaife,

"

its final

The Indian Captivity of O. M. Spencer

,

little

at

Kekionga.^^

more than

a year

of her new

spirit's final destination.

spirit

his friends tended his grave suggest that they believed that

for

army

with his weapons, blanket, and

Coocoochee's ongoing conversations with her husband's

was not prepared

Shawnees and

his remains to the site

moccasins, Cokundiawsaw's body faced the West, his

lingered and

to join the

living there, only to lose his life against Harmar's

Cokundiawsaw's

status.

she conversed was that of her husband, Cokuridiawsaw, a

the occasion of the Feast of the

after

and doubtless

she,

experienced her refugee condition as an uprooted and unsettled

the spirits with

a

plunder and honored

Although Coocoochee was respected by her fellow refugees,

many of them,

won

and the manner

Cokundiawsaw's

Yet
in

which

spirit still

journey.

78, 117.

Ibid., 116.

Ibid.,

78-80. Also see Helen

Hombeck

Tanner, "Coocoochee:

Mohawk Medicine Woman,"

.American

Indian Culture and Research Journal 3(3) (1979): 24-25,28. The Ohio Iroquois, known as Mmgoes, began
migrating into Ohio in the 1740s and 1750s; Coocoochee's family relocated to Ohio sometime after 1768,

Treaty of Fort Stanwix supposedly made the Ohio River a permanent boundary
and acknowledged that the country north of the River belonged solely to the Indians.
the year in

which the

fu-st
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The general

belief in the lingering presence of Cokundiawsaw's
spirit and the

confidence the warriors placed

Coocoochee

in

indicates

much

about the community

at

the

Glaize. After sustaining considerable losses in the
fight against Harmar, the warriors

from Kekionga, though victorious, sought a new home

Harmar's destructive
heavily on the British

raid,

at

much of the

at

the Glaize. Without food after

surviving remnant of Kekioiiga's populace relied

Detroit to supply their wants in the

upcoming

winter, and this

caused a sudden evacuation of their former villages. Under ordinary
circumstances,

Cokundiawsaw, a distinguished war chief of the Mohawks, would have received a
replete with a full

Condolence Ceremony, intended

relatives, prevent calamities

from

evil spirits, assist

to reinvigorate his

Cokundiawsaw's

journey, and install another leader as the fallen chiefs

Coocoochee's move
than a year until his

re-interred his remains,

Ceremony. Thus Cokundiawsaw's

spirit

remained

The absence of a Condolence Ceremony
that

mourning

spirit

As

it

on

his

was, due to

Cokundiawsaw's grave remained unattended

to the Glaize,

widow

successor.''''

Coocoochee and her family had begun

for

to live

though

still

funeral

for

more

without a Condolence

restless.

Cokundiawsaw could

more

like their

also indicate

Shawnee

hosts,

who

did

75!

not perform the Condolence

ritual.

Furthermore, Coocoochee's observance of the Feast

of the Dead closely mirrored the similar Shawnee custom, but they differed

in that

A

good analysis of the Condolence Ceremony is found in William N. Fenton and J. N. B. Hewitt, "The
Requickening Address of the Iroquois Condolence Council." Journal of the Washmgton Academy o f
Sciences 34(3) (March 15, 1944), 65-85. Also see William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse:
A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 136-37,
178-79.

Erminie Wheeler Voegelin did an entire study on Shawnee death and burial customs, spanning the period

from the

late

seventeenth century through 1938. The author also compared the differences in the practices

of the five separate Shawnee divisions. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Shawnees began to practice a
form of the condolence ceremony; Voegelin, Mortuary Customs of the Shawnee and Other Eastern Tnbes
Prehistory Research Series, 11(4) (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, March, 1944), 243-319.
,
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Coocoochcc's
(lays

Ir()(|ti()is

ancr the mourned

version of the Feast of the

indivickial's death, while

onee a year,

just after the

Death

was intended

linal

I-easl

journey.

should have

I

l)y

Green Corn Ceremony
to

nourish the

he feast held

for

spirit

Dead was supposed

Shawnees held
in

their

to lake phiee ten

Death Feasl only

summertime.^'' in both eases, the

of the deceased, helping

Cokundiawsaw's

occurred

spirit

prepare

to

much

later than

both hoquois and Shawnee standards; both groups believed a

restless for so long

was

departing war parties

at

dangerous.*^" Yet

the Cilaize,

by conferring with

Coocoochee,

it

spirit

woman was

if not directly

have performed

in effect fulfilling a role that

for their

own

peoples

in

assuaging the passions of

vital to

household she raised a mixed-blood grandson, thought
Ironsides,

he

times.

those living

at

the Glaize, she

also developed closer ties with the British traders and agents living there.

Coocoochee's daughter married George

I

Shawnee and Miami shamans would

more ordinary

As Coocoochcc's presence became more

kept

the dead and prophesying to

the lingering ghosts, could perhaps at least foretell of calamities they might cause.

medicine

for its

it

to

be Simon

In her

(lirty's son,

and

one of the traders who had migrated

to

the Glai/.e from Kekioiiga after llarmar's raid. This couple lived directly across the

Maumee
I

River from Coocoochee.

he marriage between Ironsides and Coocoochee's daughter suggests an

increasing interdependence between the British and the Indians living

Ironsides had married into a prominent family; his mother-in-law's

at

the Glaize.

power and

brothers-in-laws' status as warriors insured him a position of respect.

his

Ironsides'

new

" James Howard,
by William N
and Kchiilli of

l

286-87; Arthur C. Parker, Parker on (he Iroquois: Hook Two; edited wilh an inlrochiction
enton (Syracuse: Syracuse Dniveisily Press, 1<H)K), S7; Aiitlioiiy !. C. Wallai c, lic H ath

llie

I

Seiu-c a

(New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 98-9.
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I

(IwulliMg

(he

al

livm;. <„,

was

(

iKiiphuy

iIk-

Icllow tiaders and

Moreover,

s.l.iakd m,

ccnlcr of the

iI,c

as he and Ihe other traders had

were now silnated

aj'.cnls

the

al

combined
done

al

villa,',cs.

Kekionj-a, he and his

hnb of interaction

like Ironsides, the Indian aj',ents at the
(ilai/e,

integrated

members

house and Ihe Aiiglai/e Kiver

sat a

namely Matthew

ol this iiilertribal comimiiiity."'

I

)epaitinent

depot and pail time residence lor
Indian Department's branch

al

|)ei

who had

inaneni lesidence

oik e lived

and McKee."'

I'.lliotI

Detroit to

(here (ban (he Hri(ish had previously underlaken

in

a(

Ihe liulian Deparlincnl assisted (he

ambush
cillu

ol

(Ik-

i

destroyed Aithiii St

lhal

(

ilai/c or Kckioii};;!.

Indian

tlir

I

I

lie

In

IikImm

<

'laii 's

( ).

aiiy

II. 1(1

.

M

Nelson,

A Mini

lames

(

inly, an

supply

a

Iced and

arm

the warriors

iiilei

tribal

at

the

groups

Kekioiiga/*'

became

onledeiac y

m

nu)rc appaient late in 17V

I,

planning, and caiiying oul the

American army moic than

IM;

lilly

M, SpciiccK

Simon

Wallace. OH 101; Parker.

95-6; liiimn.

llml.

I.

Near Ironsides'

miles Irom

addition lo providing arms and intelligence, a nufnhcr

'Inulitions, 42; Hd^Nu.

aplivily ul

These

Kekionga, the other

)cpatinicnl\s officers also took pari in the action

""TrowbridKc. Sliiiwiirsr

(,)iiailr,

(

(

al

lot

dealing with Ihe

Direct British involvement along the Maiimee

when

lainilies.

This storehouse enabled the

more quickly

giving the Department a more active role

(ilai/e,

Idhott,

small palisaded |)eiimetei Miiioiiiidin)- two linlish

Indian Deparlmeiit buildings, one ol Iheni a
mleipietei within Indian

the (llai/.e.

al

Alexandei McKee, and Ihe dirty brothers, also had Native wives
and

men had become

Instead ol

mI DistiiKtioii iimoiig Uieiii. 158.

171.
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*'
I

he

(

ilai/c ui

(iirly led a

Hook Two. !?6
1/02/' l7,2S-27.

group

of Wyandots

in the battle,

and Matthew EUiott was also

the Department also probably fought against

extreme discretion, since the

act

was

St.

present;''^

many

other officers of

Clair that day, but they did so using

a violation of Britain's official neutral status
in the

ongoing war between the United States and the Indians of the
Northwest.

American army suffered more than 1000
few dozen army personnel and

600 of them

casualties, over

civilians returned to Fort

Washington

In

the

all,

Only

fatalities.^^

(i.e.

a

Cincinnati)

unscathed.

Although certainly one of the greatest victories ever
Euro- Americans,

St. Clair's

for Native

defeat ironically exposed the Confederacy's weakness,

showing a heightened dependence on

the British.^^

While the kidian victory marked the

high tide of the fortunes of the northwestern Native Confederacy

American expansion,

it

Americans over

also tended to

weave Indian and

in its

stmggles

to thwart

British interests together

more

lightly in the Great

Lakes and upper country. Furthermore, since the U.S. government

remained steadfast

in refusing to

the

war would

leaders

acknowledge Native sovereignty

continue. Confidence soared

saw no reason why

their

at

in the

Old Northwest,

the Glaize; the Confederacy and

its

overwhelming success against American arms should not

continue, particularly with support from their supposedly neutral British confederates.

Consequently,

in the years

immediately following

Sword, 182, 188; Horsman, Matthew

Elliott. British

St. Clair's

defeat the British Indian

Indian Agent 69.
.

White, The Middle Ground 454; Allen, His Majesty's Indian Allies 74-76. This excerpt from Allen
contains a contemporary British account of the battle and its implications, found in an anonymous letter
,

,

MG

The general engagement
1 1, CO 42, 88.
24 November 1791, CNA,
known as St. Clair's Defeat is best detailed in Sword, chapter 17. Only Edward Braddock's defeat near the
banks of the Monongahela in 1755 nvaled the magnittide of St. Clair's Defeat 36 years later.
from Niagara

three

weeks

later,

White, The Middle Ground 454.
.
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Department enjoyed

its

strongest inniience ever

among

the intertribal

communities

at

the

Glaize and along the Maumee.

During the brief period 1791

to

1794, events

at the

Glaize tended to dcfme

British-Indian relations overall. Despite the British government's
proclamations of
neutrality and

its

urging the leaders

and relations with the Indians

by those Indian agents on
situation,

McKce's

site,

position

Canada

in

in the

reduce Indian expenditures, actual

tics

upper country were primarily shaped and carried out

Alexander

became

to

McKee

and

his staff

particularly delicate.

As

'^'^

the

Within

this

war wore

nebulous

on. Blue

Jacket, Little Turtle, Buckongahelas, Captain Johnny, Snake, and other leaders near the

Glaize trusted the British more heavily, and they viewed

McKee

as their lifeline to this

support.

John Graves Simcoc, the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, also

McKee, expecting him

heavily on

both

in

to

relied

maintain British interests within the Confederacy,

matters of trade and war. Simcoe and other British leaders had grown

increasingly concerned about the activity of the traders in the Ohio Valley and

potential to

element

bound

in

undermine government

developing

to the traders'

Simcoe wrote

to

ties

policy.

between the

If the British fur trade

British

became

the sole

and Indians, Whitehall could

find itself

diplomacy, conducted by profit-seeking individuals on the

McKcc, complaining

that the "self-interested

frontier.

& Venal Traders" would

lead the Indians to believe "that G. Britain will sooner or later engage in a

States in the defence

its

War

with the

of the Western Indians [those Indians within the borders of the

United States]," and that

if the traders

should find

it

in their

own

interest,

they would not

White, The Middle Ground 455; Horsman, "The British Indian Department and the Resistance to
General Anthony Wayne, 1793-1795," 270-71; Calloway, Crown and Calumet 51, 64-65, 70-74.
**
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hesitate to "counteract the general Instructions

buoy up

the hidians

by

that false hope."'^'^

A

& Conduct of his Majesty's

Servants,

&

year later Simcoe defended the practice of

distributing Indian gifts at a distance farther from the
posts, partly to "rescue the Savage

from. .the rapacity of Our Traders."'" Thus, British leaders depended
on the handful of
.

agents such as

McKee, who

maintain a status quo
influence

was

When

in

did not have personal vested interests in the trade, to

British-Indian diplomacy, particularly at a time

it

came

commitments on

to

war and diplomacy, Simcoe

the government's part. Late in the

McKee,

the Confederacy's

was

told to

on

also relied

McKee

summer of 792 Simcoe
1

upcoming general council

by creating

to

that

be held

at

the Glaizc that

would encourage

.

In addition to

McKee

to preserve the

between American

preserving the integrity of Indian

possessions, Simcoe also hoped that such a buffer occupied

protect

fall.

the continued

his proposed "extensive. .Barrier" lying

and British possessions.

would pemianently

sent careful

indicating the specific goals and policy he wanted carried out in

work toward a peace settlement

Indians' territory

to influence

making any permanent

development of "so numerous a Confederacy" among the Natives, and

territory

the traders'

significant throughout Indian country.

the Confederacy's leaders in Britain's favor, but again without

instructions to

when

Upper Canada's sparsely

by

a militant Confederacy

settled loyalist

communities from

American expansion.

" John Graves
in Cruik.sliank,

^ Simcoe

to

Simcoe to Alexander McKee, 24 September 1792; Simcoe
Simcoe Correspondence V: 23, 25.

McKee,

10

November

1792,

,

George Hammond. 21 January 1793,

" John Graves Simcoe

to

to

in

MPHC,

25:

522.

Alexander McKee, 30 August 1792, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence.

208.

44

I:

In order to best carry out Simcoe's instructions
without either alienating the
Indians,

damaging the unity of the Confederacy, or

United States,

igniting a

McKee remained purposefully vague

in his

war between

Britain and the

communications with the

primary Native leaders along the Maumee. Although he obeyed
Simcoe by not

promising the King's intervention, no record
Indians that this would never happen. In

exists that

fact, the

McKee

ever expressly told the

subsequent words and actions of the

Confederacy's leaders indicate that they contmued

to

harbor hopes that their British

Father would defend their interests. After lengthy deliberations in the October
council
the Glaize, a deputation, primarily under militant
as Simcoe's representative. Painted Pole, a

McKee 's
rest

Shawnee

influence, addressed

at

McKee

war leader from the Foot of the Rapids near

residence, served as spokesperson, and the chief made

of the Confederacy's delegation expected the British

it

clear that he and the

to protect Indian interests:

Father; At this Council fire

which is in the center of our Country/, is placed the
Heart of the Indian Confederacy to which we have always considered our father
to be joined, therefore we hope on this great occasion, that he will exert himself to
see justice done to us, as it must be through his power & mediation that we can
expect an end to our troubles.

Knowing

that

Native hopes hung on every word he spoke,

McKee

remained

evasive; he merely passed the speech on to Simcoe, allowing the latter to draft a

response. Simcoe, in his answer, adopted a well-established practice in Euro-Indian

diplomacy, seizing upon the Indians'

own

rhetoric as he implied the King's goodwill

towards them:
Children

& Brothers,

You

say "at this Council

fire,

which

is

of your country,
which you have always

in the centre

placed the heart of all the Indian Confederacy, to

is

considered your Father to be joined." The King your Father fi-om the earliest

92

Confederacy's Address to Lieutenant Governor Simcoe, 9 October 1792,

45

ibid.,

I:

229.

moment of his
no

reign, has

beUeved

this

union to be necessary for your welfare

&

so to that of the neighbounng countries; and.
.your late supenntendan't
general, Sir William Johnson, in all his
Councils inculcated its propriety.^^
less

.

Simcoe's diplomatic endeavors mirrored those of the
Confederacy's
leaders viewed themselves as using the Bntish to compel
the

These

leaders.

Amencans

to agree to a just

peace, a peace that would preserve their intertribal territorial claims.
Similarly, Simcoe

hoped

to use the strength

protect

of a united Confederacy

Upper Canada against

the United States

Native warfare to compel the Americans
both Simcoe and the Indian leaders

to

to bring about a

by threatening

peace that would

the use of continued

seek terms favorable to Britain. Although

may have

acted in self-interest and tried to

manipulate the other, both probably believed that their interests were intertwined. In

Simcoe's case

this

took the form of urging Britain's Native

Confederacy, arguing to the leaders

at the

Glaize that

it

allies to strengthen the

was "necessary

for your

welfare."*^^

The council
Confederacy's

at

the Glaize addressed three principal issues,

namely the

territorial goals, their reactions to recent revelations that the

government intended

to

impose

agricultural reforms

the Confederacy should rely on British support.

upon them, and

While most

United States

the extent to

tribal leaders in the

which

Ohio

country advocated the notion of unity and strength within the Confederacy, these issues
the Glaize exposed the fact that the Confederacy lacked clear leadership and

were divided on the objectives

for

which they were

indicated a decline in Iroquois influence

93

Speech from Lieutenant Governor Simcoe

among

to the

fighting.

46

members

Moreover, the council also

the western nations.

Western Indians, October 1792,

Ibid.

its

at

ibid.,

I:

230.

Tensions over leadership and goals were immediately
evident when the Shawnee
leaders,

whose influence within

authority of the Six Nations.''^

was

the coalition

challenged the influence and

rising,

Shawnee spokesman Painted Pole opened

upbraiding the delegates of the Six Nations for aniving

the sessions

by

and by revealing his

late,

suspicion that the Iroquois lacked genuine loyalty to the Confederacy.
Painted Pole

"We

sarcastically concluded,

suppose you have been constantly trying

good, and that was the reason of your not coming sooner
the

most important Delaware

to join

to

us."'^''

do us some

Buckongahelas,

leader, agreed, exclaiming.

Don't think because the Shawanoes only have spoke[n] to you, that it was
their sentiments alone, they have spoke the sentiments of all the Nations.
All of us are animated by one Mind, one Head and one Heart and we are
resolved to stick close by each other

The

militant leaders directed these statements at the Iroquois faction led

Seneca chief Red Jacket, who arrived

The question regarding

States.

Americans,

stating, "Brothers,

at

I

Red

Jacket encouraged a negotiated peace with the

we know

that the

Americans have held out

talking to the

talking to them.

John Norton
action against

later

mentioned

St. Clair.

this place.

Americans your head

When you

left

reject it."^^

him of selling out

Jacket, accusing

can see what you are about from

still

is

their

F.

to the

Americans:

Brother of the 6 Nations, you are

now

your village to

towards them, and you are

come

here,

at the Glaize, 2

Shawnees became leaders of the intertribal alliance prior to the
Klinck and James J. Talman, eds., The Journal of Major John Norton,

October 1792,

in

Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence

Ibid.

"

Proceedings

at the

now

you had a bundle of

1816 (Toronto: The Champlain Society), 177-78.
Proceedings

hands to

The next day Painted Pole

that the

See Carl

the

the Glaize with a peace proposal from the United

you peace. Don't be too proud Spirited and

heatedly responded to

by

the Six Nations' lack of fidelity to the Confederacy's

when Red

goals seemed confirmed

offer

& defend ourselves to the last.^^

Glaize, 4 October 1792,

ibid.,

1:

222.

47

.

I:
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Aiiirii(

N;ili()iis
iKi

now

here

Ihrn) what

Irll

Wc Know

hcic

Stunned hy

speeches \uu\n ytuw

ill!

Hiollirts ol lhr

drsiir V'li to sprjik liom yoiii
lh;il

himdlr wiis whii h yon

what you ate ahoni

I'iinilal I'olc's

irpir';riil;ilivr.s Itoiii dir

"•iif.hlv.

Ami

wc

nuhelmcnl. Red

lr;ii

I

h,i<l

(.

NjiIiod-;.

.iiul in

I

under youi

liuin

.1

dillnciil

y<,iii

Month

Aim whrn

v<»n

(

;inic

sec yon phiinly

dclcnded hnnscK

liiekcl

Six Nations, cxch»iniinp„

"Yon have

;ind his Irllow
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was whether

that

(hvidrd thr opposing, lactions

to linst lliitish eHoils

h( Ip
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pioteet

huhan
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eonncil

only diaw the suspicion ol Ihrn
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addicsscd the Six Nations pointedly, making
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(

(

imlmne

AmeiK

lo li;ive

it

clcai

such dealings

;dlics.

th.il

at
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perspective, the Six Nations had httle choice hut to negotiate with Ihc

Kuch

llir

no

willi the

I

,alci,

line

the

(

lhh/,e

Given

Amei leans,

their

hut

Tainted Tolc again

mcmhci

ol the

Americans:

we might not act as one
Now Miotheis ol the ^ Nations, Ins is the way they served you, and you
Man
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m your hearts, not to he broken olThy
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All the

ans wanted was to <livide us, that
I

it

(
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In Ins iiiial
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at

'oiilcdeiat y

the council, I'ainled Pole indicated

tnally did depend, asserting. "|w|e have a reliance

justice

l

speech

(

lic

done

lo us, as

wc have always

louiid

wc may

upon

on oui

l

whom

the

athei [the

coiilidently

(

KingJ seeing

depend upon Imn

Six Nations delegation, led hy Kcd Jacket, nnwilling to he deemed an

hopes ol

their

I'KKCcdings

at

western

the

(

allies,

ilai/c. 3

"" ProLcrdings al the ({lai/c. 7

I'KHTcdings

al llir (JIai/r.

enemy

"'"^

to the

accepted the Shawnee hard line position against concessions

October 1792.

Oi

onlederaey

tolirr

K Octolicr

1792.

I

/92.

iliid..

224.

ibid.. 22(>

iI)kI.,

228.

48

to the

Americans and

Confederacy

at the anticipated

1793.'^' In the

show unity with

Sandusky conference with U.

to

"They

we mean

fight] them."'"''

be ready

to receive

Soon

after

Red

Glaize. Like

Red

Jacket, Brant

[i.e.

[the

Maumee

informing him that the Council

Mohawk

at the

line, as

we

he

is

to present the

he probably knew

Proceedings

at the

how

the

true

his

to the

By

the time Brant

met him,

American proposals.

Shawnee

at the prior

Instead, the

leader Snake,

who

Washington has always been sending

and wants peace, the Ohio [River] must be the boundary

we

will

meet him

American overtures

at

for peace

Sandusky."'"^ Hence, Brant

even

if

he had wanted

to,

and

roughly Painted Pole and the other leaders had handled Red

Glaize, 7 October 1792, ibid., 227-28.

Grand Glaize, 1 1 June 1792, recorded by Thomas
Indian Department, Native American Collection, Clements Historical Library, Ann

Speech of the Shawanoes and Delawares

Duggan, Clerk, British

at the

Arbor, Michigan.

Snake's Speech

way

American

sachem. Learning the determinations made

long ago agreed upon, and

had no chance

'"^

if

made

as usual, but

Glaize had ended, but they briefly held a smaller

reiterated the Native position, exclaiming, "General

Now

dupe us

River, several of the western Indians

representative sat and listened to the words of the

to us for peace.

to

S. capitol at Philadelphia.

council. Brant did not even bother to present the

Mohawk

in

to ignore the speeches

Americans] mean

came with peace proposals from

government, having just come from the U.

council with the

commissioners

Jacket's departure, Joseph Brant belatedly

reached the mouth of the

the rest of the

them, and they merely passed them on to the
officers in the

British Indian Department, arguing,

to

S.

meantime the Shawnees and Delawares continued

Americans sent

that the

the council promising to

left

at the

Foot of the Miami Rapids, 28 October 1792, Cruikshank, Simcoe

Correspondence 242.
,

49

Im KH. nn

wrNlrmrirt

ill

prm

(•

Aliu

Hit-

:.l,.tWIIPCri itixl

SP('lrl,.,v

ilt all

,,i.il,,

ilthl

(

,ii, ii|.i

..III.

Ill,-

iSi

coiilciilr. nl

^^iv(

Ilkr

ll,<

Willi

III* III

,1

I

locr.

Nhitiin^', linitl.

iiInii

il

Mini

l.iii

(

\

llini I'lu

wuiild mriin Ihc

^-c-,,,!,

.ujrri,

,

i

,1

Ml

.|

I

nl

,,i,p,iriilio.i

<nuir»|iiriilly

»l

Six

,„„„(•.

||„

,,

.urjjilfl

oilM

(

wni,l,l

nrw

lllivr

I..

l|,r

.S;

.

Li,,ii,i,).> ||i,,|

t

h,

|,i.||.„if.|

.ii

iimK,

m

ni.nl

dnlicM

,

ihc Six NiiIk.hm oI

lilrMlylr. ihk

Awyrwuy

.|

I

\n\tiv llirii

|(i

ll.r l.alll.

,

y Hiul

i,

lli.

||i<

Nalivr-. Ittlirvril

Ih,-

li.

<>| ,|||,|.

Ihrii,.

li,

Ihn prupir

I,.,-.

«...

Nlllluiiri* rlloil-.

||,.,l

.,,1

p,,| llini, |ili,

,S.

l'in,(

III,

(

w.ikc n|

"""

-.rr.

iliii/r. ll.r

|',,|r iriiiiiMlr.j

Inn "lo

<

.

ll.r

iii

loi Inn,

<

|>I

|„ .Io.i.h

(

if ii^-irriihlr

I'VaV

i/rd Si

liiiii-.li

ilii

ll.r

il..

,|einyy,

Miii..|. o,,.

!•>

|,i,li<tttN,

<|..

klmi

'n..|(

..,,,,„.„,,,•..

.

'h \n\yy,>\yc

lo ph.i.l

li.iiuiri

(

ill

Sp.-. il„ ..lly, I'.iml.

iiiiliKr Willi

,,i,tln iiinir lni(lilioiit.l

(

whllr prnpir

(l(M iiiiinilr> <iiillit»i

Ill

ill,'.,

It

In Ini, h ||ir

W..:.I....Hln,.

ll.r

,,.

,.1.1,1.11,1 ii„||VlMll»

lioiii Si

hoilMlN, llini «>xn,

A,,,n

III)

ihcNc

MHiir uiAiuUny,

..ll,, .,,,., ||,.„,

liMliiiiiN

(ivrird

llir <lo( iiiiiriilfi ir(

iVrmln.l

|,,iril

W.ii 11,11, V Ki.ux IMMIIr.l

..I

a,,.„i^'.

wrNlnii

iilitiiiiiiiK l<> llir

Iho

„o|

oll.n

.

.nnrly ninMiiUKr.l

|nM,-.,.|, Ih.u.l

I

m,

iippniir.l In lir iiioir

\nnu\

r

,

iii|*ui,iiilv i..;....h.„i

I.

111'

Sliilf. will

<»WII

.,.|.

I.

in...,,,, ,.„,|r.|

l<>

miii.iiKnl In

I

Mulmvvl..

ll,.

t,ii,,

ili.ii

itml

«

Ih.il

h ..mir

,

I,.,,

j.

pr;u{i

ili.ui

woiiM

.iiiMiiif-i

illilll.lllC^li,

A
iiikI llir

\

nil. ill

(ilai/c could o(

my

(.(

I. lit!

(

lined

Six Niilioim no lon^'ri lirM

OIK r nijoyi'd

III

iii,p

«

KiioK lo

"" I'm, rr, IllltiU

(«l

I

III'

vn y

I

III

vvillioiil Iti.tnt

l,>M

llir

(

|ili

I

.k

I

lli.iiil, .'/

(l.n/P.

/

(

1

1,.,

llir iiiIIik

itil,

I

1

1

,

iiidinUrN

liiiir

)i;|ll|lPI

williiii llir

I

\

/'ij,

,i(

,1 ).,l

onhdrim

<

r ovri

,

ii,,i,

<

llir

,1

.i',

ll.r lu'.\ ol'llir

NiMtliwrnl Iniltoiy

/*)2, t 'llllkijIlUIlk

,

L.!!!!'.>J'.

y'ri IritdciNliip

.,1

llir

wrrilrn.

.,^1, <>,,. Il.al

ip< u

ll,,

,,,

i

.t, ,1

Mol.i.wK

»

<

liirpM

(

ihry had

I

,,1,1

I;

227,

.,i

ilin

Willi

nIhIi,-.

I'ttp^rii, C'lpiltPlllH lllHluili-nl

I "!!'fjuilcute,

ilni/c!,

I

ilnit.y

the possible exception of McKee, British leaders
had not foreseen this growing

Confederacy. Only seven years

hegemony over

earlier

rift

in the

Haldimand had predicted perpetual Iroquois

the western Indians, and as late as

summer's end 1792, John Graves

Simcoe, unaware of the growing anti-Iroquois sentiment within the
Confederacy,
continued to envision such a role for the Six Nations.'^^ Less than a
year

time of the general council

at the

later,

by the

Foot of the Miami Rapids (1793), Simcoe better

understood Brant's declining status and threw British support behind the more militant
faction of the Confederacy.

Division and Defeat. 1793-1795

The gulf between
following summer,

Rapids.

'^'^

when

the Six Nations and the western Confederacy widened the
the Confederacy's leaders

Brant's reception there in late

the Six Nations' declining position

leader recalled that the

there to receive

May

among

met

1793 confirmed his plummeting status and

the western tribes. In his journal, the

Shawnees accused him of being "a

Money and

that they

would have nothing

compromise based on

some

108

territory

Simcoe

to

the

that

would produce

Muskingum

River,

to

1792,

ibid.,

I:

I

only came

do with me."'

boundary

a lasting peace.

He

Mohawk

Brant strove
line with the

envisioned a

which would have given the United

northwest of the Ohio River, but

McKee, 30 August

& that

Traitor,

for unity within the Confederacy, but he advocated a renegotiated

American commissioners, one

Miami

in a council held at the

would

it

also have required the

States

American

208-09.

Reginald Horsman offers a good analysis of the proceedings at this council in "The British Indian
Department and the Abortive Treaty of Lower Sandusky, 1793," The Ohio Historical Quarterly 70(3) (July
1961):

189-213.

Captain Brant's Journal of the Proceedings

at the

General Council held

Miamis, 3 June 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence

51

,

11:

6.

at the

Foot of the Rapids of the

'

government

to relinquish

thus a true compromise.

was doomed from

make any

some of the lands

it

Though Brant and

the start because the

had acquired

in the Fort

his supporters did not realize

at

among

the

Maumee

Fires,

began

to follow a course

independent of the Confederacy. Their future interests would
with closer

ties

Maumee

Fires, like the Six Nations,

boundary and relinquishing

more

lie

he managed

part

and Wabash Valleys.

had

little to

lose

Fires, the

more

in the North,

The Ottawa

leader stated,

"You were

It

should also be noted

by endorsing the Muskingum

Miami Rapids

the Three Fires

Interest,

we

Mohawk

behalf

1

in the

leader thought most

& the Indians, you are able to judge of

therefore place full Confidence in You."

boundary widened the division

1

7

The dispute over

George Hammond,

8

this

Confederacy; henceforth the British could never

again fully unite the tribes of the Old Northwest and Upper Canada.

''^

On

the Promoter of this Confederacy and from

your knowledge of the English, of the Americans,

to

and

Ottawa Chief Egushwa graciously acknowledged Brant's past

services and placed his trust in any settlement that the

Simcoe

to

of southeastern Ohio, a chunk of territory distant from

country. In the midst of the proceedings at the

of the Three

our true

to

The Ottawas,

supported Brant's proposal, thus opting for a peacefully negotiated boundary.

proper.

proposal

geographically to the Lakes region and economically to the British fur

trade there than to the tribes of the

Three

tribes,

the council from other factions present.

Ojibwas, and Potawatomis, or the Three

own

this

concessions remotely resembling Brant's plan."

temporarily gain some support

their

it,

American commissioners were not authonzed

In spite of Brant's declining influence

that the

Harmar Treaty -

September 1793,

MPHC, XXIV:

Brant Journal, 24 July 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence

52

608; Sword, 247.

,

8.

At one

point during the council,

general support for his
his

own hands

a

appeared that Brant might have garnered

Muskingum compromise,

but Alexander

this

set at the

took matters into
at

midnight on

meeting these leaders, with the Shawnee war chief Captain
Johnny

spokesman, issued without further discussion

boundary

McKee

and privately met with the leaders of the militant faction

August 9'^ After
as their

it

Ohio River.

When

Buckongahelas responded by "pointing

their "final

Brant protested

at

Col.

McKee,

this

Resolution" in favor of

maneuver, Delaware leader

[saying] that

is

the Person

who

advises us to insist on the Ohio River for the line.""^ Moravian missionary
John

Heckewelder

later recalled that the

message sent from the Foot of the Rapids

American commissioners "was both hnpertinent

& hisolent" and used "Language.

no Person having knowledge of Indians, would believe

Heckewelder added,

"We saw

to the

it

.

that

an Indian Speech."

quite plainly that the Indians

were not allowed

to act freely

and independently, but under the influence of evil advisers."""*

McKee probably believed

that

he had merely followed orders by asserting his

influence in the general council, since Simcoe reminded
exert your ascendency over the Indians in inclining

offers, if they

them

him during
to

the proceedings "to

accede to those [American]

be consistent with their safety, and benefit, or to reject them

if

they seem

likely to prove injurious to their real Interests.""^ Furthermore, the British Indian

Department had

its

closest ties to the Indians of the

Maumee

Valley, most of whom

113

Ibid., 16.

W.

Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with John Heckewelder (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1958), 19: American State Papers: Documents Legislative and Executive, of the Congress
of the United States Indian Affairs (hereafter ASP, Indian Affairs), 2 Vols. (Washington: Gales and
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—

Seaton, 1832),
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Simcoe

to
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McKee

and Major John Butler, 22 June 1793,

53

,

II:

24, 33.

MPHC, XXIV:
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belonged

to the militant nativistic faction,

backbone of the

resistance

came from

and beginning with Harmar's Defeat, the

that quarter.

Consequently,

it

made sense

to build

a confederacy around this core of resistance. Therefore,
British leaders probably
believed, albeit mistakenly, that the

have

come through

to

in the

Confederacy would

those nations that had most heartily participated in the
recent

victories over the Americans.

would have

optimum degree of unity

Simcoe knew

to traverse this region

that

any American army sent against Detroit

of entrenched Native

resistance. Finally,

McKee was

linked by marriage and kinship to the Shawnecs, and he tended to favor
their interests.

Simcoe approved of McKee's actions because

he, like the western Native leaders,

questioned Brant's loyalty and no longer trusted him. The Lieutenant Governor
suspected that Brant "was pledged to [the U.

S.]

Congress

to give

it

as his opinion to the

Council, that the Indian Nations should give up part of the territory, on the northern side

of the Ohio."'' Simcoe also believed

United States sought "an alliance with the

that the

Six Nations," hoping to turn "them against the Western Indians.""^ Finally, the

Governor

realized that Brant probably possessed goals that

with British

interests;

he therefore wanted

to

reduce the

would not always coincide

Mohawk's

influence.

Simcoe

wrote,

He
He

[Brant]

is

shall think

labouring to effect a pacification upon such terms and principles as

proper and which will eventually

make him

that

mediator which

the United States have declined to request from His Majesty's Government.... He

considers the Indian Interests as the

Object

Same

to

Simcoe

to

.

Major General Alured Clarke, 10 July 1793,

same, 14 June 1793,

to

that as a second, tho' very

.

necessary by degrees and on just principles that

Simcoe

—

He prefers the British. .to the people of the States, yet I. .consider
He has made of his Power to be the subject of just alarm and that it is

inferior one,

the use

first

ibid.,

ibid.,

it

should be diminished.

569.

549.

Henry Dundas, 20 September 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence

54

,

II:

59.

1

1

Although both Simcoe and

McKee wanted

peace and unity,

it

was

better to risk a

continued war with a fractured Indian confederacy than to
place a stronger confederacy
the hands of a principal chief whose loyalties to Britain
had

become dubious.

Although Brant complained of McKee's interference,
ears,

and by

McKee had

late

October 1793, he was virtually

ii

his protests fell

on deaf

isolated. Prior to Brant's complaints,

written to Simcoe, blaming the Six Nations for the prevailing
divisions

within the Confederacy and actually claiming that he himself had favored a
compromise

regarding the boundary!

McKee

However conscious

predicted,

may be of having

used no improper influence in the
Councils of the Confederacy...! nevertheless expect from the malevolent,
disappointed and ill disposed to be blamed for the opinions which the kidians
have adopted and for their Resolution which put an end to the negotiations.'^^

Simcoe swallowed
all

respects."

it

I

whole and assured Mckee

that his conduct

At the same time, Simcoe was inclined

was

to accept

"perfectly proper in

McKee's view

that

Brant was to blame for the fractured state of the Confederacy, declaring, "I suspect that
the principle of disunion arose from this Chieftain.'

Simcoe's anti-Brant explanation of the Confederacy's troubles

failed to

acknowledge the schism's deeper and more complicated sources, which included old
tribal rivalries, the

competing

political

and

territorial

needs of the Confederacy's various

members, and the degree of McKee's manipulative influence among

tribal leaders.

the existence of factional divisions after the council at the Foot of the Rapids

But

was

undeniable. Moreover, the emergence of three broad subgroups -the Six Nations, the

McKee

to

Simcoe, 22 August 1793,

Simcoe

to

McKee,

8

MPHC, XXIV:

595-96.

September 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence V: 72-3.
,
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Maumee

Valley

developmcnl

tribes,

and the Three Fires

that tlircatcned to

(or

undermine the position of relative strength the

Confederacy had previously enjoyed through
After the council

at the

Lakes Indians) factions-was a major

its

victories over

Harmar and

St. Clair.

Foot of the Rapids the Confederacy continued to rely

heavily on the British. At the conclusion of the proceedings,
the western nations sent a

speech to Lieutenant Governor Simcoe, with Captain .lohnny serving
as spokesman:
Father,

Always considering
Confederacy,

we must

that

your Heart

placed

is

in the

center of the Indian

expect, that our great depcndance

is still on you... .We
need not we hope, again repeat, the great reliance we have on you for your
advice
assistance;
and
altho'
&
many have united themselves with us at this Council fire,
yet we can depend on nothing, so certainly as your protection
& friendship... at no

fomier period have
In his petition to

we

stood in so

much need of both.'"

Simcoe, Captain Johnny also added

"look up to the Great

God who

is

a Witness to

that

all that

he and the other Native leaders

passes here, for his pity

& his

help," demonstrating that the nativist faction appealed not only to their British Father, but
also to the Great Spirit for deliverance and for the restoration of their country. '^^

Indeed, Captain .lohnny's concerns were well founded. Since a peace between the

western Confederacy and the United States never materialized, the Indians of the

Maumee

Valley

knew

renewed American invasions were imminent. Furthermore,

that

after St. Clair's debacle. President

ablest

back

American

into Indian country.

Simcoe
1793,
'^^

officers

to

XXIV:

of the early Republic,

Known

to lead a

as "the Legion,"

Henry Dundas. 10 November 1793,

ibid., II:

Speech

Washington appointed Anthony Wayne, one of the

ibid., II:

much

larger, reorganized

amy

Wayne's force numbered more than

100;

Simcoe

to

Lord Dorchester. 10 November

102.

to Chiefs

of the Western Nations

to His

Excellency Governor Simcoe,

597-98.

Ibid.
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late

August 1793,

MPHC,

5,000 men, and the aggressive commander had already begun
constructing a chain of
forts in

southwestern Ohio pnor to the Confederacy's council

Rapids

in the

summer of

at the

Foot of the Miami

1793. While the arguments in council continued to

weaken and

divide the Indian coalition, Wayne's army grew stronger, ultimately
gaining the

initiative.

Native efforts to form a consensus with which

had

strategically benefited the Americans.

negotiations

by sending

Greenville (the

December

the

site

of today's Greenville, Ohio)

where they constructed Fort
1

Wayne immediately

794,

still

in the early

autumn of 1793, and

further north, stopping at the site

in

of St. Clair's defeat

Recovery.'^''

Wayne's Legion was now

The Confederacy's

not lose an Indian war.

followed up the failed

his Legion deeper into Indian country to construct Fort

army moved

By early

to negotiate a peaceful resolution

virtually in a position in

which

it

could

leaders understood this, but they continued to

harbor the expectation of direct British intervention. British leaders themselves

wondered

if

another Anglo-American war was inevitable, and Native confidence soared

when Simcoe

acted on

For Simcoe, the need

McKee's advice

to

to fortify the

country to the south of Detroit.''^

defend the upper province against an anticipated invasion had

temporarily superceded Whitehall's policy of

fiscal

retrenchment for the defense and

Indian budgets of the Canadian provinces. Therefore, in the spring, Simcoe's

redeployment consisted of constructing blockhouses along western Lake Erie

mouth of the River Raisin and on

'^^

Turtle Island at the

the

mouth of the Maumee. Most

Paul David Nelson, Anthony Wayne: Soldier of the Early Republic (Bloomington; Indiana University

Press, 1985), 243-44.
'^^

at

Sword, 261-62; Larry B. Nelson,

A Man

of Distinction

57

among Them

,

167.

importantly, the Bntish built Fort Miami, a full-sized
fortress

Rapids, containing cannons larger than the

These

activities

artillery

at the

Foot of the Miami

of the United States Legion.

and troop movements had an electnfying effect among
the

Indians; Native confidence in the British soared.
Throughout the spring, remnants of the

Confederacy began
Glaize.

Even

respond favorably to

to

calls requesting

Lord Dorchester,

"It

appears that the Chippewas

Three Fires' enthusiasm was probably due more
with British troops and cannons;

the Confederacy's

1

Maumee

Valley

Confederacy's objectives, accepted the invitation; Simcoe wrote to
[i.e.

Ojibwas], in consequence of some

superstitious circumstances have unanimously determined

approximately

to regather at the

the Three Fires, despite having differing views from the

tribes regarding the

Maumee

them

waning

unity. In

it

to

upon War."'-^

Simcoe's decision

In truth, the

to fortify the

lower

did not necessarily portend a restoration of

any case, by June 1794 the alliance numbered

,500 warriors, consisting of Wyandots, Shawnees, Miamis, Delawares,

Potawatomis, Ottawas, and Ojibwas. '^^ Even Brant and the Six Nations, though not yet
themselves prepared

to fight,

Indians to continue to

saw the necessity

resist, particularly after his talks

ended when the Americans informed him

Muskingum boundary.
more apparent than

Simcoe

Larry B. Nelson,

1

28

Simcoe

29 April 1794,

never agree to his proposed

to believe that "[tjhere is

MPHC, XXIV:
,

May

with the American authorities

that they could

A Man of Distinction among Them

Brant to McKee, 8

and the Lakes

This seeming restoration of the Confederacy's unity, while

real, led

to Dorchester,

for the western nations

every appearance of the

660.

168-69; Sword, 277-78.

1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence V: 86-87.
.
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most general union of the
Simcoe's confidence
For

seemed

Indians, against the United States, that has yet
been

aside, the factious

to the test.

their part, the Natives continued to look to
Britain for military assistance and

to feel they

had good reason to expect

questioned two Shawnee prisoners

now come

the Indians the[y] were

& join

generally turn out

Three weeks

earlier, the

[the]

it.

who informed
them

to help

On 26

June 1794,

Wayne and

his staff

the General: "[T]hey [the British] told

to fight,

them they wou'd advance

& if they the

Indians wou'd

& fight the American Arniy."'^^

Americans questioned two Potawatomis who informed them

"the British say they will have

sending

Confederacy would soon be put

known."'"

1

500

militia,"

Pota.[watomis] messages

and

that

"Governor Simcoe had been

previous winter."'^'

all

that

Whatever basis the

Natives had for believing the British would send troops, they knew from mid-.Iune

onward

that the British traders

destinies

and Indian agents

were therefore intertwined with

campaign. This

at

on 16 June 1794;

any

rate

was

their

who

own, would

to

Confederacy's

the conclusion of a council of war held near the Glaize

army now

in

readiness to march."

council leaders handed Matthew Elliott a belt of black

Simcoe

fight in the

a British officer recorded in his diary: "Resolved, therefore, that

shall join the [Indian]

"^^^

shared their country, whose

Lord Dorchester, 29 April 1794,

MPHC, XXIV:

To

we

seal this determination the

wampum,

binding him and the

660.

'^'^

Examination of two Shawnee warriors, taken prisoners on the Miami of the Lake, 20 miles above Grand
Glaize, 26 June 1794; at Greeneville, by Anthony Wayne; Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology
(hereafter

'

(lABLA), Shawnee

File,

January-June, 1794, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

Examination of two Potawatomis,

5

June 1794,

GABLA, Shawnee

File,

January-June, 1794. Accorduig

Potawatomi prisoner on 21 July, "The British told all the Indian Nations to bring on all their
Warriors & that then the British would bring more than all of them put together." The latter quote is taken
from. The Examination of a Patawatime [sic] Warrior who was in the Attack upon Fort Recovery on the
to another

30'^ Ultimo, 23 July 1794,

Cruikshank, E. A.,
Historical

ed.,

GABLA, Shawnee

File,

"The Diary of an Officer

July-December, 1794.
in the Indian

Magazine 3 (1908): 640.
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Country

in

1794," The American

other whites to assist in the upcoming hattlc. All
white personnel dwelling in the

Maumee

Valley, whether traders, agents, or officers, were
compelled to fight.

The apparent
After waiting

at the

Blue Jacket learned

restoration of unity within the Confederacy proved
to be a mirage.

Glaize for last-mmute reinforcements on 18 June, Shawnee
chief

group of 127 Ottawas and Ojibwas from Mackinac and

that a

Saginaw had raped women and pillaged

men of those

villages

were absent, preparing

to fight the

previous antagonism between the nations of the
Indians.)'

Maumee

only did the attackers have to

lift

their siege

on U.

when

Valley and the Lakes

S. forces at Fort

their

some of the Shawnee and Delaware

Ottawa-Ojibwa

their villages, fired

on

on

McKee

feared that this defection

country will

warriors,

still

all

Elliott tried in vain to

that "the Indians in this part

they must meet on their

themselves against Wayne's advancing Legion

ibid.,

Larry B. Nelson,

''"^

in the

McKee
of the

diminution of their strength by the example they [the Ottawas

way

who

home."'"'^

well founded, as the militant faction of Maumee tribes were

Cruikshank,

homes

prevent their departure.

the other Lakes Indians as well as those

whom

are expected and

angry about the

contingent of northern Lakes Indians.

a

would spread, predicting

feel a sensible

and OjibwasJ shew

and

when

Recovery. Not

a result, the Ottawas and Ojibwas withdrew, returning to their

North, even though

later,

ammunition ran low, but durmg

the course of the battle

raid

while the

Americans. (There existed some

" The intra-Confederacy conflict remained unresolved
twelve days

the Natives launched a poorly conceived attack

As

Maumee

the villages along the lower

later in the

left

alone to defend

641; Sugden, Bluejacket: Warrior of the Shawnees 162.

A Man of Distinction among Them

,
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169; Sword, 278.

who

McKee's concerns were

summer.

.

are here as those

After the failed attack on Fort Recovery the Miami
war leader Little Turtle sensed
that

adequate Bntish support would never be forthcoming.
Realizing that the problem lay

less

with the officers

go

refusal to

in the Indian

to war, Little Turtle

ranking British army officer

Department and more the with British government's

bypassed

in the

McKee

and went straight

West, Colonel Richard England

to the highest-

at Detroit.

Little

Turtle requested soldiers and artillery, and he informed the Colonel
that if the Native
alliance

remained unassisted by the English "they would be obliged

of attempting
satisfaction

to stop the progress

and

Little Turtle, as a

Unlike McKee,
along the

Maumee

of the American Army."'-*^ Colonel England gave no
consequence, abdicated his position as war leader.

Elliott, the Girtys,

River and

to desist in their plan

who worked

Colonel England and his superiors

in

and other Britishers who lived with Natives
to

keep the

intertribal coalition together.

Quebec and London

reflected a policy

of

nonintervention and withdrawal that would soon result of the signing of the so-called Jay
Treaty. In June 1794, Britain had opened negotiations with U.S. diplomat John Jay,

hoping

was

to resolve several issues left

over from the American Revolution, one of which

the withdrawal of all British posts from

American

included Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Niagara,
the borders of the United States but

all lifelines to

Among others,
Indians

who

to

Joseph Chew, 7 July 1794,

looked to the British for aid and sustenance.

MPHC, XX:

10,

go

to

.

II:

334.

how these related to events on the frontier can be found in
Commerce and Diplomacy (Knights of Columbus, 1923; rev.

account of the Jay Treaty proceedings and

Samuel
ed..

to

364.

Colonel Richard England to Simcoe, 22 July 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence

An

these

lived within

war with revolutionary France since January 1793, could not afford

Britain, at

McKee

who

soil.'"'^

New
and

Bemis's Jay's Treaty: A Study in
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962;

F.

12.

Also see Burt, 82-165.
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2"''

printing, 1965), particularly chapters

1,

8-

war

to protect the Indians, especially for
a part

policymakers

at

home

of the Empire

and

regarded to be of secondary importance.

Knowledge of these ongoing peace

efforts

made

personnel even more hesitant to support their former
clear to the Indians

that administrators

on 20 August 1794

at

allies,

Fallen Timbers,

Legion routed the remnants of the confederated

American dragoons pursued

leaders in

tribes

and

Canada and army

this

became

painfully

when Anthony Wayne's

and chased them for miles. The

the fleeing warriors virtually to the gates

Miami, located near the Foot of the Rapids, where just

of the British Fort

a year earlier the divided

Confederacy had bickered about what kind of boundary ultimatum they should
present
the

American peace Commissioners. Major William Campbell ordered

denying any refuge
continued their

of the

full

to the routed warriors.

flight

Stunned by

towards Lake Erie. In

this brief

significance of this act of British isolation.

British Father

had refused

to aid

to

the gates closed,

this betrayal, the Indians

skirmish they became keenly aware

Even

in the

midst of a

battle, their

them. Thus, the most stinging aspect of the defeat was

psychological. In a few short years during the early 1790s the Natives in the Ohio and

Lakes regions had come

to rely

on Britain for military and material support. '^^ Now,

with the exception of some sixty or so Canadian and Loyalist militia

who had

fought in

the battle dressed in Indian garb, the Confederacy's leaders found that they were fighting

the

Americans alone. The Indians would never forget

messenger informed the Indian Department

that

White, The Middle Ground 467.
.
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this betrayal.

One Shawnee

according to Blue Jacket and

many

others, "the English

same conclusion

were [now] thought nothing

that Little Turtle

of.">^^

had reached one

Blue Jacket had come

battle earlier.

In the ensuing peace proceedings at Fort
Greenville in

Americans would have

came

to treat

Askin,

Jr.)

with

who

their

way

Wayne were now

British

at

Greenville ran afoul of Wayne

at Fallen

in

confinement

abandoned them, but the Great

seemingly favored the Americans. Apparently
of the battle

who

completely isolated; the lone British agent (John

attempted to attend the peace council

Not only had the

August 1795, the

with the leaders of the former Confederacy. Those

and found himself treated as a spy, and ultimately locked
Jefferson."*"

to the

Timbers "that the Great

Little Turtle

Spirit

at Fort

Spirit

now

once prophesied on the eve

would hide

his face in a cloud,

should his red children not talk of peace with the great chief Wayne." After the battle

"many of our young men knew

the Great Spirit

now opposed

Thus, believing that even the Master of Life

themselves

marveled

at the treaty

at

how

Thomas Smith
John Askin,
Quaife, ed.,

to

Jr.'s

processions with

was angry, and would not help

much

them."'"*'

them, the Indians conducted

grace and humility; one author has even

"they handled themselves with extreme dignity."''*^ In the end the

McKee,

1

1

October 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence. V:

1

13.

Report to Colonel England on His Mission to Greenville, 19 August 1795,

The John Askin Papers

,

2 Vols. (Detroit:

Detroit Librar>'

Commission, 1928),

I:

in

Miio M.

564.

Dresden W. H. Howard, "The Battle of Fallen Timbers as Told by Chief Kin-Jo-I-No," Northwest Ohio
Ouarterlv 20(1948): 45-47; Sword, 306.
'"^

Andrew

R. L. Cayton, '"Noble Actors'

of Greenville,"

in

,

Affairs,

1:

The

'the

Theatre of Honour': Power and Civility

Contact Points: American Frontiers from the

1830 ed. Andrew R.
1998), 266.

upon

L.

Cayton and Fredrika

J.

Teute (Chapel

Mohawk

Hill:
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Treaty

Vallev to the Mississippi, 1750-

University of North Carolina Press,

treaty proceedings at Greenville, replete with Native speeches, are

564-83.

in the

found

in

ASP, Indian

Natives accepted the

(lirficult

terms which

desired peace, but because they

The Treaty
Old Northwest

now knew

Wayne meted
"that there

out, not only

must be peace

because they truly

for ever."'^'

ofCireenville represented a pivotal turning point in the history
of the

for all groups,

mhabitants residing there.
northwest Ohio, hoping

whether

Of the

to live

for the

former

American,

Maumee

British, or

confederates, a

indigenous

number remained

in

amicably with the Americans under the treaty's tenns.

A

large portion of Shawnees and Delawares migrated west to the Mississippi
Valley, and a

few, choosing to maintain ties with their

1

796, the

F^ritish

government strove

I^ritish Father,

to shift

its

moved

to

Upper Canada.

foreign policy in accordance to the

In

new

peacetime conditions brought about by Jay's freaty and the freaty of Greenville. While
British troops prepared to

withdraw from

sununer. Lord Dorchester

set

their loiigtnne

about crafting a

new

set

American possessions

that

of Indian guidelines and

instructions to reflect those policy changes shortly before his retirement. These

alterations included an Indian policy that

would attempt

to further

reduce expenses and

deal with the Indians regionally, as opposed to stressing the importance of a confederacy.

Indeed, peacetime retrenchment would bring

new

many

changes, marking the beginning of a

era in British-Indian affairs.

&

Lower
Travels throueh the Sates of North America and the Provinces of Upper
1797 4"' ed., (London: John Stockdalc, 1807), 2 Vols.; (reprint,
Canada. Dur inu the Y ears 1795. 1796.
Isaac Weld,

Jr.,

&

New

.

York: Augn.slus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970),
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CHAPTER 2

A NEW DIPLOMACY: BRITISH-INDIAN RELATIONS AT AA4HERSTBURG
1796-1803

In compliance with the terms of Jay's Treaty, British authorities
relinquished the
last

of the Crown's possessions within American

With

the British evacuation of their forts in the

new posts on

the Canadian

territory during the

summer of 1796.

Old Northwest, and the creation of three

side— Amherstburg, George, and

St.

Joseph— a new phase of

British-Indian relations began, the implications of which would be explored by both
parties to the old alliance in the years under consideration here, 1796-1803. During those

years British policy makers faced distinctive issues in the geographical areas within the

sphere of influence of each of their western outposts: Amherstburg in the Detroit area,
Fort George near present-day Niagara, and

Each of these

St.

Joseph

in the northern

Great Lakes

district.

three areas will be the subject of one of the next three chapters, beginning

here with the story of British-Indian relations in the Detroit- Amherstburg area in the
aftermath of British withdrawal from the

Maumee

and upper Wabash Valleys, places

had been so hotly contested by the United States and Britain's Native

allies, the

that

Ohio

Confederacy, in the mid- 1790s.
British resources for continued

allies

good

relations with the

included a number of officers of the Indian Department

homes

in the

Western

notably, Alexander

District

McKee

Crown's long-time Indian

who removed

to

new

of Upper Canada. These individuals included, most

and his son Thomas, Matthew

Elliott,

George

Ironsides, and

the three Girty brothers -Simon, James, and George. Relocating at or near Amherstburg,

they worked to establish a British sphere of influence that eventually stretched as
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far

west

as the principal tributaries to the Mississippi: the
Wisconsin, Rock, and lUinois overs.

Also, most tribal groups in the region that encompasses
present-day northern hidiana and

southern Michigan

still

sought closer

ties to the

Bntish in the

1795 the British no longer held significant influence
previously been greatest: the Wabash,

now

American annuity payments

to the hidians

placement of Forts
villages of

Wayne and

who

lived there, but also to

at

produced significant changes among the

many

and factionalism divided

(near the

mouth of the Maumee River)

come

tribal unity

Shawnee

made
felt

to a

tribes.

fi-om

1

Old Northwest ended a

Ohio Confederacy

members

to

794

to

1

796, the former

at

their

Swan Creek

Shawnee

leader Blue Jacket, once a leader of resistance to U. S. expansion,

militants

who now

Americans, creating a schism with other Shawnee chiefs

he had usurped their peace-making authority.' Other factions fi-om

CNA.

who

Swan Creek such

which numbered approximately 250 followers, rem.ained

aloof.

Claus Papers,

MG

19,

The five Shawnee divisions are Chalaakaatha, Mekoche, Thawikila, Pekowi, and
James Howard, 24-30. The Mekoche division usually presided over matters of peace; Blue

7, 124.

Kishpoko; see

1794-1795

consensus over diplomatic strategy, and any remaining vestige of

his peace with the

Vol.

in

direct

regroup in smaller

While living as refugees

Sugden, Blue Jacket 195-96; Speech of the Mekoche Shawnees, May, 1795,
1,

strategic

had long considered the British

coalition

.

F

Wayne's

to

soon disintegrated. Typical of intratribal factionalism was the case of the

as Tecumseh's,

'

tribes that

many former

villages,

failed to

had

respectively.

British presence there, so too the death throes of the old

Intertribal disputes led

it

the sites of the former intertribal

Just as the withdrawal of British outposts from the

allies.

where

under United States hegemony, due not only

Defiance, which sat

Kekionga and the Glaize,

in the regions

However, by

Maumee, Sandusky, and Auglaize River valleys.

For the most part these areas

fell

late 1790s.
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recognizing neither British nor American sovereignty.^
the bands of Captain

maintain close

ties

Johnny and Blackbeard formed the only

by

miUtant Shawnces,

significant faction to

with the British and consequently chose to relocate with them to

Upper Canada. Like
to abide

Among the

the Shawnces, Potawatomis near Fort

Wayne and

the terms of the Treaty of Greenville, but other Potawatomis

northern Indiana and southern Michigan held out against U. S. control.^

Miamis,

Little Turtle

British to an

and

American

and prominent leaders
figure significantly

influence.

his adopted white son,

orientation.''

that

among

tribes

came

tribal

the

the

into the

a

tribes

Amherstburg sphere of

Shawnee

in this chapter, therefore,

factions under Blue Jacket and

at

St.

Jacket was a Pekowi Shawnee, and

Amherstburg

Joseph River and the southern shores of

Ojibwa and Ottawa peoples

ties to the British at

at

Brownslown, the Shawnee bands of Captain Johnny

scattered throughout southern

Michigan and Upper Canada. The Sauks and Potawatomis of northern

Kishpoko

the

William Wells, also shifted from

groups that figure

and Blackbeard, the Potawatomis along the

seek closer

Among

remaining more closely associated with the British

1795 included the Wyandots

Lake Michigan, and

lived in

These examples simply suggest why many

the Indians that

Largely missing from the

Tecumseh. The

who

had been bulwarks of the old Ohio Confederacy would not

would be Miamis and Delawares and

after

Detroit attempted

Illinois

would

also

Amherstburg near the turn of the nineteenth century.

Tecumseh and

his brother, the future

Shawnee

Prophet, belonged to the

division.

-

John Sugden, Tecumseh:

^

R. David

A

Life

(New

York: Henry Molt

Edmunds, The Potawatomis: The Keepers of the

& Co.,
Fire

1997), 94-97.

(Norman: University of Oklahoma

Press,

1978), 153-55, 159.

Wells had actually begun to support the Americans, scouting for them prior
victory over the Ohio Confederacy at Fallen 1 imbers.

Rafert, 62-63.
final
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to

Wayne's

British Gift-Giving Policy Debates,

Once
had

officials

the agreed-upon withdrawal of their forces
to decide

with their former

allies

had never been clear
Britain's North

The

allies.

them who
ties

what

sort

was completed

in

1

796, British

of relations they would attempt and be able

to maintain

of the old Ohio Confederacy. The possible choices were many.

in the past

whether those indigenous nations

who

Indians' legal status

lived within the

became even more ambiguous

visit

subjects or

after 1796,

temtory of the United States sought

when many of

to maintain their former

His Majesty's posts

in

the indigenous nations independent of Euro- American sovereign powers?

British authorities considered these groups to have never been anything

the question

still

cultivate closer connections with the Indians

American jurisdiction. Should Whitehall now take
political

and economic

Canada's

stability

pressing, and

new

who now

in

a

lived under

strategies represented the best interests

Nor were

British officials unified

from 1796

to

among

1799 revealed

strategy, British leaders did not

all

know how

of the Crown was

themselves, as the

too clearly.

the Natives

would

policy measures. In the autumn of 1796 British traveler Isaac

District

allies,

steps to strengthen these groups'

gained a glimpse of the disposition of Britain's Indian

Western

more than

if

with the British government as a means of promoting Upper

British authorities

Whatever the
respond to

ties

which of these

among

Even

and security? During peacetime these questions would become more

not altogether obvious.

debates

Canada.

remained whether or not future British policy should be structured

manner which would

of Upper Canada. Weld made his
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allies

visit to

It

dwelt within

American possessions should be considered the Crown's

with their "British Father" as they continued to

Were

1796-1799

who now

Weld

lived in the

the township of Maiden

^

(including Fort Amherstburg) and to the American post

McKee

resettled the

Blanc. Although

included those

few remaining Indians from Swan Creek

Weld

who had

did not

Maumee

name them,

Weld

his Indian hosts

learned

much

only a short time after

to the

nearby island of Bois

his Indian informants certainly

recently emigrated from

Johnny and Blackbeard. From
Detroit and Maiden,

at Detroit

Swan

would have

Creek, possibly even Captain

and other Natives

in the vicinity

of

about such recent events as the struggle in the

Valley and the battle of Fallen Timbers. According to him, the sentiments
of

his Indian informants reflected a

Amencans

much

stronger dissatisfaction and concern with the

than with the British, in spite of the acknowledged British betrayal

at

Fort

Miami.

At

this stage the

continued relationship between British leaders and these

remnants of Britain's former

allies

from the

Maumee

Valley lay not so

much

in the

Natives' love for and fidelity to the British, but in feelings of frustration due to the failure

of the United States
frustration,

and

its

to deliver annuity

goods as promised. Weld described the Indians'

causes, well:

The American officers here [Detroit] have endeavoured to their utmost to
impress upon the minds of the Indians, an idea of their own superiority over the
British; but as they are very tardy in giving these

Indians] do not pay

much

people any presents, they [the

attention to their words. General

Wayne, from

same time always postponing the
them, has significantly been nicknamed by

continually promising them presents, but at the
delivery

when they come

to ask for

them. General Wabang, that

In addition to this grievance,

the

^

is.

General To-morrow.^

Weld's account generally conveyed the

Americans imposed on the refugee Indians, and

Weld,

II:

200-21; 289-91.

^Ibid., 187.
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it

relentless pressure

implied that the frontier struggle

could never be peacefully resolved. Weld also believed
that the Indians received better
treatment

in

Canada, explaining

that the "English settlers"

understood the "necessity of

treating the Indians with respect and attention."^

Building on the Natives' anti-American feelings, Alexander
to continue strong British-Indian relations during the

British evacuation from the

in the British Indian

Brownstown and

American

Department among Natives

new

general council

from the Chippewas, just north of Lake

latter

St. Clair

river— and on 30 August

declared the

site as a

new

1

postwar period. Well aware that the

at

such traditional

McKee hoped

fire

permission from Simcoe and Dorchester,

confluence of the Rivers

McKee hoped

Clair on the Canadian side of the border

first

—

speech

the reserve took

at

would include "the Six Nations,
the

under British auspices along the

Chenail Ecarte, the

the Nations of Canada and

Northward and the Mississippi."
lines

Indeed,

its

Chenail Ecarte,

location "for a General Council fire for

to resettle at

Confederacy by the

purchased a twelve-square-mile parcel

and Chenail Ecarte

796, in his

places as

on the Canadian side of boundary. With

McKee

St.

meetmg

to restore the

addition to the loyal bands of the recently beaten tribes from the

regions that

sought ways

side of the border in 1796 led to a loss of influence

the Foot of the Rapids,

establishment of a

McKee

new
all

McKee hoped

all

at

the

name from

the

McKee

Nations." In

Maumee
council

and Detroit

fire,

he stated,

the Nafions of Tribes to

for a grand council fire

of Brownstown, through which he and other British

leaders could once again influence a restored Confederacy. Lord Dorchester also had

high hopes for the

'

Ibid., 200.

Weld

new

reserve, anticipating an intertribal population, as he put

also asserted that the Natives in

Canada had

settlers living there.
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it,

of

the utmost "predilection... for the French"

"Two

or Three Thousand."'

would have been
this

was not

Blackbeard,

to

Had

these estimates ever been reahzed, the

larger than either

Kekionga or the Glaize

be—none of the pro-British

moved

to Chenail Ecarte,

Shawnee

Johnny and

and very few of the militants from Swan Creek

Ecarte, Great Britain attempted to demonstrate

McKee

heydays. Although

leaders such as Captain

ever accepted the invitation'"—by offering their defeated

In his speech at the site

in their

new community

tried to

allies a

refuge

at

Chenail

good

faith.

make

the case that his government's

dealings with the Indians had been honorable. Regarding the British withdrawal from the

American posts

in

1

796,

toward the Americans,

McKee

power,

McKee

asserted that this

who "have

at last fulfilled

was an

last

of "the Justice of the King"

the Treaty of 1783." In this transfer of

continued, the King, far from betraying his Indian

"taken the greatest care of the rights and independance

by the

act

[sic]

had always

allies,

of all the Indian Nations

who

Treaty with America are to be perfectly free and unmolested." The veteran

Indian agent also asserted that the King's desire to resettle "all his Indian Children"

demonstrated the King's "paternal regard" for them, and that he had an equal affection

toward them and "His
the

King had

that the

people

who have

Upper Canada.

King would never "abandon" them "so long

By

Alexander McKee's Address

his choice

many of whom

fought and bled with you,"

also resettled throughout southern

obedient children.""

'

own

as they

McKee promised

Finally,

behave

like

good and

of rhetoric, the Indian agent attempted

to Indians at Chenail Ecarte,

30 August 1796, CNA.

RG

to

make

it

10, Indian Affairs,

Vol. 9,9170.
'

Dorchester to the

Duke of Portland,

18 June 1796,

MPHC, XXV:

126.

Sugden, Blue Jacket 212.
.

" McKee's Speech

at

Chenail Ecarte, 30 August 1796,

71

RG

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 9,

9167, 9170-71.

scciu thai Ihc Hnlisli government IkuI always aclul
with consistency and in good faith,

and

that

drifted

il

huhan

Rritish

away from

therefore,

MeKee

relations had been altered,

it

then" British h'ather, not vice versa.

argued

was due
I

to the Indians

having

Inder these eireumslanees,

that future British Indian interaction

would depend

solely

on

the Natives' attitude and coiuUict.

Despite his confident paternalistic tone
Ecarte,

McKee was

lu)|)ed to

and additional

an attempt to sustain close

In

continue these former

gifts

the Indians at (Micnail

pursuing a concept of British-Indian relations not shared by his

superiors at Montreal and (,)uebec.

McKee

when addressing

and provisions

that

allies'

dependence on

had characteri/ed

ties

with the hulians,

the British for

that relationship

many

years of intermittent warfare. Writing to his superior John U)hnson

1797,

MeKee

alluded to past

liritish

policy

when

intended Ibr those groups moving to Chenail

During

a

long period ol

war materiel

during the

in Jaiuiary

requesting additicMial provisions

I^cartc:

(lifllculties

among

the Indian IVibes aiui pending

the evacuation ol the Posts aiul those parts ol the Indian (\)untry from
their sustenance

through the

was generally drawn,

Commander

in

the

humaiuty

&

whence

Policy of (Jreat Britain

Chief Lord Dorchester directed

their distresses to be

relieved as well in Provisions as in an extra allowance of Cloathing, untill [sic]

they

MeKee's

sliall

be enabled

to plant for their

request did not meet with

own

support.'''

much sympathy from Johnson, who

Johnson had recently returned from a four-year sojourn

aware of his country's wartime commitments
peacetime retrenchment

in the liulian

Upper Canada would never permit

in

McKcc
(lu-

I

o Johnson, 20 January 1797,

llonoiiiahk- Vcivi Kussell, 3 Vols.

(

in E.

in

in Britain,

Furope, seemed

did not respond.

and being keenly

to

understand

that

Dei)artment aiul the reduction of the military budget

the increase in the Indian expenditures

A. Cruikshank

A. V Hunter, cds.,

McKee

The Correspondence of

Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1932-1936),

72

lliat

I:

130-31.

'

proposed. Only llucc weeks prior

to

McKce's

letter,

Johnson had written

siiborchnate offieer, instruetnig hnii to cut costs and
disapproving of

add ad(htional stad

As

to the hidian

to his

McKce's

intention to

Department's payroll:

cannot but look upon the present Fstahlishnient of the hulian
Dcparlnient as on too great a Scale, particularly should there be no
Occasion for
the Services of the Indians In the War in I'urope, against revolutionary
I

France]

|

that

we

arc engaged

and of which there is little prospect at present....
must request that you will be particularly attentive to the Necessity ofthc
Sei-vice in the expenditure of Provisions and presents, and that your
Requisitions
will be made accorilmgly.
in,

I

'

As

the highest-ranking onicial in the Indian Departmeiil, .lohii.son

more

easily understood

the need to reduce ex|)enses in the Indian budget Irom his distant and comfortable

vantage-point

and

at

Moiilical.

son Thomas,

his

how

realized

Conversely, Johnson's ofTicers

l-lliott.

in the field,

namely McKee

Ironsides, the Girty brothers, William Claus, and others,

disillusioned their Tormer allies

were with

(ban ever before, the British needed to act graciously

of l-riendship" with these nations formerly

if

allied to the

the British witlulrawal.

they wished to maintain a "Chain

Crown.

The Indian Department's ofllcers on the local level did not prevail.

summer of 1797

the refugee

Bois Blanc began

Amherstburg.

moved

to a

to notice a

Shawnees who had moved Irom Swan Creek
diminishing

These bands chose not

new

remove

to

the

to

agency

the

to the Island

of

at I'ort

Chenail Fcarte, and McKee, having

In council

one day

at

Amherstburg, four Shawnee

Blackbeard, Captain Johnny, the Boner, and the Buflaloe

Commandant, William Mayne, and

" Johnson

How of rations from

By

residence on the River Thames, was no longer present to administer to

the Indians' needs on a regular basis.

Chiefs

to

More

McKee, 30 December 17%.

laid out their

Ibid.. 104.
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complaints;

met with the

Colonel
still

McKee who

& that he would

so

many

for

years had been our great friend told us that he was
always pay attention to us
would see that our great

&

Father King George would take great care of us.
McKee does not now take notice of his children.

of the

It

appears to us friend that Col.

We know that the greatest part

fine presents that our great Father sends to us

use. ..[Furthermore] Capt. Elliott does not take pity
.

Ironically, these loyal

faith

Shawnee

he keeps behind for his own
on us as formerly he did."^

militants believed that the British

government had kept

with them, and that the reduction of gifts could only be explained by
corruption

The Shawnee delegation did not

the Indian Department.

accused were among the few

and an increase of gifts
Indeed, the

who

advocated a return

still

to those tribes in the old

Shawnee

addressed Captain Mayne.

commandants who served

at

to a

more

fell

upon deaf ears when they

his successor. Captain Hector

McLean,

practices.

the

Amherstburg during the years 1796-1801, both took

expose any form of corruption within
all

they

liberal Indian policy

themselves to question the practices of the Indian Department, to curb

accounting for

men

Chain of Friendship.

delegation's complaints

Mayne and

realize that the

goods distributed

its

ranks.

McLean imposed

in

its

two

it

upon

power, and

to

a rigid form of

to the Indians, a radical departure

Since the Indian Department

in

from wartime

Upper Canada had just come under

civil

authority in 1796, theoretically this heightened pressure from the military should not have

mattered, but the military

Governor General,

still

financed the Indian budget, and Dorchester's successor as

Sir Robert Prescott, also favored military authority over Indian affairs.

Feeling the pressure from the added scrutiny of the Indian Department and the necessity

to

reduce expenses, even

"these Indians.

.

.to

McKee

finally

recommended

that his colleague Elliott urge

cross the Lake [to the American side]

& endeavour to feed

Talk between Captain William Mayne and Indian Chiefs, Amherstburg, 30 June 1797, in Historical
Archives of Fort Maiden. Jolin Marsh Papers, File 3, 151-52; MPHC, XX: 519-20; CNA, RG 8, Military
Series, Vol. 250-1,233-38.
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C

themselves"

in order "to lessen the quantity

of Provisions required."' ^ Had Captain

Johnny, Blackbeard, and the other British Shawnees
known of McKee's instructions they
certainly

would have understood them

had gone

Mayne

to

a few

months

as a confirmation of their suspicions

McKee probably had come

restored Confederacy with a

Yet
already

McKee

knew

McLean

took

had

little

new

to return to the

to realize the hopelessness

council

fire at

American

of his dream of a

new

standards; perhaps he

conduct was coming under closer observation.

command

Amherstburg, the

status.

McLean

new commandant

Department

to

When

Hector

quickly asserted his

what he believed was

its

proper

recognized that the Department operated more "by custom

than by any Instructions," and he resented

Amherstburg carried on

side of

Chenail Ecarte.

choice but to conform to the

authority, determined to reduce the Indian

peacetime

of Natives

that Elliott's

at

they

and accused the Indian agent of betraying them.

earlier

In asking Elliott to encourage entire groups

the border,

when

it

that Elliott

their affairs independently

and the other agents

of the garrison's army

at

officers,

technically a violation of the regulations Dorchester issued a decade earlier in 1787.'^

Furthermore,
a

McLean was annoyed

meager annual

salary of 1,000 pounds,

his farm a mile south

McKee

to find that Elliott, a

to Elliott, 13

owned up

to fifty slaves

of Fort Amherstburg, supposedly

October 1797,

MPHC, XXV:

low-ranking

at the

Crown

official

with

and lived lavishly on

expense of the Army, which

158.

James Green, Military Secretary, 10 August 1797, CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol.
250-1, 128. For Dorchester's instructions, see "Instructions for the good Government of the Indian
Department," Dorchester to Sir John Johnson, 27 March 1787, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 789,
6759-65. Although Dorchester instructed the Indian Department to distribute Indian gifts in the presence of
the post's commandant and junior officers, the Governor-General also instructed "the Commanding
Officer... not under pretence of this regulation to interfere with the Agent in die management of the Indian

McLean

to Capt.

remained unclear as to who actually possessed die greater
favor the Indian Department, peacetime the military leaders.

Department." Under these ambiguous orders
authority.

War

years tended to

it
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financed the Indian Department.'^ The commandant
also discovered that Elhott daily
sent his slaves to the Fort's bakery to pick up twenty
to twenty-five loaves

supposedly for the Indians, but

By themselves,
from the

service, but

Indian Department

in truth as provisions for his

these abuses probably

McLean's opportunity

came

in

October 1797, when

coup d'etat against

Elliott,

following

Elliott's dismissal

Elliott

and the

McKee's

orders,

submitted a requisition for goods necessary to supply the Indians wintering
Ecarte. Elliott's order for provisions

assumed

supposedly included some absent bands
sent an officer to determine the actual

count of only 160.'^

Bowl, confirmed

When

at

534 Indians lived

that

at

at

living there,

Chenail

the reserve,

the time of Elliott's rough census.

number of Indians

trip,

family and plantation staff

would not have merited

for a

on every

which

McLean

which resulted

in a

the principal leader at Chenail Ecarte, the Ojibv/a Chief

this latter figure,

it

seemed

that Elliott

had intentionally

falsified his

earlier return.

This discrepancy, coupled with McLean's earlier charges of iiTegularifies

against Elliott,

was

all that

dismiss the Indian agent
or public

hearing.'^*^

in

Governor General Robert Prescott needed

December without even

McKee's son Thomas replaced

to

unceremoniously

the dignity of a further investigation

Elliott as Indian

Superintendent

at

Amherstburg.

McLean

to

Green, 14 September 1797,

MPHC, XX:

538;

CNA, RG

8,

Military

C

Series, Vol. 250-1,

150-51.

Same
" For

to

Same, 23 September 1797,

^°

8,

548.

the various returns for provisions requested at Chenail Ecarte, see

157. Also, Lieutenant

RG

MPHC, XX:

Military

C

Thomas

MPHC, XXV:

,

556,

Eraser's census at Chenail Ecarte, taken 26 October 1797,

XXV:
found in CNA,

ibid.,

is

Series, Vol. 250-2, 339.

Prescott to Russell, 15

Correspondence

MPHC, XX:

II:

December 1797, MPHC, XX: 585; Cruikshank

& Hunter, Russell

43. Also see Russell's letter to Elliott, relaying Prescott's order, 6 February 1798,

165-66.
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A full retelling of the McLean-Elliott controversy is not necessary here, but for
the purposes of this study the incident's significance lies
in

changing British Indian policy
relations in the West.^'

how

and

at the time,

how

it

represented the

this in turn affected British-Indian

Previously, during the years of intense frontier conflict

Britain's continued presence in the upper country sometimes depended
in the Indian

Department,

necessary perquisites
Elliott's dismissal

Elliott's

conduct and

to the agents, but in this

enabled

McLean

to

activities

new

on the

would have been regarded

era they

agents,

exercise greater control

that

firing

most of whom were equally

had caused

Elliott's downfall.

conducting Indian
expenditures.

22

affairs in

as

were treated as abuses, and

for Elliott, the agent's dismissal

demonstrated the diminishing importance of the entire Department, and

monitoring the Indian budget. The

field agents

reduce the peacetime power of the Indian

Department. Far more than a personal setback

Army would now

when

by

rigidly enforcing regulations

of Elliott served as a warning

guilty of engaging in the peculation

McKee

it

in particular

had spent an

meant

that the

and

to the other

and

irregularities

entire career

an informal manner, rarely accounting for his large

For the remaining agents

in the

Western

District, the consternation

of

witnessing Elliott's forced departure and the Department's having to succumb to mihtar}'

and

political authorities

must have raised concerns about

their future role as agents in His

Majesty's Indian service.

For further reading on the McLean-Elliott controversy, see Reginald Horsman's Matthew Elliott, British
Indian Agent chapter 6, and Robert S. Allen's The British In di an Department and the Frontier in North
America, 1755-1830 Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History, no. 14
^'

,

,

(Ottawa: Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1975), 60-63.

had also approved Elliott's inflated order for the Indians at Chenail Ecarte, and the Deputy
Superintendent General could have also been fired for submitting this supposedly fabricated report.

McKee

77

1

respond

he agents were equally concerned with

to the changes,

how

in Jay's Treaty, the

Shawnees,

by

the British betrayals at Fort

who had

married into their

while apt to deny the far-reaching extent of Elliott's influence

former agent had once served, conceded that
tribe called the

23

Still,

McLean's

"[t]he

some shape connected.
bitter

Confederacy. Little more than a year after

government of Upper Canada began

.

to

Miami

of Elliott,

Even McLean,
tribes that the

some weight with

whole of the

.either

"that

officers

of the

by Marriage or

remarks did not acknowledge the degree of

dissatisfaction with British policy that prevailed

the

whom

tribe.

among the

Elliott still carried

Shawanese," with

[hidian] Department are indeed in

Concubinage."

would

in particular, reacted negatively to the firing

a longtime friend and adopted brother

comtemptible

allies

and whether or not the Indian Department could
continue

cultivate close relations with them. Already upset

and

former Native

their

among members of the former

Elliott's

removal, the Indian Department and

to notice the effects

among

beginning of February 1799, Lieutenant Governor Russell wrote
Captain [Joseph] Brant [also a paid

member of the

the Indians.

At the

to Prescott:

Indian Department] took

me

on one side and mentioned to me in Confidence that Capt. Elliott was so
universally beloved by the Indians that his dismissal had given them great
uneasiness; and that the Shawanese had it in Contemplation to send a Deputation
to his Majesty to move the Throne in his behalf, which he prevented. -I find by
his last letter that the same uneasiness subsists among the other Tribes.'^'*

The agent's

swift removal during a time of transformation and retrenchment in British-

Indian affairs could only have caused greater distrust and suspicion

" McLean

to

James Green, Military Secretary, 27 August 1799, CNA,

RG

8,

among

Military

C

the Indians in

Senes, Vol. 252,

234.

February 1799, Toronto Public Library, LI 8, Russell Papers, Letterbook of
Correspondence to Governor General Robert Prescott, 1796-1799; Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell
Russell to Prescott,

Correspondence

,
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Prescott could not understand

sometimes from great

why the

Indians should be encouraged to visit the posts,

distances, and he

saw no reason why "the

Issues of Provisions of

the present day" should be "of equal extent with those
of former years." Therefore, like

McLean,

the

Commander-in-Chief believed

that Indian distnbutions should

be vastly

reduced from the expenditures that characterized the years of frontier
warfare, and

any attempt by the Indian Department

to

impede

this reduction

that

was "highly

reprehensible."^^

With

Elliott out

system of Indian

of his way and with Prescott's support, McLean transformed the

gifts distribution, strictly

to a tighter budget.

adhering to Lord Dorchester's regulations and

The peacetime policy of reducing Indian

exposed further

gifts

unsettled issues inherent in British imperial strategy involving the Indians.

Did

the gifts

represent compensation for the Indians' past allied services, or did they constitute a form

of rent and acknowledgement of Britain's continued presence

in Indian country?

Or were

Indian gifts simply the British government's method of controlling and manipulating a

dependent people, a policy

that

was no longer urgently needed

America? Dorchester's predecessor

Sir Frederick

in

peacetime North

Haldimand had adhered

By

theory, that the Indians deserved compensation for past services.

some day "abohsh''

McLean's

desire to

the Indian

Department should not

indicated a

new

former

contrast,

Indian gifts altogether, and Prescott's belief that

distribute provisions equal to that

outlook, one which no longer found

it

of previous years,

necessary to compensate the

Indians based purely on the merit of past services.

Prescott to Russell, 16 September 1798,

to the

CNA, RG

10, Indian Affairs, Vol.

80

1,

228.

By mid- 1797 McLean

and

his superiors

viewed the

entire

system of giving

Indians gifts not as something their government

owed

to these past alhes, but rather as a

symbol of the King's goodwill and

When

complaining about the conduct of

generosity.

the Indian Department,

McLean wanted

the Natives, hoping "to

Show

Government,... [and that they
it

Home

any misunderstanding on the part of

the Indians Clearly that

are] receiving

from the hands of an individual,

of Portland,

to eliminate

«&

it

it

is

the bounty of

out of the King's stores, instead of getting

supposing

it

their Gift."^°

From Whitehall

the

Duke

Secretary, concurred. In a matter regarding a misunderstanding
with

the Mississaugas of Upper Canada, Portland emphasized to Lieutenant Governor
Peter

Russell the importance of making the Indians realize that the gifts were certainly
not
theirs

by

right,

nor was the British government obligated in any

way to

grant them.

Instead, Portland maintained, "the Messessaugues...[must be] impressed with a due sense

of the obligations they are under

By

His Majesty for the Presents they anually receive."^'

to

1800, Russell's successor. Lieutenant Governor Peter Hunter, also took this stance in

his dealings with Brant, informing the

Mohawk

leader that "[the] King's

Bounty

Indians must not be considered merely as a reward for their past conduct but that
entirely and absolutely

power

depends on

their

endeavours

to

promote

to the

to the

it

utmost of their

the King's interests."

"Memorandum

Respecting the Public Matter

in the

Province of Quebec submitted for the consideration

of the Right Honourable Lord Sydney by General Haldimand," 16 March 1785,

CNA,

MG

1 1,

CO 42,

48, 251.

McLean
Marsh
^'

to

Captain James Green, Military Secretary, 18 August 1797, Fort Maiden Archives, John

Collection, File 3, 155-56;

CNA, RG

Portland to Russell, 5

November

Hunter

March 1800, CNA,

to Portland, 8

8,

Military

1798, P.R.O.,

MG

1

C

Series, Vol. 250-1, 126.

CO 42/322,
1,

CO 42,

81

143.5-144.

Vol. 325,

1

10.

Vol.

This

new

imperial perspective of 1797-1800

contradictions, notably the desire to achieve
less in return.

make

the Indians

internal

control over Natives while giving

In order for the British administration in

dominance over indigenous peoples
to

more

was not without

Upper Canada

to

wield the

that Portland envisioned, British leaders

more aware of the

latter's

them

would need

dependence on the Crown. Indians,

Russell wrote, would need to be instilled with "a proper sense of the
Obligations they

owe

to

His Majesty,"

in return for the gifts "to

which they

indebted for them."" In a "Secret and Confidential"

Department's Superintendents
gifts to Indians in

in the

such a manner "as.

are in

no way

letter sent to all

entitled, but are

of the Indian

upper province, Russell ordered them

.

.to

to distribute

leave the strongest impressions on their minds

of their Dependence on His Majesty's Bounty."^"* But

this goal

simultaneously with the Russell-Portland policy of instructing

was

to

be implemented

field agents to

reduce

Indian distributions and decrease budgets.

Such a contradictory policy could only lead

that

at

he believed

make

"

more dependent, McLean worried

on British

gifts,

and

that too

& Hunter,

Russell to Colonel

Russell Correspondence

McKee,

.

Capt. Claus, Thos.

Ill:

1

1

settle at

it

clear

Far from wanting to

that the Indians

many would

Russell to Lieutenant General Count Joseph de Puisaye,

Cruikshank

Amherstburg, already had made

at

should eventually be abolished.

that Indian gifts

the Indians

rely too heavily

agency

Britain's largest Indian

among both

when Captain Hector McLean,

British personnel and tribal leaders, particularly

commandant

to further confusion

were beginning

to

Chenai! Ecarte and

June 1799, P.R.O.,

CO 42/324,

169.5;

211.

McKee,

Esq., Jas. Givens, Esq., 15 June 1798, Toronto

Public Library, LI 8, Peter Russell Letterbook, Indian Affairs, 1798-1799. Also see, Portland to Russell, 4

November

McLean
Military

C

1797, Cruikshank

& Hunter,

Russell Correspondence . IL

James Green, Military Secretary, 14 September 1797, MPHC, XX: 536; CNA
Vol. 250-1, 146-47; Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 3, 178-79.

to Capt.

Series,

3.

82

RG

8,

other reserves, where they would

Moreover, McLean predicted

would cause

become

permanent "burden upon Government."

a

that if Britam

contmued

to

dole out Indian presents, this

& indolent," smce "a total dependence on

the recipients to "turn effeminate

Govt, for the means of subsistence. .relaxes their exertions to
provide for themselves."^^
.

Consequently,
gifts

McLean

took steps to reduce this burden, entailing both a reduction
in

and a limited schedule as

General Prescott,

McLean

to

when

would be distnbuted. Like Governor

also could not understand

distance" should be encouraged to

Portland nor Russell ever

the presents

made

visit the post.^

'

a policy distinction

why

"Indians from so great a

Furthermore, although neither

between Britain's actions toward

Indians living within the boundaries of Upper Canada and those living without,

McLean

believed that the government had virtually no obligations to those Indians living on the

American side of the border. The commandant

instructed

of that description. .should not be permitted

approach the Garrison

.

their Visit is

known," and they

we

that "Indians

until the purport

McLean justified

this,

are at present in want of their aid or alliance.""'^

arguing, "I do not conceive

From

this perspective, Indian

nations outside of British territory should always be considered as sovereign

principalities

and potential wartime

allies,

but not wards of government.

Both the Indian Department and the Natives protested McLean's reductions of
Indian provisions.

McLean

to

Thomas McKee wrote

1,

McLean

September 1798,
to

William Claus, his superior

MPHC, XX:

613;

in the

RG

10, Indian

230.

" McLean to Thomas McKee,
Russell, 16

to

Major James Green, Military Secretary, 18 July 1798,

Affairs, Series A, Vol.

17 June 1799,

ibid..

Thomas McKee,

of

are "to obtain permission previous to their being admitted

to this side [of the Detroit River]."

that

to

Thomas McKee

Vol.

1,

CNA, RG

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26,

228.

17 June 1799,

ibid..

Vol. 26, 15269.

83

15269; Prescott to

Department, complaining

that

McLean's

restnctive measures

were an "extraordinary

deviation from a system which has been pursued
here ever since Pontiac[']s War." The

younger

McKee

also predicted that "this breach of so old
a

custom may greatly operate

the diminution, if not the total extinction of our
influence and

His Majesty's Indian Interest
in not

wishing

in these parts."^^

to alienate the Indians,

in 1763, as the tribes in the vicinity

Although

much had changed

may

infinitely prejudice

McKee may have been

in

no position

prudent

in the years since Pontiac's

of Detroit and Amherstburg had grown

dependent on British goods and were

to stage

to

War

more

far

When

another revolt.

Superintendent John Johnson visited the upper posts in the spring of
1799, Shawnees
living near

Amherstburg assured him of their "steady Attachment

to the

Father." But they then went on to complain of their poor condition.

Johnson, was that they were "surrounded on

all

sides

by

the

King

The

their

cause, they told

White People, and

their

hunting ruined. "''^ The regions of the Western District, the Detroit frontier, and

northwest Ohio no longer teemed with an overabundance of wildlife,
to fully sustain

independent Native peoples as

McLean had

at least

not enough

hoped. Rather than a

reduction in provisions, the Indians needed more protection and support, but as of 1799,
British policy

had moved

and annuities for

in the opposite direction,

their Indian neighbors

and former

toward reduced expenditures on

gifts

allies.

Thomas McKee to Claus, 5 June 1799, Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 6, 291; MPHC,
XX: 573; CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 252, 163; Cmikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
.

Ill:

220-21.

Johnson

to

Robert Prescott, 3 June 1799, Cruikshank

84

&

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

,

III:

219.

Realities Intrude. 1798-180.3

Despite

all

the discussion

provisioning Natives, and

all

among

British policy

to

for

the complaints from Indians about reductions in
British

support, the realities of the situation were

from Whitehall was intended

makers about cutting expenses

more complex. While

to gradually diminish the

the policy that emanated

government's Indian burden and

perhaps eventually terminate British-Indian relations altogether, increasing
numbers of

Indians turned to Britain for aid, hardly what

McLean and

his superiors wanted. In fact,

figures indicate that in the years following the defeat at Fallen Timbers and
the

subsequent Treaty of Greenville, the

Western
past.

District relied

tribes in the regions

more heavily on

of Detroit and Upper Canada's

British gifts and provisions than they had in the

During the period between 1798 and 1803, the Indian agency

at

Amherslburg

served a growing number of Native visitors, averaging 5,548 each year.

By

1803, 6,207

Indians received provisions there, representing an increase of 1,038 over the total for

1798, a jump of more than twenty percent during the five-year period. Only once within
this stretch

statistics

-1802

— did

the totals decrease from the previous year's numbers, but the

quickly rebounded to the five-year high recorded the following

However, these

statistics

do not

territories that fell into Fort

will

be shown

tell

the

Maiden's

whole

(i.e.,

year.''^

story of British-Indian relations within the

Amherstburg's) sphere of influence,

in this subsection, the conflict

for, as

between, on the one hand, Britain's

initial

goal of reduced gift-giving and the Natives' complaints about that policy and, on the

other hand, a continuation of strong British-Indian relations,

Indians Served at Amherstburg, 1798-1803,

CNA, RG

85

was simply

10, Indian Affairs,

a reflection of a

Vol. 10, 9369.

complicated game of give-and-take
infighting

among

While the

British officials

m which Natives of diverse tribal backgrounds and
played significant roles.

all

British continued to seek a sphere

Amherstburg during

this period

of peace,

it is

composition of the groups seeking assistance
this six-year stretch

belonged either

to

(1798-1803)

Ojibwa reserve

at

at

totals

percent of those receiving provisions

Wyandots, or

to the

Chenail Ecarte showed no signs of a diminishing populace, as

immediately following

Elliott's dismissal in

reserve's requisition orders.

Wyandots, and Shawnees

These

a

British policy

Amherstburg

in the years

five tribes

— Ojibwas, Potawatomis, Ottawas,

— eventually provided

the

backbone of the

British-allied tribes

War of 1812. Hence, just

of the nineteenth century many of those peoples who would

decade

later

McLean

1797 for supposedly having inflated the

south of the Great Lakes and along the Detroit frontier in the

Crown

Shawnees.

were Ojibwas alone, and the predominantly

and the government might have hoped; instead the numbers increased

after the turn

around

the time. In any given year throughout

Fires' nations, the

Moreover, over forty percent of the

in the region

important to note some key changes in the

at least eighty-six

one of the Three

of influence

fight for the

demonstrated their confinued fidelity to the British, despite a stingy

and the attitude of Captain McLean,

who

did not leave his post

at

until 1801.

In spite

of these indications of apparent healthy

ties

between Britain and the

Natives in the southern Great Lakes, a pro-British orientation was not typical of every

tribe.

The Miamis and Delawares, two of the nations

that

segments of a powerful triumvirate (with the Shawnees)

For returns of numbers of Indians settled
641-42, respectively;

CNA, RG

8 Military

at

C

in the

Chenail Ecarte in 1798

Series, Vol. 251, 148,

86

had once comprised key

&

Maumee

1799, see

Valley during the

MPHC, XX:

617-18,

and Vol. 252, 145, respectively.

1

790s, rarely visited Amherstburg any more. Only
a few dozen Miamis

annual gifts from Amherstburg, and
1801. Similarly, when, in the

visits

made by Delawares

at

received

temporarily ceased in

wake of Fallen Timbers (August

had invited the refugee Indians temporarily living

still

1794), Alexander

Swan Creek

McKee

to relocate to places

further north, particulariy Chenail Ecarte and Bois Blanc
Island, fragments of the

Shawnees did

Miamis and Delawares generally returned home

expanding American

to the

the

so, but the

settlements.''^

White and Wabash Rivers during

The Miami and Delaware

who now

Elliott in

visited his

September 1797.

cooperated with American

Elliott's findings

agency were from locations

far north

were

leaders, such as Little Turtle,

these villages were beyond the British sphere of influence

Matthew

villages that dotted

the early years of the nineteenth century

mainly under the influence of chiefs and former war
Buckongahelas, and Captain Pipe,

to places nearer

officials.'"'

was confirmed

showed

in a report

that the Indians

of the Wabash and

its

That

by

who

tributaries

where

American influence had grown considerably."^ The limited number of Miami and
Delaware

Some

visits to

Upper Canada,

therefore, could be a byproduct of closer ties with the

Christian Delaware, primarily near the Fairfield Mission (Moravian Town), did live in

Upper

Canada, but probably none of them participated in the late war agamst the Americans, nor did they
typically have dealings with the Indian agency at Amherstburg.

one scholar, the Miamis even moved further southward from where they had previously
lived when they returned to the Wabash River Valley after their defeat at Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of
Greenville. The new village sites not only placed them further from Amherstburg, but the American

According

agency

to

at Fort

Wayne now

sat

squarely between them and the British. See Rafert, 63.

Goods Recommended to be Given to the Indians, Fort Maiden, 20 September 1797, Fort Maiden
Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 3, 188-90; MPHC, XX: 545-47. According to Elliott's report, none of
the bands visiting Amherstburg came from villages fiirther south than the Elkhart River, a tributary to the
St. Joseph River and Lake Michigan in present-day northern Indiana. The communities who still sought
ties with the British at Amlierstburg also included some of the villages situated along the Sandusky,
Thames, and Huron Rivers, Brownstowoi being at the mouth of the latter.

87

Amencans,

as well as the

westward migration of several Delaware bands.'^

Nevertheless, despite having, on the whole, grown
distant from the British, the Miamis

and Delawares never

fully severed ties

and sixteen Delawares

visited

with their former Father. In 1803, 162 Miamis

Amherstburg. Moreover, several hundred "Monseys,"

loosely considered a component of the larger Delaware
nation,
the post annually.''^ Consequently, after

Canada could count on

all this

time,

either the support or neutrality

it

seems

still

received provisions

that the British in

of most Indians

at

Upper

in the southern

Great Lakes, leaving open the possibility for a renewed Confederacy
in the future.

The above

statistics

did not

mean

that Bntain's Indian expenditures

remained

high during this period, but rather that signficant numbers of Natives continued

Amherstburg
Elliott

post

in spite

of receiving much smaller rations

there.

After the dismissal of

and the implementation of stricter guidelines. Governor General Prescott expected

commanders

visitors.

to

oversee and account for

all

distributions of provisions to Native

At Fort Amherstburg Captain McLean did so with a vengeance

his efforts to trim the

to the Indians.

McLean hoped

to

accomplish

discouraging Indians from visiting the post, and he began to deny

who came. The commandant

gifts

this

and

the

by
ftiU rations to

maintained that

McKee

Joseph Jackson, the informant Alexander
reported in May,

as he continued

power of the Indian Department while simultaneously reducing

govenmient's obligations

those

to visit

westward only days before he (McKee) died,
met on the White River informed me they were all going
sent

799 that "The Delaware. .1
this
Spring to join the Shawnees on the west side of the Mississippi." See Report of Joseph Jackson sent as a
Messenger to the Mississippi by order of the late Deputy Superintendant [sic] General, 5 May 1799, CNA,
19 F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 8, 91 Although some Delawares may have moved West, the journals of the
Moravian mission on the White River indicate that some Delawares continued to live there at least through
For these journals see, Lawrence Henry Gipson, ed.. The Moravian Indian
1 806, and probably longer.
1

MG

.

.

Mission on the White River: Diaries and

Letters,

May

5,

1799

to

November

12,

1806 (Indianapolis:

Indiana Historical Bureau, 1938).
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Indians served at Amherstburg, 1798-1803,

CNA,

RG

88

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 10, 9369.

all llici. |ll,c

whims and uiircasonahlc desires ouglil not to be so
much
hitherto, when (he best reason that coud
[sie| olten be assigned (or

Natives'

allcndcd to as

I

giving them any unnecessary article was, that
they ask'd (or
Curiosities and l,uxuries that [Ihel human heart
can invent

IT all the

it.

were deposited in the
Indian Store and that they saw them, they would
ask for them, but it does not
follow that they are nece.s.sary or that they ought to be
gralily'd |sic|. They may
indeed address us emphatically with the term l-alher,
as they arthilly
certainly

Con,se(|uently, in

.should

have

humor them

May

1

do (or we
like little children in all ol their unrea.sonable
reciuests.''"

709, Mcl .can instructed agent

a "Relly full"

Thomas McKee

that

each Indian

and nothing else "exceeding two days Provisions." This

amount was intended merely

to

provide a

Moreover, no

to

be distributed, except once a year when the shipmeiil of

gilts

were ever

little

food lor the visitors'

homeward

lourneys.

Indian stores arrived in October.'''

Behind McLean's
in Mrilain's

complex

attitude lay the

ever-evolving frontier policy.

Were

is.sue

of the Natives' ambiguous status

military officers and civil officials maintained that the Indians were both.

CivW Administrator
"I

in

Quebec

have always understood

in

1807, implied this dual understanding

that the Indians

subjects, but as Military allies."

Dunn

Some

the Indians subjects or allies?

William Dunn,

when he

wrote,

were not considered by the [CJrown merely as

further argued that this

was why

"all the

expenses

attending" the Indians were "to be paid out olThe I-^xtraordin aries ol the Aimy."

McLean
actions

also adhered to this logic as he developed his

at

allies, the

McLean
Papers,

i

rationale in supporting his

Amherstburg. Though previously having been considered both subjects and
Indians

to Sir

ilc 5.

McLean

own

to

who now

lived

John Johnson, 24

May

on the American side of the boundary no longer

1799,

MIMIC, XX: 634;

l-ort

Maiden Archives, John Marsh

290.

Thomas MtKcc, 10 May 1799, Cruikshank

William Dunn

to

William Winclliam. Secretary

at

^

lluiitc-i, Rir.'.cll

War, 6 June 1X07,

286.

89

(

(

oitcspcinldi.

NA, M(i

I

1,

t-,

CO 42,

III:

193-94

Vol. 132,

qualified as subjects, and

Indians as

that

allies.

McLean

Why keep

believed that there

was no reason

an alliance during peacetime? The commandant
reasoned

His Majesty's government had "[n]othing ever

to fear

from the Indians while

peace with America." McLean's confidence was partly due
prevailed

at the

to retain those

to the

good

at

relations that

time between his government and a Federalist-led United
States, but

in

the unlikely event of another British-Amencan war, the Captain
argued that whenever

necessary the British could easily restore a Native alliance, inasmuch as
"the Indians

being totally guarded by Interests

& not principal will side with the best bidder."^'

In applying this rationale, the rigid

commandant

carried his policy as far as he

could before his superiors intervened. Russell and his administration in Upper Canada

were not prepared

to

go as

far as

Thomas McKee and William

McLean

in severing ties

with their former

allies.

Agents

Claus, fearing the repercussions of McLean's restrictive

measures, warned Russell of the danger.

McKee

claimed that the commandant's

tampering with "a system [of gift distribution] which has been pursued here ever since
Pontiacs

War" had caused

"great dissatisfaction"

among

the Indians, and he predicted the

possible "extinction of our influence" and loss of the "friendship of the Indian nations. "^^

Claus concurred, claiming "that Captain McLean

is

going too

far

with us."^^ Not yet

willing to greatly alter Britain's Indian relations, Russell heeded these warnings and

ordered

McLean

to

"immediately suspend" his "plan of withholding Provisions from the

Remarks Submitted to the Commander In Chief, by Hector McLean, 10 November 1797,
Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 4, 221; MPHC, XX: 573.

" Thomas McKee
MPHC, XX: 637;

to Claus, 5

Fort

June 1799, Cruikshank

Maiden Archives, John Marsh

& Hunter,

Russell Correspondence

Papers, File 6, 291-92;

CNA, RG

.

"

Claus to Russell, 6 June 1799, Cruikshank

&

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

90

,

III:

Ill:

8,

Series, 252, 163.

221.

Fort

Maiden

219-20;

Military

C

Indians"

lest this lead to

"consequences not only injurious but dangerous

this Province."^^ Russell's crucial decision,

coming near

to the safety

of

the end of his term as

Lieutenant Governor, helped prevent the eventual dissolution
of British-Indian relations
in the

Great Lakes and Upper Canada.

of relative calm

in

On

the brink

of a new century and dunng a penod

Canada, McLean and the military had seemmgly gained
the upper

hand over the Indian Department, making the
Prescott's intervention.

latter

powerless apart from Russell's or

However, the aging Russell,

a former soldier and lackluster

administrator, prevented further extreme reductions, a policy that would
remain in force
until a successor administration

once agam actively prepared for war

in 1807.^^

Russell's interference in Indian affairs should not be construed as a shift in
policy,
despite the fact that

orders

McLean

by attempting

believed that he had merely been efficiently following

to restrict Indian presents

and provisions. While Russell advocated

a reduction in expenditures, he also sought to preserve the age-old Chain of Fnendship

with the Natives

who

visited the posts.

The

issue then

should follow a policy of retrenchment, but rather
policy be implemented? Considering the

weak

was not whether

how and

state

to

Like Russell, other leaders

in

1798-1799;

Canada ultimately took

"

McLean, 19 June 1799, Toronto Public

CNA, RG

8,

Military

C

it

was not

at the

time and

clear exactly

entail.

retrenchment merely meant a continuation of former

Russell to

what degree should such a

of the upper province

the Indians' nebulous status (whether subjects, allies, or both),

what peacetime retrenchment should

or not the British

Library,

L

ties

the

view

that the policy

of

with the Indians, but on a

18, Peter Russell Letterbook, Indian Affairs,

Series, Vol. 252, 165.

Russell served on the ill-fated expedition with General Braddock in 1755, and he assisted Sir Henry

Clinton with his history of the American Revolution, but this work remained unpublished until 1954. See
Edith G. Firth, "The Administration of Peter Russell, 1796-1799," Ontario History 48(4) (1956): 163.
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.

reduced budget. The Executive Council of the Upper
province agreed with

this

interpretation, advising Russell "to take such steps as he
[Russell] shall Judge proper (by

writing to Captn.

McLean

or otherwise) for the purpose of preventing any
change in the

old system until the Pleasure of the

month

later Prescott

McLean

made

Commander

his "pleasure

in

Chief [Prescott]

known" when he supported

"to issue Presents and Provisions to the Indians in the

Post" previous to his alterations

in

May

mode

or

manner of conducting

language coming from the
excessive Native visitors

Elliott

and

Amherstburg indicated

the value of maintaining relations with the Indians.

was not intended
preserving

ties

as a

means

to

who

who

allies

had earlier supported

also

To

"

.

Such

to discourage

Canada

still

considered

these leaders, then, retrenchment

during a time of fiscal cuts.^^

McLean

in the latter's

stemmed from

feud with Elliott and

some diplomatic

ties

with

the treatment of Indians at

a letter he had received from John Johnson

Minute of the Executive Council, York, 17 June 1799, Cruikshank
Ill:

at the

to "interfere. .as to

wanted

that leaders in

The Governor General's concerns about

Amherstburg probably

was not

also

the Indian Department, understood the necessity of retaining

the Indians.

manner customary

phase out Britain's Indian relations, but rather as a way of

with the Crown's former

Prescott,

Russell, ordering

the business of the [Indian] Department.""

man who sacked

at

A

known."

1799, "and in conformity to the existing

regulations." Prescott also later informed the Captain that he
the

is

& Hunter, Russ ell

Correspondence

.

236.

Prescott to Russell, 18 July 1799,

ibid.,

277.

In fact, the Indian budgets continued their

downward

trend,

and

late in

1802,

when John Chew,

the

Indian Department's Storekeeper General, submitted his budget request for 1803, Lieutenant Governor
Peter Hunter slashed Chew's request by more than twenty percent before approving the budget.

Remarkably, Hunter's stiff reductions came after the war in Europe had temporarily ceased, albeit briefly,
with the short-lived Peace of Amiens. James Green, Military Secretary to John Chew, 17 December 1802,
CN A, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 1210, 240-4 1
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only weeks pnor
the discontent

in the

to Russell's injunctions against

among

McLean. Johnson informed Prescott of

the Indians he had encountered there while on
his visit to the post

spnng of 1799. The bands who

lived near

Amherstburg

at

the time, primarily

Shawnees, Ottawas, Delawares, and Wyandots, once the nucleus of
the Confederacy

war

the late

against the Americans,

they could continue to receive

them when they

lived at

now

wintered near the post

at least a fraction

Kekionga and

at

m

Amherstburg, where

of the aid the Bntish had once given

the Glaize.^^

During Johnson's 1799 tour of the Western

District the leaders

of these bands

reaffirmed their loyalty to Britain, but did so as a preface to informing the Superintendent

of their needs. The Shawnees even asked Johnson

to help

them secure passage

to

England, where they could present their case directly to the government, in order "to find
out what they had to depend on."^°

Spanish had offered them a place

Shawnees already dwelt, and

The Shawnees

to reside

were presently

Spanish would
attitudes

stir

at

offer.

Johnson

that the

west of the Mississippi, where numerous

that the tribe also intended to

Spanish King to further consider the
Britain

also informed

The Shawnees,

send a delegation

to the

realizing that Spain and

war, probably hoped that the threat of their defection to the

Johnson, McLean, and other British leaders out of their complacent

toward them. Although the Natives near Amherstburg most likely understood

the extent of their dependence

on the

British,

and consequently probably never

considered rebellion as their fathers had done in 1763, they did, however, seem

understand their value as potential

allies,

or at least the formidable threat they

For the Indians wintering near the fort, see John Johnson
Hunter, Russell Correspondence III: 219.
,

60

Johnson

to Prescott, 3

June

1

799, ibid.

93

to

to

still

posed

Robert Prescott, 3 June 1799, Cruikshank

&

when

an enemy. Johnson, not wishing to lose the longstanding
relationship

allied to

between the British and the Indians of the upper country,
the Indians

still

had only one "Father," and the Superintendent ordered
Thomas

and the other agents "to point out
Deputation

to Spain."^'

[to the

Thus, the possibility of the Shawnee defection, in spite of

grabbed Prescott's attention and

led

him

military impotence,

to order a continuation

For a time the Bntish, especially the officers
this threat.

Mississippi Valley

was

Logistically, they

success.

The

elder

knew

in the Indian

that a

earlier, a

is

most

likely

what

of gifts to the Indians.
Department, seriously

Franco-Spanish invasion up the

possible, particularly with Indian support.

Revolution less than twenty years

Mackinac and raided

McKee

Indians] the Impropriety" of "sendmg a

McLean's assurances of Native weakness and

considered

tried to reinforce the idea that

mixed British-Indian

During the American
force set out from

the Spanish territory near St. Louis, albeit with only moderate

McKee was

also

aware of the importance of the passage through

present-day Wisconsin via the Wisconsin and Fox Rivers, but he believed "[t]he Sakies

and Fox's" were sympathetic

to British interests,

and thus could be "induced

to resist

any

attempt of the French[,] Spanish or unfriendly Indians to pass through their Country."^''
British agents understood the need to maintain ties with these distant tribes, and

believed that French and Spanish agents regularly circulated war-belts

among

McKee

the Indians

of the Mississippi and western Great Lakes; only days before his death on 15 January
1799, the ailing agent dispatched an informant, Joseph Jackson, to the lower Mississippi.

Ibid.

"

Louise Phelps Kellogg, The British Regime m Wisconsin and the Northwest (Madison; State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1935; reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1971), 163-69.

"

Prideaux Selby to Peter Russell, forwarding the instructions of the

1799 Cniikshank

& Hunter.

Russell Correspondence

.

Ill:

94

late

Alexander McKee, 23 January

61;MPHC, XXV:

186.

Bui Jackson Ibund

evidence of any potential nn asion biewuig

lilllc

ni that region; the

Indians inronned Jackson that neither l-iench nor
Spanish agents had sohcited their
service within the previous two years. However. Jackson
did believe that although "very
large Bodies ol Indians

of the Creekt.] Cherokee

innucncc;' the Natives would only participate

produce a substantial army

True or

in the

not, the reports

were of special

Indian alliance. Writing to Russell,

among

an invasion

if the

Spaniards were to

lower Mississippi; such a force never appeared/"'

restoration of the Indian Depai tnient

"the French are busy

in

& Choctaw Nations are under Spanish

wartime

s

Mohawk

interest to those

who wished

to see a

and perhaps a revival of Britain's

status,

leader Joseph Brant firmly believed that

the liulians. and they will (if possible) Invade the Country."

Brant feared that a renewed French inlluence might shake the western nations from
their

longtime allegiance to the British. The
disillusionment

among

the Indians to

Mohawk

leader also ascribed

"some new arrangements.

nepaitnient. which they are not acquainted with." adding, "they

The "new anangements"

to

which Brant alluded most

.

.in

some of the

the Indian

seem

to

likely referred to

be jealous."^^

both the

reduction in the Indian budget and to Hlliott's dismissal. With the possibility of either the

French or the Spanish having become active among the Indians. Brant could not think of
a

worse time

for Britain to reduce its Indian

Report of Joseph Jackson.

MCi

19, !

1,

Vol.

S.

May

90, .lackson

previously traveled to

tlie

s

1799. Cniikshank

report

may

McKee &

to Britain

in

tliat

Cniikshank

I'C:

.

I:

Riant to Russell. 27 January 1799, Cniiksliank

\\V:

According

and claimed

Capt. Elliott and (hat they will always keep

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

i^-

Ill;

of another uiformant. .lames Day,

1797

be." Information of James Day. 10 October 1797.

Mohawk

Conespo iidc nce.

Hunter. Russell

con oborated

lower Mississippi Valley

Delawarcs liying there professed loyalty
of Col.

commitments. Moreover, the

CNA,

it

that they

to

188;

chief.

CNA.

who had

Pay. the Shawiiees and

could "never forget the friendship

minds in whatever sit\iation they
F 1, Clans Papers. Vol. 8. 35-37;

in their

MG

19,

300-01.

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

188.

95

.

Ill:

69-70;

MPHC.

who

for several years

had clamored

the Natives living at the

status

to gain exclusive territorial rights

Grand River Reserve, could enhance the Six Nations' sovereign

and possibly even improve his own position

acknowledge

and sovereignty for

the Indians as indispensable allies.

if the British

Matthew

were

to

once again

Elliott similarly predicted a

French-led invasion into the Upper Province, originating from the Upper
Mississippi and

Lake Superior.^^ Like Brant,

Elliott

warnings of an invasion came

at the

had a vested

interest in these matters,

and

his

very time that he submitted personal Memorials to

his superiors, listing his past services and hoping for reinstatement.^^

When none

of the dreaded western invasions materialized, Captain McLean took

pleasure in discrediting the rumors, and the

exception of Brant,

commandant pointed out

the exaggerated reports

all

seemed

that,

what he regarded

to filter through

as untrustworthy sources in the hidian Department's branch at his post.

that "[tjhese reports

their

soon became more specific
informants, a

Shawnee

from which

may be

which gave

Russell to

to

for the

weight and influence in Upper Canada. "^^ The commandant
in his accusations

chief, lived "with

easily conjectured

Mr.

how

when he discovered
Elliott

and

is

that

one of the

entirely under his influence,

the reports are generated and the motives

rise to it."^^

Pndeaux Selby,

2 February 1799, Cruikshank

For the Memorials of Matthew of Elliott, see

McLean

McLean charged

have without doubt originated with the Dept. themselves,"

purpose of adding "to

it

with the

&

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

MHPC, XXV:

,

III:

90.

178-82; 210-12.

James Green, Military Secretary, 21 March 1799, CNA,

RG

8,

Military

C

Series, Vol. 252,

63.

Same

to

CNA, RG

same, 8 August 1799,

MHPC, XX:

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26,

656; also,

15291.

96

McLean

to

Commodore

Grant, 23 August 1799,

Without knowing

McLean's

for certain

whether or not the reports contained any

truth,

haste to discount the stories tends to reveal his motives.
In fact, according to

previous British informants, Indians hving on the Mississippi
had already admitted that

Spanish agents had made overtures to them a few years

But McLean worried

earlier.

that

the smallest threat of an invasion might create a wartime footing in
which the officers in
the Indian Department

frontier activity

and Indian

spending allocated
to

would once again have autonomy and
relations, a situation that

to the Indian

budget

a time

at

control over Britain's

would only increase

when McLean's

reduce costs. In spite of his recent success against Matthew

he could

still

lose his stmggle with the Indian

convinced Lieutenant Governor Russell
Indian Department to

its

to

Department

superiors wanted

Elliott,

if the

the military

him

McLean knew

that

Department's officials

acquiesce to their goals and to restore the

previous standing. Russell did not understand Indian affairs as

well as his illustrious predecessor, John Graves Simcoe, and to a large degree the

new

administrator had to rely on the information and advice of his subordinates.^^ In

McLean's mind

this

made

by those who wished

to

a pretended invasion."^'

gifts

was

the Lieutenant

Governor even more susceptible

™ Firth,

When

McLean

"Mr. President Russell has been deceived. .by
.

to

Green, 21 March 1799,

Crisis. .of
.

Russell eventually ordered the Captain not to withhold

fretted at

CNA, RG

8,

Military

97

C

how

false information

163, 167-68.

McLean

being duped

"impose a belief on" Russell of "the importance of the

or provisions from the Indians, the frustrated

that

to

Series, Vol. 252, 63.

"astonished" he

from

this

quarter," but the Captain agreed to
shall

comply with

have whatever the Superintendant

Whether or not
Prescott feared

is

the province

beyond knowing

British leaders, the delicacy

was ever

hopes of remaining

in

in a state

for certain.

of Indian

and promised "that the Indians

asks for them."^^

[sic]

Indian relations had reached a crisis point

his orders

of danger by 1799 as Russell and

However,

at this critical

the future course of British-

time, and

unbeknownst

to

most

relations possibly even affected Britain's future

Upper Canada. Although McLean believed

that the Indians

no

longer had any bearing on the future of Britain's Canadian empire,
higher British officials

were not so

sure.

any case, although the possibility of an enemy invasion from the

In

West seemed remote,

British leaders in

relationship lapse with those Natives

later

Canada made

who

the crucial decision not to

lived in U. S. territory, a decision that

let

their

would

pay dividends.

McLean's cooperation did

weeks

after Russell ordered

Fox and Sauks from

not

McLean

come any

too soon. In eariy July 1799, barely two

to stop turning

away

the upper Mississippi descended

group of fifty warriors had discovered

that the late

Indians, a large delegation of

on Amherstburg. Apparently

Alexander

McKee

this

and others were

concerned about the extent of Spanish influence among them, and the Indians therefore

wished
the

to

prove their loyalty by visiting their Father

Chain of Friendship" and

this quarter."''^

to rely

McLean

on British

" McLean

to

gifts

Commodore

to "strengthen the

in

order to "brighten and strengthen

confederacy with our Brother Nations

particularly resented tribes from distant regions

who

in

continued

and provisions, but he must have taken some satisfaction when the

Grant, 23 August 1799,

CNA, RG

Major James Green, Military Secretary, 7 September 1799,

98

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26,

MPHC, XX:

659.

15289;

McLean

to

Fox and Sauk delegation seemed
rumors from the West were
and

to the

government's

all

to corroborate his repeated assertions that
the invasion

unfounded. Due

efforts to

to the deputation's

reduce expenses,

unannounced

Thomas McKee found

visit

little in

the

storehouse to give to the loyal sojourners, and the agent was
forced to send them away

"Naked" and

unsatisfied, giving

The appearance of a
was

significant.

It

it

demonstrated that

mattered most

and Sauk

at

ammunition.'''*

large delegation at Fort

in spite

Miamis and Delawares,

relations with the

where

them only

Amherstburg from a

distant region

of a reduced Indian budget and weakening

the British

still

held the fidelity of the nations

the time, in the Spanish borderlands.

visitors also indicated the effectiveness

of messengers

The presence of the Fox

whom

Alexander

McKee

had sent west within the previous year. British Indian policy from Amherstburg had been
a success in that

the

way

it

had managed

to

seemed

ties

with groups from the southern Lakes

The Fox and Sauk delegation went

to the Mississippi Valley.

restore a relationship that

maintain

to

Amherstburg

to

be waning. At a time when British leaders hoped

to

lessen the government's Indian obligation, the distant

a greater

commitment from

In council

with

Thomas McKee, McLean, and

British cause during the

in the

Fox and Sauk

Britain, including a restoration

Fox and Sauk emissaries reminded

all

to

tribes

of a wartime

wanted

to see

alliance.

other officers at Amherstburg, the

the British leaders of their peoples' attachment to the

American war and lamented

that

"our Father did not consider us

Peace he made." Nevertheless, the western delegation faithfully contended

that

"[w]e have never considered any as our Father but one," and "should you require our

"

Extract from the minutes of a Council held the

Saakies
^*

& Foxes, CNA, RG

Thomas McKee

to Claus,

1

1* July 1799

at

Amherstburg with several Chiefs of the

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15271.

28 July 1799,

CNA, RG

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15278.

99

may

services, you

seiul Idi

i,s

"
I

laidly

viewing themselves as a neutral power, the chiefs

also asked spec ilirally lor hritish traders to be sent to
their country, because

no benefit from the Americans, neither
sinvived, the late Alexander

in

have taken nuieh delight

scene and hearinj- these words of loyalty from nations so
British nilluence

knew

among them

that the I'ox

would

stands as a tribute to his

tlistant as pieseiil

after the

hoping

I'o.x

&

contmued

Yet his son Thomas
to

(heal Uritian"

and loyalty

Amhcrstburg, the principal Wyandot chiefs from
there.

These leaders, while

still

Inst nation in the

Extract from the luimites of a Council held the

Saakies

One

&

boxes,

CNA,

ol Ihe elder

peoples

who

lived

lulelitv al all costs
I

/O*),

" Thomas McKee
'**

1'*'

Alcxandci

Ihe

In the

name of all

to Claus,

to detcmiine the disposition

Wisconsin ami ho\ Riveis and

McKee

lluntci, Russell

at

78

four

Kii 10. liulian Allairs. Vol. 26, 15271-72.

on or neai

At a Council held

in

July 1709 at Amherslbiii g with several Chiefs of the

1

McKee*s primary deathbed concerns was

Ciuikshank

western Confederacy

speak lor the leaders of the nations of the Three Fires,

"those of the Otiavvas, Chippawas, and Poiifawatamies."

"

Islaiul

permanent bond between them and the

to atliiin a

Moreover, the Wyandots, formerly the

times of war, claimed to

at

with their Fhitish Father. Just a month

protesting the Amhcrstburg garrison's excessive cutting of timber on Bois Blanc

British.

all

friendship.

allies reaffirmed their friendship

lirownstown and Saiulusky also held an important council

and elsewhere, used the council

he

llail

witnessing this

In part, the

life's work.'*'

wilh every mark of regard

to conliniie the past relationship

anil Saiiks visited

in

desire

saw "the proprielv and necessity of treating

Others ol Britain's former Indian
this time,

distanl.

and Sauk professions "of then Ancient attachment

not continue unless his superiors

Nations as well

way of trade."''

presents \n]oi in the

McKee would

"we

to

secuie then

to l*nilean\ Selhy, 10 Jaiuiaiy 1/^)9,

Coucspondcncc

28 July 1799,

CNA, RG

,

HI:

i

oiilinneil tiienilship

and Selby

to Russell,

23 January

Allans, Vol. 26, 15278.

Amherslburg, 10 August 1799 with the Chiefs of the Wyandots.

100

and

49,60-62.

10, Indian

Indian AHairs, Vol. 26, 15283.

of these very

CNA, Rd

10.

nations, the

district,

Wyandot

leaders then offered a large gift of land lying
adjacent to the town's

enabling the garrison to continue gathering necessary timber
and firewood. The

delegation wanted the King to
their gift, they

know of their

gave four strings of black

beyond the Great Lake."^^ However,
also

wampum,

like the

wanted evidence of continued good

concluding their speech with an appeal
hi this context

faithfulness and generosity; as a token of

faith

to

"be seen by our Great Father

Fox and Sauks before them,
on the

Wyandots

the

of their longtime European

part

to "receive... what

you have always given

us."^*^

of affairs, Blue Jacket, formerly one of the most important leaders

of the western Confederacy, once again demonstrated his support for the British
having lived quietly

ally,

for several years.

In

August 1800, barely

after

five years since he

had

repudiated his British military commission and signed the Treaty of Greenville, the aging

Shawnee

leader secretly

threatened to

kill

met with Thomas McKee.^' McKee, the man who had once

Blue Jacket for making peace with the Americans,

now

attentively as the old warrior disclosed private information entrusted to

American commandant
United States.
return bearing

82

at Detroit,

Thomas Hunt,

key information

found himself in a position
British, for

*°

15284.

Ibid.,

15285.

Thomas McKee to William
MPHC, XV: 24-25.
^'

Ibid.;

the

officer, apparently

fi-om his interview with

much

him by

the

predicted an alliance between France and the

American

to act as a

he potentially had

Ibid.,

who

listened

expected Blue Jacket to

McKee. Though Blue

double agent, his loyalties seemed to

to lose

by confiding

Claus, 15 August 1800,

CNA,

Sugden, Blue Jacket 194-95, 223-24.
.
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MG

in

19,

F

Jacket

fall

with the

McKee. The Shawnee

1,

Claus Papers, Vol.

8,

1

17-18;

continued to receive annuity payments from the
American government, and he had a

"Son

at

School among them [the Americans]. "'^ Blue
Jacket

another Anglo-American war,

begun

to

grow

or, like

dissatisfied with the

again be useful

if

McLean had been

Americans and thought

that the British

may have

might once

such a struggle were to occur. Thus, in a sense, Captain
Hector
right.

While

at

peace with the Amencans, the Bntish really had
if

another Anglo-American war should

Britain's former allies, being "rather prejudiced against the

would once again

anticipated

other Natives in the southern Lakes, he

nothing to fear from the Indians, and even

commence,

may have

Amencans,"

gravitate toward the British.^''

The eighteenth century ended with
Alexander McKee's death

in

the future of British-Indian relations uncertain.

January 1799, an irreparable

British-Indian affairs at the time.

The

symbolized the

loss,

state

of

illustrious leader's passing further indicated the

Indian Department's loss of status and power. Yet the kidians

among whom McKee had

labored for so long demonstrated their devotion to their late adopted kinsman, just as they

continued

after

to

proclaim their loyalty to the King. In a separate ceremony several months

McKee's extravagant

In a ritual

conducted

of miles north of the
in

honor of their

funeral,

at the gravesite,

late brother,

have joined

83

McKee

in the dancing.

to Claus, 15

to

pay

tribute intended

August 1800, CNA,

by those conducting

Girty later recalled that in

MG

19,

F

1,

102

own

McKee

respects.

(a couple

danced for well over twenty-four hours

"White Elk." Thomas and several of the

Simon

their

located on the property of Thomas

Fort), these faithful friends

Maiden, recognizing the supreme
to

hundreds of Indians wished

Claus Papers, Vol.

8,

all

1

officers

the ritual, are said

of his

17;

from Fort

many

MPHC, XV:

years

24.

among

(he liulians ol Ihc

twice heloie

the

liad

Ohio hontici

he witnessed eeieinoiues

huhans wonld only l)estow
In

aiul the

siieh

Wcslci n

tried to

make them

tlie

l

Some
(lie

(

I

(

anada, only

Giiiy also elainied that

anionj*. Ihein."^^

would never again

decade

aller

1

7*M, these peoples

saw

who had

less than thai.

wauls ofthc

l)ccoine

With

McKee

knew what

r.one

slate.

and MiioU toived

to expect.

Yet

in spite

Ipper ('anada steadfastly clung to the idea of maintaining the old

I

of Yiendship, hoping

'hain

ippci

hardship and sullering, thousands ol Indians Trom the former alliance along the

Detroit frontier and

(

one

I

so nnndlul oniieir inlcresls, and

out ol service, Hiitaiirs loimei Native allies no longer

ol'theii

t>l

lormidahle ally ol Great Britain, a nation thai once supported

their cause, to a ihspossessed set ol lelugees

McLean had even

l

lanienteil thai they

who was

they reeogni/ed this as the passing of an era. In

a

u

an honor on 'men ofdislinetion

a distinguished leader or a friend

themselves reduced (lom

)isli

thai rivaled Ihis

honoring Alexander MeKee, the Indians

know sneh

I

lu uinstaiKcs

onnniuulei

ni

(

t't

to preserve a

Rcniaiks ichiling lo Ihc

Inel |l>v

Capliun

Archives, John Maisli I'apeis.

I

ile

1.

I

leeloi

Mcl

remnant of a passing way of

Iiuiian

ncparlincnt (o be

ean], 10

November

life.

suliniiltoil \o tlic

1797,

MPHt\ XX:

consideration of

57J; Fori Malilen

221.

Snnon Krnlon. ^ ebinaiv IS ^2. Snnon Kenlon
Papeis. I)iapei Mannsei!i>ls. Vol ^ Hill IS (nmiolilm. Matlison: Wiseonsm llisloiieal Soeiely)
Kegauin»^\ ihe Hntish ollueis who pailieipaletl ni the eeremony. appaiently neithei (inly, noi Snnon
John

1

1

James Noles on

(

"onveisalions willi

(

ieneial

1

l

Kenton's niloimant. Solomon McCulloch. loKI Kenton Ihese men's ulcntities ( with the exception of
Thomas McKee, of course), fhe oiriecrs who danced were most likely Indian agents, or (ormerly so. ami
lliotI, George Ironside, and
in addition to the younger McKce. they piobably inchuled the duty biotheis.
I

William Caldwell, all ol wlu>m lived and served m Ihe vicinity of Amhcrslurg. AHei all that luul passed
between Mcl can and Ihe Indian iVpailmenl. one suspects that the conunandant and his slalToi regular
army olliceis did not participate in Ihe ceremony, but all would have alteniled the late agent's ollicial
luneral held several

months eaiher.
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CHAPTER 3
RRlTlSH-INni AN RFXATIONS FN THE NORTH, 796- 802
1

In C(MiipIiancc with the Jay Treaty, the British

the

summer of

1

796, but they estabhshed a

had multiple reasons

Mackinac, Fort

Company

and

A

Valley.

St.

its

new

withdrew from Mackinac Island

post at nearby

St.

in

Joseph Island. Britain

for deciding to maintain a presence in the area.

Joseph continued

1

Like the old post

to protect the British fur trade as the

at

North West

competitors continued to expand further west and into the Mississippi

northern military post also served diplomatic and strategic putposes. At

Joseph the British could continue relations with Natives

who

St.

lived in the western Great

Eakes, the upper Mississippi Valley, and even the northwest regions in the direction of

Lake Winnipeg and

the

Red

River. This vital link

would enable

the

Crown

to foster ties

with the northern Ojibwas and Ottawas, the Winnebagoes, Menominees, Fox

and Dakota Sioux. The
and

cultural

first

political traits

section of this chapter will describe the most distinctive

of some of these groups. The evolution of British-Indian

relations in the North will be the topic

Like the previous post

of the

rest

& Sauks,

at

of subsection two.

Mackinac, Fort

St.

Joseph remained isolated from much

of the upper country; no sailing vessels or communication could pass

from these places

for several

months out of every year when weather and

ice

to or

made

navigation impossible. Although remote and isolated, the outpost held significant

geographic importance. Since

post,

and

eastward

later,

ail

1

763 Mackinac had served as the westernmost military

Indian agency, in a long, thin line of communication which stretched

the

way back

to Halifax, then across the Atlantic to

104

Whitehall in London.

Mackinac

rested

on the edge of an empire, and Bntain's sphere
of influence north and

west of the Great Lakes depended on a continued
British presence

of the

Straits

French,

who

of Mackinac protected channels of commerce with

there.

traders, both British

lived further west in places scattered throughout
the regions

Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Manitoba.

Some of these key

British control

and

of present-day

locations included Prairie

du

Chien, La Baye (Green Bay), Arbre Croche (Traverse Bay),
the Falls of St. Anthony
(Minneapolis), the Red River (of Lake Winnipeg), Milwaukee,
and elsewhere.

Furthermore, by remaining near the Straits of Mackinac, British authorities
could more
easily monitor activity to and from the

of the Great Lakes and the

tributaries

key portages which separated the water networks

of the Mississippi.' Any potential Fiench or

Spanish invasion from the Mississippi would

in all likelihood cross the

Wisconsin-Fox

portage before slipping through the Mackinac corridor and attacking Upper Canada from
the rear.

British-Indian Relations in the North Prior to 1796

Prior to

1

796

British policy in the

North was characterized by relative

indifference on the part of the British leaders

of warfare

in the

Ohio country and

when compared

the Treaty

to other regions.

of Greenville had

liad little effect

The years
on the

northern tribes, and these groups did not rely on the annuities that the American

government distributed

'

I'oiir

The predominant

tribes

of the region, most

of the five primary portages separating the great water systems of the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence

seaway and
Straits.

further south.

Mexico

the Mississippi River/Gulf of

The

fifth

Michigan and the Mackinac
through Lake Michigan nor past Mackinac, had a

entailed travel through Lake

portage, which did not require travel

route from Lake line, the Mauiiiee River, then from Fort

Wabash, and from

the Wabasli

on down

to the

Wayne

a

seven-mile portage to a tributary of the

Ohio and Mississippi

Narrative and Critical History of America 8 Vols. (Boston
.

1884), IV: 200,224.

105

& New

Rivers.

See Justin Winsor,

ed.,

A

York. Houghton, Mifflin and Co.,

importantly the northern elements of the Three Fires,
includmg the Ottawas and Ojibwas,

continued close

ties

with the British

Joseph.' These tribes' villages dotted the

at St.

shores and tributaries of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior;
the Ottawas' principal

of Arbre Croche was situated

village

at

the northeast end of Lake Michigan, near

Traverse Bay, and the Ojibwas primary village, Chequamegon,^ rested
on the southwest

end of Lake Superior. Other

tribal

groups that

less frequently visited the post at St.

Joseph included the Menommees, Winnebagoes, Sioux, and Sauks. These nations'
contact with Bntish officials and traders from

Dakota Sioux who were often

at

outposts run by the North West

from Fort

St.

Joseph, especially ni the case of the

war with Ottawas and Ojibwas, often occurred

Company and

other trading companies in Indian lands far

Joseph.

St.

British leaders and the Indians of the northern

the

Mackinac

War of

at

Straits

and the surrounding area

to

Lakes both considered the region of

be of vital importance. As

late as the

1812, Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada and Commander-in-Chief

of British forces

in

North America, wrote

to Earl Bathurst, explaining the

continued

significance of holding Mackinac:

[T]he Island and Fort of Michilimackinac

promote our Indian connexion
geographical position
Indian Tribes to
to

it

New

is

[sic]

admirable;

is

of the

first

and secure them
its

in

importance as tending
our interest;

influence extends and

is felt

to

its

among

the

Orleans and the Pacific Ocean: vast tracts of country look

for protection and supplies:

and

it

gives security to the great tradmg

Bay Companies by supporting

establishments of the North- West and Hudson's

which interposes between them and
the enemy. From these observations Your Lordship will be enabled to judge how
the Indians in the Mississippi, the only barrier

^

The Potawatomis,

the third element of the Three Fires, generally

the British at Fort St. Joseph, preferring to visit Fort

^

Chequamegon

Wisconsin

collectively refers to the Island of

Amherstburg

La Pointe and

coastline.

106

hved too

far

south to have dealings with

instead.

the nearby peninsula along the northern

necessary the possession of this valuable post, situated on the
outskirts of these
extensive provinces, is daily becoming [for] their future security
and
position.^

The Governor General's remarks, while exaggerated
the British leadership in

Although written
been central

in places, indicated the

Canada placed on possessing Mackinac and

in 1814, Prevost's statement

to vintage British strategy in the

its

importance

vicinity.

echoed a diplomatic perspective

that

North since the 1780s, when leaders

had

at

Whitehall and Quebec viewed Britain's continued presence in the Northwest as essential
for both the security

of Upper Canada and the control of the Mississippi Valley.^

Long before Euro-Americans ventured

into the region, the

peoples in the vicinity of Mackinac regarded the area as

Ottawa and Ojibwa

vital to their interests,

and

possibly even necessary for their survival. For them the region held spiritual,

cosmological, and historical meaning. According to one myth, the Island of

Michilimackinac became the
Flood, and consequently the

first

piece of land restored by the manitous after the Great

home of the

first

peoples, or the Anishnabeg, ancestors to

the Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis. Later, the Great Spirit, or Gitchimanitou (also

Kitche Manitou) sent an emissary, Nanabusli,

Mackinac

"

*

Island and to instruct

Prevost to Bathurst, 10 July 1814,

J.

Leitch Wright,

Jr.,

them on how

CNA,

Britain and the

MG

19

American

E

5,

to

dwell

to live.^

among

the

Anishnabeg people

The people of the Three

Andrew Bulger

Papers, Vol.

1,

File

Frontier. 1783-181 5 (Athens: University

at

Fires then

1, 15.

of Georgia Press,

1975), 66-76, 82-85.

Ojibway Heritage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 13-17; Edmund
Jefferson Danziger, Jr., The Chippewas of Lake Superior (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978),
7,20-22. During his travels through the northern Lakes country in the 1760s, English trader Alexander
Henry alluded to Nanabush and commented that the people whom he encountered on the north shores of
Lake Superior also referred to this supernatural bemg as "The Great Hare." See Alexander Henry, Tra\'els
and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Temtories. between the Years 1760 and 1776 with a Foreword
^

Basil Johnston,

,

by James Bam, editor (New York: I. Riley, 1809; reprint, New York: Burt Franklin, 1969), 205; and
James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culmre, 1665-1965
(Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 35.
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believed that the general vicinity of Mackinac was a
perpetual source of power, or

metaphysical strength. Wnting a history of his people, early Ottawa
historian Andrew
Blackbird told of a separate race of people

dwelt on the island, and from

Anishnabegs

left.

whom

known

as the Mi-shi-ne-macki-naw-go,

the locale took

The Senecas then came and

its

name, apparently

annihilated

all

but two of the

assisted the Ottawas and Ojibwas. According to Blackbird,

fortunate as to meet and see

become

them and

to talk with

a prophet to his people, either Ottawa or

and roaming

According

to the

in the wildest part

Three

spirit

beings

"[W]hoever would be

sc

them, such person would always

Chippewa [Ojibwa]."^ The author

maintained that "every Ottawa and Chippewa believe to
in existence

who

after the

Mishinemackinawgos, a pair of young lovers who escaped and then became

who

J.

this

day [1887]

that they are

still

of the land."^

Fires' traditional beliefs,

Michilimackinac also marks the

core or focal point from which the three nations diverged in their separate routes of
migration. Eventually the Ojibwas,

numbenng

Potawatomis combined, lived mainly

far

more than

in the regions

the Ottawas and

which became northern Michigan,

northern Wisconsin, southern Canada, and northern Minnesota. The Ottawas dwelt
largely in the central part of Michigan, and the Potawatomis, further south, occupied the

regions of southern Michigan, northern Indiana, northern Illinois, and southeastern

^

Andrew

J.

Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan:

A Grammar of Their

Language, Personal and Family History of the Author (Ypsilanti, MI: The Ypsilantian Job Printing House,
1887), 22. For a good analysis of the Ojibwa myth of creation and its aftermath, see Christopher Vecsey,
Traditional Ojibwa Religion and

its

Historical

Changes (Philadelphia; The American Philosophical

Society, 1983), 84-99.
*

Blackbird, 21. Blackbird claimed that for a time these

Charlevoix County, northern Michigan, but departed when
23.
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beings continued to dwell near Pine Lake in
too many whites settled in the area. Ibid., 22-

spirit

Hy

Wisconsin.'

ilK- ,ni<l

Mirlnj-an and \Uv au as ol
lioni nudliple

mUm

sixUvnIli

duispcia look Ihr

y, llus

akr Supmoi, vvhnv

I

Ophwas

into noillu ,m

nuounlcivd

lliry nnlially

stilT resistance

enemies, nsually hoxes and Dakotas, and oeeasionally
Iroquois war parlies

as well. 'Hiese initial eneonnters louehed oireenluries
(>rhostililies between the Ojibwas

and the Dakotas, but

nmeleenlh eenlury,

pushed onward

'

William Waiien, mixed blood

aeeordinj'. lo

Opbwa

his ancestors gradually prevailed, ^^^'aining loot

alon^; the southern shores

orthe

by

Lake Supei um

liieal

historian ol lhe

loot'' as

|;'"'

|

l()N(),

Irom withm

tins coiujiieied

cultural center, (oiinin)'. IIk

bands into

a sinjde

and

I'rom this site

Ojibwas

anionj', the

movement,

or

I

men who

and

I

l

Willi. nil

movement may have
been

a

I

H

II

unitiiij', all

and
of

their

uiopean contact.

of S|)n

lisloiy ol (he

(

a iclij-ious

I

aj'.tMit,

ilual

leni y

as the

with extraordinary spiritual

Kowe

lo years

o

I

warfare,

Schoolcralt, lunetrtMilh century

described this society as "an assiKiation of

known

to the tril)es/'

whose primary purpose

existence, their nature ami

)jilway People, wilii
S.'.

known

constituted a lehj'jous levitali/.ation

'

'

movement

Ve.

.1

>ey.

I-oicwokI
1

.i,

I

l>y

I

lie

(

hippevva and

Wavrlanil Piess.

I

Inc.. I*>S/).

lien

Nn^'hlnns

A

'*is

mode of existence.

W. Kogci

UulUilolicail (St. P. ml

)an/igcr, 7-8.

\

" llaiold IlK-kcison.
lleij'hls.

'luHpiamei'on and

conservative cultural ies|)onse

imicd States Indian

Wiiiit n.

(

men supposedly endowed

medicine

profess the hipjiest knowled)'c

W

ol

a lehj'jous

about their (irand Medicine Society, also

Miiincsi)la liisloiiiiil Socicly I'icss. I*>K*I).SI

Waiicn.

villaf'.e

)pbwas established

(

arose in the late seventeenth eenlury

to teach the hij'.hei doctrines

'

piincipal

ii

brouj'jil

hc

may have

mij^'ndion, and iiulial

clhnoloj'.ist

llicrc

ol'

power and wisdom.

iiiloiy, the

about

distinct people.

lliat

Midewiwin, an order

It

In

they

Sintly in ! llmolusloiy. Rrv. rd., (Piospret

and the influence they exercise among men."'' These
reUgious leaders could potentially
wield

much power over others, and

priests

of the Midewiwin generally

the Ojibwas both feared and revered them.
instructed, healed,

and called on the manitous for

favors and blessings, but they remained secretive regarding the

By

and actions.'^

among

the mid-eighteenth century, the

Midewiwin

at

extent of their

Chequamegon,
and

the

Midewiwin 's place of origin, became

interaction.''^

society."'^

Ojibwas'

pride," and

The Midewiwin's

civil affairs

Henry Rowe

authority

he even referred

was such

were "much mixed with

that

who dweh
Though

in the

the

central polity,

a de-facto center of tribal

Schoolcraft later pointed out that the

Ojibwa a sense of "national

power

created social cohesion

Michilimackinac.''^

Ojibwas recognized no form of external authority and had no

activity

full

the scattered Ojibwa bands, consisting of at least 25,000 people

northern Lakes region prior to the British amval

The

to

it

Midewiwin gave

as a "grand national

one observer concluded

their religious

the

that the

and medicinal practices."'^

Schoolcraft, Information Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian

Tribes of the United States 6 Vols. (Philadelphia:
.

J.

Lippincott

& Co.,

1851-1857), V; 420.

For more on the Midewiwin. see Hickerson, 54-63 and Ruth Landes, Ojibwa Religion and the
Midewiwin (Madison, Milwaukee, and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 89-188. and
Vecsey, 174-90.
'"'

George

I.

Quimby, Indian

Upper Great Lakes,

Life in the

1

1.000 B.C. to A.D. 1800 (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1960), 122. For the eighteenth century,
is

Quimby "s

estimate of 25,000 Ojibwas

conservative. Robert and Pat Ritzenthaler claim that the Three Fires' population figures

roughly stood

at

The Woodland

Indians of the Western Great Lakes (Milwaukee:

dominant when united, and
within the Three Fires.

potentially

of their allied tribes

&

Milwaukee Museum, 1983),

the Ritzenthalers' estimate might be exaggerated, their implication

numerous and

at this

50,000 Ojibwas, 4,000 Ottawas, and 4,000 Potawatomis. See Ritzenthaler

is

time

Ritzenthaler,
13.

Though

well taken thai Ojibwas were

that their population

dwarfed the combined numbers

Vecsey, 184-85; Hickerson, 55-57; Warren, 77-80.
Schoolcraft. Information Respecting. .the Indian Tribes of the United States V: 416.
,

.

An

ethnographic

study conducted and carried out by American officials in 1824 still found the Ojibwa tribe to be
"[r]epublican in all its features." Taken from the Chippewa Manuscripts (MS/I4C) -Col. Boyd's Account,
field

Trowbridge Papers, 434, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.
Warren, 99.
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The unifying

effect

of the Midewiwin and the resulting clusters
of northern

Ojibwa communities helped
French

1

who amved

to facilitate the tnbe's interaction
with

in the late

seventeenth century and the British

Europeans. The

who

761 showed a keen awareness of Ojibwa society by establishing
posts

sites

replaced them in

at the

primary

of Ojibwa culture and commerce: Michilimackinac,
Chequamegon, and La Baye

(Green Bay).'^ By the time of the British
interaction

arrival, the

previous century's trade and

between the Indians and the French had significantly

making them

reliant

on European goods. The Ojibwa success

garrison at Michilimackinac during Pontiac's Conspiracy
tribe's circumstances after

altered

in

Ojibwa

lifestyles,

wiping out the British

was not a

true index of the

such a long history of contact and trade with Europeans. In

1765 when trader Alexander Henry visited Chequamegon, a place he "regarded as the
metropolis of the. .O'chibbuoy," he found the people there naked, starving, and
.

desperate.

rather, they

credit in

No

longer did these northerners wish to expel the British from their country;

wanted

to reinstate the fur trade,

and they compelled Henry

them

to extend

goods "to the amount of three thousand beaver-skins." His Ojibwa hosts

Chequamegon claimed

that without the

wives and children would

perish."''^

at

immediate use of Henry's merchandise, "their

Eager for

trade, the

Ojibwas

at

the Island of

La

Pointe, adjacent to the peninsula of Chequamegon, sent deputations in 1764 and 1765 to

William Johnson

The

at

Niagara, seeking peace and requesting a restoration of the fur trade.

British soon re-garrisoned Fort

Mackinac, and numerous independent

^°

traders.

All tliree sites served as both trading posts and military foils under the French regime. Later, however,
the British, while retaining

Michilimackinac.

"Henry, 188-89.
Warren, 217-20.

tradmg posts

at

each of the three locales, only maintained a military presence

at

following in Henry's path, began to barter and live

among

the

Ojibwas and Ottawas.

This began a period dominated by individual traders in the North
that lasted
84,

when

the North

The
The

until

1783-

West Company was organized.

fur trade

became even more deeply entrenched

third Article of the Jay Treaty

in the

North by the 1790s.

between Britain and the United States

in

1794

pennitted British, Americans, and hidians "to pass and repass" to either side of
the border
for the

purpose of "trade and commerce," insuring that the British would continue

dominate the

and thereby maintain

fur trade

their nation's longtime influence

to

and

intervention in Native communities.^' Pro-British traders enjoyed greater influence

among
(i.e.,

their clients,

make good on

assist the traders in

and the

latter

and provide them with shelter

their credit

every

villages. Traders also

way

generally tried to maintain good faith with the traders

possible, enabling

them

to

at

times) and to generally

remain

in operation

depended heavily on the hidians, who acted

in the trading process, leading to

as crucial

near their

middlemen

some degree of mutual interdependence.^^

Consequently, the traders came to be trusted friends and sometimes kinsmen. Most of the
traders either married Indian

who

women

actively traded with the North

Native

woman

in

some

or took

them

as mistresses, and nearly

West Company,

capacity.'^^ All

at

all

of the

men

one time or another lived with a

of these factors gave traders a certain degree of

Burt, 146.

" Calloway, Crown
" The

North West

and Calumet 136-47.
.

Company assumed

financial responsibility for

its

traders'

wives and families, and by

1806 the burden had become so great that the Company's proprietors attempted to prevent further
marriages and/or mingling between its employees and Native women. See W. Stewart Wallace, ed.,
Documents Relating to the North West Company (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1934), 210-1 1. For
more on interpersonal relations between Native peoples and the men of the North West Company, see
Jennifer S. H. Brown, Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country (Vancouver &
London: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 81-110, 153-76; and Jacqueline Peterson, "Many
roads to Red River: Metis genesis in the Great Lakes region, 1680-1815." in The New Peoples: Being and
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political

power among

the peoples

whom

they served.^'* Particularly

a nation without any central polity or unifymg
element apart from
traders could enjoy significant de facto authority

trader at times could even induce the

among

members of his

among

the Ojibwas,

Midewiwin

its

religion,

A

smaller bands of followers.

retinue to attack an

enemy

or a

rival.

From
no

the Ojibwas' perspective, the fur trade benefited

restrictions placed

on

fur traders in the Great

all parties.

Lakes during the

With

virtually

later eighteenth

and

early nineteenth centuries, the Ojibwas received favored treatment from
competing fur
trade interests and individuals

trade's heyday, particularly

to their clients

who

between 1790 and 181

in spite

trading groups such as the North

better

1,

traders at times

even extended

credit

and distributed additional alcohol among them, which the Indians

considered a valuable article

1804), the

paid reasonable and competitive prices. During the

XY Company,

accommodate

of its negative

effects.

West Company and

its

Also, the

temporary

more

rival

successful

(from 1798

to

established posts nearer to hidian communities in order to

their customers.^^

Although the trade would eventually work

to

impoverish the Natives as they increasingly depended on European goods, the Ojibwas

and Ottawas briefly prospered during the trade's zenith, and

at the

Becoming Metis

S.

in

North America

,

ed. Jacqueline Peterson

and Jennifer

H.

turn of the nineteenth

Brown

(Lincoln: University

of Nebraska Press, 1985), 37-71. For fur trade families associated with the Hudson's Bay Company, see

"Many Tender Ties": Women in Fur-Trade
(Wmnipeg, MB: Watson & Dwyer Publishing Ltd., 1981).
Sylvia

Van

Kirk,

Victor Barnouw, "Acculturation and Personality

Anthropologist Association's

Memoir

no. 72,

among

the

Society in Western Canada. 1670-1870

Wisconsin Chippewa," American

American Anthropologist

52: 4, part 2 (October 1950), 44-

48.

For more on the
the

XY Company,

XY Company temporarily

see Davidson, chapter IV, pp. 69-91. Existing from 1798 through 1804,

became

a

more formidable

threat to the

North West Company, when Sir

Alexander MacKenzie, formerly a key shareholder with the North West Company, took charge of the
cnteqirise.

Ibid.,

76-77.
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XY

century they had an abundance of matenal goods, including guns,
ammunition, clothes,
blankets, kettles, utensils, knives, and cloth; they sometimes
demonstrated their wealth

adorning themselves

in jewelry, silver brooches,

Ties through trade meant

viewed
loyalty.

when

it

much more

and

scarlet cloth.^^

than an economic exchange; the Indians also

as a form of mutual reciprocity, indicating a level of trust, friendship,
and

John Tanner, the famed

a lone trader denied

thirty- year captive

him standard

credit that

wife and family before the onslaught of winter.^^

Ojibwas had

less to offer in a material

among

the Ojibwas, felt betrayed

he needed

It

to

procure blankets for his

should not have mattered that the

exchange; as long as they continued to profess and

demonstrate their loyalty and devotion, the traders had an obligation

The Ojibwas and Ottawas extended
far

by

beyond

this

who would

The Three

meet

their needs.

understanding of a two-sided, mutual obligation

their connections with the traders; they perceived all

British in this context.

to

of their relations with the

Fires understood the role of a father as that of

someone

take pity on them and care for them, regardless of how destitute or dependent

they became. The Indians believed that their condition should never alter that role, or
lessen the responsibility of their British Father.

As

a captive youth, John Tanner

described his relationship with his adopted Ojibwa father, "Taw-ge-we-ninne,"

Vecsey, 15; Danziger, 57, 60, 62-63. In addition

to

enjoying the benefit of bartering for cheaper supplies

goods of equal quality from Indian agents (albeit
decreasing quantities during peacetime), and if the nortliemers were willmg to travel, they could also
cheaply trade for U. S. Government goods sold by U. S. agents under the newly formed factory system,
another institution which tended to keep the traders' prices in check; Danziger, 63-64, and Wayne E.

from competing

traders, the Indians also freely received

The Northwest Fur Trade, 1763-1800 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1928), 158-61 John
Tanner, a thirty-year white captive in the North, also recalled the advantage to the Indians when dealing
with rival trading companies; John Tanner, The Falcon: A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures o f
John Tanner During Thirty Years Residence Among the Indians in the Interior of North America with an
Stevens.

,

Introduction

by Louise Erdrich (New York, London, and Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994;

published

1830), 172-73.

in

John Tanner, 173.
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originally

in

explaining that the

latter

"was always indulgent and kind

rather than as a dependant."

needs, and

recalled,

large

when

"my

Taw-ga-we-nmne provided

to

began

to pity

me.

.

..[s]o

[sic] as the others."

for all of Tanner's hunting

Tanner understood

that his

I

was

able to take as

and

many

martins

adopted parents both loved him, but his

mother bore the separate responsibility of disciplining him, while

his father's role

was

to

assist his son.

Tanner's experience hints

at

how

his adopted family

viewed the Bntish. Their British Father should want
Ojibwas petitioned him they could expect
that

an equal,

he went out and spent a day in making a

number of traps, which he gave me, and then

shown

like

the youth failed in his attempts to construct marten
traps, Tanner

father

protect, guide,

me

me, treating

and the Ojibwa

in general

to care for his children,

his pity and assistance.

Ojibwas approached powerful and wealthy whites

Some

in the

and when

studies have

same m.anner

that

they would address a manitou, doing so with a gracious and humble disposition.^^

Whether seeking a vision or a material

necessity,

Ojibwas always appealed

a manitou or spirit guardian. Similarly, they could potentially share in the
traders and agents

by petitioning them accordingly, believing

significant influence

that his

among

that

that

of

power of

some whites held

the manitous.^° In his memoirs, Alexander

Ojibwa captors believed

to the pity

Henry

recalled

he possessed a certain foreknowledge of events and

became suspicious of him when he denied

their assertion.^'

Moreover, the northern

Indians looked upon British agents and traders as servants of the British King, a distant

Ibid., 16, 18-19.

Vecsey, 135-36;
^°

Vecsey, 136;

^'

Henry, 146.

Bamouw,

Bamouw,

42-48, 53-60.

58-59.
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whom

person

they regarded as a near-deity, one

and lake pity on them. From

who would ahvays

nnssionary work

his

among

the

consider their needs

Ojibwas and Ottawas of

Michigan during the 1820s, Peter Jones noted:

The

ideas entertained

the Indians generally of the

King of England, with regard
and knowledge, are most extravagant, fhey imagine
his
be absolute, and his authority unlimited; that his word is
law, to

power

to his

by

riches,

power

to

all his

subjects

which

bow

with nnplicit obedience. ..They also consider
.

that'

his riches

and benevolence are unbounded, the whole resources of the kingdom
being at his
command, a portion of which he grants to those of his subjects who are needy.

With regard to his wisdom, they conceive that he knows everything that
on in the world; that even the speech or talk of an Indian chief delivered
Superintendent of Indian Affairs

in the

For

to British agents

their deference

and devotion

and Ottawas expected much

in return,

wilds of Canada

and according

^

By

made known

go'm^

to a

to him.-*^

and authorities, the Ojibwas

to St. Joseph's storekeeper

Duggan, often "the sole puqwrt of their speeches was begging

them Charity."'

is

is

their Father

reciprocating with lavish amounts of provisions,

Thomas

would shew

Duggan and

his

cohorts then fulfilled their fatherly responsibilities. In keeping with Tanner's description

of his

own

father

by providing

as.

.

foster father, the northern Indians expected the British to act as a

for his children

.dependant[s]," even

when

the

genuine

and treating them as "equal|s], rather than

power

in

such a relationship was skewed to one

side."''*

Despite the minimal worth of the items which the northern Natives gave to the British,

Peter Jones, History of the

I

hoinas

Duggan Journal

Ojebway

Indians (London: A.

entries for 23

May

1

Bennett, 1861), 207.

1798, 10 August 1797, 27 June 1799, and 13 June 1799,

GABLA.
John Tanner,

W.

6.

1

10

it

was

the actual act of exchanging gifts that

deeper

ties

and commitments than

British participants

the North

partners

settings.

hoped

to the Indians.

It

symbolized

of a mere economic partnership.^^

gift-giving fi-om a different perspective.

The

officers in

to reinforce the Indians' belief that they participated as
pseudo-equal

by using
The

saw

that

was important

official gift-exchanges,

which often took place

British conducted these events with

presence of the post's officers,

who wore

in

formal council-

much solemnity and always
Not

full-dress uniforms.

in the

really needing

any

material items from the Indians, and hardly thinking themselves under any obligation to

continue to grant provisions, the British considered

all

distributions of gifts as an

investment of sorts in the expectation of future Native support and loyalty. This
represents a slightly different rationale than the one to which the Indians were

accustomed; the Natives would have regarded

their gifts as

services and as a loving Father's act of benevolence.

future Native fidelity

any tangible
in

made

gifts fi-om

these exchanges

both compensation for past

In truth,

more equal than

however, promises of

the Indians' past services or

them ever could. Lord Dorchester understood

1787 he considered the

ftiture benefits that

this principle,

and

could be derived fi-om the Indians by

psychologically making them dependent upon the British. The Governor General ordered

that

on every occasion, the Indians'
requests if reasonable, are to be complied with. Should they, as
these occasions, lay

down

is

customary on

Presents of any kind, they are to be taken up with

thanks, and in return, Presents exceeding the value of theirs are to be given, in

which case the Chiefs

are always to be distinguished.^^

Calloway, Crown and Calumet 137. For the meaning of Indian gifts, the protocol of gift-giving, and a
comparison of the British and French Indian diplomacy, see Wilbur R. Jacobs, Wilderness and Indian Gifts:
The Northern Colonial Frontier. 1748-1763 (Lincoln: University Nebraska Press, 1950), chapters 1 & 2.
.

Dorchester's Instnictions,

CNA, RG

8,

Military

C

Series, Vol. 789, 6759.
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The sobering and

subtle truth in this

pohcy was

that, despite the

guise of mutual

reciprocity, these gift distributions, and any form of
British trade for that matter, could be

termmated

at

any moment.

Among Dorchester's

opening remarks

in his

new

policy of

1787, he instructed his agents to assure "the Indian Nations. .of the King's
paternal care
.

and regard as long as they continue

to merit

them, by acting as good and obedient

Children ought to do.""
Ultimately, British-Indian relations in the North would

what Dorchester envisioned,

in contrast to the

more closely epitomize

course of British-Indian diplomacy

elsewhere in Upper Canada. Unlike the other regions discussed

diplomacy

in the

in this study, the

North was marked by a period of continuity between 1783 and 1812.

Although British leaders and northern Indians may have interpreted
differently, both sides, relatively unaffected

of previous

ties.

The continuity of the

by events

fur trade did

to the south,

much

the traders benefited from these consistent diplomatic and

British

government did not view the trade

itself as

and even

at its

maintain these relations, and

commercial

Crown

is

leaders.

ties.

ties

However, the
with the

partially subsidized the fur

peak, the enterprise never offset the expenses Britain incurred by

governing the region and supplying the Indians' material needs.
trade

sought a continuation

a reason to continue

Natives or to maintain a presence in the region. The
trade,

to

their relationship

Furthermore, the fur

not what gave the Indians diplomatic leverage in their dealings with British

It

was

the British desire for future Native fidelity that

Ibid.

Burt, 82-85; Stevens,

The Northwest Fur Trade, 1763-1800 159-61
,
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prompted Dorchester

to

attempt to ingratiate the Natives, and

in the

North the hidians' loyalty was never

in

question.

British-Indian relations in the North grew stronger in
spite of the two sides'
differing perspectives

continued

to

on the meaning of those bonds. Ojibwas and Ottawas

view British

gifts as

marks of their

rewartls for past services; the lopsided

Ojibwas and Ottawas believed
attitude

of humility and

that

Joseph

at St.

father's benevolence, generosity, and

mismatch of any exchange did not

by giving any small

gift,

matter.

and by doing so

loyalty, they merited the gifts the British

gave them.

in

The

an

In this

sense, the Indians did not merely consider British presents as free gifts.
This strong

Indian notion of reciprocity

was

lost

on Captain Peter Drurnmond, commandant as

St.

Joseph, in an incident late in 1799. After two Ottawa bands from Arbre Croche visited
his post in October,

they [the Ottawas]

buys

[sicj

Drummond commented

mean by saying

what they get." Yet

they never receive presents

in the

same

Ottawas receive much larger presents
Indians, in

some

to his superiors, "I

in

respects they deserve

letter

cannot comprehend what
at this Post,

Drummond acknowledged

it,

& com

more sugar

as they present

that the

gift

lead to confusion, conflict, and, in the 1780s and 1790s, corrupt dealings.

Indians' insistence

39

Drummond

on a relationship of reciprocity helped

Department

to

for the use

of

Ottawas viewed

with the British as one based on bartering and kmship.

Differences between Indian and British understandings of the

in the Indian

that "the

proportion to their numbers than any other

government than any other Indians. "^"^ Drummond did not grasp
their relationship

but rather

that

spanned

a period

The northern

encourage a string of abuses

of many years.

James Green, Military Secretary, 28 October 1799,
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to

exchange could

Some

MPHC, XX:

Indian agents

668.

at

Mackinac and

St.

Joseph's, realizing that the Indians there expected
to trade something

for their gifts, attempted to profit

from the

situation.

Once

the formal councils had ended,

the poverty-ridden Natives traded for additional goods
from the Indian store with packs

of furs and additional

gifts

of com. John Dease, cousin of Department Superintendent

John Johnson, eventually

lost his position as hidian

and furs from the Indians

in this

in

1

agent for receiving bartered goods

manner. Johnson had originally sent Dease

to

Mackinac

786, hoping that his cousin could negotiate a peace between the Dakotas and

Ojibwas,

who were

came under

fire for

constantly at war. Dease not only failed in that difficult task, but he
allegedly embezzling goods from the hidian store and conducting

personal trade with Ojibwas and other tnbes in the Lakes and Upper Mississippi.

Dease's

activities

came

to light not

because of Indian complaints, but because those

attempting to trade legally complained that Dease competed unfairly in
underselling them by bartering stolen government goods.''"

and contradictory reports, Dease gained an

Due

this

market,

to inconclusive

evidence

Yet he never regained his post

acquittal.'*'

in

the Indian Department, nor did his powerful cousin clamor for his reinstatement."*^

Dease's
expressly forbid

activities

all

most

likely influenced

"persons belonging

to,

or

Lord Dorchester's decision

employed

in the Indian

being "permitted to trade, directly or indirectly, or to have any share,

Kellogg, 201-02; Elizabeth Vincent, Fort

St.

Joseph:

A History

.

in

1787

to

Department" from
profit, or

concern

Parks Canada, Manuscript Report Series

335 (Ottawa: Department of Environment Canada, 1978), 53.

MPHC, XI: 489-96, 501-506, 514-620; Collections of the Wisconsin
cited as WHC), 31 vols. (Madison: 1854-1931), XII: 83-91.

State Historical Society (hereafter

Dease's family link to the Johnsons probably did not hurt in helping him gain his acquittal. Furthermore,
Dease at least received the dignity of a tt-ial. A decade later, Matthew Elliott would be refused both, a
heanng and any type of formal inquiry. Elliott hounded his superiors for 1 1 years, asking for a
*^

reinstatement, but

Dease passively accepted

his dismissal.
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therein."'' Nevertheless, subsequent storekeepers
Charles Gauthier and

continued to abuse the system by lending stores
their

own

use, and/or

usmg them

Thomas Duggan

to traders, appropriating the

to barter for furs

and other

goods for

goods.''" Eventually

Duggan's unscrupulous behavior became excessive, causing

the Indians to complain and

leading to the storekeeper's suspension in 1802.'*^ Until
then, however, British army
officers at

Mackinac and

of Indian goods

St.

to

St.

These conditions

at their post.

of the century contrasted the
and the

Joseph had been more lax about monitoring the distribution

activities

rigid regulations

at

Fort

St.

Joseph dunng the closing years

implemented

at

Amherstburg

at

the time,

of Gauthier and Duggan were reminiscent of Elliott's peculation prior

Captain McLean's crackdown

Joseph continued

to

at the latter post.

conduct hidian

The

affairs in a loose

fact that the officers

manner

is

and agents

at

indicative of the

continuity in British-Indian relations in the North, and British-Indian ties rem^ained steady
there as the fur trade continued to expand in the 1790s.

As of 1796,

repercussions and the corruption in the Indian Department

become

issues

deemed worthy of scrutiny, and

in the

at St.

the trade's negative

Joseph had not yet

meantime neither the northern

Indians nor the British wished to alter the nature of their relationship, which had existed
for decades.

Dorchester's Instructions for the good Government of the Indian Department, to Sir John Johnson,
Baronet, Superintendant [sic] General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs, 27
8,

Military

C

March

1787,

CNA, RG

Series, Vol. 789, 6761.

For Gauthier, see Captain William Doyle

to

Colonel Richard England, 2 February 1793,

ibid.,

Vol. 247,

10.

Lieutenant Robert Cowell to James Green, Military Secretary, 10 February 1802,

Cowell

to

Green, 29 October 1801,

ibid..

Duggan

Vol. 254, 3-4;

also drank heavily, further

Cowell brought formal charges against Duggan in a special
purpose, 25 January 1802. ibid., Vol. 254, 7-9. Also see Vincent, 106-07.

complicating his difficulties and abuses.
council called for that

Vol. 253, 341-42. Apparently

ibid.,

Lt.
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Wayne.
the

The Ojibwas and Ottawas

Amencans

Detroit, they

which went

at

Mackmac, and

would not share

to

in the

North did not warmly welcome the amval of

unless these northern bands

in their tribal

made annual

annuity disbursements from the Americans,

those bands dwelling nearer to Detroit and the Western
District of Upper

Canada. Therefore, the northern groups did not cultivate the

some of the bands

living in the regions of Detroit,

tribes in the northern

allies to the south.

North

Furthermore, the bitterness
the southern

Finally, the fur trade

some

would continue

to

Confederacy's

interest with their

tribes,

former

in the

which had resulted from

their

summer of 1794, probably

still

to support the peoples living in the

time, whereas the regions of Detroit and northern

a steady decline in the fur trade that had

would continue

Maumee

common

to the

between the northern Indians from

felt

campaign against Fort Recovery

48

for

with the Americans like

Lakes never considered themselves partisan

Mackinac and Saginaw and
quarrel during the

ties

Brownstown, and northwest Ohio. The

defeat at Fallen Timbers, and they no longer held a

lingered.

pilgrimages to

begun decades

earlier/"^

Ohio were experiencing
These divergent paths

shape British-Indian relations in the two regions.

The North. 1796-1802

When

the British

withdrew

fi-om Fort

they nor the Indians of the region fully

Mackinac

knew what

in the

to expect

summer of

1796, neither

from these changes. Aware

For the annuity disbursements sanctioned by the Treaty of Greenville, see Treaty of Greenville,

American

State Papers, Indian Affairs

,

1:

563;

MPHC, XX:

413.

Examination of a Patawatime Warrior [Prisoner], 23 July 1794, Shawnee File, July-December, 1794,
GABLA; Cruikshank, '^Diary of an Officer in Indian Country in 1794," 641; Alexander McKee to Joseph
''^

Chew, 7 July 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence
Country,

ibid.,

V: 94; Alexander

McKee

II:

310; Diary of an Officer in the Indian

to R. G. England, 10 July 1794, ibid.,

Sugden, Blue Jacket 167-68; Larry Nelson,
,

,

A Man

of Distinction among

123

Them

II:
,

315; Sword, 278;

169.

of how the United States had recently expanded
to

Ohio country and had attempted

nito the

usurp Britain's role as the Indians' overseer and protector,
the northern tribes were

understandably alarmed. What would become of the British?
Would

this signal the

decline of the British fur trade? Did these changes indicate
that British innuence in
general

would decline

Despite these

initial

in the

North? Would the area Indians now deal with two
Fathers?

concerns, British-Indian relations

in the

ever during the next several years, and the North West
returns during this period, hardly feeling the effect of

men and

North proved as stable as

Company had some of its

American competition

as

best

company

other British traders expanded deeper into Spanish and American territory.
This

section focuses on

how

the British and Indians in the North interacted in the years

immediately following Britain's move

to Fort St. .loseph,

emphasizing the enduring

friendship and lasting ties that both sides continued to cultivate.

In

the

June

1

796, as the British prepared to evacuate Mackinac in the ensuing weeks,

Ojibwas and Ottawas grew concerned regarding the departing

officers

and personnel.

These Native visitors believed that the moral obligations of a father bound him

who depended upon

his provisions.

British sovereignty,

Amable, an Ottawa Chief, expressed

On

his final visit to

Mackinac while
his

"Concern

it

was

to those

yet under

for the English

evacuating the upper Posts, and his apprehension of his Nation being abandoned by them

and

left to

the

mercy of the Big

knives.""''"

Once Amable and

the British intended to maintain a presence in the North, they

the area Indians learned that

were no longer

distressed;

they realized that their relationship with their British Father could continue as

Wayne

E. Stevens,

always

"Fur Trading Conipaincs of the Northwest," Proceedings of the Mississipp Valley
i

Historical Association 9 (October 1918): 286.
50

it

Amable's Speech, 27 June 1796, Duggan

Journal,

124

had, and they

the Indians

would not be compelled

knew

to deal with the

American newcomers. Yet

for certain that their relations with the

until

Bntish would remain a status

quo, the situation remained tense.
Initially, things

appeared grim

local Natives' response.

wondered

if

the Indians

command

at

and they worried about the

Major William Doyle, former commandant

would commit

of 796, when Doyle and
1

to the British as well,

his garrison

Mackinac, even

hostilities against British troops.

summer

In the

were relieved by a very small force ordered

Fort St. Joseph in June, the

Governor Russell. Doyle feared

at

commandant expressed

that Indian discontent in the

his

to take

concern to Lieutenant

North would increase once

the Natives realized that the Bntish intended to maintain only a token military force
of a

dozen soldiers
strength

at St.

Joseph, a post relatively smaller than Mackinac. Such a reduction in

when compared

to the

growing American military presence

Old Northwest would probably be interpreted as

a sign of British

at

Mackinac and the

weakness and a possible

harbinger of a complete British withdrawal from the Upper Country. Russell relayed

Doyle's concerns

to

Governor General

Prescott, fearing that such circumstances in the

North

may

lead to contempt [by the Indians], contempt to insult (for

it is

v/ell

known

Savages are ever influenced by appearances) and should insult once begin, no
man can say when it may end. In Short Major Doyle thinks that Ensign Brown
that

and his small party are
neighboring

in

very serious danger, from the present temper of the

Indians.'"'

Prescott immediately responded to this alarming

detachment of forty soldiers

"

news by sending an

to reinforce the post at St.

Russell to Prescott, 29 August 1796,

MPHC, XXV:

130;

320, 675-76.
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CNA,

additional

Joseph Island.

MG

1

1

CO 42,

Colonial Office, Vol.

Doyle's fears proved unfounded. The
departing officer had most Hkely
witnessed
a

bnef spasm of frustration by bands

probably had just learned

visiting

Mackinac Island and by groups who

that the British intended to
leave the site.

Only days poor

to

the evacuation of Mackinac Island, and
therefore very close to the time of Doyle's

alarming report, Storekeeper Thomas Duggan
wrote,
Indians would be very troublesome here in
the

You,

that

it is

quite the contrary, and that

'1

was given

to

Spnng and Summer;

They have been

since last

I

understand that the

am happy to tell

fall

to this

Moment

remarkably quiet."^^
Far from wanting

hoped

to preserve a relationship that

weather grew colder
first

to destroy

winter

at St.

protect us against

in the

Joseph,

Ensign Brown and his handful of troops, the Natives

had existed

for

more than a generation. As

autumn of 1796, and with

Ogaw, an Ojibwa

leader,

any Bad people who wanted

the

the small British garrison facing

promised the officers

to disturb us[,] that they

that

its

"he would

Imew no

other

than their English Father[,] that They would never go to see the Big Knives
[Americans
at

Mackinac

Island, or elsewhere]

shrewdly implied
relationship

at St.

that the British also

was one of mutual

to protect us.""^

depended on the Ojibwa, suggesting

Ogaw

that their

Eariy in 1797, the leader of an Ottawa delegation

benefit.

Joseph's picked up on the same theme, proclaiming to Duggan and the officers, "I

hold you by the hand and

you

and would winter near us

if

you should want

Nation seeing

it

will

never

me -here

know

" Thomas Duggan to Pndeaux
" Ogaw's Speech

I'll

it

and

is

let it

the

assist

go,

shall

be always near

You

mark of my Tribe presenting
you

in time[s]

Selby, 20 June 1796,

at St. Joseph's,

I

CNA,

MG

assist

the Belt[.] All

of trouble." In keeping with

19 F

26 October 1796, Duggan Journal.
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ready to

1,

Claus Papers, Vol.

7,

230,

my

Dorchester's instructions, the following
day the post commandant responded

promismg contmued
powerful party

By the

Drummond

aid to the hidians but

making

it

m council,

plain that the Bntish were the

to the relationship.^^

following

summer of

1797,

reported that "the Indians

they formerly did

at

new

post

commandant Captain

Peter

m this Quarter, visits [sic] this Post, the same as

Michilimackinac, and appears

[sic] to

be as friendly as usual."^^

Clearly, Bntish apprehension regarding
Native discontent had been exaggerated.^^

reporting to Storekeeper General Joseph

conceding

that

the following

When

summer, Duggan, while
at the

time

Michilimackinac," also reported that "they appear
to be as

at

attached to us as ever,

our coming

Chew

"our Indian Fnends" did not have "a favourable
opinion of us

of our Evacuating the Post

much

more

&

to this Post [June,

have the pleasure of informing you

I

that the Indians since

1796] have conducted themselves entirely to our

satisfaction." If these statements

were

correct, then only

days pnor

evacuation of Mackinac Island the northern Indians were not

to the British

at all displeased,

and they

expressed no dissatisfaction in the immediate wake of the occupation of
St. Joseph
Island."

Once both
by

prompted

the Jay Treaty-mandated British withdrawal from their former posts, and once
both

had declared
unique

^'^

the British and their Native allies got over the apprehensions

that they

wished

to

maintain friendly after the move, a variety of issues

to the St. Joseph's milieu surfaced for British policy makers.

Mitarmnance's Speech and the British response, 12

Drummond

to

&

13

March 1797,

James Green, Military Secretary, 29 June 1797,

Kellogg, 233-34; Russell to the

" Duggan to Chew,

9 July 1797,

CNA, RG

8,

Military

C
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ibid.

MPHC, XX:

Duke of Portland, 28 September

1796,

Four such issues

ibid.,

518.

XXV:

132.

Series, Vol. 250-1, 256; ibid.,

XX:

522.

in

which conditions
Amherstburg

at

Fort

St.

Joseph required distinctly different
poHcies from those

will be discussed here in
detail. First, St. Joseph's
military officers

intervened in tnbal affairs to appoint
chiefs, a practice the Natives in

of influence accepted.

By contrast,

it

would have been unusual

Amherstburg

to appoint tnbal leaders

sensibilities.

Secondly, authonty over Indian

from

shifted

Fort

St.

and any

effort to

at

Joseph's sphere

Bntish officials

much more

rapidly

Amherstburg. Thirdly, the threat of competition
fVom, or

Amherstburg. Finally,

intertribal rivalries

unique to

St.

was

at

m.ilitary

greater at St. Joseph than at

Joseph's sphere of influence,

between the Ojibwa and the Dakota Sioux, posed a

challenge to the British goal of maintaining peace

at

reasons particular to the area,

to military officers

action by, Bntain's French and Spanish imperial
rivals

hostility

for

St.

do so would have offended Native

affairs, for

of the Indian Department

officers

Joseph than

most notably

at

among

its

significant

Indian trading partners and

allies.

Army officers

at St.

Joseph enjoyed more influence

neighboring Ojibwas and Ottawas than the officers
dealings near Detroit and even Brownstown.
their allegiance to the traders

military personnel in the

among them

officers

even

further.

The northern Natives who so

in their

readily gave

also extended their loyalty to the officers and

as the King's representatives

possessed the power to remove the traders

of the

Amherstburg exhibited

Upper Country. The Natives well understood

commandants and Indian agents served

this loyalty

at

in the affairs

at

that the post

and thereby

any time. The Ojibwas and Ottawas carried

They not only demonstrated an eagerness

and Indian agents, but they also sought

128

to

obey military

to derive their authority

and

political

power over

their

own bands

fron. the Bntish.^^ In their

egahtanan society, which lacked

a poHtical infrastructure, northern Ottawas
and Ojibwas grew accustomed to the
notion of

Bntish-recognized leaders

among

them.^^ British officials installed or
recognized chiefs

by giving them medals and sometimes

flags or officers' gorgets.

The Native

leaders

appreciated these symbols of honor and authonty,
and they viewed them as continuing
the practice

begun by the French. One Ottawa

leader,

Eethsaguam, specifically asked for

a medal to replace the "one he got in the fime
of the French."^^
In the

same manner,

the northern Nafives also looked to British
officers and

Indian agents to remove a chief if necessary.

summer of

1

On

one occasion

at St.

Joseph's in the

798, during which time a group of Ottawa leaders received
medals, this

delegation requested that the officers remove from authonty one
of their fellow Ottawa
leaders (also present

at

the council) for having

murdered some fellow

villagers at

Croche. Significantly, the Ottawa delegation themselves did not attempt

dishonored leader, but Duggan wrote that

chiefs medal "from him
their

at

sought the authority of Captain

58

Bamouw,

remove the

"Mr. Langlade" took the guilty

the desire of all the other Chiefs present for murdering two of

Own Nation[,] One of them

chief of his medal.

friterpreter

to

Arbre

a Chief."^'

Apparently, the chiefs had specifically

Drummond, who

in turn

ordered Langlade to

strip the

Remarkably, the Ottawa leaders had permitted the murderer

to

46.

James Clifton argues that the Potawatomis, also a member of the Three Fires, never even had chiefs
among them until their contact with the French brought about the evolution of this role within their mode of
government late in the seventeenth century. See Clifton, The Praine People 55.
,

Entry for 19

May

1798,

^'

Entry for 14 June 1798,

^-

Drummond

to

Duggan

Journal.

ibid.

Major James Green, Military Secretary, 24 June 1799,

129

MPHC, XX:

640-41.

accompany them

to St. Joseph,

where he was pubhcly stnpped of his
rank and

Apart from the anticipated revenge

to

status.

be taken by the victims' famiUes,
the Ottawa

delegation expected the British not only
to establish authonty but to
mete out justice.

Since the murderer, Shaushauguaw, had
suffered
the eyes of the Ottawas, the Bntish
satisfaction.

Duggan and

Stnngs of Wampum.

.to
.

killed

by Shaushauguaw

hoped

much

that that

disgrace and public humiliation

would be enough

for everyone's

the officers advised restraint, and they
distnbuted

the Chiefs to speak to the Relations of
the Indians
to pacify

ir

"Seven

Who

were

them, [and] presents were also delivered to
them

[presumably referring to the victims' families, since the

rest

of the delegation already had

received their gifts and provisions].""

By

expecting the British to delegate authority and admmister
justice

the northern Ottawas and Ojibwas

showed

that they regarded their

imperial overlord. Although British-delegated authority

than real. Natives

who

among them,

Bntish Father as an

may have been more

apparent

disregarded such distinctions of authority could conceivably
be

cut off from receiving future British gifts.

As

a result, the Bntish found

it

much

a

task to manipulate and control Natives in the North than they did elsewhere.

simpler

By creating

chiefs, they not only fostered loyalty, but the British also tended to gain the
cooperation

of those

whom

they did not

make

chiefs.

British officers expected the

chiefs to wield authority and to control their people, but,

people loyal to British

On
Mackinac

"

at least

most importantly,

they

to

made

keep

their

interests.

two occasions. Major William Doyle,

prior to the

men

American occupation

in the

Entry for 14 June 1798, Duggan Journal

130

the last British

summer of

1

commandant

at

796, even issued written

commissions

to

men whom

he made chiefs.

On

8

May

Keekwitamigishcam, an Ojibwa

leader, with a British

consequence of your attachment

to the English,

proofs.

1796, Doyle presented

of which you have given repeated

hereby constitute and appoint you a Chief
of the Chippewa Indians residing

.1
.

the said Sault St.

Mary [Mane]"^^ Less

Nangotook, who had asked
father,

confirm
willing

You

commission

in order to

"who had been made Chief in

this request, issuing the

fidelity, zeal

for a

young man

and attachment
the said

a

testified

assume the position of his

that stated:

to the British

Nangotook a Chief of Kishkacon

Government,.

[band]. .of the
.

among

these longtime

allies.

commandant hoped

You

mention

.1

do hereby

Ottawa Nation,

as such."^^

men

With

prepared to

to strengthen British loyalty

still

drew

the

their authority, not

their trade goods, fi-om the British.

The

practice of creating chiefs

among

the

Ojibwas and Ottawas was unique

northern British Indian agency. In the other regions examined
authorities ordinarily did not confer such authority

agents on the

Entry for 9

.

However, Doyle need not have been concerned about

northern Indians' disposition, for the Ottawas and Ojibwas
to

Doyle granted

"In consideration of the

coincidental timing, Doyle issued these commissions just as he and his
deliver their post to the Americans; the

at

time to an Ottawa leader,

the time of the French."

commission

by You

this

and singular the Indians Inhabitants thereof to obey

all

at

than two months later and in his final few
days

Mackinac, Doyle presented another wntten commission,

deceased

m part read, "In

commission which

Maumee

May

such as Alexander McKee,

1796, ibid;

CNA, RG

8,

Military

C
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leaders.

While

and the Girtys had

Senes, Vol. 249, 213

Entry for 4 July 1796, Duggan Journal.

in this study, British

on individual
Elliott,

to the

all

British

held

significant influence in the
councils of the Miamis,
Delawares, and Shawnees, they
did so

as delegates representing their
king and government; they
also attended these meetings
virtue

of their

status as

adopted kinsmen, but

leaders in Indian councils.

and located

at

The Native

chief.

Maumee

In fact, in an incident

Elliott after the agent

give them authonty over other

leaders in the coalition formed
at

the Glaize, considered Britain
a joint

time would any British agents on the

remove a

this did not

m

1

by

member of their

have had the power

Brownstown,

confederacy. At no

to either install or to

793 a Delaware war chief upbraided
Matthew

had merely inquired as

to the business

of a pro-American Indian

delegation sent to confer with Confederacy's
leaders. The Delaware leader
reprimanded
Elliott:

Did you ever see me at Detroit or Niagara, in your
councils, and there to ask you
where such and such white man come[s] from or
what is their Business- Can you

watch, and look

Business?
In the

appear never

all

Do you

around the earth
not

know

North clear limits
to

that

we

who come[s] to us? or is what
upon our own Business?^''

to see

are

to the British role in creating or

confimiing

their

tribal leaders

have been established, and the extent of British authority
among the

northern Ojibwas and Ottawas remained undefined. At
Mackinac

when

it

seemed

expedient to grant commissions to Native leaders. Major Doyle
did so without hesitating.

Apart from rare exceptions such as Joseph Brant's case, almost never
did the British

government issue commissions

to Indian leaders elsewhere.^^

The

tribes in the

Ohio

Quote taken from White, The Middle Ground 455
.

As

the virtual protege of Sir

William Johnson, Brant's case was exceptional. Blue Jacket stood as
another notable exception, having received a commission from John Johnson. But even then.
Blue Jacket
was already an established war chief among the Shawnees, and did not derive his authority from the
British; Sugden, Blue Jacket 27, 68. Furthermore, some rival Shawnee chiefs from the
Mekoche tribal
.

made "a
having made any
division

great noise about Blue Jacket's Commission," and "blame[dj the English very much for
chiefs among them especially the younger Brothers [referring to Blue Jacket's Piqua

were made, they say it ought to have been some of them." See George Ironside to
Alexander Mckee, 6 February 1795, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence Ill: 288-89; Calloway, Crown
division], if any

.
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Valley would not recogn.ze
Bnt.sh-.mposed authority or distinctions,
particularly
did not conform to the proper
Shawnee, Delaware, and

m the North, such

Whereas

Ottawas, and the British

at

Miami

an infrastructure did not exist
Forts

Mackinac and

St.

these

.f

poht.cal hierarchy.

among

the Ojibwas and

Joseph encountered

much

less

resistance to their meddling in tribal
affairs.

Another

distinctive feature of British-Indian
relations at Fort St. Joseph, setting

apart

from circumstances

army

officers in Indian affairs.

at

it

Amherstburg, was the degree of involvement
of its regular

When

Alexander

McKee

first

discovered that Doyle had

granted a commission to a Native leader, the
"astonished" Indian agent immediately
notified his superiors.

commissions per

McKee, however,

se, for

he saw no danger

an authority over them. Instead,

had usurped a

commission

to

did not protest the actual granting of
Indian

McKee

in

meddling

complained

that

Indian affairs, or wielding such

Doyle, a regular army officer,

and privilege reserved for the Indian Department by
issuing a

role

an Indian. Doyle had prevented "ft]he Principal officers
of the

Department" from

fulfilling their

duty and from increasing "their influence by the

Selection of proper characters for chiefs."^'^ Joseph
the

in

Army commissions

chiefs,

it

Chew

agreed, claiming that whenever

"Surely will have a Bad Effect with Regard

Influence the Officers of the Department ought to have with Indians."^^ For

Chew, Doyle's

to the

McKee

and

actions threatened the Indian Department, because they viewed the

Department's role as that of a permanent liaison between the government and a people

and Calumet 43. The Mekoche division of the Shawnees provided hereditary peace chiefs who presided
over affairs involving the entire nation. Blue Jacket, a war chief from a different division, had no
.

permanent or hereditary authority. Sugden, Blue Jacket 9-10,27; James Howard, 27, 38-39; Trowbridge,
.

Shawnese Traditions
Alexander

McKee

.

8.

to

Joseph Chew, 19 June 1796,

CNA, RG

133

8,

Military

C Series,

Vol. 249, 216.

who

should be kept in a

Department
grievance,

officers

state

of continual dependency, and the
agents viewed the Indian

as best suited for continuing
to cultivate that sort of relationship.
In his

McKee

would "be

complained

that Indians receiving direct

commissions from army

freed from that dependence on
the Department

which has

hitherto

constituted

all

the hifluence and fnendship so
happily established between the Bntish

Nation and

all

the Indians in this Country.

These statements show
circumstances

at the

that

McKee

and

Chew

northern post, nor could they foresee the imminent
changes

McKee's own Amherstburg

agency. Not only did

officers to interfere in Indian affairs, but the agent

regular

army

officers

course, occurred

Captain Hector

did not fully grasp the

began

when

to eclipse the Indian

the events that led to

McLean

McKee

think

was soon

improper for army

ftirther

Department

Matthew

it

at

at

dismayed when

Amherstburg. This, of

Elliott's dismissal in

1797

left

wielding substantial authonty over Amherstburg 's branch
of the

Indian Department. The role of the military in hidian affairs theoretically
should have

been reduced when Indian
the Lieutenant

affairs

had come under

civil authority in

1

796, since this gave

Governor supreme authority over the Indian Department

province. Therefore, prior to the McLean-Elliott controversy

at

in the

upper

Amherstburg, Doyle's

granting of Indian commissions in the North would have appeared as an even greater

usurpation of the Indian Department's role.

What

the elder

Mackinac and

^'^

Joseph

Chew

Alexander

to

St.

McKee

Joseph

in

1

did not realize was that the British military

796 held principal authority over the Indian agency

Captain James Green, Military Secretary, 14 July 1796,

McKee

to

command

Chew, 19 June 1796,

ibid.,

216.
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ibid.,

218.

at

there.

Conversely, the Indian Department

antonomous manner
Joseph extended

its

at

Amherstburg

One

until late in 1797.

reason

funetionecl in a virtually

still

why

the military leadership at St.

authority over the hulian Department
there

of the Department remained disorganized and
siiorthanded, as

move from Mackinac. McKee had
Superintendent

at St.

assigned post."

Joseph, but the younger

Except

agency, choosing instead

Governor

appointed his

for short visits, J

McKee

even Huent enough

Duggan doubled

Thomas

Deputy

homas McKee never spent any time

at his

In

order to cut costs,

McKee's appointment of an

one point the agency employed an

to adecjualely

as

to its

at his

remain near his Amherstburg home.

to

the post, and at

at

son

had been prior

it

branch

that

never bothered to reside

(ieneral Prescott rescinded Alexander

interpreter

own

was beeause

communicate with

interpreter

additional

who was

the Indians.^^ Indian agent

not

Thomas

as storekeeper and clerk, but he eventually ran afoul of
the post

commandant when he began drinking heavily and puiportedly

expropriated and traded

Indian goods from the storehouse.^'' I-urther complicating matters, Charles
Chaboillcz,

Duggan's French-speaking replacement, could not understand

Fnglish.^''

conditions army personnel assumed control over Indian affairs

at St.

^'

Under these

Joseph, and Major

Thomas McKee assumed Flliott's position at Amherstburg; upon the lattcr's
holding tiic assignment of Deputy Superinteiuleiit loi both posts smuillaiieousiy between
Ihereloie made sense lor lum to reside at Amlieistbuig dining that period. Nonetiieless,

Vincent, 105. In truth,

dismissal, tlieicby

and IXOS.

17')7

McKee

cho.se not to reside at his assigned post, bolli prior to lUliott's disnussal

restoration.
uiilil

the

Although from

War of

"

Vincent, 106.

"

Ibid.,

CNA,

It

106-07;

R(;

8,

McKee

held the position as

St.

altei the latter's

Joseph's Deputy SupcniUendent

1812.

ieutenant Robert Cowell to

l

Military

Vincent, 107

a distance,

and

I

t

C

Major James Green, Military Secretary, 29 August 1801,

Same

Series, Vol. 2^}, .Ml-4.^;

to

same, 10

l

ebiuary 1802,

("owell ordinarily had to translate instructions into

Cowell was eventually translerred

to a diHerenl assignment,

greatest difl'iculty with respect to the instnictions

requesting that in future they

may

be Sent

in

1

(

haboille/.

I

rench

inlormed

receive and hope there

both Hnglish

135

loi

is

& French, or the

(

ibid..

Vol. 254, 3-6.

Alter

liaboille/..

Ins superiors, "1

no impropriety

latter alone,

my

in

when

have the

I

can have

Doyle considered himself justified

He

instances.

in issuing

commissions

to certain Indians

m rare

could easily justify this practice,
not only because special circumstances

merited these favors, but because no
person of adequate rank
northern branch of the hidian Department

who

at the

time served in the

could confer such an honor.

Perhaps the military authonties heeded
Alexander McKee's complaints. For

whatever reason,

it

does not appear that Doyle's successors
issued any additional

commissions. Nevertheless, representatives

in the hidian

under the auspices of post commandants,
continued

Department

their practice

at St.

Joseph's,

of creating chiefs

within the small bands of Ottawas and Ojibwas
that regularly visited the post. The
elder

McKee

had no objections,

as long as the Indian

Department played a key role

ceremonial process of establishing a chief Thus, the
Department's

in the

officials at St.

Joseph's continued to present each newly-created chief
with a medal and usually a

Jack for the chiefs band

to

hang above

Umon

their village, an indicafion that those receiving

these items took great pride in the disfincdve status they
symbolized.

The

British

needed

to use caution, taking care not to create

necessary for their purposes, nor to award too
distributed

whom

numerous medals,

many medals. Had

more

chiefs than

they carelessly

the Indian agents might have inadvertently created a chief

the prospective leader's people

deemed

less deserving

and

less

experienced as a

hunter and a warrior. Such a situation would only foster jealousy, having the opposite
effect

of the medal's intended purpose of cultivating loyalty

headman. Moreover,
distinction and

a distribution

to a British-controlled

of too many medals would diminish the value of their

undermine the respect due those who wore them. Therefore,

British

not doubts respecting their meaning." Charles Chaboillez, Storekeeper and Clerk to Prideaux Selby, 31
May 1803, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15481.
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officals at Fort

St.

bandleaders, or to

summer of

In the

medal

for his son,

Joseph always attempted

to present

men who were acknowledged
797,

1

[it]

as leaders sinee "the time

prudent to wait for Colo.

directions with respect to giving
Eshkan's

Son

Predecessors, Relations, were ever

to

storekeeper pleased the young

known

man by

a

Medal

all

who knows

all

to

In the

the

Ottowas

further

any of his

Duggan

the gorget instead of a

at

requested a

meantime, the

giving h.m a gorget instead

the other Chiefs of that place if a

Langlade had good reason
just north

of the French."

McKee's

as [neither] he nor

be Chiefs."

"The reason of my being of the opinion of giving

would offend

to older, established

when Eshkan, an Ottawa man from Arbre
Croche,

Duggan "thought

because Mr. Langlade

them

explained,

Medal was

Arbre Croche well, said that

it

Medal was given."'^

be concerned. Arbre Croche, a cluster of villages

of Little Traverse Bay on the northwest shore of
Michigan's Lower Peninsula,

had served as the Ottawa nation's most important community
and the center of Ottawa
affairs

from the 1760s.'' In

Joseph's, a

fifteen

three

much

larger

May

1798, less than a year after Eshkan's band visited

Ottawa delegation arrived from Arbre Croche,

Union Jacks! After presenting Duggan, Langlade, and

Makaks of Sugar,"

the principal leader

his concern that the British system

this

St.

time bearing

the officers with "Forty

among them, Keeminichaugan, expressed

of establishing chiefs was undermining

tribal unity:

Father, Since our old Principal Chiefs deaths the

Young Chiefs hold Councils by
themselves constantly, this is the reason We are not all come together, I am sorry
We are not all united as fomierly, there are different parties among us. It is your
fault. Father, in not following the Ancient Customs of Your Children the Ottowas,
You make too many Young Chiefs this is the Cause of the differences among us
and the reason We are not all come together, besides You received Several of
"
76

Entry for 3 July 1797, Duggan Journal

Helen Hornbeck Tanner,

Oklahoma

ed., Atlas

of Great Lakes Indian History (Norman and London: University of

Press, 1987), 62, 132.
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dTno?re to^ir
Immediately

after voicing these concerns,

ended by reaffirming

behaved well and

Keeminichaugan asked

his people's loyalty, stating,
"Father,

We

for additional gifts and

remember our Ancestors

follow their examples."^^

Keeminichaugan's remarks indicate
developing jealousies and factionalism
installed leaders

-on why We

^-''^-'^ ^'^^
^

at

that

Langlade's previous concerns regarding

Arbre Croche were perceptive. The
British-

had indeed divided the community

at

Arbre Croche, and as the older

chiefs died, this allowed for a turnover in
Ottawa leadership. Although Bntish

intervention

may have

caused temporary competition and disunity,
the Ottawas had never

had any form of centralized governmental authority
prior

Ottawa leaders held

virtually

no power apart from

to

Bntish meddling, and former

their level

of influence and

ability to

persuade. Since Ottawas, like their Ojibwa brethren, were
politically organized

and not as a single

tribe or nation, British-based authority

may have

in

bands

actually served to

unite the bands in the long run. In any case, despite
Keeminichaugan's concerns over the
loss

of Ottawa

common
known

unity, his people later

demonstrated that they could rally around a

cause whenever necessary, as in their struggles against the Sioux.
At no other

time did the Indians
British influence

in the

among

North complain about British meddling

the leaders of northern

any Franco-Spanish invasion force would have
loyalty and cooperation.

Any army would have

little

in their affairs.

Ojibwas and Ottawas insured

that

chance of gaining the Indians'

great difficulty in advancing up the

Mississippi Valley, across the hidian-held portages, and through the Mackinac corridor

"

Entry for 23

May

1798,

Duggan

Journal.

Ibid.
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without

suppcl or.hc

(l.c

nui,genot,s Rritish trading pailncs.

general pro-lint.sh sentiments and
invasion. (^,p,ain

nobody

ties,

nnunniond seemed

James Green warned hnn oflTeneh attempts
antieipaled hieneh-led atlaek.

appear pleased
Hridsh

(

lollow

lis

al

wha(

traders

among

to

suspeel an

Russell and MU.tary Secretary

to onl.st the Indians n, then

(he Indians

l'resen(s (hey ge(,

iovernn.e>.(."'"

when

Drununond responded

found any dissatislaction as yet

North had reason

n, (he

surprised

Because ofthe Indums'

to (ireen,

who

and Deelares

elaunu.,

cause prior
thai

an

he "had not

resort (c (h.s Post, Ihcy

|s.e| their

to

always

attachment to the

No( a((ack lollowed. ronsec,uently, the British
Hag condn.ied to

mto American and Spanish

territories,

and these

latter

governmen(s

found (hat they could not break (he s(ranglehold of Bri(ish
(rade and inlluence over the
Indians of (he wes(crn Great Lakes and (he upper Mississippi
Valley.""

Drummond

and odier Bi Kish

ollicials in die

North worried

less

abou(

l-rench invasion than they worried about (he incessan( hostilKies
be(weeii (he

and (he Dakota Sioux.

This,

more (han odier I'uro-Ainerican

disrupt Rritish trade and inlluence in (he Nordi.

Winnebagoes

a po(enlial

Opbwas

|)owers, Ihrealened to

A( (imes the Mcnominees and

also had altercations with the Ojibwas."'

The British

at St.

Joseph's tried

vain to broker a permanent peace between these nations, but they merely achieved
a
series

of temporary

and Ojibwas

Sauk

^'

tribes

Dnimmond

at

truces, beginning with

Mackinac

in

1787. Yet the Sioux,

would not be manipulated by

to

John Dease's diplomacy between the Sioux

Menominee, Winnebago, and

the British to the

Green. 21 Mardi 1799, MPilC, XX: 0

same

l<'ox

extent as the Ojibwas

U).

Kellogg, 237-38, 242.

Louis Ai tluir Tohill, "Robert Dickson, Hiilish Fur Trader ou the
Historical Quarterly 3(1) (October 1028):

S.

1^0

I

ipj^er

&

Mississippi/* Ntwlli Dakiila

in

and Ottawas. Due largely
latter

to

two nations had much

geography but also

partially to their tnbal structure,
the

closer ties to the Bnt.sh at St.
Joseph's, while the Natives
,n

Wisconsin and the upper Mississippi
Valley

visited St. Joseph's

Despite less contact with the Western
groups, the British

still

much

less frequently.

held considerable

mHuence

over them through their numerous
traders along the rivers of Wisconsin
and Mmnesota,

and the officers

at St.

could the Indians.
activity

Joseph could rely on traders

When

for reconnaissance just as
well as they

Lieutenant (iovernor Russell

initially

wanted a report of any

on the upper Mississippi, Captain Dnimmond
explained,

difllcult to get Intelligence

war with

the Indians

from the Mississipy

in that

[sic] as the

"It will

Chippawas

make

it

more

& Ottawas are at

Quarter, having no Intercourse with one
another.

The Surest

Information will be by the Indian Traders. "^^

Drummond
area that included a

referred to the traders in a region south and
west of

number of private

British traders and

Lake Superior, an

encompassed the important

Fox-Wisconsin River portage. The traders there generally operated
independently, or
small combinations, belonging to neither the North West nor

men

XY Companies."

who

did not often visit British posts, by encouraging them to prefer
British goods,

and by preventing American and Spanish attempts
trader,

Robert Dickson, established

daughter.

84

ties

to

develop a trade network. One such

with the Dakotas and married a chiefs

After more than two decades of living

among

his wife's people,

instrumental in recruiting his clients and kinsmen into the British cause

Uniminond

to

Vol. 252, 51-52;

"

These

helped to maintain a British sphere of influence by cultivating
relations with those

tribes

-

in

Major James Green, Military Secretary,

MPHC, XX:

630.

Kellogg, 241;Tohill, 12-14.

140

21

March 1799, CNA,

RG

8,

Dickson was

in the

War of

Military

C

Scries

1812.

In the

absence of more formal

such as the Chain of Friendship
which the

ties,

British had cuh.vated with nations
further east, the informal
mdividual bonds

traders and the Sioux are

nineteenth century.

what cemented British-Dakota

More

of the

importantly, as a result of these links, the
Sioux recognized the

British as kinsmen, in spite of the
their

relations at the turn

between the

enemies the Ojibwas, both

ongomg

at St.

relationship the British maintained
with the

Joseph and through the North West Company.^^

John Johnson, Superintendent of Indian

Affairs,

had an unrealistic perception of

the nature of British relations with the Native groups
further west, particularly with the

Sioux and

their hostility

towards the Ojibwa nation. Johnson regarded the
continuing

warfare which pitted the Ojibwas and Ottawas against the
Sioux "merely as a private
Quarrel," ever since Amabic, an Ottawa Chief from Arbre
Croche, visited him

at

Montreal, claiming that some distant traders had fomented
"Hostilities... between the

Sioux and

them."'^^'

The Superintendent mistakenly believed

that British

intluencc, via the Indian Department, extended to that region in the

had evolved southwest of Detroit.

On

power and

same manner

that

it

multiple occasions in the late 1790s, Johnson

naively referred to "the Peace that was Settled with them by Mr. Dease [Johnson's

cousin]" more than a decade
nations,

whom

earlier.*^^

Johnson simply could not believe

that the

western

he considered under British auspices, would defy a British-mandated

peace without having been under an external and devious influence. The head agent went

'"Tohill, 14.
85

Gary Clayton Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations

(Lincoln

&

London: University of Nebraska

in the

Upper Mississippi

Press, 1984), 76.

Major James Green, Military Secretary, 3 December 1798, CNA, RG 10, Indian
Series A, Vol. 1,251; Johnson to ?, 7 July 797, CNA, MG 9 F
Claus Papers, Vol. 8,11.
John Johnson

to

1

1

87

Johnson

to ?, 7 July 1797,

CNA,

MG

19

F

1,

1

Claus Papers, Vol.
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,

8,

12

Affairs,

on

to

accuse "cn.r remote Traders. .[of
being] the Instigators of those
Predatory Wars
.

from Interested Motives," and he
instructed

his Held agents

and the comma.,dant

at St.

Joseph's to remind the.n (the Indians)
of Dease's peace settlement "with
those
nations.

.
.

when they pronnsed

Large Helt with

my name

m

the

most Solenm manner never

and the year upon

them of what was agreed upon."^« Johnson

,1,

was

left

,nust not

have real./cd

for

First, (he

backing British
the North

was

interests.

West Company,

Spanish and American

the activities of these very

Due

to the traders^

the hidians

territories,

who

Johnson

to

more

than a dccade.«'^

men

away

for the

that kept the

as the west side

continued

western tribes

continued inHuence and the expansion of

lived in the

Upper Mississippi Valley,

in

both

continued to Hy Union Jacks over their villages during

the early years of the nineteenth century.'"'

88

very

Superintendent had imagined the British regime
in

of the Mississippi; second, Johnson mistakenly blamed the
traders
it

a

that hostilities

the North strong enough to compel the cooperation
of nations as far

hi fact,

and

persisted for another half-century.

Johnson erred twice.

hostilities,

it,

w.lh the C'h.ppewas to remind

between the Ojibwas and the Sioux had continued
uninterrupted

The Sioux -Ojibwa wars

break

to

The

traders possessed

Green, Military Secretary, 3 Deccmlier 1798,

CNA, RG

.far

more inOuence than

10, Indian Affairs, Series

A

Vol

I

252-53.

llickcrson, 83; Danziger, 61-62. Years later, Lieutenant Zebiilon Montgomery Pike,
American emissary
to the I Ippcr Mississippi, commented on why the British had failed to quell the Indian
wars there:
I
|hc British government
often brought the chiefs of the two nations together, at Michilimackinac; made
.

.

them presents, & c. but the Sioux, still haughty and overbearing, spurned the proferred calumet (italicized
as done in original text); and returned to renew the scenes of slaughter and barbarity. ..the British
government, it is true, requested, recommended, and made presents; but all this at a distance; and when the
.

chiels returned to their bands, their thirst of blood soon obliterated from their recollection the lectures of
humanity, which they had heard in the councils of Michilimackinac." Donald H. Jackson, ed.. The Journals

of Zebu Io n MontMomery Pike, with Letters and Related Documents 2 Vols. (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1966), I: 216-17; Danziger, 64-65.
Kellogg, 258.
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own

the.r

The

government, and they certainly did not
want contnu.cd nUertnbal

conll.ets.

incessant warfare between the Sioux
and the Oj.bwas often hn.dered trade,
and U

also threatened the hves of the traders,
particularly those

near to the bands with winch they dealt.^'
These
(hose traders

who belonged

and a few of them

to the larger

lost their lives.''^

who worked

men had

companies found

virtually

that they too

own

lives

before he

was

were vulnerable,

and fortunes; indeed, the year

before his death Michael (\irot, an agent with
the North West
rival,

no protection. Even

Although nvalnes oAen grew intense, traders
d,d not

tend to loment wars that might endanger
their

with his

alone and hved

killed at his

own

Company, sought refuge

post the following

year.''^

Although the Sioux-Ojibwa wars persisted, the Ottawas
did not always participate
in

these conHicts.

that distant traders

the Sioux,

was

The Ottawa
planned

leader

Amable, who

to instigate hostilities

initially

between

his people at

in the

to

John Johnson

Arbre Croche and

either confused or manipulative, because he chd not
represent the

sentiments of his community. Three months after Amable's

Montreal

complained

summer of

1

797, Captain

Drummond

visit

with Johnson near

held a council

at St.

Joseph's with

See "The Narrative of Peter Pond," in Five Fur Traders of the Northwest ed. Charles
M. Gates, with an
Introduction by (iracc Lcc Nulc (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society,
1965), 47. On the eve of the
American Revolution, Pond and the other traders had solicited the intervention of Mackinac's
commandant,
Arent de Peyster, to negotiate a peace hciwccn the Sioii.x and Ojibwas, but the Colonel "told
them it was
0[u]t of his Power to Bring the CioverniiKiil Into l.ncy I'xpcns in Sending to ihise But Desird that
we
,

would

&

Means among (Ourselves and he would Indavcr to youse his Hniluans as
CumMandin|g| Ooffiser." Even at that early date British leaders knew tiiat they did not hold the
fall

on wase

necessary to impose a peace, and they expected the traders to influence the Indians for
diplomacy.

llie

authority

benefit of British

Sioux killed Michael Curot, a trader of the North West Company, for having .supplied
the Ojibwas; see ibid., 240. More than a dozen years earlier, the Sioux had killed David

hi 1806, the

weapons
Monin, a

to

clerk of the North

West (\impany, and

his

companion. See "The Diary of John MacDonell

"

in

ibid., 112.

'•^

.lohn Tanner's description

of the

which

the Nor' westers fomented against the Hudson Bay outpost on
Red River near Lake Winnipeg stands as a rare exception. In that incident, the traders of the North
West Company had little to fear in the way of reprisals, but one of them was sentenced to death in a court
raid

the

of law. See John fanner, 209-10.
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an Ottawa delegation from Arbre
Croche, confronting them directly
about the rumors of
"considerable difficulties

among

themselves. .instigated by the
Traders." The chiefs
.

resoundingly "answered they had no
knowledge of any thing of the kind and
were certain

no such speech had been sent by
any bad

listen to

their Nation,

reports, that there

was no

They then begged

truth in

their Father

would not

them and hoped he would never think

of them again."^^ For good measure, the
following June an Ottawa delegation
from

Arbre Croche returned

to St.

Joseph on their

way

"to see their father Sir

Their leader, Keeminichaugan, "begged hard,"
asking Duggan to write a

John Johnson."
letter for

him

to

present to Johnson, stating.

We heard of the bad Bird's conduct in lower Canada We have be-n
We thank you for wnting our father [Captain Drummond] last

Father, since

very sorry.

.We were not concerned in any of that bad Bird's transactions,
he makes us
very much afflicted at what he said— We shall send
down in a few days a Canoe
well manned to meet him, when he sees our
people he will contradict
fall.

.

every thine

he said of us.

The Ottawas
and

British,

at

Arbre Croche remained firmly attached, both

in their

in their loyalty to the

dependence on the traders sent among them.

One can only

speculate as to Amable's motives for fabricating stories to
Johnson

regarding the actions of the traders in Indian country, but perhaps the
Ottawa headman

had valid cause

who

lived

among

Amable knew

Council

to resent the traders, both those at his village

the Sioux.

that they dealt

Even

if the traders

weapons

to his

of Arbre Croche and those

did not actively attempt to foment a war,

enemies, and the mere fact that British

Joseph's with Ottawa delegation from Arbre Croche, October, 1797, Duggan Journal.
Captain Drummond recorded the delegations' official statement at this council, and he took the signatures
of all the chiefs present, five village chiefs and five war chiefs. These are listed in Captain Peter
at St.

Drummond

Chiefs and their Reply, 19 October 1797,
Series, Vol. 250-2, 317-18.
to the

Entry for 7 June 1798, Duggan Journal.
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MPHC, XX:

561;

CNA, RG

8,

Military

C

traders bartered

weapons

to belligerent nations already
at

For the Bntish had begun

sides.

to cultivate relations

war endangered

prior to

also fight to defend the Bntish traders
on

on both

with the Sioux similar to those that

they had established with Amable's people
more than a generation

would now

lives

earlier,

and the Sioux

whom they depended. A month

Amable's meeting with Johnson, Duggan reported

that

some

British

Traders were nearly pillaged by the Sacques and
Renards headed by some
[Spanish] Traders around with authonty ft-om
the Spanish Commandant at St
Lewis. [Fjortunately for those interested, a party
of Scioux were at La

Prairie

Chien which overawed the other Indians and the property

Amable might have perceived

that the

with the Sioux as they had with his
that they

Bntish were attempting

own

dependence and poverty resulting from the
until after the

and West would continue

to

War of

.

of danger.*^^

.out

to establish s>anbiotic ties

people, and perhaps the Ottawa leader feared

had become the pawns of empire

From 1800

is.

due

as they faced a debilitating future

of

trade.

1812, British relations with Natives in the North

be marked by a pattern of trade and dependence, but British

attempts to quell warring nations there would never fully succeed, because British
officials did not possess the authority

they

managed

to exert

power over

persisted between those groups

and control over the Sioux

the Ottawas and Ojibwas.

summer of

1799, Captain

same extent

The perpetual

became an accepted way of life, and by

nineteenth century British leaders in the North no longer

pressing pnority. hi the

to the

struggle that

the turn of the

made seeking peace

Drummond

wrote

that

there a

to Military

Secretary Major Green, cavalierly stating,

I

am happy

to

inform you that most of the Mississipy Traders are

amved

at

Mackinac, and bring no news of Importance, only the old Quarrel between the
Chippawas and the Seus [sic] is still kept up as usual, but nothing of any

Entry for 12 June 1797,

ibid.
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consequence has happened only

Despite the ongoing

a

few Scalps taken, which

Duggan happily reported

hostilities,

in

is

the case every

1801 that

all

Indians in his

"quarter appear very well affected to [the
Bntish] Govemrnent."^^^ Thus, British-hidiai
relations in the North continued in a unique

manner

in

which trade and

defined British relations with indigenous nations,
some of which were
another. Conversely, British authorities

less,

at

war with one

strove to decrease their ties with the Natives
and lessen the latter's reliance on

nineteenth century

was geared toward

encouraging unity of the

Drummond
Duggan

to

letter

Military

C

to

Green, 24 June 1799,

Pndeaux Selby,

Upper Canada

Upper Mississippi

MPHC, XX:

the turn of the

and traders had attempted

to

Valley.^^

640.

Military Secretary, 6 July 1801,

from The Duke of Portland

at

creating intertribal division, rather than

sort that British officers, agents,

cultivate at Fort St. Joseph and in the

See

at

Amherstburg, where trade volume was much

British support. Also, British policy elsewhere in

^'

familial ties

to Lieutenant

CNA,

MG

19 F

1,

Claus Papers, Vol.

8,

Governor Peter Hunter, 4 October 1799, CNA,

Series, Vol. 252, 270-71.
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CHAPTER 4

A NEW SOCIETY ON THE GRAND RIVER,

A third
was

the

locale of British-Indian relations
after the

Grand R, ver, a

site north

General Sir Frederick Haldimand

of Lake Erie
in

1

784

in

1784-1801

American Revolution ended

Upper Canada,

for the Six Nations

set aside

and

had fought for the British during the war. At
Amherstburg and

in the

maintained a sphere of influence mainly through
trade and Indian

1790s

at

Amherstburg

British officers reduced

all gifts

their

by Governor

dependencies

North, Britain had

gifts,

though

and annual presents

former Native alhes. The Grand River community
was distinctive

who

m that

it

in the

to their

was

a large

grant of territory intended as a place of settlement
for the loyal refugee tribes, including

Mohawks, Cayugas, Onondagas, Senecas,
were from

New

Tuscaroras, and Delawares, most of whom

York.

This chapter will explore

how

the terms of the

Haldimand Grant became a

contested subject between British authorities and the natives. The

cover the period from

1

784

to

1

first

subsection will

797, during which both tribal and British leaders

attempted to define the nature of the Grant on terms favorable to their
respective
interests.

The key

issue of this period

River would be allowed to

sell

was whether

the Indian residents of the

Grand

land to white settlers. British resistance to such proposals

contributed to a virtual deadlock between the British and Indians regarding land sales by
the end of this period, and the stalemate fueled a dispute over the extent of Six Nations'

sovereignty' and the Native legal status in Canada in general.

The Six Nations

at

the

For the purposes of this study and specifically for the context of this chapter, the term "sovereignty" is
used to describe the extent to which the Natives, specifically the Six Nations' community at the Grand
'
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Grand River
their

stressed that they

community

were the King's

alHes, nothing more.

They tended

to

view

as a self-sufficient, separate
pohtical entity that could deal with
outside

nation-states and individuals
independently of Great Bntain's interference.
Conversely,
for Britain Native

autonomy

Whitehall was not prepared

in

Upper Canada presented

to grant Indian

demands

a potential security threat, and

pertaining to sovereign authonty

over land. The onginal Haldimand Grant
made no provision for the Indians

any of their

land,

government the

to alienate

and even the subsequent amended land
patents always gave the British

right

River case was the

of preemption, acknowledging only Crown
sovereignty. The Grand

first

internal Indian crisis in

United States gained independence, but

it

jurisprudence and Canadian Indian policy

Canada

that the

Bntish faced after the

would influence subsequent Bntish

down

colonial

to the present time.

A second secfion covers Bntish relations with the Grand River Indians and related
tribes

from 1797

Grand River land
between British

to

1801 and will show that a series of controversies, less broad
than the

sales issue but

officials

and

still

their

undemiined friendly

significant, further

former Indian

allies.

Again, the

common

relations

thread

running through these struggles was the greater issue of Iroquois sovereignty,
which

remained nebulous as both sides were compelled
years

at the

Grand River. The Six Nations'

to

compromise during these

legal status in

undefined long after the close of the period covered by

Canada would remain

this study.

River, could conduct itself as an independent nation, govern itself by

its

own

customs, enter into agreements with foreign peoples and other indigenous
transactions and distribute Reserve property,

all

crucial

laws, practice

its

own

and conduct land
without the consent of the British government.
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tribes,

Response

When
1

784, the

community was composed of a

indicated that

the Grand.

new

various bands of Ind.an refugees
originally settled along the Grand
R.ver

1

A census taken ,n

diverse set of peoples.

1

in

785

,843 loyal Natives from mneteen
different tnbes or bands had
settled at

In addition to elements

of the S,x Iroquo.s Nations, other
groups found

at the

reserve included Delawares, Nanticokes,
Montours, Creeks, Cherokecs, Tootalies,

Oghguagas, and Canadian Iroquois from
entire

community were

Iroquois, and the

St. Reg.s.^

Mohawks

Nevertheless, over two-thirds of the

alone numbered nearly a quarter of

the total populace.

These figures helped
influence

at

the

Grand River

Mohawk sachem
intertribal

Joseph Brant maintain a greater level of

community than other Native

Brant soon became the community's pnncipal
spokesperson and
record as a war chief during the

Amencan

this era.

As

a youth, Brant had

brother-in-law of the late Sir William Johnson
sister

Molly

as his mistress and eventual

pnmary

leader.

His

Revolution certainly enhanced his standing as

a capable leader, but his other qualities and attributes are
what

pnncipal spokesperson during

leaders there, and

(d.

1774),

common-law

made him
become

who had

wife.

As

the Six Nations'

the protege and

taken Brant's older

a result of his close

connections with the Johnsons, Brant learned English, received some formal
education,
joined the Anglican

Department.
including

faith,

By 786
1

Hugh Percy

and received a captain's commission

he had twice traveled
(later the

to

in the British Indian

England where he met several key

Second Duke of Northumbedand),

A

Home

figures,

Secretary Lord

Census of the Six Nations on the Grand River, 1785, in Charles M. Johnston, ed., The Valley of the Six
Nations: A Collection of Documents on the Indian Lands of the Grand River (Toronto: The Champlain
Society, For tlie Government of Ontario, University of Toronto Press, 1964), 52.
^
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Sydney, Charles James Fox, K.ng
George
Consecuently,

in spite

and the Arehb.shop of Canterbury.

III,

ofnever having possessed any
heredUary author.ty

couneils. Brant's position and
experienee had nu.de

hn.

the

.„ Iroquo.s

most n.portant haison

between the Six Nations and the
whUes when the Grand R.ver Reserve
was estabhshed.^
Early

in

1787, Brant and the S.x Nations' leaders

made

their Hrst

transaet.ons by selhng several
thousand aeres to ten Loyahst friends.
Apart from the

la.Kl

llald.mand Grant, the Six Nations
possessed no other legal
acted independently, without ineluding
the government
(he transaet.ons

title to

these lands, but they

in the transaetion.

later,

he vowed

to

"order

the white people olTthe Lands."'

all

General instructed John Johnson

confirm

to

their [the while people's]

mform

1

I

laldimand

(irant.

all

concerned parties

Much of the

now seemed

confiict

to

transfers

more than

to

King

will never

keep possession."^

be reneging on the stipulations

stemmed from

the vagueness of the

laldimand Deed, which, while not expressly restricting the
alienation of Native lands,

did not sanction the transferring of land either. According
to the

I

laldimand Grant, the

Indians were "to take possession of and settle upon the
Banks of the [GrandJ Rivcr."^'

For Brant's origins and position witlnn
London, sec ibid., 380-91.
^

Mohawk

society, Kclsay, 39-41; for the chiefs final visit lo

*

Speech by John Dcseronto at Conncil at the Ray of Qninte
September 1800, Johnston. Valley of the Six Nations S4
'

Statement by Sir John Johnson

1788,
*

in

Dorchester's

Name

to

(recalling events

Aaron and

ibid., 72.

"Ilaldimand (irant,"

in

Graymont, Appendix B, 299; Kelsay, 363.
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a

The Governor

that "the

Grants nor allow the individuals

Brant was incensed that the British

of the

For some time

went unnoticed by both the Indian
Department and Governor General

Lord Dorchester. However, when Dorchester
learned of these land
year

Grand River

of September, 1788), 2-10

i.saac Hill,

Montreal 20 September

Tlu>u,l, (he government's intent
behind the prochnnat.on

assumed

that

by

this

document

Crown

the

was

later often

debated, B.ant

olTered land to the Six Nat.ons on
an ec.ual

basis with any other grants of land that
the government awarded to whites

The

(

llmpne Loyalists,

Inited

subsequently settled
land to

(hat

whomever

common

example, had fought for the Kn.g

Upper Canada

u. the

govern.nenCs expense; many

at the

Canada.

war and
later sold their

they chose. In other words, the S.x Nations
expected a written deed

acknowledged

held in

m

for

m

their full

by

all

ownership

to the

Crand River

lands, or a

title in

fee simple,

of the reserve's Native inhabitants.

The controversy was

intertwined with the greater issue of Iroquois
sovereignty.

Rrant and the Six Nations, while desiring

full

possession of their lands, knew that they

could not adecpialely argue their case from the perspective of
the United l-mpire Loyalists
or other whites, because these settlers were acknowledged as Hrilish
subjects, while the
Indians viewed themselves as autonomous

River community could

l

sell or lease

then lands lo

allies.

If indepciulciu, tiien the

whomever they

Grand

pleased, whether to

iench, American, or British settlers, without the consent of Whitehall or any
leaders in

Canada. Rrant believed
over

all

of

Iheir affairs.

that the Iroquois

In

response

on which we stood previous"
knew... they

'1

by

hail

no

to the

he Hrilish held

ailici lo

I

.inner

(

degree of mastery

Dorchester's restrictions against the Six Nations'
that the Iroquois are

"on the same footing

American war, adding, "your government well

i|uile aiiolher

iIk- latter

F.xceipt Iroin Joscpli Hiaiil's speech
(

this

right to interfere with us as independent nations."^

the Cabot family in

lioin

to

had always po.ssessed

of Grand River lands, the sachem argued

sale

'

Crown

loionio:

part

iit

view. Ever since the Canadian discoveries

of the sixteenth century, overall sovereignty of

Niagaia,

JdIiiiC.

made

late

I

/KOs, in T. G. Marquis, ed., jiuildc

Winston Co., 1903), 202-03.

i.s

ul ranaila

Bntish possessions

m North Amenca had always rested with the Enghsh

the Bntish) Monarch.

known

the nght,

give them

Of course

as the nght of usufruct, to
dwell

full title.

Whenever

government maintained
the land, but that

the Indians within these vast

was

that the tnbes

all,

since the

domains had

upon and use the

the Indians ceded their lands

by

still

enjoyed

land, but this did not

treaty, the British

had actually surrendered

Crown had

(and after 1707,

their usufructuary

nght to

already possessed sovereign authority
over

those lands.^ Contrary to Brant's claims,
the British had never acknowledged
any
different status for the Iroquois lands in
colonial

the Indians' postwar exodus to the

understanding.^ At the
just as before. Brant

tradition.

new

site,

seemed

to

Grand River

New

York, and the government viewed

as a continuation

of a centuries-old

the Six Nations again possessed their
usufructuary right,

be the innovator

in

wanting

to

aher

this

longstanding

Furthermore, the Bntish government could not recognize
Iroquois sovereignty

over the land because British leaders, when fomiing
government Indian policy, did not
consider indigenous groups as political

entities,

but rather as separate racial classes, or

groups, that were to receive special consideration or treatment. '°

With such

radically different notions of the Six Nations' legal status,
conflict

unavoidable. Although Lord Dorchester never evicted the

move

*

to the

Grand River

as he

had threatened

to

do

in

1

first

wave of white

was

settlers to

788, Brant would not rest until he

Wright, 38-39.

A

good example of an eighteenth-century perspective on the relationship benveen the colony of New
York and the Iroquois is Cadwallader Colden's The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada which
Dependent upon the Province of New York... 2 Vols., 1727-1747; also see Jennings, The Ambiguous
Iroquois Empire
1-17, and White, The Middle Ground 351-54.
,

1

are

.

Bruce Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereienty: The Existing Aboriginal Right of Self-Govemment
Canada (Montreal & Kingston, London, and Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 19-20;
Sidney L. Harring, "Indian Law, Sovereignty, and State Law," in A Companion to American Indian
History ed. Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury (Maiden,
& Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers,

MA

,

2002), 453-55.
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in

and the Grand River Council
possessed a deed acknowledging
the Six Nations'
ownership, a

have

to

title in

concede

fee sin^ple. Until that
happened, the British

that the

matter hung

limbo and received

in

concerned with the brewing

crisis

question grew more complex
in

791

1

,

at the

Grand River Reserve. For

less attention, as

on the

nearly drew the British into another

government

government would never

Haldimand Deed meant anything more
than a mere

occupation for the Indians dwelling

when

license

of

several years the

Canadian authonties were more

Maumee when

Amencan

full

the advance of Wayne's

army

war. Furthermore, the Grand River

the British Parliament restructured
the Canadian

creating the province of Upper

Canada and thus an

additional

bureaucratic layer of government with which
Brant would have to contend in his efforts
to gain the land title

When John
Amencan

war,

and the Six Nations' legal status which he sought.

Graves Simcoe, a distinguished veteran and officer who
served

became

the upper province's

first

Lieutenant Governor in 1792, Brant

immediately petitioned Simcoe for the Grand River deed
for the previous seven years.

would remain

in

any future land

feared that Brant

sell

"

Brant

describing the

St.

would deal

deals.

in

first

dined

Mohawk

Mary Quayle

at the

1

he had persistently sought

his efforts to talk Brant out

The Lieutenant Governor and other Bntish

"Land Jobbers," who would

many of whom

lacked loyalty to the Bntish

Simcoe residence

late in

153

in turn

1792, Mrs. Simcoe hinted at this mistrust,

Mrs. Simcoe's Diary (Toronto

Martin's Press, respectively, 1965), 82-83.

of

leaders

parts of the Reserve to

leader as possessing "a countenance of art or cunning." Entry for 9

Innis, ed.,

two men

796." Brant regularly clamored for a

same time continued

these tracts to any set of buyers,

When

1792.

at the

that

issue insured that relations between the

strained until Simcoe's departure in

proper deed, while Simcoe

engaging

The land

in the

& New

December
York; MacMillan of Canada and

govcrnmcn,

o, ,o

,„„sh

The

.ntercsls.

stancion conHnucd, and l.ant
.nlonncd

hul.ans "were not always to be
fools because they had once
been such.'"^

ll.al ll.c

Neither Simcoe nor Dorchester
wanted
sell

Suucoe

to

concede

or lease their lands, so Simcoe
Imally .ssued a

new

to the S.x

Nat.ons the n,ht

to

patent to the S.x Nations in

•lanuary 1793. carelnlly delinn.g
and cncunKscnbnig the Indians' rights
to the land: "IT
IS

ROYAL WILL AND

OL'R

gift

I>IT.ASUR|.; that no t.ansler, alienation
conveyance sale

exchange lease property or possession

District or Territory or

any

part or parcel

shall at

any time be made or given ofthe said

thereof""

In spite

ofthe

full

preventing (he Six Nations from alienating any of
their lands, Simcoe

restrictions

left

an opening to

Brant by including a clause providing for land
sales under the condition that Uiesc

"always.

shall
.

at

some

be purchased for Us [the British governmentj,
our Heirs and Successors

public meeting.

.to
.

be holden

lor that

purpose by the Governor, Lieutenant-

Governor or person administering Our Government."" Hence,
Simcoe did

his best to

please everyone, including both Dorchester and Brant, by
restricting any free alienation

of Iroquois

lands, while simultaneously permitting the

Grand River Six Nations

portions of their territory to the government alone whenever

it

became

ab.solutely

necessary. Yet the Six Nations' council believed that Simcoe had done

undermine Iroquois sovereignty by giving the

liritish

government

preemption over the Grand River lands. Such a policy mirrored
lledgling United States, and

Simcoe
13

to Dorchester, 6

Simcoe^

The Viking
Simcoe \s

usually iHcanl

December

1793,

(

llial llic

Yiiikshank,

liulians

little

more than

the sole right

that practiced

would

Simcoe Correspondence

of

by the

not receive a

.

1

14.

hand River Lands to the Six Nations, 14 January 17*)3, Johnston, Valley o( the
Also see John A. Noon, Law and Government ol tlie (Jrand River Iroquois (New York:

Patent ol the

Six Nations, 74

it

to sell

(

huiul. Inc., 1*M9), 86-87.

Patent, 14 J anuary 1793, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nalions, 74.
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^

competitive pnce for the acreage,

government
patent

still

also

wanted

sir.ce the

land

was not

sold on the open market;
the

to turn a profit in resellmg
the land.

Furthermore, S,mcoe's

maintained a premise of Crown sovereignty,
descnbmg the Six Nations'

Reserve as a "Tract of Land under our
protection."'
Brant rejected the patent outright, arguing
that

purpose of the Haldimand Grant. From then
Council have always claimed

that

until

it

violated the spint, intention,
and

now, the Six Nations' Grand River

Simcoe's deed could never be binding upon
them.'^

If

the Six Nations had merely wanted to sell
the lands without seeking any
additional legal
status, then

Simcoe had technically made

more. Yet the

Mohawk

it

possible for them to do so, but Brant
wanted

leader needed to use caution in seeking
greater autonomy,

because his sentiments could have been construed as
seditious. After rejecting Simcoe's
deed, the Chief poured out his heart to his soon-to-be
estranged friend, Alexander

McKee,

describing the breach between him and the British:

am

Sorry to inform you that we the Grand River Indians are.
.greatly disapoited
[sic] of not having been able to obtain such Deeds
we would have wished to have
.it hurt my pride and feelings extremely.
... I cannot hardly reconcile
myself to
Live on Such Situation I never did expected [sic] that my attachment
to the
English should any time Shake I am totally dispirited.'^
I

.

.

.

Knowing
soon believed

that Brant's loyalty to the British

that they

had further cause

had been shaken, leaders

to question the

Mohawk's

fidelity.

in

Canada

Late in

1793, Simcoe informed Lord Dorchester that the Six Nations' leader communicated
regularly with representatives in the

American government, and

the offers of [the American] Congress to him, were a

Ibid., 73.

Noon,

86,
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Township

that "Brant has said that

for himself, as

much

-

'-^•^

Ik-

,o,

A.ncncn

cxa,,c,.,e.cl

loyally lo

Iruc lo

Ic.

,lK.

„K. ..ul.ans, n.ul .

IlK- I.ul.an

Inlcrcsl,

the Hn,.sl. Na..on."'«

possihil.ly oI

<

^'lh"'l «'

-"'l<l

...

...

Aii.i

i

a

I

dud's

,>,.o.,„.s

Nations'

tiic

sill!

headman would

llniled Stales.'"

perhaps

will, Ihc A„.crica.>,s

The only

Ilppc, Canada.

exploit tins to

trouble

was

ic

a dej'.ree

that in

I

Snncoe

in

still

an eiroit to broker a peace
feared that Hiant

would

,l,a, is

appeared

,.,a.n

Hiaiii lo

McKce, 25 February

Siincoc \o DdicIicsIci, 6

Icvcaj-c

lovcrnor

in

were already

lo Ihe Six

eithei

at

that ll.cS.x

hmau,

to

Ihc

the

Nevertheless,

draw Hiitam

into a

war

coul..iuc alicm|)li.i)' to play oil

1793, Johnston. Vallev of the Six Nations 75
.
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a.ul

war, lessening his diplomatic

manipulate inatteis

ibid.. 76.

to

order to play olTlhc (wo powers,

Nations' advantage.

I

The

..........uU.

of success, between the Hiitish and

Rt iiiaikiuido

December 1793,

lac„,g

S.x Nal.o.is' sovereit',nly. RranI could

)oiches,i-r aboul H. ant's

/

(

play..,,-, oil

Britain

I

a„cl

onlede.aey could help

mcidy

Uiulcs Slates

is

not n>,u-cnu-<l,

-ici.la.anl

against Ihc Dniled States, or that the duel would

a)',a.. IS, the-

,s,

7'n (wo key elcinents with which HranI dealt

Western C'onlederacy and the Americans
leverage

(

1

Ind.ans' advantai-c by

ti.e

polc.t.al d. plo.ua,

had done, w.lh

ol U.an,

Yet Simcocjuslii.ahly feared

ruslrated in lus cllo.ts to

utili/,e (his

just as Ins ancestors

French

I

Ins

....acxcplahU-, par,.c ula,
ly

Si.ncoc tn.slcd the other, Ihc

chiefs in(l„cnce over both the Six Nations and
the Weste...
.,,

nul.Ced

s,a,cn.cnls

wm-

H,.u.. p.ol,al>ly

war.

ica..

ahn.alc nrani wh.k- war

(Idennine Hritam's (ntuic

'

wa. a,ains, .vvol„„onary Fnn.c-.

:,.,op.a..

H.a.., „o,

,1k-

,o. ...n.sd. ,o,

lus A„ad,.,.a,l, vvlu-.c-

To Suucoc, IkanCs

a.iollii-i

Alll.....r.l. ..c-.,l,c-,

so,

day

Suncoc condudui, "'My opnnon

and hono.ablc

wl.c. Hnla.M was anlm..!ul

IIk-

.vu.

..((n. In.,

Rnlisl. I.cl Ms l.nn.s.

a

machinations

Simcoc explained
which

in all

"that he [Bran,] sees the
Caiannt.es [the h.d.ans are to

expeneneel

probabn.ty must uhiniately attend
the Conlmuanee oflhe War, unless
by

some means

or other Great lir.tain shall lake
a dneet part on the protection
ofthe

Indians"^" Si.iicoe demonstrated his
suspicions ofthe chiefs disloyalty
when the he
sided with

McKee

in the latter's dispute

with Brant over a potential peace with
the

American comnnssioners. Simcoe's decision
divide the Western

Americans. Thus,

Simcoe

at the

(

to support

'onlederacy and ultimately proved

more than

in little

Grand River, and

later

six

McKee

over Brant helped

war

fatal to its

to

effort against the

months. Brant was twice thwarted, once by

by McKee, with Simcoe's support,

at the

Miami

Rapids.

Alarmed
has

at

Brant's growing belligerence, Simcoe considered
"the use

made of his Power

and on just principles
that

to

that

be the subject of just alarm and
should be diminished."''

it

By

that

it

[BrantJ

necessary by degrees

is

"just principles"

he intended to reduce Brant's authority gradually through

He

Simcoe meant

official channels.

The

Lieutenant Governor hoped to avoid an overt and permanent schism
between Brant and
the British and sought legal

interpretation indicating

means by which

why

to

the Six Nations could not sell or lease

Having already questioned Brant's motives and
claimed

that the

Laws of Great

^°

^'

reduce Brant's authority, including a fresh

loyalty to the British,

chiefs land schemes were simply

Britain.

Grand River

Simcoe now

"illegal in respect to the

The Lieutenant Governor reminded Brant

that,

Henry Dundas, 20 September 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Corresponden ce. V:

to

Simcoe

to Dorchester,

Simcoe

to

Henry Dundas, 20 September 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence V:

Simcoe

to

Dorchester, 6

Joiin.ston,

Va lley ofthe

Joluiston, Valley
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59.

Six Nations 76.
.

.

December 1793,

Customs and

according to

Simcoe

6 December 1793,

of the Six Nations 75.
,

lands.

59.

British law. if the Indians

were mdeed

being subjects, could not lease or

sell

lands to Brittsh subjects." Th,s
determination

weighed heavily on Brant nearly three years
interpretation in a speech near Fort

and no, subjects, then the Six
Nations, no,

allies,

George

later,

in

1

when he complained about

thts

796." By having the ambiguous

still

unique

legal

status of dependent allies, the Six
Nations had neither the full rights and
privileges

enjoyed by British subjects, nor did they have
the liberty

to

conduct their affa.rs as a

sovereign power.

Simcoe

also delayed

any determinations on the land issue

infomiing Brant that any permanent decision

by

the King's ministers.

to the lands

them."
the

25

Nations

I

shall

do

my

Meanwhile, Simcoe took measures

in the

in

1

building of a

in death,

new

to

in

"In respect

appease Brant to some degree by visiting

council house.

to assist the Six

The government of Upper Canada

for Brant's wife Catherine, in the event

and

Whitehall

utmost to procrastinate any decision on

794 and allocating the necessary funds and resources

promised a future pension
preceding her

m this matter would be made at

The Lieutenant Governor then promised Dorchester,

on the Grand River,

Grand River

for as long as possible,

also

of her husband

1795 Simcoe even approved of a measure

that granted

Brant 3,450 acres of land as personal property he had previously requested on
Burlington
Bay.^^ Simcoe's concessions were significant, indicating that the government, while

Simcoe and Dorchester partially based Simcoe's argument on the
which denied British subjects in North America from purchasing or

of the Proclamation of 1763,
on Indian lands.

rationale
settling

Speech of Joseph Brant at an Indian Council, Newark, Upper Canada, 24 November 1796, Cruikshank &
Hunter, Correspondence of Peter Russell I: 93; Johnston, Valley of the Six N ations. 82. Brant complained
that Simcoe had informed the Grand River nations, that, as "only Allies," the Six Nations "cannot
possibly
have the King[']s Subjects to be. .Tennants."
.

.

" Simcoe

" Same

to

to Dorchester, 3

March 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence

Same, 9 October 1795,

ibid.,

IV, 101-02.
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174.

distrusting Brant and refusing to
acknowledge Six Nations' sovereignty,
thought

important to continue amiable
fidelity

ties

with them in an effort to secure their
traditional

and support. The delicacy with which
Simcoe and other Bntish leaders

Brant shows their continued respect for the
Mohawk's endunng influence

River and

among American

final

at the

dealt with

Grand

officials.

Prior to his departure from Upper Canada
in the

one

it

summer of

1

796, Simcoe

made

attempt to solve the land issue by drafting
yet another land patent that

incorporated a more-clearly worded provision by which
the Six Nations could lease land,
albeit

only

to the government.^' Brant

because they

still

found

it

confine the leasing rights

and the Six Nations rejected the new document,

too restrictive, and the patent's wording did not
necessanly
strictly to the Iroquois at the

remnants of Six Nations' enclaves, such as those
Deseronto's band

any leased lands

at the

at the

Bay of Quinte, could

at

Grand River.

Buffalo Creek in

It

implied that other

New York

and John

also share in the revenue generated from

Grand River.^^ For Brant,

this

would have defeated the puipose of

attempting to generate revenue specifically intended for his people's survival
and

independent use

Native lands

in

at the

Grand River.

Still at

hopes of one day having the

an impasse. Brant continued to illegally lease
legal right to sell the title to those lands.

After Simcoe's departure his successor, Peter Russell, for a time also attempted

delaying tactics regarding the Grand River lands, but unlike Simcoe, Russell was forced
to

come

" Simcoe
28

to a

more

to Brant, 2

definitive resolution on the matter.^^

March

Brant to Joseph Chew, 17

1796,

May

ibid.,

1796,

The new

administrator, with

little

206.

ibid.,

268,

29

At the time of Simcoe's departure, he left the Province on the basis of a temporary leave of absence,
expecting to one day return. Therefore, Russell often preferred the title of "President," with the imphcation
that Simcoe would eventually return to the post of Lieutenant Governor.
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knowledge of Indian ainnrs or

policy, had n,her.,e<l a
chplonnU.e c.uagnnre lhal had

begnn helore Sinicoe's adnnn.s.rafon
and was grownig worse. Branl
nnn.echa.ely
pressured Russell (o speed.ly resolve
the .ssue
to

outhne

in

new

Lieutenant

mionnatioii belore Upper

responded with lightning
-leutenanl

(

several

to

expedite matters

lo

anada's Lxeeutive

.speed;

expected the entire matter
prepared

iovei nor then pronn.sed lo lay

(

he

members of the

it,

and the

be resolved
in the

(

all

"m

manner

.sell

Mohawk

of the requested

Hianl

only two days after the

leader inloiined Russell that he

the course of Ten days.""

that

or lease, and lo

'ouncil fbr their consideration.

i.ssued the report to Rus.sell

ioveinor had re(|ueslcd

(

Kussell asked Bran,

writing preeisely wh.ei, lands the Six
Nations wished lo

whon..'" The

I

u, the Ind.ans' lavor.

Brant expected.

Due

Russell

to the

was not

poor health

ol

I-xeculive Council, and the fact that the legislative
session had

ended, Russell did not have lo comply with lirant\s "ten
days," and Ihc legislature could
not meet until spring.

particularly the

The delay enabled Ru.ssell

)uke olT'oilland, Prime Minister

I

to lurlher consult Whitehall,

Pitt

Ihe

Younger's

While awaiting mslruetions from home and carefully pondering
the Six Nations, Russell

tracts

were

I79(),

conliiiM

and did not plan

^'

"

|>iirchast'is

iIr-ii

and

of the pro.spective buyers of the Ciiand River

Brant learned that the Executive Council would not meet again during the
to

Ru.ssell lo Rrant, 2.1 Oc-folu-r 1796,

piospcclivr

his response to Brant

Upper Canada.

When
of

that all

lome Secretary.

loyal British subjects, indicating that BianI did not wi.sh to subvert
British

authority in

fall

conHrmed

I

()!

(

iiaiul

reconvene

rmikshaiik

Rivn

<"v

until Ihe

following May, he mleipieted Ihe

llunaT, Rii sst'll ('(Mit'spondciKc,

liacls IkkI to liisl uiulnj-o a

slalus as loyal Hiilish sul)|cx(s.

Hiaiil U) Russell,

Russell to the

24 October 1796,

Duke

ol rottiaiul, 14

ihul., 76,

Novemhei 17%,
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ibid.. 84.

pun
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75-76. All

ess dI vci ilKalioii

iii

oiclcr to

postponement as another

employed against him

intentional delaying tactic, similar
to the

for four years.

The chief bitterly exclaimed,

"^""^ "^"^^
'
w' cannotTrfrom their conduct towards
..We
Intentions are nor what we are to
expect from them.
nor what we deserved.

^''^

in CanaddJ.
m
Cana^.l

assured that

this subject, as they
IS

no

we have

have from

spoke[n] for the

their

last

^i.e.

British officials

us. .learn

.

Be

methods Simcoe had

.

.

..It is

what their
not what we ca^ci^icu
expected

time to the great

Conduct gave us plainly

their Intention to

to

men

here on

understand that

it

do any thing for us. ..Surely our Father their
Master [the
King], never intended that we were to
be trifled with in this manner I repeat
it
again, that is not what we deserve.-*^
.

Brant had

come

to the

end of his patience, and, as he

deal with British leaders in

travel to Britain

Canada on

The

he intended

to

never again

frustrated leader instead resolved
to

himself in order to secure a proper deed for his
Grand River Reserve.

But, short of funds, he never
to

the issue.

stated,

wrangle with leaders

in

made

the trip, and, contrary to his declaration, he
continued

Canada on land matters

until his

death a decade

later.

Brant hoped to drive a wedge between Whitehall and the
Canadian authorities,

and he tended

to stress the Six Nations' loyalty

exaggerated terms.

In

November

1

and devotion

to the

King, often in

796, Brant restated his peoples' loyalty, declaring,

[W]e pride ourselves by the losses we have suffered in the good cause of our
Great Father the King of England.... and are firm in our Attachment
to our Great
Father, the King of England. ..the ill Treatment we met with from
Individuals
.

sent to [this]

Country

Government

that

The Mohawk

sends them

^*

never wean our Affections form that

here.^''

leader even claimed that his peoples' fidelity and attachment exceeded that

of white Loyalists, adding,

Brant's speech

to rule, shall

at

"this

Disappointment in not obtaining our Grant would (were

Newark, 24 November 1796,

Brant's speech at Newark, 24

November

ibid.,

93-94; Jolmston, Valley of the Six Nations 82-83.

1796, Cruikshank
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.

&

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

.

I:

95.

we white men) shake
Father.

.it

.

us in our Loyalty and Attachment
for the King of England
our

would leave

a

.

On numerous
council, the

wound

not easily to be healed. But

we

are hid.ans."^^

other occasions in his public
statements, whether written or
spoken

Mohawk

leader

was always

his "affection and Loyalty to the

King

careful to reaffirm this loyalty,
promising that

shall

never be shaken."^'

Brant's opponents understood what was

at stake.

Russell's Attorney General,

John White, pinpointed the crux of the problem
when he connected
government's
whichj was
Despite

all

legal difficulties with the

that the Six

Grand River Reserve

all

of the

to "the Principal [difficulty,

Nations do not acknowledge the Sovereignty
of the King.""

of Brant's rhetoric about

the vulnerable

m

loyalty, the specter

young province was empowering

of a potential Indian rebellion

to the Indians,

and Brant knew

in

it.

Therefore, Brant played up the threat of an invasion
to Upper Canada, and he did his best
to intimidate Russell.

as

Years

later,

William Claus, the

late

Alexander McKee's successor

Deputy Superintendent General, cynically remarked.

Whoever pretends

moderate knowledge of the 6 Nats, and their politics m a
War between two powers of white people which may affect their Country.
.will
allow that their first and principal view... is to find out which of
the two
contenting fsicj parties is the best able to supply them with their
Necessaries in
Trade as well as best able to bribe them. ..During the interval of the Conflict
to a

.

they

.

make no Scruple of Conscience. when Opportunity
.

..

"

.by carrying

.

serves to take what they can

Lies.'**

Ibid., 94.

Brant to Russell,

John White
Cniikshank

&

1

1

June 1799, Cruikshank

&

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

26 September 1796, Toronto Public Library, L
Hunter, Russell Correspondence 1; 46.

to Russell,

.

Ill:

228.

18, Peter Russell Letterbook. 16;

.

William Claus, "Remarks and Observations upon Indn. Politics as to their
War between White People," undated, but presumably about 1804, CNA,

Political

MG

11,65-66.
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19

F

1,

Maxims

in

Time of

Claus Papers, Vol

Ciaus understood

,hat .here

was a

,™„

,o the S,x Nations' loyalty

towards the Bnt.sh, as

Simcoe had previously surmised.
In

1

797, Russell personally experienced
the Six Nations' diplomatic
pressure.

The Governor infom^ed Portland

that

Brant and the Six Nations, with
their patience

exhausted, "took upon themselves
to conclude... the Sale of
Part of these Lands without

waiting for His Majesty's Sanction.""
Russell did not immediately dispute
the
regarding

Insult

it

as "impolitick [sic] in the
present

weak

state

of this Province

even from an Indian Tribe."- Thus,
the administrator chose not

Brant's propositions, while

st.ll

to

to

sales,

provoke

openly

maintaining that no "alienation of the
lands

[is]..

reject

.valid

without the Consent of the King," and
that the Six Nations "have placed
themselves

under His Majesty's Protection by taking
up

their

Residence within

this Province."^'

Russell's letter to Portland hinted at the
diplomatic vise beginning to tighten in

upon him. Neither Russell nor
sovereignty, but the

his superiors

were prepared

to recognize Six Nations'

weak condition of the amiy and small population of
the upper

province prevented the government from

flatly

denying Brant's demands. Moreover, as

tensions between the government of Upper
Canada and the Natives at the Grand River
escalated during the early

months of 797,

distant vantage point, did not

Duke of Portland

1

the

home government

at

Whitehall, from

have a clear grasp of the seriousness of the

did not think

it

situation.

its

The

necessary for British leaders in Canada to compromise

on the matter.

&

Russell to Portland, 28 January 1797, Cruikshank
Hunter, Russell Conespond ence
IS also found
Toronto Public Library, L 18, Peter Russell Papers, 36-42, and P.R.O.,
104.

m

131. This letter

CO 42,

40

Ibid., 133.

^'

I:

Ibid.
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HO

K.j

(

I

lif.

N A. M(

i

K»l.al

I

,,.sl„„, l.„(isl,

would hsien

h„„.

,o

envoy

WhMe

,„ ihe

,

InMcl Stales; he also spoke
U, a„yo„e else

i„ I-hihulelph,.-, ,he

s.ehen, vo.eeci lus eo,„pl„„„s

who

a,

,he „,„

where he lodged, purpoiledly asserting
with great resentment of the
treatment he IkuI n.et w,th Iron,
the Kmn's
Oovernn.ent ol C "anada, and threatened,
not ohunn redress tluou^,,
Ilahcs are Irom "ru-kshank 's
ed.ted vers.on; the phrase is
underhned
,h
ongn.al letter ], that he would offer

me

I

(iTeneh envoy
a Revolution,

to the

his services to the l-Yench
United States), and march his Moluwks

and overturning the Hnt.sh (iovernment

n, the

Mnuster Adet

to ass.st

m

effeeting

Province.

L.ston patiently listened to Bn.nl, but the
Hnlish envoy wrote to Governor
(ieiieral

Robert Piescott, warning him oC^the p(,ss,ble
event of an Insurrection
Province,"

hopmg

"to avert so serious a danger."^"

Executive Council would meet,

(David William) Smith, exclaiming,

Government

[asj

we were

wrote

liranl

"|

to

On

WJe wish

is

m

1

1

)pper|

days before the

to

be on the same looting w.th

il

.some danger ol getting rusty."^'

Ru.s.sell,

that

f).

W.

|the|

what

we

The very next

expressing his distress

Nations could 'enjoy the lands here... in the same
independent and

nnlimited manner |as they supposedly had done

in the

then the ancient British-Iroqiiois friendship would be

m

(,iily

the

Upper Canada's Surveyor General

day, the Six Nations' chief also sent a similar letter to

point, and

K June,

before the |American| War... we look upon

formerly called the covenant chain

that, unless the Six

I

m

late .liine three

of the upper province,

Mohawk

in peril.^''

Valley prior to the warj,"
Brant insisted upon

hundred angry warriors accompanied him

to forcefully

to

this

York, the capital

demonstrate the importance of the matter while the

Ibid.. 156,

I.i.slon to

Prcscoll, X April 1797, loioiilo

Hunter. Ku.sscll C'orrcsp()iKlciice
*^

4h

Brant

to Sinilli, hS

Mrant to

Ru.s.sell,

June 1797,

.

1:

I'lihlic l.ihiary, 1. iX, Rii.sscll

160.

ibid., 189.

10 June 1797, ibid., 190; P.R.O.,

CO 42,

165

32

1

,

234,

I

.ctlcrliook. 'H-<)4; Cruik.shank

&

Indians awaited a decision.- Indeed,
Brant's behavior

1797 did not

reflect the

dunng

the

spnng and summer of

degree of loyaky he had proclaimed
the previous autumn.

Brant's tactics brought a measure
of success to the Grand River Indians'
endeavors.'''^

Acting on his

own

Executive Council, and hoping

authority, but with the

to

ward off an Indian

from home and confirmed the land sales

imminent

hostihties, Russell

made

that

strictly

the

rebellion, Russell

evaded his orders

Brant had already transacted. Fearing

this decision

on the matter from Portland, even though

unanimous support of the

before he could receive final instructions

Home

Secretary's previous correspondence

forbade any alienation of Iroquois lands in
Canada."' Since Russell had already

detcmiined

to

disobey his instructions, there was no longer cause
for delay, which

at that

point could only risk exacerbating the already-strained
relations between his government

and the Six Nations.

In addition to

confirming the Six Nations' prior

Lieutenant Governor also provided a
transactions, but only to the King,

way

who

for the Six

sales, the

Nations to conduct future land

retained the right of preemption.^" Therefore,

Russell believed that in spite of his having neglected his orders,

all

parties

would

ultimately be satisfied that he maintained peace and tranquility and entitled
the Six

Nations to conduct future land transactions

strictly

with the government.

Russell's hopes were soon dashed; neither Brant nor Portland
pleased.

The Duke "lamented"

the Lieutenant Governor's handling

was completely

of the matter, and

Charles M. Johnston, "Joseph Brant, the Grand River Lands and the Northwest Crisis," Ontario History
LV(4) (1963): 275.

Ibid.,

"^

'°

280-81.

Portland to Russell, 10

March 1797, Cniikshank

Russell to Brant, 3 July 1797,

ibid.,

&

Hunter, Correspondence of Peter Russell

204.

166

.

1:

155

-56.

Portland feared that this show of British weakness
might develop into "a most dangerous
tendency."^' For his part, Brant thanked Russell for
his efforts thus

complained, "I
footing

am

sorry the

we were upon

mode adopted

is

far,

but he

not yet satisfactory, because this

is

not the

before [Cruikshank's itahcs mdicatmg emphasis in original

letter]."

Furthermore, the chief gave another subtle threat regarding the possible demise of
British-Six Nations relations, remarking that the government's continued intervention
"is

entangling the Chain

we

so long kept hold of,

Brant's response stunned Russell,

which

I

should be sorry to be the case."^^

who summoned

another meeting with the

Executive Council before meeting with the chief personally on 21 July 1797. Russell
nearly revoked his previous offer to Brant, explaining to the

King's ministers would have
land,

and

that

to

Mohawk

determine the Six Nations' legal rights regarding their

His Majesty's government would provide an annuity

Nations material needs

in lieu

to

meet the Six

of any alienation of lands, precisely what Portland had

"Brant appeared. .greatly affected by"

already proposed.

leader that the

.

explained to Russell that had his people

known

this,

that "the lands

and he passionately

on the Grand River were

given to them upon any other footing than that on which they formerly possessed those

on the

Mohawk

that the Six

River," then they never would have accepted them, and he emphasized

Nations "were a free

& independent Nation."^'*

Russell, fearing that Brant

"was very capable of doing much mischief," relented and again extended

" Portland

to Russell,

4

November

1797,

ibid., II:

"

Brant to Russell, 10 July 1797, Cruikshank

"

Russell to Portland, 21 July 1797,

ibid.,

&.

3;

P.R.O.,

CO 42,

the

321, 345-49.

Hunter, Corresponden ce of Peter Russell,

219-21.

Ibid., 221.

167

same

I:

211.

offer

he had presented

to the chief earher in the

therefore confirmed the land sales
that the
the future the

would serve
that he

Crown would

as trustees

to dispose

later,

on any

said,

further relinquishments

"This

of more land, as

Grand River Indians had already made,
but

get,

Sir, is

this will

of Grand R.ver lands. Knowing

Brant this time responded favorably.

every thing

we

wanted,

we have no

Blood."" Russell thought

now

that the matter

all fight

was

for the

mortified" to receive a

now

of whom "marked

specifically requested that Russell

new speech from

"empower them

without waiting for His Majesty's approbation."^^
all

Brant again backed

to the lasi

drop of their

finally settled.

the next day,

when he was

Brant, supposedly written on behalf

of the Six Nations' leaders and expressing the Six Nations'

threatening to end

all

King

The acting Lieutenant Governor discovered otherwise
little

desire just

& Approbation in the most distinguished manner," and Brant

emphatically declared "that they would

"not a

He

be enough for our immediate wants."^^
Three days

Russell met in council with the leaders
of the Six Nations,

their satisfaction

in

possess the right of preemption,
and the King's ministers

had better take what he could

thanked Russell and

month.^^ The government of
Upper Canada

dissatisfaction.

They again

to continue to sell at their pleasure

When

Russell held his ground,

agreements regarding the confirmation of the current land

off,

sales.

explaining that the Six Nations did not expect Russell to

acquiesce, but that the Lieutenant Governor should interpret this latest written
speech as a

"

Ibid.. 222.

Ibid

" Russell

to Portland,

29 July 1797,

Ibid., 228.

Ibid.

168

matter of tnbal protocol, in which
the Indians needed to voice
their sentiments.^^ In
other

words, the Six Nations' council did
not want
without

first officially

was simply

completely accept Russell's offers

to

submitting his people's objections
and misgivmgs. Brant's pomt

although his people would accept
Russell's terms on this occasion,
they

that,

did so only grudgingly, and that the
Six Nations

still

believed that the Bntish had an

ethical obligation to eventually
recognize their full sovereignty.

Brant, like Russell, found himself in
an impossible predicament.

sachem derived
to

his non-hereditary authority

from a people

who

believed themselves

still

be free and independent, and he was caught
between them and the Bntish,

never grant

this

degree of autonomy. Brant frequently faced

quarreling factions

at

the

Grand River, but

critics

and had

as long as he kept the pressure

regarding land matters, his leadership authority

among

his people

compromise

that

would keep

the peace, permit a degree

who would

to deal with

on the

would remain

Thus, while facing similar plights. Brant and Russell needed
each other
a

The Mohawk

of latitude

British

intact.

in order to effect

for the Iroquois,

provide a future method of meeting Six Nations' material needs,
maintain provincial
security,

and preserve dignity on both

Russell's position

was

sides,

allowing both

particularly delicate.

disobedience to Portland's instructions might
anticipated, the

Home

mean

men

to retain their positions.

The administrator understood
his dismissal,

that his

and as Russell

Secretary was not pleased with Russell's actions. In utter disbelief

Anthropologist William Fenton makes an important point in explaining that Iroquois people
"distinguished 'talk in the bushes' when an issue might be explored or an agenda formulated from more
formal meetmgs or conferences preliminary to a treaty." This sheds light on Brant's apparent
inconsistencies

durmg

these public and private talks at

"Structure, Continuity, and

Change

York

m the summer of 1797.

See Fenton,

Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," in The History and Culture
of Iroquois Diplomacy ed. Francis Jennings, et. al. (Syracuse; Syracuse University Press, 1985), 27.
in the

,

169

tlK.I

Russell wcn.lcl perm,, ^'Rrant, or any
other (^hief or

the... Government

Body of

of His Majesty's Provmee," Portland
wote

Indians, to uiterlere with

that

he considered

this

most dangerous tendency, and the necessity
of giving wav to .,, [andj allowing
such necessity to have existed, can only
have arisen from not pursuing a pro-x"
.ne ol conduct towards the Indians,
who, in consequence of the assistance
they
<lenve and can only derive from the
King's bounty, should be given
a

owe

inideistand, that they

explicitly to

every return, which can he expected
from the warmest

and the most unshaken

gratitude,

Portland saw no reason

why

fidelity.''"

the British should have to

derived then malenal support from the King.
The
dial illhe Indians

compromise with Natives w!io

Home

Secretary could only conclude

had a mistaken understanding of this relationship,
then

it

meant

that

Russell had not properly implemented sound
Indian policy.
Russell

I

knew

better.

Portland did not grasp the dangerous political
climate

Ipper Canada, and he did not

seem

British position in the province

believed that British leaders

he saw no reason

to

m

was

to

have a

at

the time.

Canada could

full

act

understanding of

from

compromise, and he assumed

that if

rebellion that everyone

he handled the affair

hoped

to avoid.

how weak

Most importantly, because

that

imposed on Native people, even though the Indians
Rut Russell realized

just

a position

in this

the

Duke

of complete hegemony,

mandates could be

still

the

in

unilaterally

considered themselves sovereign.

manner, he might

The beleaguered President wrote

ignite the

to

Governor

Cieneral Robert Prescott, explaining this

dangerous dilemma

which am reduced: Disobedience of His Majesty's
Commands or an Indian War, and tho' should choose the fomier, am not
certain
shall escape the laller, for it appears.
from the offence .loseph Brant has
to

I

I

I

I

.

PoitUiiul to Ru.sscli, 4

November

1797, Cruikshank

&

42,321.345-49.
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Iluntci, Russell Coiicspoiideiicc

.

11:

T.R.C),, C

O

taken wUhout cause that he meant
to pick a
seeks a feasible excuse for joining

German

quarrel

the French should they

Clearly, Russell and the British
government in

dominance and control within
vantage point

in

whh

mvade

Canada did not have

us and only
this

Province/"

the level of

the upper province that Portland
imagined

from

his

London.

Portland's view of Indian gilts also
differed sharply from that of the Six
Nations.

While Portland considered

the "King's bounty" a

means of pacifying

the Natives and

securing their future cooperation. Brant and
the Six Nations always regarded British
as

compensation

for past services,

and they never

felt that

by receiving the King's

presents and provisions they had forfeited their
independence.

compensation

By

accepting the

gifts as

for previous services rendered, the
Iroquois understood the transfer

goods as a solemn gesture symbolizing

gifts

British faithfulness

and indicating

that the

of

bond

of friendship, or the Covenant Chain, between the British and
the Six Nations could never
be broken. Portland's narrow understanding of Indian

affairs signaled further conflict

with the Grand River community.

Continuing Struggles

The continued existence of these
status

of the Indians

in

it

the

Grand River, 1797-180

1

diametrically opposed views regarding the legal

Upper Canada meant

produced a temporary truce only, since

at

that Russell's

compromise on

failed to address the real issue

sovereignty. This chapter subsection focuses on

some of the

the land issue

of Native

other issues

at

the

Grand

River, in which, as in the case of the land crisis. Brant and the Six Nations continued to
strive for greater

autonomy.

Among

these issues were the Six Nations' bid for a resident

Russell to Prescott, 17 July 1797, Toronto Public Library,

L

18, Russell Papers,

Correspondence with Governor General Robert Prescott, 1796-1799.

171

Letterbook of

clergyman, the. intertnbal dealings
with the Mississaugas, a French
nobleman's attempt
to settle

on a land grant from

government and

to tribes

the Mississaugas, and Brant's
overtures to the United States

dwelling withm Amenca's borders.

By the mid-summer of 1797,

Lieutenant Governor Russell's failure
to resolve the

land grant issue was becoming
increasingly evident, and Brant,
frustrated but resolute,

sought

King

new ways

to strengthen his position, in

hopes of one day arguing his case

that his people should receive a
land patent bearing a title in fee
simple.

Meanwhile, Portland, troubled by Brant's
machinations, sought
administration and beyond to check

The Duke's main
Russell,

fear

was

that the

at

for the rest

Mohawk

would subsequently be encouraged

sachem, having extorted a compromise from
to

seek to expand Native power even further.
to

keep the indigenous nations of the

upper province and the Great Lakes divided and dependent
upon the

undermining

all

was necessary

of Russell's

every turn Brant's seemmgly expanding
power.

Consequently, Portland wanted leaders in Canada

it

to the

of Brant's endeavors. As the

Home

Secretary put

it

British, thereby

in a letter to Russell,

to give

strict attention to

every possible means of preventing connections or
confederations from taking place between the several Nations, and.
.the
.

them dependent on your Government, and keeping them
as possible from each other, should be laid down by you

rendering

as separate and distinct
as a system.^^

Indeed, Portland's instructions marked a sharp departure from the policy that
Simcoe had

pursued merely two and three years

earlier,

when

the former Lieutenant

Governor

attempted to encourage a vast confederacy that would theoretically serve as a buffer to
protect

was

Upper Canada from American expansion. The difference between 1797 and 1795

that the

Americans no longer posed

Portland to Russell, 4

November

a threat, and, ironically, Portland and Russell

1797, Cruikshank

& Hunter, Russell

172

Correspondence

.

II:

3

now

bel,eved ,ha, ,he Ind.ans themselves
presented the real danger to the
tntemal peace

and security of Upper Canada.
Realizing that Portland had ample
reason to remove him from his
post should the

Duke wish

do

to

so, Russell

consciously strove to comply with
every aspect of the

Home

Secretary's instructions for the remainder
of his administration. Consequently,
Russell

now became more

active than ever in attempting to
curb Brant's

and he carefully monitored

all

power and

influence,

matters pertaining to the Grand River.
Early in 1798, less

than a year after the heated land disputes
of the previous summer, another issue
arose

which brought Russell's

intervention.

Towards

the end of 1797 Brant had petitioned

Superintendent John Johnson, requesting a
pennanent resident clergyman of the Anglican
faith to serve the Six

Nations on the Grand River." The Indians there
had not known the

benefits of a resident minister since the Reverend
John Stuart departed in 1789, and Brant

grew concerned regarding

the future spiritual well being of his people.''

The Mohawk

leader had already selected a potential candidate,
Davenport Phelps, a former lawyer

had studied

for the ministry

Like

all

and

now

who

sought ordination.

of the other issues surrounding the Grand River

at the time, the subject

of

procuring a resident clergyman soon became linked to the question
of the Six Nations'
fidelity.

From

the start, authorities in

Canada expressed concern, not so much over

Phelps's spiritual qualifications, but regarding his political sympathies. The
Bishop of

Quebec, one Jacob Mountain, emphasized the important role of an Anglican clergyman
the

63

Grand River, "not only

Kelsay, 546-47; For Brant's

in... Religious

initial request,

and Moral"

affairs,

see Brant to Johnson, 15

the Six Nations 238-39.
.

173

at

"but [also] in a political

December 1797, Johnston, Valley of

point .1

omcer

v.cw;-

in

Russell c,uestioned (he loyalty
of Phelps,

who had once

served as an

an Ameriean militia and who,
as an attorney .n Upper
Canada, had purportedly

helped rally a group of sedit.ous
fanners

of a man accused of treason.

1

march on

u. a

a provn.c.al courthouse
in support

he adnnn.strator sa.d he considered

,t

h.s "duty to guard

against the introduction of Persons
to situations ol (hal nature
(wherein they

misch.el) whose attachment to the British
Constitution,

I

have the slightest cause

suspect;""' Yet Russell also noted "that
the placing of a discreet

Clergyman of, he
iisefi.ll

(

hurch of l^ngland

among

the five

[i.e.

later

to

& respectable

Six] Nations

would be a most

|sK| measure in every point of view,
whether religious, moral, or

Portland

may do

Political."''^

agreed, arguing that the Grand River
Indians should have a "resident

Clergyman... Rut... (hat

the choice should be entirely independent
of them, and lhal they

and the Clergyman should know and

feel, that

they neither have been, nor ever will be,

consulted on die subject."^**

Both Russell and
mi.ssionary

Samuel

(he

Bishop were probably aware of the role the American

Kiiklaiul had played in splintering (he Iroquois
Confederacy

by

(urning the Oneidas and Tuscaroras against the British in
(he RevohKion. Kirkland

only helped

in

(o bring

abou( (he ex(inguishinen( of (he League's Council fire

a(

iio(

Onondaga

1777, bu( he also succeeded in undeiininiiig (he fabric of Brilish-lrot|uois
relations.

John

WoKe

l

ydekkfi,

ranihiulgc (Jniversity

Bishop of Oiiebec-

Moliawks (New York: The Maciiiillan Co.; and Canibiidge. UK:

I'he Faillilul

l^icss, 1*).^S), lK()-87.

to Ru.s.sell.

1

1

.laniiary

1798, Cruikshank

&

t>(i

Ru.s.scll lo (,)iic-hec, conlKlfiiliai,

22

i

et^niarv !7<)8, ibid.,

Ibul,

Poi

llaiul lo Rus.sell.

24 January 1799. P.R.O.,

CO 42,

174

324, 3-4.

Hunter,

R ussell

Corres pondencp,

II:

63

.

Even

if by

chance both Russell and the
Bishop of Quebec had forgotten
about K.kland's

influence in drawing the Indians

have remembered these

away from

difficulties

between

the British,

John Johnson certainly would

his late father

and the politically biased

missionary.- The Bishop of Quebec
demed Brant's request
that

no person

is "fit

to

to unsettle their notions

be their [the Indians'] Spintual
instructor

of loyalty

Governments under which

To no

to orda.n Phelps, arguing

it

is

who would be

& obedience & weaken their attachment to

disposed

the

their happiness to live."^°

avail Brant, himself a staunch
Anglican,

complained

to Russell, noting

Phelps's puiported 'Testimonials of his
Moral Character and Loyalty." Brant further

reminded Russell of the assistance

him

in the

assumed

that the

Archbishop of Canterbury had promised

King's presence twelve years earlier in London.''
The

that the provincial leaders

would want

Mohawk

to

naturally

the Six Nations to have a resident

minister, since they had encouraged the teachings
of Anglicanism

among

his people for

nearly a century. Despite these efforts, a suitable and
willing candidate never
materialized, and the

Embittered, the

Grand River never acquired

Mohawk

a resident minister during this period.'^

chief threatened to invite "a

For a background of this schism, see Graymont, The Iroquois

™ Quebec
^'

to Russell, Private, 12

Brant to Russell, 8

May

1798,

June 1798, Cruikshank
ibid.,

148; P.R.O.,

Romish

in the

Priest" to settle at the

American Revolution 42-47.
.

& Hunter, Russell Correspondence

CO 42,

.

II;

180.

322, 155.

Bishop of Quebec petitioned the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (S.P.G for
an
)
augmentation of Reverend Robert Addison's salary, and the Bishop directed him to make frequent
itinerant
Instead, the

Grand River. Addison served a parish in Newark, near Niagara, and after he accepted the
additional nunistry, he managed to travel to the Grand River four times per year. In essence, this
arrangement hardly differed from what the Six Nations at the Grand River had experienced for more than
visits to the

decade, and

it

Cruikshank

&

1

1

October

1

did not meet the

demand

for a resident clergyman.

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

,

See Quebec

to Russell, 12

June 1798,

180-81, and Reverend John Stuart's Report to the S.P.G.,

798, Johnston, Vallevofthe Six Nations 24
,

175

1

a

Grand R.ver

^ The decision

to the Six Nations' quest for

to override Brant's
request in this

autonomy and, more

matter was another b low

specifically, to the

chiefs authority.

Preventing Phelps's appointment
was actually a single measure
secret policy through

which British

authorities

worked

to

in a

to the

of Brant... must naturally give

the part

rise to suspicion."

invasion of Upper Canada, Liston thought

"damp

Crown.

to the

United States, believed that "every
movement on

nature" of "the crisis" of Six Nations'
dissatisfaction

that the British should

larger

reduce Brant's power so

gradually that he and his supporters
would not be alienated from loyalty

Robert L.ston, British emissary

much

it

his [Brant's]

m

Considering the "delicate

the face

of a potential French

best "to temporize" with Brant,
believing

hopes by degrees,

extinguish thcm."^^ Portland concurred, and the

Duke

[rather] than at

once

to

advised Russell to "temporize with

Brant, even if you have reason for thinking
unfavorably of his Conduct.""

Accordingly, Russell clandestinely took measures

to

reduce the chiefs influence.

Portland feared the possibility of Brant "endeavouring to
form a Combination of
Indians. .adverse to His Majesty's Interests," and he
therefore ordered Russell to follow
.

"the general line of Policy" that he had previously given to the
administrator "in order to
defeat such Combinations."^^ In

making

instructions to Russell from the previous

Governor

to

" Reverend

Robert Addison's Report

these remarks, Portland referred to his

November, when he instructed

keep the Indians "as separate and

to the S.P.G.,

"

Portland to Russell, most secret, 7 June 1798,

distinct as possible," in order to prevent

29 December 1799, Johnston,

Liston to Lord Grenville, 4 April 1798, Craikshank

&

ibid.,

241-42.

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

ibid., 167;

176

the Lieutenant

P.R.O.,

CO 42,

322, 100-02.

.

II:

168.

"connections or confederations."^
Russell ordered agent

WHHam

Claus

George

at Fort

(near Niagara) "to do everything in
his power (without exposing
the object of th.s
to Suspicion) to

& the

foment any existing Jealousy between
the Chippewas

[i.e.

Pohey

Mississaugas]

Six Nations; and to prevent as far as
possible any Junction or good
understanding

between those two Tribes."^«

new

appointed a

hoping

to

remove

accustomed
their gifts

agent,

In addition to giving Claus these
instructions, Russell

James Givens,

this tribe

whom

from Brant's

he ordered to oversee Mississauga

influence.^'^

to participating at the Six Nations'

from the British

affairs,

Since the Mississaugas had grown

Grand River Council

there, Russell feared this

had

growing

Fire and receiving

intertribal connection.

Thus

the administrator attempted to put a halt to this
growing fraternization by ordering Givens
to

move

the Mississaugas' council fire to the

Portland to Russell, 4

two months
Russell,

1

1

November

earlier Portland

September 1797,

Russell to Portland, 21

mouth of the River

&

1797, Cruikshank

had already given Russell
ibid.,

I:

277-78; P.R.O.,

March 1798, Cruikshank

&

away from

Credit,

Hunter, Russell Corresp ondence

virtually the

CO 42,

same

II:

3.

In a letter

See Portland

instructions.

the

to

321, 193-95.

Hunter, Russell Conespondence

.

II:

122;

The

Mississaugas are actually a branch of Chippewas (or Ojibwas) who lived in the southern
portion Upper
Canada, mostly along the northern shore of Lake Ontario. When Russell used the expression
"Chippewas"
he is most likely using this interchangeably with "Mississaugas," because later in the letter the
President

them as "the Chippewas who come from the Vicinage of Lake Simcoe," who were actually
Mississaugas. Moreover, Russell also used the expression "Mississaugas" at another place in
the
document. British leaders in Canada also used the names interchangeably on otlier occasions. See Donald
referred to

B. Smith,

"Who

are the Mississauga?," Ontario History 67(4)

(December 1975): 211,221-22. Despite the
small Mississauga population, the British respected the tribe's capacity for war, knowing that the
Mississauga would probably manage
the North and West.

procure the assistance of their more numerous Ojibwa cousins to
See Peter S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario (Toronto, Buffalo, & London:
to

University of Toronto Press, 1991), 104.

"

For Givens' appointment, see Russell
Correspondence 1: 231-32.

to Givens, 25

June 1797, Cruikshank

.

177

& Hunter, Russell

Grand River and nearer

to Givens's

agency

at

York.«°

From

the

new

site the

Mississaugas would receive their annual
presents directly from the Bntish.^'

The Mississaugas

realized that

was

it

in their best interests to

com^ection with Brant and the Grand
River community
the Six Nations, the Mississaugas
were poorer and

on seasonal hunting, gathenng, and

fishing.^^

at the time.

By contrast,

most indigenous peoples. The Iroquois

more numerous than
1790, a small

the Mississaugas,

number

who had

white

north of Lake Erie.^^ Moreover, the Six
Nations had far

Euro-Amencan

to

the Six Nations

were more

more advanced form of

m Upper Canada were also

consisted of barely 1,000 individuals
in

that continued to diminish as

the Bntish Empire, and

When compared

more migratory, dependent pnmanly

sedentary, dwelling in permanent villages
and practicing a
horticulture than

maintain a close

settlers

moved

into the region

more expenence

leaders generally respected

m dealing with

them more than they

did the Mississaugas.'' Finally, the Mississaugas
had been pressured to cede most of
their lands in the southern portion

Russell to Portland, 2
city

of York was

The

later

location of the

of the upper province

March 798, Cruikshank
renamed Toronto.
1

1

&

Hunter, Russell Corresp ondence

new Mississauga

council fire is the
Ontario, situated on the northwest end of Lake Ontario.
82

E. S. Rogers, "Southeastern Ojibwa," in

in the final quarter

site

II:

of the

122.

of the present-day city of Mississauga,

Handbook of North American Indian s: Northe ast.

Bruce G. Trigger (Washington, DC: Smithsonian

The old

Vol. 15, ed.

Institution, 1978), 760-64.

83

John Johnson, Return of the Mississaugas, 23 September 1787, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol.
197; Peter S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario (Toronto, Buffalo, & London: University of
Toronto Press, 1991), 104-05.
Sir

15,

Dean R. Snow, The Iroquois (Maiden, MA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 141-57; Sally
M. Weaver, "Six Nations of the Grand River, Ontario," Handbook of North American Indians: Northeast
^'^

Vol. 15, ed. Trigger, 525-27; Elisabeth Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois:
Ritual,"

m ibid.,

432-37.
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c,,h.ccn.h

in

c

an effort

cnu.ry, giving

to retain a

then stronger incentive

some

m

ci.llkully

separating the Mississangas Iron,

had attempted

lo ph.c

leadership of Joseph Hrant.»" Russell Ihuclorc

Mississaugas' p.oicsis when he attempted
province.

l„

c-

divide the indii-enous nations

Rc lal.ons between the British and
Mississaugas had

drunken scuffie with

competent leader

a

Hntish

sliaiiied relations

summer of 7%, when,

they ap|)oiiited "the sole guardian of our Nalioii, and as our
giviii,',

Brant control over

lo Biaiil, Ihc

was

Foi Hiilisli Mississiui^Ni irhilions and
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Speech
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llie
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.|and| Attorney for
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speech
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(

(

Siii

i
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i

land cessions
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\

i

SO
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period, see Schmal/. 102 10, 120-30;

)iia\va;
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U60.

Tnnkshank

h I7Q8.

lo accept

precisely what the British had feared. Just as Bianl

niOnlaiio,

anada, I*>H4),

arrangement, his willingness

this

A

llnnlcr. Russell

( \

)ii(*-.p<>nd(-M^ r,

122.

I!

ynn\\) ol Mississaugas issued a deposition re^'ardinf* the eveni lo officers near Foil

Cieor^-e. II Srplenihei
HK

I

Drvclopnienl,

Russell to I^Hlland, ?I

Kelsay, SOS

to tuin

of a

forgot."**"

leadeiship over the Mississaugas

N(»iilirin

loss

and dealings with whites,

all ol ihcir allairs

Although Brant had not orchestrated

and

leader, lost his life

Mississauga chiefs also reaffirmed "the connection between our
Nations,

which we hope yon have not

.1.

as a result of a

I

with the ihilish and led Ihcm

in his

not luily recovered

still

For the Mississaugas, the

soldier.'*'

contend with the

to

spontaneous misunde.standmg,, Wabakenin, the princ-pai
Mississauga

KoluMi

Six

(hcn.sclves under the direction and

knew he would have

aflcr a tragic incident that had occurred
late in the

us,"

llu-

At the tnne, relations between those
groups were very amiable, and, more

in.poi lanlly, the Mississaiigas

in a

of the Six Nations

remnant of territory.**^

Russell aniK-.pated

Nations.

to enl.st the support

(

N A.

(

luels al ihe

oiicspondcin

K(

c, II;

i

S.

Mdilai v

Mohawk

<

Sri irs, Vol

Village on Ihc

186.
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2'!*).

(
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/O.

nand Rivci.

\

^ Apiil

I

/')H,

(

nnkshank

had always desired, the new position
made him the pnncipal Native leader
and sole
liaison

between the Bntish and the Indians

in

Upper Canada. Furthennore,

this

could

potentially have given Brant significant
influence with the bulk of the
Ojibwas and

Ottawas of the Great Lakes. Quite simply,
such developments threatened a
Bntish policy

of acting unilaterally
of Indians

in

in Indian affairs.

Upper and Lower Canada

Any growth of Brant's
at a

time

when

influence with the majonty

the upper province remained

weak

raised the specter of Brant and the Six
Nations gaining the necessary diplomatic
leverage
to

compel

the Bntish

alamied by these

among

government

possibilities,

to

meet

their

demands. Lieutenant Governor Russell,

noted to Governor General Prescott that
Brant's activity

the Mississaugas "Militates most strongly
against the Policy which the

Duke of

Portland recommends. "^^

Just as

Simcoe and McKee

five years earlier

had prevented Brant from gaining

the ascendancy over the Western Confederacy, thereby
blocking the chiefs attempts to

negotiate a peace between the Confederacy and the Americans
the officers in the Indian Department

Mississauga

affairs.

As

in

now

took

all

at the time,

Russell and

necessary measures to bar Brant from

1793, Bntish intervention divided the hidians by overcoming

Brant's influence, but this time, the British intentionally hoped to foster
the division.

Brant suspected the British motives
council

fire,

and

in

appointing Givens and

in a letter to Russell the chief claimed that the

Mississaugas "apprehensive" and "uneasy," and "they think
disunite

us."*^*^

Russell to Prescott, Secret and Confidential, 15 June 1798, ibid.

Brant

to Russell, 5

moving

November

1798, ibid., 307.

180

it

new

the Mississauga

policy had

done with an

made

intent to

the

In the ensuing council the
Mississauga chiefs voiced their
concerns and

complaints regarding the

new

policy, adding that they

had registered these complaints

with Brant.^' After the Mississauga
leaders mentioned Brant, Claus
"immediately

answered," trying

to put their

minds

at

ease regarding their concerns;
without mentioning

Brant's name, he implicitly denounced
the

Mohawk

leader, claiming that

could not "but believe that you have
been urged to say what you have
that

It

does not come from yourselves." The
agent also wanted

foster the division that Portland and
Russell had ordered, so he

exclaiming

that

whoever had

told

to

he (Claus)

now

spoke, and

use this opportunity to

ended the council,

them these things "were bad people."''
The

Mississaugas did not seem convinced, mostly
because Claus never gave them a
satisfactory explanation of why they

the agent twice told

looked upon

it

to

them

that the

were compelled

move

to

their council fire.

only reason for the change was that "the
Govermnent

be for their good."'"*

The removal of the Mississaugas' council

fire to

the

mouth of the Credit River

not end the collaboration between Brant and the
Mississaugas. The

seek the

Mohawk's advice

leaders in

Instead,

in the

wake of Wabakenin's death

Canada were pressuring them

to

make

the Mississaugas' wishes, continuing to advise

latter

did

continued to

(1796), a time

when

the

further cessions. Brant complied with

them on land matters,

further irritating

Russell, Claus, and other British authonties. Shortly after Russell
had ordered the

removal of the Mississaugas' council
the Six Nations on the

91

fire,

Brant invited

Grand River, where they renewed

Council between the Mississaugas and Claus

at the

all

of the Mississaugas

their friendship in

May

head of Lake Ontario, 3 November 1798,

Ib.d.

181

to visit

1

798.

ibid.,

306.

The Mohawk
assumed

leader viewed himself as the
"guardian to the.r lands," cla.ming
,ha, he

.h.s role in order to fuinil a

promise he had made

to the late

Wabaken.n and

his

people.'^''

By

1799 the Mississaugas had grown very
concerned over the goveniment's

intentions.

According

government wanted

endunng

to Brant, the

all

Mississaugas had

come

of their lands and was even willing

friendship in order "to

depnve them of it

[i.e.

Government."

to

that the

their lands] wantonly."
Brant

to

maintain faith in the

added a complaint of his own. He could
not understand why

actions should spark "[t]he jealousy of
Govermnent,"

always sought

beHeve

to terminate their long-

wrote William Claus that he would advise
the Mississaugas
British, but the chief

to

when he

"promote the Welfare of the Country" and

If Bntish-Indian relations

had become

its

his

[Brant] had, as he put

it,

"attachment to

strained, therefore, this

was

in

Brant's view due to the fact that the British "in
Several instances... seem[ed] to put aside
the

Covenant Chain."^^

The

frustrated

Mohawk

dealing with the Indians had

and

it

also

come

complained

to

to

Claus that the British method of

mirror that practiced by the American government,

appeared to him that the Crown would henceforth always
exercise

right" in acquiring Native lands.

The government might pay

lip

its

"preemptive

service to the Indians'

supposed status as "free and Independent people," but the words meant
nothing as long as
the

government did not allow them sole and

right to dispense with

94

Ibid.,

305-06.

Brant

to Claus,

them

4 June 1798,

full

as they so chose.

CNA, RG

8,

Military

C
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authority over their lands, including the

By denying the

Indians the right "to Sell or

Senes, Vol. 251, 113.
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In sp.te of Portland's instructions
to wait for a better
opportunity to purchase

additional Mississauga lands, the
matter could not be so easily
set aside.

A cadre of

Mississauga chiefs, with Brant as their
spokesman and advisor, had already
begun plans
to

complete a cession, only

in

which they were demanding exorbitant
terms. Years

this

time one supposedly favorable to
Indian interests and one
earlier,

Simcoe had considered a

land grant to an exiled French nobleman.
Count Joseph de Puisaye,
the British in their struggle against
Revolutionary France. Like so

who had

supported

many of the French

noblesse emigre, de Puisaye and his people
did not expect to return

to their

homeland any

time soon, and the Frenchman had already
begun discussions with Brant and the

Mississaugas to acquire a substantial
1

tract

of land

in

Upper Canada. Therefore,

799, Brant gave Russell a touching proposal, arguing

this

Nobleman and

"had suffered
mile

strip

his unfortunate followers

in the

same Cause,"

of choice lake-front

Mississauga chiefs,

at

"it

was

in the

in April

Cause of Loyalty

had suffered," and since the Six Nations

the Mississaugas were

terrain at the northwest

now

willing to part with a five-

end of Lake Ontario.'^ The

Brant's urging, hoped to compel the British to pay
the Indians'

requested price of one shilling, three pence per acre, Halifax
currency,'^^ for the entire

69,120

acres.

'°'

Thus,

in spite

of his warnings

to the

Mississaugas regarding the Bntish

desire to expropriate their lands. Brant pushed forward with the
proposal, hoping this

time to control the negotiations and manipulate them

Brant to Russell, 10 April 1799, Cruikshank
'°°

According

& Hunter,

to the Indians'

Russell Correspondence

advantage.

Ill:

.

168.

to Brant's best biographer, Isabel

Thompson Kelsay, this was the equivalent of three shillings
four pence sterling per acre. Hence, Halifax currency was worth nearly three times the value of Britain's
standard currency! See Kelsay, 590.
Brant to Johnson, 10

May

1799, Cruikshank

cS:

Hunter, Russell Correspondence

184

.

Ill:

195.

Russell sensed Brant's intentions,
and he attempted to eireumvent
the chiefs plan

by mformmg

the

Mohawk

that ,f the British

engaged

in further negotiations for

Mississauga lands, these would he
handled through the ageney oflnd.an
Supenntendent

John Johnson. Rven

if the

Mississaugas had earmarked the land
for the Count de

Puisaye, the government reserved
the right to alter or deny this
agreement. The governor
also pointed out that

it

was Brant and

not the British in this case

dispossessing the Mississaugas of their
to

remind Brant of protocol, realizing

that

land.'"'^

that the

In truth,

who had pushed

for

however, Russell simply wished

proposed transaction would not occur,
and

John Johnson's services would therefore be
unnecessary

in this instance.

The

administrator and his Executive Council
thought the Mississauga proposal absurd,

considering

acceded
to

to,

it

"Injurious to His Majesty's Interest

& consequently improper to [be]

not to mention the extreme hidecency of
their [the Mississaugas'] presuming

shackle their cessions to the King by any condition
whatsoever."'''^ Even

government had wanted

to,

could not have paid an amount close to what Brant
and the

it

Mississaugas demanded, particularly
drastically slashed and

when

if the

the

at

a time

when

the Indian budget had already been

war with France continued

to drain the

government's treasury. Russell explained the abortive agreement

Count de Puisaye, emphasizing

to the

home
disappointed

the impropriety of the Mississaugas' "Innovations

derogatory from the King[']s dignity," and the administrator found

it

ironic "[t]hat

Indians being ever inclined to express strong attachments to old usages, ought
assuredly

Russell to Brant, 25 April 1799, ibid., 183.
'"^

Russell to Prescott, 26

May

1799,

ibid.,

209. Also see, Russell to Portland, 26

185

May

1799,

ibid.,

205-06.

be the

[lo]

last .n

attempting thus to introduce

For the tnne bemg then, the Count
and
British

still

new ways

h.s followers

in then-

wUh

T.ansaet.ons

would reman,

hon.eless, and the

refused to reeognize Brant as
a spokesperson for the
Mississaugas.

Russell did not even bother to
n.lonn Brant of the Exeeut.ve
C ounc.Ps decision

rcgardn.g the Miss.ssauga lands.
From the Bnt.sh perspective. Brant's
repeated attempts
to challenge the Bnl.sh

government seemed

to substantiate Portland's

the hazards of the government's
attempts to

compromise with

demonstrated the apparent w.sdom hehmd
the

Home

Indians.

wamings regarding
They

also

Secretary's cautioning against
the

dangers of permK.mg the existence of
intertribal confederacies and
coalitions during
period of peace with the Americans.

When

Brant dnally inquired a few weeks

later,

this

the

Lieutenant Governor curtly shot back a
response the same day that he received
Brant's
letter,

exclaiming that

"it

was

not to be accepted because

before (that

we have

that

in his

is

Unanimous opinion of the Board

m

thai this offer

contrary to past Usages with Indian Nations

heard of) fettered their cessions of land

Comlitions (as italicized

had done

it

the

to the

C'ruikshank's edition] whatsoever."'"'

correspondence with Brant

a

month and

knew

it.

Throughout years of striving

who have

not

King with any
Moreover, as Russell

a half earlier, he again insisted

John Johnson would handle the government's future dealings
with
hi his stniggles against British leaders in

ought

the Mississaugas.

Upper Canada Brant had

lost,

for the diplomatic leverage that could

guarantee his people their sovereignty, he found himself checkmated

at

and he

one day

every

liii

n.

Beginning with Alexander McKee's undermining of his inlluence and authority
among

Russell to Count dc Puisaye, 26
Russell lo Brant, 10 .hmc 1799.

May
ibid.,

1799

&

1

1

June 1799,

226.

186

il)i(J.,

21

1

the Western Confederacy at
the

Miami Rapids

in

1

793, continumg with the flirther

humiHation Brant expenenced when
Simcoe, Russell, Dorchester, Portland,
Liston, and
Prescott

all

worked

after leaders in

the

to

deny him and

Canada and

Grand River, Brant was

agent,

at

his people a full title in fee
simple to their lands,

Whitehall combined to deny Brant a
resident clergyman

it

at

finally thwarted in his attempts
to serve as the Mississaugas'

m spite of that nation's request.

could bear

and

After this string of defeats and
humiliations. Brant

no longer. Yet when the Mohawk's
anger boiled over, Russell merely

ascnbed the disgruntled chiefs behavior

to either a case

of too much "liquor or his

extreme Impatience of Control.

Although the

crestfallen

further with the leaders in

Mohawk

for the time being reflised to fraternize

Upper Canada, he decided

to

Prescott's opinion. Brant again stated his grievances,

make

a last-ditch attempt to

Prescott,

who

told

him

that

sway

complaming not only of matters

pertaining to the Mississauga lands but the Grand
River case as well.

nowhere with

any

The chief got

he would have to petition Russell on these

matters. Additionally, Prescott attempted to do
Russell a favor

by defusing any of

Brant's remaining hopes and explaining,

whenever any Lands were wanted from Indians by the Government,
they
would be consulted respecting them according to ancient Customs,
and they
would be purchased from them in the manner prescribed by the Established
that

Regulations and in no other way.'°^

The Governor General's remarks
had appealed

dealt Brant a crushing blow, not only because the chief

to the highest authority in all

of Canada, but because Prescott's words

Russell to Prescott, 22 June 1799, Toronto Public Library, LI

8,

Russell Papers, Letterbook of

Correspondence with Prescott, 1796-1799.
Prescott to Russell, 18 July

1

799, Cruikshank

& Hunter, Russell Correspondence

187

.

HI: 278.

presumed Native subservience

overcome ever

what Brant had stnven

to

since his people's migration
to Canada.

Brant returned from his
before.

to the Bnt.sh, precisely

By December of

visit

with Prescott no less perturbed
and resentful than

1800 he even senously entertained
the notion of resettling

people within the boundaries of the
United
confidential" letter to an American
fnend,

States.

his

Brant wrote a "secret and

Thomas Moms, asking

to

make "a purchase of

the Western Indians" from within
the jurisdiction of the United
States in order to perhaps

"move

there" where

In this letter

"we would

desire to be under the protection"
of that govemment.'°«

Brant revealed that he had not given
up on his dreams of an autonomous

status for his people, and he even
hinted at the possibility of gaining
an authoritative role

over the western
In the

tribes within the

summer of

United States.

1801, barely six months after his letter to
Morris, Brant

addressed some of the western Indians within the
boundaries of the United States, namely
the Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis living
near Detroit. In possibly his most

inflammatory public speech ever. Brant sharply
denounced the British while attempting
to rally the

Three Fires under his leadership. He informed the
Three

they "have been misled by the advices
Ideas of the Shawanies

&

[sic]

Wyandotts." The

of your [British] Father and the mistaken

Mohawk

tribes in his indictment against the British because

Brant to

Fires' leaders that

leader included these latter two

of their continued close

ties to the

Thomas

Morris, 26 December 1800, quoted in William L. Stone, Life
o f Joseph B rant
Thayendanege a, 2 Vols. (New York: Alexander V. Blake, 1838; reprint, Harrison,
NY: Harbor Hill
-_:

Books, 1969), II: 405. Brant's biographer Isabel Thompson Kelsay argues
that the chief had no intention
of moving from the Grand River, but that he merely wanted to turn a profit from
this American land
scheme. Yet, Kelsay does not offer any better explanation indicating why Brant
would not have been
sincere in stating his desire to move. See Kelsay, 620-2 1 By this time in his
career Brant had come to the
end of his patience with the British, and his subsequent speech to the western Indians
at Detroit in the
summer of 1801 demonstrates his sincerity.
.
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latter at A.MlK-..s,„nrg

and Brownstown. respectively.
Us.ng .n.cnt.onal sarcasm directed

Shawnees and Wyandots. Brant

at the

inforn.ed the Three F.res that
he

those two tribes because "they
consuler themselves w.se enough

conduct."

in truth, the clucfst.ll
su.arted fron. the

when

nations

they had heeded Alexander

M.anu Kap.ds

c.ght years earlier.

McKee

in council at the

had urged them not

con.pronnse w.th the American peace
commissioners and

to insist

Shawnees and Wyandots had

not only

the angry

my advice

[at

Mohawk remmdcd

lost

would have

to

The

opposed Brant's proposal, but they also
managed

I

hree Fires'

the kap.ds in 1793 mstead of
J

the United States

have

the

Foot of the

States.

undermine the leader's inllueuce anu,ng the
majority of the Confederacy

Now

own

upon the Ohio River

permanent bo.mdary between the Native
Confederacy and the United

as a

to

guide their

not address

rcbulThe had received from those

McKee's advice

At that time

.o

would

hail then limits

headmen

attendmg

that "[h]ad

to that

at that

tmie.

you listened

to

of the English Shawanies[,]

more circumscribed, and you would

not

your country."

Brant dul not stop there, choosing to further vent
his grievances against the
British, particularly the leaders in

Canada.

He

infomied the Three Fires

that they could

only blame themselves for "listening to the foolish advice of
those petty Officers
different Posts

from

his

who

call

themselves your Father." At

harangue against the

confidence

in

them

British, assuring his Indian

Brant exempted the King

audience "that the King has no

[the leaders in Canada]; they are unexperienced [sic]

desei-ve attention and the British

those [Indian allies]

this point

who have

Ciovemment altogether has shewn

rendered

it

at the

the greatest services.

""^'^

and do not

great ingratitude to

Finally, Brant boldly

10')

Brant's speech

254.

at Detroit,

Summer. 1801

(exact date unknown),

18.
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Series Vol

claimed that

and

am

Man

a greater

n^yselfhave done more

"I

call Father.'"

the Con.n.ander in Chief
not excepted,"

al,,

for that [British]

Goven.nent than any of those

This speech represented a
turning point

grown weary of dealing with
<lu.t

than then,

leaders in Canada, he

now

in Brant's

Monarch

you

diplomacy. Having

sought external support,
whether

he from the United States
government, the tr.hes dwelhng on
the

the border, or from the British

whom

Amencan

side of

directly.

Nevertheless, the chief st.ll wished
to form a coalition of tribes
that could coerce
the

Euro-Amencan powers

to

recognize an autonomous Native

state,

hi this respect,

Brant considered h.s phght similar
to these Indian nations that
he addressed on the

American side of the border and therefore
attempted

to identify

himself dispossessed of h,s land by the
British authorities,

Grant and his position as Grand River
agent and Captain
he hoped to form a
council

Buffalo Creek with the Iroquois

at

boundary.

new confederacy and proposed

'

Nothing appears

government respond
in

lived

in spite

in the

He

believed

of the Haldimand

Indian Department.

Three Fires

to

meet him

Now

in

on the American side of the

'

'

people

who

to the

with them.

American

to

have come of this

to Brant's overtures via

territory.

Morris

invitation, nor did the

to establish a

American

new home

for his

Consequently, after 1801 the Six Nations' leader

apparently abandoned his American scheme, and he
resolved to formulate a strategy of
ultimately presenting his Grand River case to friends
and government leaders in London.

Brant
that Russell

still

retained a kernel of faith in the

and Prescott had always acted on

"° Ibid., 19.
"' Ibui., 19-20.
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home government. Wanting

their

own, the

Mohawk

to believe

remained unaware

of the extent

that leaders

m Canada had taken the. orders from

Whhehall. The Duke of

Portland constantly sought ways
to reduce the chiefs
influence, and
regularly laid Russell's letters
before the King, there

no evidence

is

when

that

Portland

George

III,

though having met Brant personally,
ever mtervened on the chiefs
behalf Instead, the

home government grew more

confident

m its dealings with Brant as the threat of a

French invasion dissipated. Portland
and other Bntish leaders
French would have much difficulty

in transporting

at

Whitehall

knew

that the

an ^rmy to North Amenca.
Bntain's

continued naval supremacy drastically
limited French strategy after the
stnng of decisive
British victones at Ushant,

Camperdown, Cape

December 798 Portland denied
1

St.

Vincent, and the Nile.

As

a result,

m

Prescott the military reinforcements
that the latter had

requested, and from Philadelphia Bntish
envoy Robert Liston also happily informed

Russell of the reduced threat to Canada, stating
that "[njothing can be effected
there [in

Canada] against His Majesty's Government without
external

assistance,

destruction of the French Squadron by Admiral
Nelson. .will probably
.

of the enemy for
prophetic, and

distant expeditions."'

The

damp

late

the ardour

predictions of Liston and Portland proved

by 1800 Bntain's naval supremacy had

a restored North

and the

virtually

ended France's hopes

for

American empire.

The fortunes of war had
pertaining to Indian affairs.

also

made

the leaders in

The passing of the French

Canada more bold

threat

meant an end

in matters

any

to

diplomatic leverage that Brant had once enjoyed in his efforts to
intimidate Upper

Canada's

leaders.

Such conditions meant

that provincial leaders

now had no

reason to

give in to the chief s demands, as Russell had done in 1797. In 1800, for
example, Peter

112

Portland to Prescott, 6

to Russell,

1

December 1798, Cruikshank

December 1798,

ibid.,

& Hunter, Russell Correspondence

1.
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23; Liston

Hunter, Russe,,, successor
as Lieu.enan, Governor
of the upper prov.nce, used
less
than his predecessors

when he

".old [Bran,] ,ha,

Agen, for,heMiss,ssagaus."Then
inflan,matoo, speech

nephew by mamage.

at Detro.t.

S,r

rn

that the

would not pennit

September .801. shortly

Brant received a

John Johnson,

Supenntendent informed Brant

I

to a

letter

,ac.

h™ ,o ac, as an

after the

Mohawk's

from his longtime friend
and

manner simultaneously caring and

government could not permit him

ster.. the

to take

on the

role he sough,, whether w,th
the Miss.ssaugas or any
other nation(s). Johnson
instructed

him

"
affairs, and desist from
assembling the different nations in
distant parts of the country
and on'v atterd
the business of your settlement,
except when

iTJZllTr

called

otherwise; as

upon by

.oZTa^lZTo

gives opening to the world to put
unfavorable conZcdons on
your conduct which must tend to
lessen your consequence in the
opinion of those
at the head of affairs; and
I much fear may do
you senous injury."^
it

Deeply hurt by Johnson's words, Brant
interpreted

this

language as a veiled

threat.

Indeed, Johnson probably would not
have sent such a letter four or five
years

earlier,

dunng

a time

when

provincial security

seemed

at risk

and strained relations existed between Bntain
and the United

due

to

States.

rumored invasions
In his response,

Brant vehemently defended himself and his
loyalty, and he complained of the

government's "change of politics," arguing

that there

was once a time when

uniting the Indians "formerly gave satisfaction,"
but this "has

The

effect."'

Hunter

frustrated chief wrote

to Portland, 8

Johnson

to Brant,

Brant

Johnson,

to

1

March 1800, CNA,

two

MG

September 1801, quoted

November

1801, quoted

1

letters to

1,

CO 42,

m Stone,

m Stone,
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II:

II:

Johnson

now

quite a different

m such a vein, but neither

325, 111.

406. Also see, Kelsay, 625.

407-09.

his efforts at

drew a response. Having endured
war, dispossession, and a
forced m.grat.n from

Mohawk

Valley, this friendship, after
nearly fifty years,

By

the turn of the nineteenth
century,

little

was

compromise
1

in

over.

had changed

Reserve since the Six Nations'
refugees had moved there

m

the

at the

Grand River

1784. Apart from Russell'
s

recognizing some of Brant's land
transactions with private buyers
in

797, the British had

made

virtually

no concessions

to the

Grand River community.

Consequently, the struggle for sovereignty
would continue, and Brant proved
himself
both resilient and relentless in

dreams, and

in the first

this quest.

years of the

new

talented protege, John Norton, and
to

The aging Mohawk never abandoned

century he would look increasingly
to his

some old fnends

obtain for his people what he believed

his

was already
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in

theirs.

London, hoping

to finally

CHAPTER

5

JOHN NORTON AND THE CONTINUING
STRUGGLE AT THE GRAND ^ivcj^,
RIVER
1801-1812

In the history

of the mtertnbal community

at

the

Grand River, the years between

1801 and 18 12 divide mto two broad periods.
From 1801
1807, Joseph Brant, the

Mohawk

community. But as

be described

will

ehieftain,

until his

m

this period.

November

remained the dominant figure in
the

in the first section

of this chapter, John Norton,
a

younger leader whose career was
promoted by Brant, came
R.ver

death in

Together Brant and Norton attempted

to

prominence

to

defend the nghts and future

at the

Grand

of the residents of the Grand River.
Brant's passing inaugurated a new
phase of the

community's history
1807

to

that will

be covered in the second section of this
chapter. From

1812 Norton became Grand River's most
prominent

leadership

opponents.

was challenged by leading Bntish

A

volatile

penod

that

its

when

in the

very survival often

to

at

by some Native

Grand River

at stake.

1

80

1

-

1

807

previous chapter, Bntish leaders in London, other officials

Canada, and the Indian Department's agents had worked
Brant

also

the future nature of the

The Emergence of John Norton.

As described

Canada and

even though his

culminated with another war involving Upper
Canada,

the years between 1801 and 1812 were a time

community was debated and

officials in

local leader,

in

in

conjunction to thwart Joseph

every turn. After briefly considenng the possibility of removing
his community

United States

territory.

Brant had delivered his inflammatory anti-British address to the

nations of the Three Fires gathered

at Detroit.

194

These aftempts

to establish a sovereign

Native confederacy outside ,he
boundaries of British tem.ory
hav.ng proved fruuless, ,he

s.ym,ed

Mohawk

remaining

at

the

leader continued his efforts
to improve his people's
eondit.on while

Grand River.

Reahzing the Hmitations placed
upon him, Brant
with Canadian and Bntish
authonties after 1801. The

altered his

Mohawk

corresponded regularly with Claus,
Johnson, or any other

Department, nor did he continue
after Peter Hunter,

who had succeeded

head the Mississaugas and
his opposition, he

to file

in

in dealing

leader no longer

officials in the Indian

gnevances with the Lieutenant Governor's
Russell,

illegally lease

became more reserved

Grand River, except

approach

admonished the chief about

Grand River
in

lands.'

his efforts to

Having a clearer idea of

openly discussing matters pertaining

formal council. Although he did not
abandon the fight to

proper land patent for his people

at the

Grand River,

office

to the

gam

a

the chief now understood that
he

could never attain this through the conventional
channels of the Indian Department and
the office of Upper Canada's Lieutenant
Governor. In the
attentions

on improving the

meantime Brant focused

internal conditions at the Six Nations

Reserve and on

completing the still-outstanding land transactions involving
the sales of the

"Blocks" of land along the Grand River

that President Peter Russell

Council had approved, albeit under duress,

some of these

sales.

in the

summer of

six large

and the Executive

1797. If he could confirm

Brant believed that this would produce enough income to

temporarily alleviate the Six Nations' impoverished condition.

'Kelsay, 619, 624-26.
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his

As

an ally in

all

of these endeavors dunng
the early years of the new
century,

Brant came to rely heavHy on
John Norton.^

of Cherokee-Scot parentage
British trader

John

first

Bom

met Brant dunng

about 1770, th. talented
nnxed-blood
the 1790s

when Norton worked

m the regions of Detroit and the Maumee Valley.^

Askm

for

Norton

possessed a plethora of abilities; he
proved an articulate wnter and a
fine orator, and he
purportedly had mastered English, French,
Spanish, and Gem.an, in addition
to a dozen

Native American dialects.^ While visiting
England and Scotland on separate
occasions,

Norton became acquainted with many

significant individuals, including the

Duke of

Northumberland, the Earl of Moira, the Earl of
Camden, Lord Castlereagh, John Owen,

George Canning,
latter's

Clapham

who was

Sir Walter Scott,

Sect.

Under

William Wilberforce, and other members
of the

the direcfion of Wilberforce and with
the support of Owen,

the Secretary for the Bntish and Foreign
Bible Society, Norton translated the

Gospel of St. John into the

Mohawk

language.

He

later

wrote a history of the Iroquois

League, adding his account of the League's
participafion
Brant sensed these talents
after the conclusion

To

of hostilities

many
in the

in the

War of 1812.^

years before Norton's travels abroad. In
1796,

Maumee

Valley and the British withdrawal from

date, the best biographical study

of Norton is Carl F. Klinck's "Biographical Introduction"
(pp xiiif« ^he Journal of Maior John Norton.
809- S
that Klinck and James J. Tahnan edited and
published in 1970. Other biographical essays on Norton include:
Klinck's "New Light on John Norton "
Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada IV(IV) (June
1966): 167-77, and J. McE. Murray's "John'
Norton," Ontario Histo rical Society Papers and Records XXYVTT (194S)1

1

1

7.I6.

Jolin Norton's

Speech to the Five Nations at Onondaga, Grand River, 12 Febniary 1807,
Norton
Letterbook, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ayer Ms 654 (hereafter denoted
"Ayer Ms"), 1 19; Klmck &
Talman, Journal of Major John Norton, xxxiv-xxxv; Murray,
9; Klmck, "New Light on John Norton,"
^

'

173,

Thomas

Scott to his brother. Sir Walter Scott, ca. 1815, John Norton Papers, 'Weldon
Library, University
of Western Ontario, London, Ontario; Kinck
Talman, Journal of Maior John Norton xx.

&

^

In 1816,

Norton gave and dedicated

(1809-1810), to his friend,

Hugh

this

,

volume, along with

Percy, second

a journal

of his travels to Cherokee country
but due to the Duke's untimely

Duke of Northumberland,
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lhe.r chiefs

According

to trad.tional Iroquois
practice,

whenever a evil chief died, top

matrons of the deceased chiefs clan
would choose a successor, usually
vacated posit,on."> However,
ehiefs, regardless

men of s.gn.Hcant

of fam.ly or clan

status.

adoption by Joseph Brant, was eligible

to

bravery and

Therefore Norton, a

lhal

could be named war

Mohawk by

virtue of h.s

be selected as a war chief independent
of the

clan matrons' selection process for creating
civil chiefs.

Norton nnphecl

skill

a son, to Hll the

In a

war chiefs generally possessed more

statement

talent

made

in

1

805,

and held more mnuence

than c.v.l chiefs, and that only those civil
leaders with the best oratorical
skills could
aspire to the higher honor of becoming a
the distinction this

way because of his own

with (he great importance war chiefs had
initially a

war chief" Perhaps Norton chose

war-chief status, but his view was consistent

in the

to

authority and inlluence

Johnsons and by

&

l

at

the

Grand River had always

handle their affairs after their removal from

principal chief, .loseph Brant, had never been

Klinck

Six Nations' Grand River society,

group of wartime refugees, the Natives living

looked to war chiefs

by

virtue

named

of his martial

feats

New

No rton,

York. Their

a civil chief, holding all

and former connections

his position as a captain in the Indian Department.''

alman, Joiimal of Major John

to present

of his
to the

fechnically both

xxxvii-xxxix, xl-xli.

Snow, 64-65.
" Sec Norton'.s address

at

Trinity College, Cambridge, 12

March 1805, quoted

in

Khnck

& Talman,

Journal ol Maior .lohn Norton, xxxvni.

Kelsay, .18-45, 109; Despite never having formally been selected a civil chief, lirant appaieiilly had
become considered a de facto civil chief at the (iraiid River by the time of his death, ilis widow Cathe
leading matron of the

Mohawk

successor. Sec t.ydekkcr,

1

l

urlle clan, took the initiative to

88-89.
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appoint her son (and Jo.seph's) as his

Brant and Norton were war chiefs,
but
that civn chiefs

would have managed

Grand Rwer they handled

at the

in the

Though shanng much of Brant's

days of a umted confederacy

vision for improvements

community, Norton had hopes and
expectations
leader.'^ Brant

had

at

all

at

the

that transcended those

of the

affa.rs

m New York.-

Grand River

of the elder

one time imagined an autonomous
and self-sustaining Six Nations

as independently allied to the
British and situated at the

helm of a united western

Confederacy, a position he believed his
people had enjoyed for generations
poor

American

Now

rebellion.

with these hopes virtually dashed and
his influence reduced,

Brant concentrated his efforts on gaining

of generating revenue through
poverty

at the

to the

control over Iroquois land for the
puipose

full

legal land sales

and leases

that

would slow

the

growing

Grand River.

Norton shared

this goal, but

he also envisioned

transform Native society. His schemes would

come

to

much more,

desiniig to wholly

resemble the assimilationist

programs ordinarily associated with the Jeffersonian
benevolence

that the

United States

practiced during these early years of the nineteenth
century in an attempt to transform

Native cultures and

of his acculturationist ideas
secret

Although he was circumspect about revealing the

lifestyles.'^

to the

community

at

the

Grand River,

the chief made

of his plans when he petitioned the support of important leaders

lengthy

letter to his friend

details

no

in England. In a

John Owen, Secretary for the British and Foreign Bible

Address of the Six Nations to William Claus, 3 September 1806, York, Norton
Letterbook, Aver
63; Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations 273-74.

Ms

62-

.

Kelsay, 650.

Francis Paul Prucha,
ed. (Lincoln

&

The Great

Father; The United States
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1984

G overnment and the

American Infli.gn^ abr.
& 1986), 48-57; Anthony F. C. Wallace,
Americans (Cambndge,
& London; The
'

Jefferson and the India ns:

The Tragic Fate of the

First

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), chapters 6
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MA

& 7.

Socty, he descnbed
to finance

the

S.

Nations' pHght and asked
the Secretary and

nothing less than the
transformation of the Grand

h.

colleagues

R.er commumty. To

begin

with, Norton proposed that
the Society send "a
Missionary or an Instructor, a
Farmer, a

Blacksmith, a Wheelnght, a Spmster
and Weaver, a Tanner[,] Saddle
to the

Grand River Reserve.'^ From

this

& Harness Maker"

cadre of support, he contmued,

'^'"^^ be immediately formed, sufficiently
stocked with Cattle
llZtf^"^
means
for carrying on its cultivation
to perfection; the Young
Men migh be
employed to work on it,
it be fon.ed into
a kind of seminary for
Boy

&

^

'"^

°f ^1-- useful

onldrst^'f^
Norton's request also called for "some
indulgence
to

encourage them

industry

to

may perhaps

be instructed, a

little

[to be]

bnbery used

be excused and leave us only

of Mankind somefimes

may reduce

& the

shewn

for the

&

bLls

their parents or relations

promotion of religion and

to regret that the

blindness of the bulk

us to that necessity."'^

Norton's description of a seminary and
educational farm resembled the mission
stations that the United States

Norton probably knew of the

government encouraged among Native peoples

activities

at the time.

of Quakers, Moravians, and Presbytenans who
ran

government-supported missions among the Iroquois

in

New

York, and

among

the

Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, and Muskogees."'
Furthermore, in attempdng

Norton

to

to

John Owen, 12 August 1806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer
Ms, 30-31

17

Ibid.,

31

Ibid.

See Joel Martm, S acred Revolt: The Muskogees' Struggle for a
1 99
1 ), chapter 4; William G. McGloughlin, Cherokee Renascence
Princeton University Press, 1986), chapters 2

&

New WorlH (Boston: Beacon Press
in the New Rep iihlir (Princeton-

R. David

Edmunds, "'A Watchful Safeguard to Our
Hoof and the Loyal Shawnees," in Native Americans and the Earlv Rep nhlir cd.
Frederick E. Hoxie, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville and
London: University Press of
Virgima, 1999), 162-99; Anthony F. C. Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca
217-36, 272-77; A. F. C.
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convince

Owen

of the benefits of such
programs, the ch.f even
pra.sed "[t]he System of

the United States to keep
friendly

& contented the hidians/'^^

This praise and optimism
regarding United States Indian
pohcy probably

stemmed from Norton's knowledge
of the

economy made by his

successful transition toward an
agncultural

father's people, the Cherokees.
Just

government was responsible

for these

how much

the

Amencan

developments among the Cherokees

is

debatable,

but this half-Cherokee believed
that the government had
"sacredly observed and

guaranteed the Treaty [of Hopewell -1785]"
and with good results

Cherokee country, he praised

to

that nation for retaining "the

Independence," and for making vast
improvements
"Cultivation" and "great herds of cattle."
in

He

-

After Norton's

appearance of

in agnculture, including

also lauded

visit

Cherokee

women

both

for their skill

spinning and weaving.^^ The mixed-blood
chief hoped to duplicate these
successes

the

Grand River, but he understood the

fragility

of developing

societies,

at

and he especially

feared the external pressure that encroaching
European settlements placed on fodian

communities attempting
that

it

would require

become

to acculturate.

at least a

Even

for the

mighty Cherokees, Norton predicted

century of uninterrupted development before
"they might

a flourishing, civilized Nation."^"*

Norton's zeal for acculturationist reforms stemmed
in large part from his genuine
Christian

faith.

He

considered himself an Anglican, as did

had internalized and personalized

Norton
21

22

23

to

Owen,

1

2

August

1

his faith to a

much

many Mohawks,

greater degree than

806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 29.

Klinck

8l

Talman, Journal of Major John Norton 59.

Norton

to

Robert Barclay, Esq., 16 June 1810, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms., 130-31.

Klinck

.

& Talman,

Journal of Major John Norton 60.
.
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but Norton

most Mohawks.

Wherever he went, he sought
opportunities
determined

to eventually bring all

Norton

first trip to

England

500 eopies of his translated Gospel of St.
John

later

stopped

Man

of the Creation; the

village of W.llstown

in

at the

m

1804-1805, he

Grand River, and when

present-day northern

the ehiefs in council there,
"[l]ay[ing] before them, that

God; the

to

Cherokee

at the

Alabama, he addressed
due from

worsh.p with other Chnst.ans,
and he was

Native peoples to the knowledge
of the beliefs he had

adopted. Shortly after his return
from his
distributed

to

Fall,

frailty

which

is

of the one, the Great Mercy of the Other,
a bnef account

and the Redemption of the World by
our Lord Jesus; with the

duties he inculcates, and their application
in life."^^ Also along this
southern journey,

Norton stopped

at a

Moravian mission

in

northern Georgia and "joined in the
devotions

of these worthy people." He described them
as "Missionanes, who are
feelings of true religion.

May the

blest with the

Almighty, bless and prosper the pious labours
of these

worthy Christians, who sojourn with a strange nation.""
Despite Norton's enthusiasm for transforming
Indian communities into Christian
societies, a large

embrace

number of Natives, both

his ideas.

In a letter to

as might be wished -there

substance."

26

is

too

at

the

Grand River and elsewhere, did not

Owen, Norton confessed

much

catching

at the

that "religion

shadow and neglecting

Part of the problem, as Norton later complained,

proper minister to instruct them

in the

word of God." Since the

and Whitehall had denied Brant's request

does not flounsh

for a resident

was

the

that "there

is

leaders of Upper

clergyman

no

Canada

in the late 1790s,

an

Norton to an unknown recipient (probably Owen), January, 1807, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms.,
142-43
For Norton's speech to Cherokee council at Willstown, see Klinck & Talman, Jo urnal of Maior
J ohn
Norton 72-3.
,

"

Ibid., 68.

Norton

to

Owen,

12

August 1806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 36.
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ordamed mm.ter .s.ted them only
about tw.ce

a year

"

Norton feared

conversions would not occur on
these rare occasions, because
that is perceived,"

upon themselves"

and he lamented

that "the

",t

.

that

legmmate

only the ceremony

estabhshed Church of England
do not take

the style of missions that
the Moravians practice.^^
Rev. Clark

Kendrick, a visiting mimster from
the Massachusetts Baptist
Missionary Society,
corroborated Norton's fears, exclaiming,
"[Y]ou

whisky shops, when they appear and

The

act

more

lack of a resident clergyman at

may see

like incarnate devils than
Chnstians."^^

Grand River may have hindered

Chnstianity, but other obstacles impeded
this as well.
intertnbal, multi-cultural

visit to the

prophet

Grand River

who

a

Mohawk

experienced visions and prophecies from "the
Upholder of the Skies

The Mohawk holy man

was grudgingly compelled

The

The Grand River Reserve was an

Samuel Kirkland encountered

White Dog ceremony with considerable success

s

the spread of

community, contaimng a number of religious
onentations. On a

villages in 1800, Rev.

[italicized in Johnston]."

latter'

the natives returning from
the

permit

to

also

at the

had reintroduced the froquois

Grand River and elsewhere. Brant

this prophet's sacrifices

and

rituals,

because the

teaching had "gained almost universal credit in
the settlement."^°

State of Missions

amongst

the Iroquois about 1810, taken from a survey
completed bv John Norton
Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations 244.
.

Norton

Owen,

12 August 1806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer
Iroquois, 1810, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations 244.
to

Ms, 36-7; State of Missions amongst

the

.

^"^

The Rev. Clark Kendrick's Opinion of the Six Nations, 1809, Johnston, Valley
of the

Six

Natiom 243-

For additional assessments regarding the state of Christian missions among
the Indians of Upper
Canada at this time, see Report to Lord Castlereagh, enclosure in Gore to Castlereagh,
4 Septem.ber
44.

1809,
349, 94-95. Rev. John Strachan, Rector at York durmg this period, also
made a very
similar report corroborating Gore's findings. See Strachan's undated report
on the Indians of Upper
Canada, Ontario Historical Archives, John Strachan Papers, F983, Vol. 9 (Ms
35, Reel 9).

P.R.O.,

CO 42,

The Rev. Samuel Kirkland's Account of Religious

Practices

Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations 242.
.
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on

the

Grand River, 26 February 1800,

The Mohawk's prophecies and

practices bore similanties to the
teachings of the

Seneca prophet Handsome Lake,
whose new rehgion had a
all

Iroquois settlements in the same
penod.

significant impact throughout

Handsome Lake viewed

his

teachmgs as a

restoration and punfication of a
traditional Iroquois religion.^'
His tenets
series

of visions

in

1799 and 1800

number of religious

revive a

Iroquois nations.

in

which the Creator instructed Handsome
Lake

ntuals that had

The Creator's

denved from

neady lapsed among

a

to

the Senecas and other

revelations also entailed the observance
of a stnct moral

code, calling for abstinence from
drunkemiess, wife abuse, infidelity,
promiscuity,

gambling,
to

adhere

come

to

theft, witchcraft, bickering,

strictly to the

and gossiping.^^ Handsome Lake's
people needed

observance and practice of this modified

an end. These teachings appear

to

faith, lest the

have gained some adherents

at the

worid

Grand

River.

Brant, Norton, and other Chnstians at the

Grand River

indirectly benefited

from

the spread of Handsome Lake's religion of the
Longhouse, for the Seneca prophet

espoused a number of the ideals regarding

lifestyle

and culture

that the Christian

missionaries also championed. In addition to his rigid moral
code,

Handsome Lake

spread a message of peace, denouncing every form of conflict
and warfare, and he even

announced

that Iroquois

men

should

now

take up agriculture for a living." These

precepts departed radically from froquois cultural practices of merely
a generation before,

when warfare had been

a necessary component of Iroquois

preserve the League and extend the Covenant Chain, and

^'

"

Anthony
Ibid.,

F. C.

Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca 315-17.
.

239-54, 278-85; Snow, 158-62.
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life in

when

the ongoing struggle to

agricultural pursuits

were

2

reserved s.r,c,Iy for
Iroquois tradition

women. Handsome Lake

when he

would mean an end

called for the

to matrilocal

matrihneal clan system

blow

at

longstanding

formafon of male-led nuclear

fam.lies,

which

fam.ly settings and a decreased
significance of the

« While the new

resembled elements of Chnsfan

further struck a

culture,

religion revolutionized Iroquo.s
life and

,ts

purpose was

to

preserve

its

community

intact

against the onrush of that culture.
In light of such sweeping changes

former League, Norton's

Handsome

own

by respected

acculturationist

religious leaders

schemes appear

from within the

less radical.

Like

Lake, the adopted Six Nations' leader
did not believe that agncultural
labor

diminished a warrior's honor and dignity.
As Norton once remarked, "The most
industrious at the plough, generally

when

the

most persevenng

at the

chase,

Winter they throw aside the hoe and take up the
gun."^^ Norton also believed, as

in

he put

shew themselves

it,

that "possession

of property

is

the basis of civilization," and that "little
hopes

can be entertained of their [the Six Nations'] improvement
either

m Christianity or

agriculture" without the tribes' adoption of a private
property system.^' Norton, like

Handsome Lake, was very concerned about
that unless the Six Nations

eventually lose

"

Ibid.,

it

to

chose

to adapt

the further loss of Native lands, and he feared

and privately use the land, they would

scheming people.

280-81.

34

282-85; Snow, 161; Carl Benn, The Iroquois
University of Toronto Press, 1998), 24-25.
Ibid.,

Anthony
Norton

CO 42,

to

F. C.

an

in the

War of

1

to

.

(Toronto, Buffalo, and London-

unknown

.

correspondent, 10 August 1808, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations 278 P

CNA, RG

RO

-

'
'

William Wilberforce,

Nations 278;

1

Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca 266, 279-80, 301-02.

140, 176-77.

" Norton

8

1

10, Vol. 27,

September 1808, P.R.O.,
15823.
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CO 42,

•

'

'

140, 180; Johnston, Valley of the Six

Norton resented the pattern of white
encroachments and Native land
dispossession
that

tended to accompany the Jefferson
administration's assimilationist
programs and

Christian evangeHzation.

always followed

The estabhshment of mission

wake of Native

in the

defeats.

could not become Chnstians while they
were
peoples.

He

stations

and forced land cessions

But Norton rejected the idea

still

that Natives

thnving cultures and independent

believed that genuine Chnstian missions
should attempt to bolster the

Natives' quality of life and independence
and prevent the Indians' slide into the
status of

wards. However, Norton believed that the
negative white influence in undermimng

Native cultures had particularly prejudiced
indigenous peoples against "the Light
oithe

Gospel

[as italicized in Klinck's edition]."^^

But the most staking difference beUveen
the

young Mohawk chiefs

ideas and those of numerous others interested
in acculturation

programs was

that the Indians should retain all

held,

and

his

view

that they should not

Nevertheless, as a

Grand River community

of the land

that they cuiTently

be compelled to move.

last resort,

farther

of the Six Nations' culture and

Norton contemplated the scheme of moving the

away from

political

the whites in an effort to retain the integrity

autonomy.^^ The prospect of building a

modernized, agriculturally-based pan-Indian

state

and

community could be expanded

if positioned farther west, this intertribal

the tribes of the Three Fires. In

1

806 he wrote

to

had appealed

Norton for some time,

to

John Owen, requesting

to include

that

Owen

and

the Bible Society "without delay secure a patent" for the Ojibwas. Ottawas, and

Potawatomis near Lake Huron

Klinck

CO 42,

& Talman,

in order to establish Christian schools

Journal of Major John Norton 48; Norton to Wilberforce,
.

140, 180-81; Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations 278-79;
.
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CNA, RG

1

and agricultural

September 1808, P.R.O.,

10, Vol, 27,

15825.

m>ss,ons

among .hem

Norton predicted
to the

before

whUe encroachments

that this "attempt at

whole" of all the Indians livmg

Norton also believed

who were

severely .a.n.ed .heir
communit.es."

cvihzing them" would "become
a general benefit
in the

.ha, the Six Nations,

Michigan peninsula and Upper
Canada.

who

relied

more heav.ly on

agriculture and

n.ore ap. .o .h,nk in terms of
owning pnvate property than the
Three Fires,

would play a

significant role in the establishment

of th.s socety."' Here, Norton
argued,

the Six Nations could po.en.mlly
uni.e w,.h "Chippawas, Otlawas,
Pon.awattamies,

Shawanons, Wyandols, Miam.es and others
from the Southward," forming

a

confederated Native state." The mixed-blood
leader further reasoned that hts
scheme

would also

benefit British mterests, arguing that
the assembled tribes of .he upper
country

"would be more

for the

good of .he Empire

noble and visionary, could never prevail

at

in case

a time

of war.""' Such .h.nkmg, though

when

the

Crown

feared Six Nafions'

sovereignty and Whitehall had taken pains to
prevent any intertribal comiections, as

Brant had discovered.

Norton's ambitious scheme to create an independent
confederacy of acculturated
tribes illustrated the

widening gulf between his thinking and

both sides pondered the future role of Indians

Norton

to

unknown

an

in

that

Canada, and

correspondent, 10 August 1808, P.R.O.,

CO

the Six Nations 277.

this

of British

officials as

gulf foreshadowed

—

42, 140, 175-76: Johnston ' Vallev of

.

Norton

"

Ibid.,

to

Owen,

12

August 1806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 34.

33-35.

Norton

to an

unkown

correspondent, 10 August 1808, P.R.O.,

the Six Nations 277.
.

Ibid

,

P.R.O.,

CO 42,

140, 177.
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CO 42,

140, 175-76; Johnston, Vallev of

further conflict

came

between Norton and the Indian
Department.- The m.xed-blood
leader

to resent the

Department

acculturation and political

Furthermore, Norton had

as the

autonomy

pnmary

obstacle preventmg the process
of

for the Indians

dwellmg

in

Upper Canada.

somehow gamed knowledge of the Department's

attempts to divide the Natives

when

previous

Portland and Russell had issued
secret orders to

William Claus and his subordinate agents

to

foment as much division as possible
between

Upper Canada's tnbes/^ Much of the remainder
of Norton's career

at

the

Grand River

involved an ongoing conflict with the
Indian Department, a struggle that
would
eventually reach

Warof

its

climax

in a leadership

schism between Norton and Claus dunng
the

1812.

As

time passed, Norton's resentment of the
Indian Department grew.

He

fully

grasped the one-sided and incongruous relationship
between Britain and her former
Indian

allies,

one

in

which Bntish leaders strove

to

reduce their Indian expenses and

obligations while simultaneously continuing to assert
their authority and influence in

Indian affairs and refusing to recognize any actual Native
sovereignty.
frustrated

by

the hierarchical structure of government in

He was

also

Upper Canada, which would not

formally hear any grievances or complaints by the hidians unless they
filed them

In a council held at

York

September, 1806, William Claus raised the concern that the Six Nations
intended to destroy the Indian Department. Though a legitimate allegation. Brant
denied it. See A Six
Nations" Address to William Claus, 3 September 1806, Johnston, Valley of the
Six Nations 274; Norton
in early

.

Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 66.
45

Norton

to

Lord Castlereagh, 23 July 1805,

that Whitehall's attempt to divide the tribes

CNA,

MG

1 1,

CO 42,

340, 123. In the case alluded

to, recall

was primarily an effort to prevent Brant from gaining a position
in Upper Canada. Lord Selkirk also recognized the conflict of

of ascendancy over a combination of tribes
interests between Norton and the Indian Department, admitting that Norton's plan, if successful,
would
render many of the Department's officers useless. Patrick C. T. White, ed.. Lord Selkirk's Diary. 18031804 (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1958), 245. The best biography on Lord Selkirk (i.e., Thomas
Douglas,

5"'

Earl of Selkirk)

Company of Canada,

is

John Morgan Gray's Lord Selkirk of Red River

Ltd., 1964.
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.

Toronto: The MacMillan

specifically through the official
channel, the Indian Department.^
Hence,

m dealing with

an organization whose best
interests lay in preventing
reforms of the govei^ment's
hidian
policy,

saw
this

and without recourse

for submitting appeals
in

the Indian Department as the

pnmary impediment

to reform, regardless

and colorfully aired

his grievances to his

806, he descnbed the Indian Department and

encouraged "idleness

its

in

London. Wnting

to

Robert Barclay in

measures as rumiing counter

He complained

& Owen]

it

policies.

Canada, Norton articulately

that this

will resemble

to all

orgamzation merely

& corruption," and "unless the system is changed &

united with yours [that of Barclay

canoe

officials in

fnends

forms of advancement and philanthropy.

its

effons be

two men jumping

into a

& paddling against each other," causing the canoe "to remain in the same

position."^^

Again wnting

descnbed the Department,
poisonous

fruit,

wholesome

but

is

to

Barclay nearly four years

this

time likening

it

to "a

bad

later,

Norton more pointedly

tree that not only

also of such pernicious influence that even
in

its

to

be our ruin."''

He

MG

Owen

forth

Owen, arguing

asked the Bible

Society's Secretary to use his influence with the government
in order

eliminate the Indian Department altogether, requesting that

bnngs

shade no

plant can thnve."^^ Norton also presented these
concerns to

Department's "principal object seems

that the

3

of how much

Department merely represented an
extension of the overall government's
Without gaining adequate redress from

1

Canada, Norton understandably

to, if possible,

"eradicate this

Norton to Castlereagh, 23 July 1805, CNA,
1, CO 42, 340, 123-24; Six Nations' Address to Claus
September 806, York, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 66; Norton to Owen, 28 January
1 807, ibid., 82.
1

1

Norton

Same

to Barclay,

to

Norton

20 October 1806,

same, 16 June 1810,

to

Owen,

ibid., 77.

ibid., 130.

12 August 1806, ibid., 26-27, 30.
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opposhion

at

the founta.n head.'-

"Government.

.turn the vast
.

The Mohawk

expence

[s.c]

leader further suggested
that the

of the Indian Department
towards the end. .of
.

bettering the situation of the
Indians,"

agents' current salaries

wh.h would

have entaHed rechannehng

mto mission programs and matenal

all

of the

necessities for the Indians.^

Norton's struggle with the Indian
Department eventually degenerated
into a

running battle between him and
WilHam Claus. Previously the two had
always been

at

odds, and Claus had begun to evince
his distaste for Norton as early
as his [Claus's]

appointment

1

to the position

800." Norton had

Fort

at

one time worked as an interpreter under
Claus

George agency, and

his personal

deputy

in

annoyed Claus, who,

of Deputy Supenntendent General
of Indian Affairs

later

while Norton was

still

handling official Six Nations'

as acting agent at Fort George,

working
affairs.

was

at the

m

Department's

there, Brant appointed

him

This in itself must have

technically the liaison between

the Six Nations and the government.
Norton in a rather short time gained the trust
and

confidence of the majority of the Indians

at the

Six Nations reserve. Fluent in as

many

as

twelve Native languages and dialects, he
functioned smoothly in multiple Native cultures,
including Cherokee, Iroquois, and Great Lakes
Algonquin societies.^^

Conversely, the people
feel

^'^

^'

much

affinity for Claus, a

who

looked

to the

adopted Norton as their leader did not

former regular arniy officer

m His Majesty's 60'^

Ibid., 27,

Ibid., 28, 32.

52

Charles M. Johnston, "William Claus and John Norton: A Struggle for
Power in Old Ontario," Ontario
History LVII(2) (1965): 103. Though informative, Johnston's essay is
a less favorable assessment of
Norton.
53

&

Thomas

Scott to Sir Walter Scott, ca. 1815, John Norton Papers, University of
Western Ontario; Klinck
Talman, Journal of Major John Norton , xx.
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Reg.n.ent,

father

who had

not spent

much time among

the

Mans the way h.s grandfather and

had done.- Norton's meteoric
nse and unexpected mfluence
was a constant

to Claus,

who

continued to visuahze a leadmg
and significant role for the Indian

Department comparable
the time Claus

tl.eat

became

to

one

it

had achieved

in the

days of his family predecessors.

Deputy Supenntendent General

the

in 1800, the

By

Department had

severely suffered from the government's
retrenchment and from fiscal reductions
in

its

Indian policy. But Norton's clamors
(and Brant's) for Six Nations'
sovereignty and his
desire to completely transform Bntain's
Indian policy happened to
that

Claus wanted to restore the Indian
Department to

its

come

at the

very time

past glory, and the agent

understood that Norton's schemes endangered
the organization's very existence.
Shortly after his promotion in 1800, Claus
warned Canadian officials of possible
Six Nations' disloyalty and treachery after
Brant had allegedly
the Three Fires

m Detroit.

made

a seditious speech to

Regarding land matters, the Deputy Supenntendem
General

firmly informed the Six Nations that any further
sales or leases (than the six blocks

previously confirmed by Peter Russell) were "quite out
of the question" and "cannot be
allowed."^^ But despite these bitter clashes between
Claus and the Six Nations, the
history and role of the Indian Department and the
predicament of the

would have probably caused
Superintendent General
bias against

a breach, regardless of who served as

at the time.

Given

this conflict

Grand River nations

Deputy

of interests and Claus's inherent

compromise, the Six Nations could expect few favors from him.

John Johnson and Daniel Claus, respectively.
Claus's speech at Fort George, 17 August 1803, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations
136; Kelsay, 631.
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By February

1

804, Norton was on his

he would ohtain redress

for all

way

,o Br„a,n.

where he and Uran. hoped

of ,he Six Nahons' grievanees.
Claus and Ueu.enan,

Governor Pe.er Hunter soon learned
of Norton's miss.on. and these
two off.cals

bitterly

resented the latter's attentpt to
eireuntvent their authority. Indeed,
the breach separating

Claus and the principal Grand R.ver
leaders beeame v.rtually .rreparable
onee Norton

began h,s d,plo,„at,e journey

to the

to further hslen to S,x Nations'

governtnent and the Inchans

home government.

Prior to this time, Claus's
refusal

gnevanees had merely dampened

at the

Superintendent actively interfered

Grand

River.

relations

between the

But onee Norton departed, the
Deputy

,n Six Nations' affairs,

overstepping h,s authonty ,n

his eagerness to thwart Norton.

In the spring

of 805, with Norton
1

still

absent, Claus

convened

a

meeting of

various factions and Indians from the
Grand River, most of whom were not chiefs,
and

many of whom Claus knew would

relish an opportunity to challenge
Norton's

and

Brant's authority, hoping that the council would
disavow Norton and his mission.'^'

The

agent also invited dozens of Senecas from Buffalo
Creek and various other Iroquois from
the

American side of the border,

the

Grand River. Previously, Iroquois leaders

all

of whom were openly hostile
still

to Brant's leadership at

living within the United States never

held any authority in matters pertaining specifically
to the Grand River, but

endeavored

to

use them against the Brant-Norton cadre of leadership

at

dubious delegation from Buffalo Creek included Brant's longstanding

now

Claus

the Grand.'^ This

rival.

Red

Jacket.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir James Craig, 8 April 1809, John.ston, Valley of the
Six Nations 280; Norton
speech al Onondaga, (Jrand River, 12 Kebruary 1807, Norton Letterbook, Ayer
Ms, 106. According to
Norton most Grand River chiefs never succumbed to supporting Ciaus's scheme to discredit
him
.

or his

mission.
57

Kelsay, 636-37; Klinck

& Talman, Journal

of Major John Norton
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,

cviii-cix.

While en route
ice

,o Claus's

on the N.agara

counc,

in early

Apnl ,805.

.h,s group,

W ver, waited on the American side

at For,

temporarrly detained by

Ntagara, where four

Atrierican officers later testified
that they had heard these
forty or so Senecas clatm
that

"they were going into Upper Canada
for the express purpose of
breaking Captain
Brant

Most of the

chiefs

who

supported Brant and Norton, and

who by

this

time

disdained Claus, refused to attend
such a sham meettng, a deosion
that played into the

agenfs hands because

it

enabled him to secure the council's
disavowal of Norton that he

earnestly sought.

Claus ordinanly did not interfere so
blatantly
their leadership to this degree.

On

in

Native councils or manipulate

the contrary, despite not advocating
Native

sovereignty, he generally respected the
integrity and independence of the
Six Nations'
councils. But in this case Norton,

by petitioning

person for support from powerful

in

individuals in London, posed a senous threat
to the status quo of Upper Canada's
Indian

policy and to the Indian Department itself Brant
had given Norton
to the

Duke of Northumberiand,

arrival,

the Earl of Moira, and Sir

letters

of introduction

Evan Nepean.'° After

Norton became acquainted with several other leading
figures

his

in the British

government, including the Earl of Camden, Lord Castlereagh,
and William Wilberforce,

and Camden worked

to bring

Norton's Grand River case before the

chiefs petitioning also prompted
instructing

58

him

Camden

to write to

to look into the Six Nations' affairs

Pnvy

and

to give

them any redress

council, ibid., 417.

Kelsay, 636; Klinck

Norton

to Earl

to

which

Leonard and others, 20 October 1805, Stone, Life of Brant IL xxxiv. Also
see
Duke of Northumberland, circa 1805, explaining the events surrounding Clauses
.

^°

The

Lieutenant Governor Hunter,

Certificate of Captain

Brant's letter to the

Council.

& Talman,

Journal of Major John Norton cviii-cix.

Camden, 20 July 1805, CNA,

,

MG

1

1,
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CO 42,

340, 122.

they were ent.tled

^ While awaiting

his time to translate the

responses, Norton met

Gospel of John into Mohawk.

On

Owen

and Barclay and used

Christmas Eve, 1804, he

addressed the Bath and West of
England Agncultural Society.-

from and approval of some of the
most powerful individuals

Havmg gamed

in the country,

a

heanng

Norton

appeared on the verge of success.

Claus and Hunter sensed

how

close Norton

was

to succeeding

and fought back.

Lieutenant Governor Hunter responded
to Camden, reporting Norton's
public disavowal

by

the Six Nations' chiefs

of 805,

it

1

raised

title to

Camden and

When

council.

many questions

Six Nations' coveted

including

m

the

this

news

arrived in

London

in the

summer

and virtually destroyed Norton's hopes
of gaining the

Grand River

lands.

the Privy Council, suddenly

The government's leading

ministers,

became more concerned with

Norton's identity and his credentials than they
were with the status of the Grand River
lands.

In July,

Norton wrote detailed

letters to

Camden and

Castlereagh, respectively,

defending his position and qualifications, and he
submitted a

full report to

the Privy

Council, detailing the history of the Grand River case
and the Six Nations' grievances."

Despite the chief s continued efforts,
Furthermore, Norton had failed
his

Camden and

to bring a

the Privy Council

became

copy of the Haldimand Grant

journey from the Grand River, and the administrators

in Britain

evasive.

at the outset

informed him

of

that

Kelsay, 635.

"

Speech of Teyoninhokarawen The Mohawk Chief to the Bath & West England Agricultural
Society
his bemg elected an Honorary Member on the 24"' December 1804, Norton
Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 141;
Klinck & Talman. Journal of Major John Norton li; Calloway. Crown and Calumet
14.
,

" Norton

to

Camden, 20 July 1805, CNA,

1805, 123-24.5,

ibid.,

MG

1

1,

.

CO 42,

123-24.5.
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1

340, 121-22.5; Norton to Castlereagh 23 Ju

they could not

make any

With dwindhng

amving
had

its

decisions on the matter
without a copy of the

ongmal grant.-

resources, the chief was
soon compelled to return to
North

m Quebec in mid-November

1805.

The

Amenca,

strategy of Claus and Hunter
therefore

desired effect, preventing the
possibility of Six Nations'
independent status, and

indefinitely preserving the status

Back

at the

quo of Indian Affairs

Grand River, Norton joined Brant

in

Upper Canada.

m reasserting their authority over

the Six Nations' affairs, and they
disregarded any of the claims

councils under Claus's auspices while
Norton

was

in

made by

the Iroquois

London. Brant, his authonty

temporarily undermined by the dozens
of makeshift "chiefs" that Claus had
bnefly

brought over from Buffalo Creek,

now denounced

these Seneca nvals for having
received

pensions from the American government,
which, he argued, compromised their
loyalty

and disqualified them from issues pertaming

to the

Grand River. Claus disagreed, but

Brant had the support of the majonty of Grand
River chiefs
silent

dunng

who had

the councils held with the Buffalo
Creek faction. This

previously remained

show of support

for

Brant enabled him to continue as the Grand River's
principal agent in spite of the wishes

of the Deputy Supenntendent

General.^-^

But apparently Brant never again visited any
of

the Six Nations at Buffalo Creek, and a permanent
split developed between the t^'o

groups.

seems odd that the British government could not produce a copy of such
an important document and
one would tend to believe that they could have found a copy had they really
wanted to do so. Furthennore
Simcoe and Dorchester both lived m England at the time of Norton's visit, and both
men possibly had
copies of the original Grand River Grant, but no evidence indicates that
either of the retired administrators
were ever specifically petitioned for the document.
It

Kelsay, 639; Brant's complaints against Claus in council
of the Six Nations 106-08.
.
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at

Fort George, 28 July 1806, Johnston Valley

Along wi,h

came

the reconfi™a,ion of
Bran, as head ch.ef and agen,
a, the

the restoration of Norton's
chieftainsh.p, a necessary
procedure since Claus's bogus

councils had disavowed him.
In councl
leaders upbraided Claus,
exclaiming,

public manner, you received the
series

Grand River

at

"You know

Wampum

of heated speeches delivered

York on

at Fort

that

September

1

S06, S.x Nations-

he (Norton] was made a Chief
,n a

on the occasion

*

Five weeks

earlier, in

a

George, another leader from the
Grand River.

Benjamin Okoghsenntyonte, rebuked
Claus
denied that Claus had the authonty

3

for

meddling

in

S,x Nations' matters, and he

,o create chiefs, particularly
those fron,

Buflalo

Creek:

Brother -The right of being chief
according to our customs arise[sl either
from
hereditary hne on the female side
or from havmg d.stmgu.shed by
meritorious
conduct so as to be accepted as such.
This has not been the case in the last
appointments you sanctioned - one of them
[Red Jacket, or "Cow Killer"
perhaps?] we know to whom you pay
great regard has been distmguished
in your
opinion for some things we have not been
accustomed to pay that respect to/''
In addition to this support, Norton drafted
a twenty- six-page memorial, defending
his

qualifications,

which he read

Grand River on

1

2 February

as a speech during a council held at the

1

807.^« In this lengthy
address, he noted that

of the Six Nations' supposed disavowal of his
he suspected

"it to

headquarters]."^''

Onondaga

activities in

London amved

when
at

village,

the letter

Whitehall,

be some misrepresentation from Fort George [Claus's

He went on

to praise "the greater part

of the Grand River people.

Six Nations' speech to Claus at York, 3 September 1806, Norton
Letterbook,
Valley of the Six Nations 274.

Aver Ms

63- Johnston

.

Speech of Benjamin Okoghsenniyonte, 28 July 1806, Fort George, Norton Letterbook,
Ayer Ms,
Norton^s speech

at

Onondaga, Grand River, 12 February 1807,

Norton's speech

at

Onondaga, Grand River, 12 February 1807, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms,
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ibid.,

51.

98-123.

116.

particularly those

who were

Chiefs "

who

"could not be led into the
error" of support.ng

Claus.™
>n spite

of Six Nations-

leaders' repeated rebukes,
Claus continued to res.st

Branfs leadership and Norton's
reinstatement. By eariy Apnl
1807,
Norton's speech

at

Onondaga, Claus wrote

to Francis Gore, the

new

shortly after

Lieutenant Governor

of Upper Canada who had replaced
the recently deceased Peter
Hunter. The agent
wished to convey

to

Gore the

identity

of the man he believed was

antagontst in Indian affairs, asserting
that "John Norton

is

he does will not surprise me."" Claus
went on to deride
ridiculing the

grievances

headmen's claims

to the

General repeated
"I

would not take

concerned.

that the Indian

their

primary

such a Character that any th.ng

all

the Six Nations' leaders,

Department refused

to relay their

Lieutenant Governor." Most tmportantly,
the Deputy Superintendent
to

Gore

the

vow he had made

to an old

Onondaga chief a year eariier;

notice of any thing from them [the Six
Nations] in which Norton

was

"^^

Yet Claus would
twelve days after Claus's

find

difficult to disregard

it

letter to

Norton's claims to leadership. Only

Gore, Norton delivered another speech

at the

Grand

River, supporting Brant and expressing the Six
Nations' grievances regarding the delays

and poor handling of several land sales

Norton also admonished Claus
and concluded by expressing

™

that Peter Russell

for not recognizing the

his

hope

that, as

he put

it,

had approved ten years before.

proper leaders

to Gore, 2 April 1807,

"

Ibid.,

"

Ibid., 563.

CNA, RG

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, Series

562-63.
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the

Grand River,

"a practice so improper

Ibid., 106.

" Claus

at

A, 562

may be

dropped

for the future.'Judging

from the councU records of
1806 and 1807, and from

numerous statements made by Brant
and Norton dunng
majority of the Indians

at the

Grand River believed

manipulating their councHs, and
latter's status as

was po.sed

to

that

that

he had no nght

ch,ef At the time of Brant's
death

these years,

to

in

is

clear that the

Claus had overstepped by
d.cred.t Norton or to discount
the

November

succeed Brant as ch.ef of the Six
Nations

h

at

the

1807, therefore, Norton

Grand River, and

the

majority of leaders there hoped for
this succession.'^

Prelude to

W ar^ The Grand River rnmm..n.fy^

]

80^_|8P

After Brant's death Norton became
head chief at the Grand River. In
"the chiefs

& principal

Warriors of all the Five

River" appointed Norton "solely

be

to

at the

[i.e.

May

Six] Nations living on the

1808,

Grand

head of their Councils." Knowing

that this

decision would not be popular with
Canadian authorities, Norton insisted that
the tribal
council "first

make known

to [the]

most promising beginning

to

community's

was

leader, but

"how obnoxious

One

I

thing,

am

it

to [the]

Government

what proved

to

this their

determination."

It

was not

the

be a long career as the Grand River

a realistic gesture on Norton' part given,
as he put

it,

Government."'^

however, was not

realistically possible.

Norton would not be

recognized as Brant's successor as the Six Nations' agent
in the Indian Department.''
This mattered not

74

75

at all to

Norton because his view of the Department was so negative

Norton's .speech, Grand River, 14 April 1807,
Brant to the

'*

Norton

"

Klinck

to

&

CNA, RG

Duke of Northumberland, 24 January

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 27, 15699.

1806, Stone, Life of Brant

.

John Owen, 10 August 1808, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 128-29.
Talman, Journal of Major John Norton

.
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II:

425.

.ha,

he had no w,sh

to be associated with

i,.

Moreover, neither he nor
C.aus could have

tolerated working with each
other as fellow agents.
In,.,ally, therefore, the
chief did his

best to avotd further direct
confrontations with et.her Claus
or Gore.
to try to influence

Bntish policy was to wnte

petition for their support

of his plan

letters to

to evangelize

Grand River Community. Although
never

did do

London, continuing

in

to

and acculturate the residents
of the

sufficient

kind of Indtan socety that the chief
envtsioned

tHends

What Norton

at the

by themselves

to bring about the

Grand River, these

letters

brought

the plight of the Six Nations to
the attention of some of the
highest-rank.ng leaders in the

Empire and thereby did much
Canada's administrators

to

when

to

compel

to relieve the Indians' distress.

The impact of Norton's
evident

keep the pressure on the home
goventment

efforts

and those of his supporters

,n

Britam was most

Secretary of War Lord Castlereagh wrote
to Governor General Sir James

Craig in April 1809, inquiring as to the
status and condition of the Indians
of Upper

Canada. The tenor of Castlereagh's

letter indicated that

he did not personally

Norton, refenHng to him as someone "who
calls himself an Indian,"
Britain "without

the Lieut.

in

who had come

to

any regular Deputation, and without any previous
Communication with

Governor of Upper Canada." The Secretary

further alluded to Claus's report,

which "the Indian Chiefs disavowed Mr. Norton's
Journey and the objects of it."" But

in spite

of his skepticism regarding Norton's

Norton had powerful supporters

in the

on the verge of success. According
wanted

78

tnist

to investigate the

identity, Castlereagh

government and

that those

to Castlereagh, several

Haidimand

affair to

wem on to

indicate that

lobbying for him were

of the King's Ministers

determine the feasibility of implementing

Castlereagh to Craig, 8 April 1809, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations 279-80.
.
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significant

refers among

,he Indians, possibly
even ,o the extent that Norton
and Brant

had long envisioned7^
Despite

this

apparently renewed interest
on the Grand River case,
Castlereagh's

instn^ctions to Craig contained
a request that indicated his
reluctance to undertake any
substantial refom^s.

The War Secretary sought

Upper and Lower Canada regarding
government was not prepared

to

the opinions of the top
officials in both

the proposed reforms,
indicating that the

impose

radical reforms in

Canadian Indian policy over

the objections of their administrators
there. For their part, Claus
and

resolutely opposed to such sweeping
reforms.

remained simply too weak
the Indians.

would

fall

their perspective

that if the Indians

Intercourse with the Indians, would in the
that protected them,

and

who

Instance, teach

first

in the next,

would

loyalty towards Britain, and with

Native

umon among
their lands they

in their um-estrained

them

defi-aud

With much of the populace of Upper Canada
already possessing

the border, the government in

Upper Canada

had sovereign control over

victim to "an unpnncipled set of
Land Jobbers,

Government

Gore were

allow any significant degree of
autonomy or

to

Gore predicted

From

home

to despise the

them of their Land."^°
less than a

lukewarm

more American immigrants constantly streaming

Canada could

ill

across

afford to relinqmsh sovereign control over

territory.

These concerns represented only a portion of Gore's
response
Since Castlereagh had asked for their opinions. Gore and
Claus seized

to Castlereagh.

this

opportunity to

Ibid., 280.

Gore

to Castlereagh,

response

4 September 1809, P.R.O.,

to Castlereagh, is also

found

Archives, John Norton Papers, F440,
on pp. 112-13.

CO 42,

m the CNA, MG
Ms

1

349, 90-91. This important letter Gore's
1, CO 42, 349, 88-92, and the Ontario Historical

94. Johnston's Valley of the Six Nations contains a fragment
of
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it

runher Cscredi, Norton, ,ak,ng

upon his return

front Bntain.

their

revenge on hin, for reasserting
his nghts as ehief

The prospect of piaeing

the Nat.ves under the
supervision

or eontrol of Norton was
preeisely what Upper
Canada's leaders wished to avoid.

Consequently, Gore cast

Scotsman by

B.rth and

Nonon

came

to

as an impos.er

of humble

Canada, a private sold.cr

birth, stressn,g that

-

In addition to

"he

is

a

attempting to

dentean Norton's ,dc„t,ty, Gore
(basing his allegat.ons mainly
on infonnation provided

by Claus) proceeded
the

Grand River

to suggest that

affairs.-

Norton had corrupt motives

Gore alleged

that

Norton, like the

"extensive sunts of corruption," hoping
to pocket

forthcoming land sales

if the

for attempting to handle

late Brant, practiced

much of the revenue

generated from

Six Nations could begin to
ahenate their lands."'

Gore's allegations against both Brant
and Norton were very serious. In

Gore had only
about the

lived in

ntallcr;

that Brant

Upper Canada

he merely relayed uiformation

had handled h,s business

succeeding

at

for a short time,

affairs too

that

truth.

and he consequently Icnew

Claus had given h,m. The

little

fact

was

poorly to have had any great chance of

the large-scale intrigues of which
he stood accused.

Without adequate

education or the experience necessary to engage
in the sophisticated type of business
that

he had attempted to transact
River, the late chief often

-

of the approved blocks of land

became confused and worked

For his

part,

Norton exhibited even

hi the final sentence

of his

letter to

trustees.

*'

84

in the sales

less

al

odds against

of a desire

to

at the

Grand

his appointed

accumulate wealth than

Ibid., 89.

from Claus.

Castlereagh, Gore indicated that

much of his

information had

Ibid., 92.

"ibid., 89, 90,91.
Kelsay, 631-32. Like Claus, Brant was also bewildered as to where the
Six Nations' land revenue
actually went, and durnig a council held in July, 1806, he publicly blamed
the agent for havuig

22

Brant had, and

m

at certain t.n.es

financial matters.

He had

the younger

ch.f demonstrated apparent

previously fallen mto debt to
h.s fonner employer,
trader

John Askm, and he also ran up
big debts dunng
he permanently

left

Grand R.ver

the

lapses of thought

m

his tops to Great

1823, he

Bntain

-

Even when

showed no concern about coUectmg

contmuing pension payments.Claus and Gore never understood
Norton, nor
discern his true motives.

They probably remembered

failed to see

graft, or

they

the cases of Matthew Elliott
and

John Dease, both of whom embezzled
Native goods, and they assumed

anyone would practice such

m

his

that almost

worse, if only given the opportumty.
Thus, they

any difference when Brant and
Norton clamored

for Six Nations'

sovereignty and control over Grand
River lands.
In addition to this distrust of
Norton's motives

and concerns

for

Upper Canada's

secunty, the government had another
reason for being unwilling to allow
Indian

autonomy or

to

permit any significant reforms

at the

Grand River, and

this

was

their

skepticism regarding the Native capability
of maintaining intertribal unity. In his
Castlereagh, Gore discouraged alterations
in Whitehall's Indian policy, arguing,

letter to

"It is

impossible for a large body of Indians to subsist
together, for any Considerable time, in

any one

part

of the Country -they would soon disperse, and
form themselves

into small

appropriated $38,000 of the Six Nations' supposedly-missing
funds. Brant's unfounded allegations agamst
Claus did more to reveal the sachem's ignorance and lack
of accounting skills than it did his perfidy Upon
hearing Brant s accusation, Claus abruptly left the council.
Brant's speech in council at Fort George 28
July 1806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms,
45; Johnston, Valley of the Six Nation. 108; Klinck
Talman
Journal of Major John Norton ex.

&

,

John
PaEers,

Askm
I:

to

Thomas Smith,

457, 466-67; Klinck

5 January 1793,

&

and Smith

March 1793, Quaife, John Askm
Talman, Journal of Major John Norton xxxiv, Ixxxvi-lxxxvir
Ke'sav
to Askin, 3

,

637; Murray, 15.
86

Klinck

&

Talman, Journal of Major John Norton xcv-xcvii,
,

222

Bands."

Gore's thoughts

may have contained

an element of truth
regarding the

Natives- reluctance to abandon
their former lifestyles
and take on a sedentary
ex.stence.

showed no

but he

des.re or willingness to
ever gtve

Grand Rtver's res.dents

Furthermore, the tone of h.s
remarks, often cy„,cal, mdicated
in the Indians- ab.lity to
adapt,

that

he had no confidence

and the Lieutenant Governor
offered no

plan to help foster Native people's

firture survival.

.0 Norton's; the latter believed that h,s

would make any changes necessary

people

at

sort

Gore's opin.on stood

the

Grand River,

for their future survival

a choice.

of altemat.ve

,n stark contrast

like the

Cherokees,

and integrity as a

confederacy. But the administrator
derided the efforts of the
philanthropists in London

and spoke condescendingly of the
Indians
undersecretary.

Edward Cooke. M.

P..

in his province.

Writing to Lord Camden's

Gore complained.

only wish Mr. Wilberforce and his
benevolent associates, had a
knowledge to guide them in their philanthropic
views
I

They would soon be

satisfied, that these

little

practical

respecting these People the Indians] would con Wer

Gentry [i.e.
themselves very little obliged to them for
any attempt to abndge their National
or
Personal Independence; .... - To gain
their Lands individually with
the
unrestrained Power of Alienation
would be to supply them with the means
of

gratifying their Passion for Rum.'*

Gore, while resisting any significant measures
of refonn,

at least

acknowledged

the failure of the prevailing Indian policy
that Whitehall had implemented after
1796.

As

discussed in eariier chapters, the peacetime policy
of retrenchment, entailing a significant
reduction in Indian expenditures, simply could not
strengthen British-Indian

simultaneously ending British obligations to their fonner

Governor bluntly

87

88

slated that "the

Gore

to Castlereagh, P.R.O.,

Gore

to

Edward Cooke,

CO 42,

allies.

Esq., ca. 1810, P.R.O.,

CO 42,
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349, 186.

while

The Lieutenant

System of gradually reducing the Presems

349, 91.

ties

to the Indians

of Upper Canada... preceding

my amval. appears

to

me, neuher

.o

have been founded on

a sound Policy, nor agreeable
,o justice." According
to Gore, Nat.ve leaders
were not shy
in telling

Service

him, "You are very kind,
when you want us

is

dwindled

performed, you shut the Store
door
to

such small port.ons that "very

Nations" no longer even bothered
to

visit

,n

to fight for

you but when

our Faces."" Apparently the

many of the most

that

gifts

had

respectable and gallant

"the King's Posts to receive the
triflmg

quantity."''"

Gore's observations about the negative
consequences of the shortcomings
and
inconsistencies in British Indian

poHcy were made

as tensions rose once again

the United States and Britain. In
1807, the Bntish warship

American mantime

rights

and nearly ignited a war

violently seizing four naval deserters
off of an

American

sailors.

December of the same year

In

HMS Leopard violated

in the so-called

Amencan

Canada's internal

growing international
instability

and

to

crisis led

Chesapeake Affair by

vessel and killing three

Jefferson's economic

hard-line response to both Bntain's and
France's restrictions on
shipping.'' This

Gore

between

to seek

embargo was a

Amencan merchant

measures

to

reduce Upper

prepare his province for the possibility of war.

Logically, then, the Governor wished to try to
appease the Indians, even if merely by

increasing their gifts,

lest

in order to secure their

89

Gore

to Castlereagh, 4

the latter take advantage of Bntain's

own

weakness

in a

time of war

sovereign independence.

September 1809, P.R.O., CO, 42, 349, 92.
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Gore also confessed that "[a]t present there is not a Blanket for every
Seventh Person, which is the
occasion of a good deal of remark and observation, on our breach of
faith towards them in this respect."
Points to which Lord Castlereagh desires to be informed, 4 September
1809, ibid., 94.
Ibid.

" For good
(Urbana

&

discussions on these events, see Donald R. Hickey, The
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 17-24, and

History of the American Peop le,

3"^ ed.

(New York:

F. S. Crofts
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War of

18 12:

Thomas A.

& Co.,

1946),

A

Forg otten Cnnflirt

Bailey,
1

15-23.

A

Diplomatic

Such an outcome stood
the bulk of the Bntish

Wellington

in the

unprotected.

as a distinct possibihty

army having just begun

Ibenan Pemnsula

in 1807,

Fewer than 1,400 Bntish

m Upper Canada at the time.

a difficult campaign under
the

With

Duke of

Canada's Upper Provmce was
virtually

regulars remained

m Upper Canada.-

Judging by

such minimal troop strength, the
Bntish government had obviously
not given significant
forethought to the defense of the
province, and as early as 1807
Governor General Sir

James Craig even considered

Upper Canada

in the

the possibility of withdrawing
the Bntish presence from

event of war, abandoning

it

Amencans. Acting on orders

to the

from Castlereagh, Craig considered
"the preservation of Quebec as the
object of my

and principal consideration, and

that to

which

all

others

first

must be subordmate."

Furthermore, the Governor General predicted
that "if the Americans are really

determined

command,

I

to attack these

fear

effectual defence

it

Provmces, and employ those means which
they

would be vam

for us to flatter ourselves with the

Upper Canada could not ward off an American

others concluded that the only hopes of preserving
that sector
militias and,

most importantly, support from

easily

hopes of making any

of the open Country."^^ Having therefore
conceded

forces stationed in

may so

that

any British

invasion, Craig and

would depend on Canadian

Britain's former Indian allies scattered

throughout Upper Canada and the Great Lakes. Craig and
Castlereagh both believed that
"[i]f a

war takes place,"

the Indians "will not be idle -If

We do not employ them, there

cannot exist a moment's doubt, that they will be employed against

us,

and

in that

Distribution of the Forces in

Upper Canada serving under Lieutenant General Peter Hunter 1 December
1801, CNA,RG 8, Military CSenes, Vol. 1209, 108a. Also see Allen, The Bntish Indian
Department and
the Frontier in North Ameri ca. 1755-1830 67, and Allen, His Majesty's Indian
Allies 1 19
.

.
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Craig to Gore, 6 December 1807, P.R.O.,
P.R.O., C0 43, 22, 110.

CO 42,

136, 153-54; Castlereagh to Craig,

1

September 1807
"
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'

event... The chain of our

them] would be

Connexion

[sic]

which has subs.sted

for so

in

compliance

wUh

Cra.g's wishes, began to

determine the temper of the Indians
throughout the Great Lakes.

Crown's

g.fts to the Indians

Britain's former allies

who

Claus to Amherstburg early
in

years [with

broken."'^'*

Accordingly Gore,

the

many

1

m his province. Gore sought to reestablish

808

to

summon

earlier.

He

ties to

dispatched

leaders of the various nations
to council

hopes of reestablishing (he old Chain
of Friendship

Timbers fourteen years

efforts to

In add.t.on to increasing

dwelt on the American side of
the border.
in

make

Claus did not have

that

had nearly lapsed

to petition

after Fallen

very hard; Indians

throughout the Lakes, northern Ohio,
Indiana, and Michigan rapidly answered
the King's
call.

Throughout the spring various groups continued

leader

Tecumseh and some of his followers

to filter in.

also visited the post

In

June the Shawnee

where they met Claus,

opening communication between the Indian
Department and the growing
confederacy

at

nations living

Prophetstown on the Wabash, which gave the Bntish
a link

there.'^'^

The next month Gore personally held

where he addressed approximately 1,000 warriors and
100

who had

returned with

many of his

Craig to Gore, 6 December
C^O 43,
135.

Claus Journal

at Fort

XXIll: 53. According
Allen,

The

and speeches

intertribal

1

&

to his journal,

British Indian

CO 42,

1

14 June 1808,

chiefs, including

36,

1

CNA,

55; Castlercagh to Craig, 8 April

MG

19, Fl,

Claus Papers, Vol.

Claus spoke with Tecumseh for three hours during

Depa rtment and

in this council, see

CNA, RG

Amherstburg

Tecumseh

followers from the Wabash.'' After Gore's meeting.

807, P.R.O.,

Maiden,

a council at

to the multiple

the Frontier in North America.

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 11,
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1

9,

809, P.R.O.,

206;

this first

MPHC,
meeting.

1755-1830 68. For records
9884-9904.
.

N.,l.vc v,s„s ,„ „,c
„<«, co„,i„„c,i ,„ increase
.InunaUcally,

arnvcd

A.nhcrstburg that

at

The
was

and „ca,ly

5,,KH, In.hans

aiitiinni.^^

posit.vc response of Nat.ves
l.v.ng n. the Un.ted States
to I^nt.sh overtures

not inH.ed,ately shared by
those hv.ng

the

at

Grand R.ver. An.enean expansion

seriously endangered the luture
ol the tnbes beyond
Canada's borders.

Six Natu,ns

at

the

Grand R.ver dul

nu.eh less n.eent.ve

i>ad

letter to

Castlereagh

any more

n.

no, ,ace an

to llgh, ,or the

n.mediate

to visit the posts in

Precarious conditions

territorial threat,

Crown. As Gore had eommenled

many of Upper Canada's

I

that

in Sir

in

Upper Canada

James Cra.g's Indian

in h.s

lengthy

namely the uneertauUy

policy.

ol the Six

caused a cunous

Canada's administrators and agents knew

now needed

lo

be careful

aggressive-minded groups did not drag Britain into
a war with the United

States too .soon, particularly

necessary

and therefore

order to receive the King's bounty.""

they could rely on Indians from across the
border, bu, they

that those

contrast, the

resident Indians hardly bothered

Nations' support and the c,uest.on ofthe
loyalty of the md.t.as
aberration

Ry

lo hold the

when Canada's

leaders did not have the internal support

upper provitice. As a matter of necessity, then,
Craig and (iore

ended the policy of peacetime retrenchment and adopted

a

wartime stance

in their

dealings with the Indians.

For the Natives
gills,

and

for

as agent and

" Claus

Norton

it

at the

Cirand River the

policy temporarily meant additional

eventually led to a wartime commi.ssion and sigmlkant autonomy

commander ofthe

to i'nclcaiix Sclby.

new

Six Nations during the

l8Jamiaiy

I

XOy,

CNA, RG

8,

Military

CO 42,

349, 92,

66-67.

(Joic to Caslicreagh, 4 St plnnhci

I

S()<),

I'

K.O.,

upcoming
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C

conflict.

Sciics, Vol.

2S6

5-

Though Claus

MI'IK

•

XXIII

and Gore both desp.sed h,.,
they recognized

that

Norton continued

to

hold considerable

.nlluence over the S.x Nat.ons,
and they te.poranly avoided
provoking or alienating the

chiefany
its

further lest he discourage
those at the

anticipated struggle.

significantly in

Just

that

As

a result,

Grand River

how

far

would

affairs

,n

Upper Canada's leaders avoided
mterfenng
between 1810and 1812.

the British

of the Grand K.ver nations,

Grand R.vcr from supporting
Bnta.n

government go

in the face

to gain Indian support,
particularly

of the new international

some type of fair and permanent understandmg
with

the Indians

crisis? Certainly,

was

desirable; British

leaders d.d not w.sh to have to
periodically rely on questionable
Native fidelity every

time a

crisis arose.

agents

in

As war drew

Canada reverted

near,

hopes of compromise grew dim, and
the Indian

to their old practice

pressuring the Indians to fight for the
to blur the extent

all

Crown

of mutual obligations

in the

of increasing Indian

if

necessary.

gifts

As always,

and tenaciously
policy tended

this

Anglo-Native relationship. Were the

Indians subjects or allies? Craig continued
to pursue the dual stance of telling
the Indians
to

prepare themselves for war, while informing the
Americans of his country's

neutrality.'"^

These contradictory actions could only lead

to further distrust

on the

part

of

cither the Natives or the Americans, or both.

The approach of war

also brought other changes in Canada.

In the

autumn of

1811, Norton received favorable news regarding a change in Upper
Canada's leadership.
In his journal

Norton stated

that

Major General Isaac Brock "arrived

at

York, to take the

Calloway, Crown and Calumet, 230. Craig not only proclaimed British neutrality
to the Americans, but
early m 181 he attempted to make his claims even more convincing by warning
the American government
of imminent Indian attacks along the country's frontiers. This crafty attempt to absolve
Britain of
1

responsibility for an Indian

war

convince American leaders, as seen in President Madison's
reasons for asking Congress for a declaration of war against Great Britain in June, 1812.
See Wesley
Turner, The War of 1 8 1 2: The War that Both Sides Won (Toronto & Oxford: Dundurn Press,
1990), 33.
failed to
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con,™and of .he Troops

,n .he

under .he T„le of Pres.den.,

Upper Prov,„ce.-a„d

a. .he

sa.e

also

.in,e .ha. Frane.s

assume .he c,v„ Goven^en,

Gore Es<,r.-L,eu.. Governor,

took h,s Depar.ure for England."
Regarding .h.s .ransuion, which
en.a.led .he removal of
Gore, one of Nor.on>s principal
an.agonis.s. .he ch.ef wro.e.
"This change was very well
received .hroughou. .he Province."
Fur,her emphas.z.ng ,he co„.ras.
benveen Gore and

Brock, Norton added .ha. Brock
displayed "d,scer.men., candour

which "confounded .he spin, of Party,
and exposed
Brock's arr,val

may have

might

i.,

war break

fac.ious disputes."""

General

summoned

Grand River and

leadership, Norton

at the

a proper land

the

to ascertain

But Brock's

arrival

headman

York

to

wha. was needed

.o

this opportunity to apprise

Grand River, informing him

title.

Though

to discuss the

mood of

secure their a,d should

Brock of the Six Nations' history and

that the people there desired,

the General remained noncommittal, he

Norton he expressed a "disposition
Claus once again attempted

above

mamtamed

to

to favour their requests" as

much

as

was

& Talman,

all else,

a

letter to

in his

power.

prevent the Six Nations' leaders from submitting the
land

question to Brock, but Norton claimed that "this time" the agent's
intrigues were

Ibid.,

we

gave Nor.on new

"favourable Disposition" towards the Grand River
people, and in a subsequent

Klinck

had

out.

Norton seized

gnevances

by

after, the

the Indians at the

would never occur under Gore's

".o re.ire .o .he Sou.h Wes.. .o
prepare an es.abhshmen. where

live undis.urbed

hope, and soon

Mys.ery of Calumny."'*

preven.ed Norton from leaving
Canada. Discouraged by .he

belief .ha. his v.sion of reform

decided, as he pu.

.he

& rec.i.ude," quali.ies

Journal of Major John Norton 286.
.

287.
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"without effect

Perhaps for the

more than two decades earher

(1

first

time smce the creation of
the upper province

791), the Six Nations' leaders at the

opportunity to address a lieutenant
governor
to

do so without interference from

who

Grand River had the

earnestly desired to hear their
pleas, and

the Indian Department.
Norton

was

quite taken

by

Brock's caring and thoughtful
response, and upon heanng the
general give his honest
assessment

in interpreting the

Haldimand Grant

as a

full,

exclusive land

title

for the Six

Nations, the chief immediately threw
his support behind the military
governor. "From
the time that he

made

this

candid avowal," Norton wrote,
"I became opposed to insisting

any further on the Land Matters,
Norton was probably a

until

we

bit surprised

point of Six Nations' land rights.
Brock

acknowledge Six Nations' sovereign
what he intended

to

Brock also rested

say

should see the end of expected

by the

officer's verbal concession

may have been

rights

the

first

unliesitating devotion to

provide key information regarding the sentiments
of the nations dwelling

to waver.

In

choosing

to deal directly

would

inspire those

all

residents at the

the Bntish in another conflict.

after a deputation

'"^

'"^

him

at the

who

to

Grand

continued

this rare opportunity.

Grand River shared Norton's enthusiasm

A division among them became

for supporting

apparent in June 1812

of Iroquois chiefs from within the American boundary arrived

Ibid,

Ibid.,

to

with Norton and the Six Nations, Brock

circumvented the Indian Department, and Norton leapt upon

Not

to

if that is in fact

General confided in the chief, looking

River, and the General hoped that the chiefs
loyalty

on the

Bntish leader ever

over the Grand River lands,

when he spoke with Norton. Norton's

in the fact that the

hostilities."'^^

288.

230

at the

Grand R.ver, hopmg
delegat,on argued,

it

the

want

d.suade

"Why

of the Conquerors?
the former

to

should

their northern brethren

we

again

fight,

and

from

call

Why then should we endanger.

smiles only for the

Day

.

the cause of the K.ng,

.the existence

m which they need us?"'°^

would

if

to

when

Amencan government. "We

Amencans claimed

are

the

not to

m New York

m their [the Amencans']

power," added the deputation's spokesmen .'^^
These arguments had a strong
causing the people of the Grand River to
hesitate for two days

they

enjoy thdr

The delegation then repeated

they were to join the British,
their people living

suffer repnsals from the

We thought

neglect, except

of our fam.hes,

uselessness of joining in the conflict
on either side, since the

need their services, and

Th.

have any regard for us."
"In

most honourable. ... Expenence
has convmced us of the.
us.

war.

upon ourselves the resentment

We know that neither of these powers

War," the speaker contmued,
"we espoused

gomg to

effect,

m fonning a response.

Ultimately, a majonty chose to remain
idle, hoping that peace might
continue.

Challenging

consensus

in favor

acknowledged
remain
is

at

this opposition,

that the Iroquois peoples living

'"^

Grand River

on the American side of the border should

peace, but with regard to the Canadian Iroquois,
he maintained, "Our situation
at

the

Grand River,

it

was a matter of honor and secunty to

an American invasion, and Norton alluded to the
Americans' past treatment of

Indians, even of those

"^^

to rally the

of the Crown. Arguing eloquently, the
mixed-blood leader

very different." For those

resist

Norton did his best

Ibid.,

288, 293, 295-96.

Ibid.,

289.

Ibid.,

290.

Ibid.,

290-92.

who

attempted to remain neutral, reminding his audience
that the
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Americans "have always been the
Enemies of the Abongmal Nadons."'»'
He added
an

Amencan

its

inhabitants' claims of neutrality.

conquest of Upper Canada
would destroy the Grand R,ver
Reserve, despite

Ultimately, Norton's attempts

government satisfactonly resolved
little

at

persuasion proved

land, the

in Iroquois societies,

based mostly on

wamors
each

how he

war began, Norton and

the question of the status of
the

a

at

Grand River had

man would

anticipated

Grand River

lands,

Amencan

mere

sixty

depraved as

to

attack.

Cheered

at

to see Norton,

Grand River, but

faithless."'^^

then, neither he nor

a small minority of the

Niagara in July 1812 to help repel an

Brock eagerly inquired

the chief could only reply:

some

coming forth,-but when they engage,
be

incentive to fight. And, as
always

wamors, representing only

unfortunately divided into parties, and there are
retarding their

little

perceived this affecting his personal
best interests, ^^^,en the

current general sentiments at the

plausible

I

as to the

'They

men, who succeed

are

in

have no doubts they are not so

Norton's predictions would

later

prove correct, but

until

Brock could depend on the majority of the Six Nations's
wamors.

the chief and his small party of wamors departed
from Niagara to assist in the

upcoming bnef siege of Detroit,
band reached

Ibid.,

291

Ibid..

293

109

Until the Bntish

individually decide whether or
not to take up am.s,

Grand River's 400-plus able-bodied men,
amved

108

futile.

support could be expected from
the Six Nations in Upper
Canada. Without a clear

title to their

When

,hat

the

his followers

dwindled yet

Moravian mission of Fairfield on

232

the

further,

and by the time

Thames, only

thirty-eight

his

men

still

accompanied him.- The majority
of .he Six Nations'
remain neutral

at

leaders and

wa„,ors chose

to

the war's outset, and the
Mtssissaugas followed smt, withjroldtng
the.r

warriors as well/^*

Although Brock thought highly of
Norton and respected
the Six Nations'

lukewann response

to

Bntish overtures

in a

his efforts, he interpreted

highly negative way.

Despite the loyal chiefs optimism that
the bulk of the Six Nations
would yet prove
faithful to Bntain,

wamors

at

Brock remained unconvinced. Judging
by the small turnout of

Niagara, the

Canada had

little

commander correctly reasoned

that the Natives living

confidence in Bntain's ability to protect
the province against ./Wencan

aggression. Their unwillingness to fight
infiinated Brock,

even

less than

he did the

many potentially

who

would eventually join one

would remain
absurd."'

'2

in the

The

trusted neutral hidians

disloyal whites in his province. He,
like his

predecessors, believed that Indians could never
remain idle
that they

m Upper

dunng warfare and assumed

side or the other. "[T]o expect that this
fickle race

midst of war in a

state

of neutrality," Brock wrote,

"is truly

Indians' refusal to fight ftirther complicated
Brock's problems, because

most of the available white male inhabitants who

lived near the

Grand River refused

to

join the militia once they learned that the majority of
the Six Nations' warriors had
refi-ained fi-om entering the contest.

The white

inhabitants, like Brock, believed that the

Indians would not remain neutral for long, and that the

wamors of the Grand

River would

Benn, 48; Entry for 5 August 1812, Lmda Sabathy-Judd, ed., Moravians in Upper
Ca nada: The Diary nf
th e Indian Mission of Fairfield on the Thames. 1792-1813 (Toronto:
The Champlain Society, 1999), 483-

"' Benn,
51.

Brock

George Prevost, 26 July 1812, Cruikshank, ed., The Invasion of Canada and
1812 (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1912), 91; Benn, 46-47.

to Sir

of Detroit,
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the Surrende r

soon take up
put

it,

a™s

aga.ns, whichever s.de
stood a. a disadvantage.

were "unwilhng

affords such wide

to leave the.r

room

fa^ihes

for suspicion."'

people

do

so.

who

al,

mercy of 400 Indians, whose
conduct

fact that he, contrary to
the

Native

Canadian Indians as Brr.ish subjects,
rather than tndependent

could freely enter the conflict
as the King's

Shortly after Norton

the General

Brock

as

"

Brock's feelmgs stemmed from
the
perspecfve, viewed

to the

The wh.es.

first

allies, tf

and when they chose to

informed Brock of the S,x Nations'
reluctance

met with Upper Canada's Execut.ve
Council on

pem,ission to impose martial law.

Among his

3

to f.ght,

August 1812. request.ng

reasons for seeking such a measure.
Brock

included the seditious conduct of
both whites and Indians, specifically
claiming "[tlhat
the Indians

on the Grand River... had withdrawn
from

declared for a neutrality, which,

with the King's other subjects.'"

seemed
rights

in respect

"

in

their

of them, was equally inadmissable

[sic] as

viewing the Indians as reneging subjects,
Brock

to believe that, unless they fulfilled
their duty, the

and protection

Volunteer Services and

that they possessed

under the Crown.

Natives should

On

forfeit the

4 August, the day

after the

Executive Council voted to suspend habeas coipus,
giving Brock virtual dictatorial
powers, the General wrote to a fellow

had

it

in its

power, "the

first

officer,

suggesUng

that as

soon as the government

step ought to be to expel the Indians from
their present

residence and place them out of the reach of doing
mischief.""*

Norton probably never knew of Brock's strong sentiments
regarding the Indians,
their obligations,

and perhaps most important, the military governor's conception
of the

'"ibid
114

Council minutes

at the

Government House, York, Upper Canada,

234

3

August 1812, P.R.O.,

CO 42,

352,

Indians' status with respect
to the British Empire.
Clearly, the
the Native warriors living
in
territories

and

interests, a

British subjects.

Such an

Canada had a moral obligation

to

commander

believed that

defend the King's

duty that stemmed primanly
from their hypothetical status
as
interpretation

of the Natives' situation indicates

that

Brock had

not fully grasped the meaning
of the Grand River council's
earlier stipulations regardi
ing
their control

and possession of land

that the council

proclaimed as the necessary

prerequisites needed to induce them
to take up the King's cause.
At that time

did not occur to Brock that the
Indians' request for a land

title

m

it

probably

fee simple also entailed

the distinctive free and independent
status that Brant and Norton had
always espoused.

But Norton's unhesitating devotion

to

Brock from

that point

forward suggests that the

chief also misunderstood British policy,
insofar as he believed that Brock
agreed with

him on

the issues of land, sovereignty, and
the Six Nations' legal status.
Convinced that

Brock understood "the

true Intent and

was content

commander, and thus

to trust the

meaning of General Haldimand's Grant," Norton

issue of Six Nations gnevances again,
"until
hostilities."'

later, this

Due

to the

the

we

Mohawk

leader decided not to raise the

should see the end of the expected

General's untimely death

at

Queenston Heights a few months

misunderstanding never surfaced, and Brock went

to his

grave

much admired

by Natives and whites alike."^

Brock

to

Colonel Baynes, 4 August 1812, Cruikshank, Invasion of Canada
120.
.

Klinck

& Talman,

Journal of Major John Norton 288.
.

After Brock's death, the Six Nations honored him in a traditional
Condolence ceremony, recognizing the
fallen general for "his kindness towards us," and expressing hope
that Brock's successor's "heart is
warmed with similar sentiments of affection and regard towards us." A General Council of

Condolence

held at the Council House, Fort George, 6
Museum, Montreal.

November

1812,
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Collection, Folder 6a,

McCord

Brock's rationale

m dealing with the Indians was based on

several factors. While

regarding the Indians in Upper
Canada as Bntish subjects, he sincerely
wished to address
their grievances, but

many

this, his situation

was

quite desperate/

as sixty percent of Upper
Canada's population were either

or were direct

is

more than

most

people.

Amencan

cntical, not

...

all that this

offspnng.

-

As Brock wrote

bom

Perhaps as

m the United States

to a fellow officer,

"My

situation

from anything the enemy can do,
but from the disposition of
the

The population, believe me,

is

essentially bad.

.

.

,

A

full

belief possess

them

Province must inevitably succumb."'^^
Given these dire circumstances.

Brock was extremely anxious

to gain

Native support, and he would have
been inclined to

agree to nearly anything Norton said
in council regarding the Haldimarid
Grant.

Knowing

that the

opening phase of the war could prove pivotal,
and realizing

numerous Natives and whites
committing themselves
if he

alike

needed

to the conflict.

could provide a psychological

lift

to

that

have a sense of anticipated victory before

Brock boldly took the
to the inhabitants

He

initiative.

believed that

of Canada, they would

rally to

the King's cause. Accordingly, the immediate
captures of Michilimackinac and Detroit
in the

summer of

1

812,

combined with

the destruction

of Fort Dearborn

provided the inspiration that Canadians sorely needed, and
to Norton's

mid-August,

in

relief,

Nations finally lived up to his prediction that they were "not
so depraved as

the Six

to

be

Fred Landon, Western Ontano and the Amencan Frontier (Toronto
& New Haven: Ryerson Press &
Yale University Press, respectively, 1941; reprint, Toronto; McClelland and
Stewart Limited, 1967), 28.

"

George Sheppard, Plunder, Profit and Paroles: A Social History of the War of 1812 in
Upper Canada
(Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1994), 18; Brock to Prevost,
1
July
William
1812,
Wood,
ed..
Select
British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812 3 Vols.
2
(Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1920-1928), I: 352.
,

'^^

Brock

to

Colonel Baynes, 29 July 1812, Wood, L 396.
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fa,.h,ess."

Brock's bold strategy
i^edia.e.y ga.van.ed .he Grand
Rrver ch.efs and

warriors, and

by

unanimous

Che

begi™.ng of September 1812.

in rallyrng .o .he
Bri.,sh

and Brock believed

.he S.x Na.,ons- leaders

cause.'- Nothing more was
sa.d about neu.rali.y,

that the Indians,

embarrassed by their earlier refusal
to

"appear ashamed of themselves,
and promise to wh.pe

[sic]

away

surrendered Detroit, most of Upper
Canada's Native
that three

wamors

Amencans had

turned up at Fort George.

hundred tadians had amved

at the post,

anticipated the arrival of two hundred
more.'" These figures account for
nearly

available fighting

men

Moravian Indians

as well.

at the

all

that his military successes, especially
the capture

had shamed the Six Nations

in attitude at

and he
ofthe

Grand River, combmed with some
Mississaugas and

Although Brock believed
Detroit,

now

fight,

the disgrace into which

they have fallen by their late
conduct." Barely two weeks after
the

The Major General commented

were nearly

into fulfilling their duty to the
King, the

of

sudden

shift

Grand River, while remarkable, does not
necessarily convey a growing

sense of obligation on the Indians' part. At
no time did one hundred percent ofthe
Grand
River's

wamors

fully

embrace the King's cause.^^^ The delayed decision

Americans did not indicate
subjects;

it

merely meant

that the Indians

suddenly acknowledged their status as

that the Six Nations, acting as a neutral

assess the fortunes of war before determining

Klmck
122

123

&

how

power, needed time to

to best safeguard their

own

land and

Talman, Journal of Major John Norton. 293

Joseph Willcocks

Brock

to fight the

to Sir

to

John MacDonnell,

1

September 1812, Johnston, Valley ofthe Six Nation. 196-97.

George Prevost, 7 September 1812,

ibid.,

Norton. 302.
'^"Benn, 110-12
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197; Klinck

& Talman, Journal ofMaio r John

liberties.

After the

initial hostil.ties

opened

in favor

of the Bnt.sh. the Six
Nat,ons,

regardtng themselves as an
independent force, deemed

landholdings to ally themselves

to attain an

autonomous

best for the.r future status
and

to the British.

The ensuing war extmguished
Canada

it

the Hnal

status.

glimmer of hope

After the.r

initial

for the Indians

Canada, particularly the
the following

invasions.''^

summer,

On

some of the most

battles

in

critical

the former occasion

Brock

Amencan pnsoners
its

taken

quo ante bellum,

known

for

Upper

in

twice thwarting

Norton

Dams

enemy

contingent of

s

army of Amencans, leading
The famed Winfield

to the

Scott

was among

Queenston.

inconclusive outcome mirrored the Six Nations'
fonunes and

status in Canada. After a difficult struggle,

Amencan powers

at

on multiple

October 1812. and Beaver

lost his life, but

destruction or capture of the entire invading
force.

The war and

in

which the Indians were instramental

warriors turned the tide against a far
supenor

the nine hundred

moments of the war

of Queenston Heights

of Upper

hesitation prior to the capture
of

Detroit, the S,x Nations fought
w,th a purpose, distinguishing
themselves

occasions. These included

stil,

little

was

resolved.

When

the .\nglo-

agreed to cease hostilities in accordance with
terms amounting

the Six Nations lived under the

same nebulous conditions

to status

that they

had

prior to the war. Moreover, with the advent of
peace, the independent status and

land patent which the Grand River people had coveted
for so long were

At war's end,

the British

government had

1816 the Crown once again placed Indian

Klinck

& Talman,

less

now

out of reach.

reason than ever to grant these terms. In

affairs in

Canada under

military jurisdiction, a

Journal of Major John Norton cvi-cxx, 299-370; Benn, 86-173; G. F.
G. Stanley,
"The Significance of the Six Nations Participation
the War of 1812," Ontario H istory LVf4)
,

m

218-31.
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n963v'
^'

branch of govem.on,

,ha, faced another
peace.i„,e

penod of re.rench.en.. As

.he wh,.e

popu,a.,on around .hen, grew
increasingly dense, .he
S,x Na.,ons could only .ry
as bes.
they could .0 ma.n.ain
.heircolleCvc in.cgn.y. Years
la.er, in 1841. as
squa..ers

increasingly encroached on
Iroquo.s lands along .he
Grand Rive,-, .he gover^men.

evcn.ually saw .he necess,.y
of consolida.,ng .he ren,a,„ing
lands of .he Hald.nrand
Gran,
in

order ,o pro.ec. .he rcnnan.s
of .he Reserve; by

acres .o each male head of
household

among

Upper Canada had effeCvely been
absorbed
periodically con.inue lo

Ahhough
lha, Branl

deny

848 .he Crown assigned one
hundred

.he Six Na.ions .here.""

as Bri.ish subjec.s. .hough
.hey

.he Six Na.ions never realized
.he

would

dreams of sovere.gn.y

.o ,he ex.en.

and Norton had so .enaciously
pursued (and believed Haldimand
had

much of wha.

.hose leadcs had envisioned.
In

827, .he Reserve finally acqu.red a resident
clergyman, albei. .h.rty years after
Bran.'s

reques., and ,n Ihe ensuing decades
children .here

were educa.ed

which certamly would have pleased Norton.""
By .he
Nations .spoke English and

1

The Ind.ans of

.his s.a.us.'"

in(ended), .hey nevertheless
achieved

1

1

830s most Indians

at

the

many had

achieved English

Grand River

Grand River Six Na.ions con.inued

lo

early

1

missionary schools,

820s, nearly

li.eracy.

thrived as fanners.""

in

"'

all

of .he Six

Furthermore, by .he

Most impor.an.ly,

.he

operate under a counci of chiefs, which
became an

Weaver, 532-33.
Ibid., 526.

By

1822 Norton had little desire to continue translating the Gospels
into Mohawk since most of his
people had already incorporated the English language.
See Klinck & Talman, J ournal ofMa ior Jolin
Norton, Ixxxvi.
'

'^^

Weaver, 525.
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elected

body

after 1924.

and the Indians there never
rel.nqu.shed the.r sense of tdenttty

and heritage.'^' Hence, through
selective assimilation, the
Natives

emerged from
their culture

Ibid.,

a time

of traumatic change

and livelihood

in the early nineteenth

intact.

532-36.
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a, the

Grand River

century with

much of

CHAPTER 6
RESTORING THE CHAIN OF FRIENDSHIP

IN

THE WEST AND

THE
^i^^^KiH,
NORTH

IN

1801-1812

After the turn of the nineteenth
century, as Joseph Brant
and John Norton

continued their struggle for autonomy

elsewhere proceeded along different

at the

lines.

Grand Rwer, Bnt,sh-Indian

As

relations

a result of their defeat and
subsequent

events that occurred in the 1790s,
tnbes residing

m northwest Ohio and the Wabash

Valley depended less on the Bntish.
The fonner Westerri Confederacy of
the
Valley, including significant

Maumee

numbers of Shawnees, Wyandots,
Miamis, and Delawares,

sought not only peace with the
Americans, but in some cases also a
degree of
acculturation to

Euro-Amencan

very few of the Native leaders

lifestyles.

who once

By the commencement of the War of

supported British interests

Western Confederacy against the Amencans
counted among Bntain's supporters.'

Amencan expansion developed more
farther west, including

Kickapoos from

in the late eighteenth

By contrast, renewed

1

812,

m rallying the

century could

still

be

Native resistance to

extensively from within the ranks of tribes
situated

Potawatomis of Illinois, northern Indiana, and
southern Michigan;

Illinois;

and Winnebagoes

in

Wisconsin. These were joined by militant

Ojibwas and Wyandots from the region surrounding Detroit
and Brownstown, and
together they formed a

the

Shawnee Prophet's

new

alliance that gained

revitalization

much of its

movement, between 1805 and 181

represented a revolution in hidian leadership along the

The Wyandot leader Roundhead was
Native resistance movement.
'

early unity and strength from

Wabash Valley and

the only signer of the Treaty

241

1.

of Greenville

in

1795

These changes
Detroit

to later join the

frontier,

causing fonher uncertainty

in .he already

nebulous

state

of Brrtain's

relations

with the Natives of that region.

Conversely, Bntish relations
with the northern Oj.bwas
and Ottawas dwelhng in
the northern Great Lakes,
and with the Sauk, Fox, and

Menommees

in northern

Wisconsin and the upper Mississippi
Valley, generally continued
as they always had.
Hardly affected by Anthony Wayne's
defeat of the Ohio tnbes
maintained closer

ties to

Bntish traders and agents

in the northern

Mississippi Valley. The expanding
fur trade, conducted

Company,
this

the

in the 1790s, these
nations

country and Upper

pnmanly by

XY Company, and a handful of pnvate Bntish and

the North

French

interests

dunng

penod, increased Native economic
dependency without presenting an
immediate

threat to the cultures

commercial

and social stmctures of those nations
involved. Their increasing

ties to the

Amencans, placed

Bntish, coupled with a greater distance
between them and the

these northern nations in a position
nearly opposite to that of their

Native brethren to the south, who, after
1808, gathered on the Wabash

Shawnee Prophet and

spumed

the

Shawnee

relations in the

An

West

his brother

Tecumseh. In

brothers' revitalization

1

801 the British leaders

at

altogether, giving Bntish-hidian

stability.

R rownstown. and

the

Amherstburg continued

Wabash

the post's

its

fomier Native

commandant, kept a

Quebec and

at

allies.

tight control

Whitehall never wavered

242

observe the

to fiirther reduce

Captain Hector McLean,

over Indian

in their

Vallev. 1801-ISO^

to strictly

government's Indian policy of retrenchment, attempting thereby
Britain's obligations to

of the

most northern Natives eventually

movement

North further continuity and greater

Uncertain Alliance: Amherstburg.
In

fact,

in support

affairs there,

still

serving as

and his superiors

support of his control over

in

An,hers.burg-s branch of .he
Indian Depann,en,. Indeed,

support McLean's earlier
decision ,o dismiss veteran
Ind.an

none gran.ed

Elliol, the dignity

pohtical climate, the

and. as

a.

much

agem Mat.hew

commandant enforced

a parsimonious accounting

as possible, he discouraged
Native v.sits to his post.

more than 5,000 per

visitors .o the post

whom

the Bntish had been

Confederacy's defeat

at

British gifts, and there

is

more

visited

to rely

Shawnee groups had formed

a

year,

of Ind.an goods,

While McLean
remained steady

ser^-ed

at

a

visits

from those tnbes

794.

Very few Miamis contn.ued
at

Amherstburg between

Wyandots had fragmented, and while

to receive

1

798 and

several bands

most of them resided within United States

terntory,

more heavily on U.S. annuity goods.^ Several
of these

new pro-American community

under the leadership of the village
village, other

1

no record of any Delawares

Amherstburg each

and both nations came

this

closely associated poor to the
Western

Fallen Timbers in

1803.^ Moreover, the Shawnees and
still

and

year.^

During McLean's command the
post experienced fewer
with

Ellio,,.

of either a formal inquiry or
a public hear,ng.

Amherstburg. .he average number of
Indian

little

au.hon.ies conhnued .o

all

chief,

Black

Hoof ^

former war leaders such as the Miami

Indians Served at Amherstburg, 1798-1803,

CNA, RG

at

Wapakoneta, Ohio,

In addition to

Little Turtle, the

Black Hoofs

Delaware

10. Indian Affairs, Vol. 10,

9369.

'ibid.

'The American government made

large annuity distributions from Detroit, where the
British had formerly
distributed gifts, weapons, and supplies. By replacing
the British in this capacity at Detroit the

government hoped to further undermine the connection between
Britain and her former Native
1802 Miami leader Little Turtle and Five Medals, a Potawatomi, convinced
Secretary of War Henry Dearborn to also begin making annuity
payments
The Potawatomis 160-61.

U

S

allies

In

President Jefferson and

at

Fort

Wayne See Edmunds

.

See Edmunds, '"A Watchful Safeguard
Native Americans in the E arly Republic
'

,

to

Our

Habitations': Black

eds. Hoxie,

Hoof and

Hoffman, and Albert,
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1

the Loyal

62-99.

Shawnees

in

Buckongahelas, the Wyandot
Tarhe, and the Potawatom.
Five Medals had
favor accommodation with
the

Amencans

after 1795. Fmally,
s,gmftcant

all

come

to

numbers from

within these fonnerly confederated
nations had begun migratmg
west to commumties

along the Mississippi

Rwer dunng

the

1

780s and

1

790s, further decreasing
Bntish

contact with the Crown's
staunchest Native alhes of
previous decades.

While these old allegiances weakened,
Bntish Indian agents

contmued

their

Brownstown,
site

communication with Wyandot leaders

Brown and

a

Thomas McKee
few others

still

imminent

in the

residing at

Amencans

.a
.

very good

cnsis,

Adam Brown

power

treated

Brownstown would prove

McKee

Adam

to Lt.

ties

Brown

him

in the

official stance

Brown's statement relayed

to

Thomas McKee,

3

member of the Bntish

handsomest manner, he
saved."' Although

life

Upper Canada.

RG 8, Military C Series,

December 1807,

ibid..

Vol. 254, 143-44.

Vol 255 139-40'

XXIII: 42.

'
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War of

influential leaders at

crucial to Britain's prospects of retaining

CNA,

and his

of neutrality as the

between British agents and

Colonel Vincent, 9 September 1803,

McKee

considered "Captain

have his [Mckee's]

to

Brownstown community would profess an

1812 approached, these enduring

warned

intended to execute any captured

in his

to

when another Anglo-American war seemed

later,

man" who "had always

[Brown] would do everything

be sent

Brownstown whom he considered "deserving
of

Indian Department in the forthcoming conflict.
Since

McKee.

this

Bntish

to

specifically requested that additional
provisions

wake of the Chesapeake

fellow agents that the

From

803, after a year of bad crops throughout
the Detroit

1

His Majesty's bounty."^ Four years

^

directly across the Detroit
River at

longtime Wyandot peace chief Adam
Brown remained firmly attached

region, agent

"

Amherstburg

the symbolic center and
council fire for the former
confederacy.

agents and leaders. In September

the

at

'

MPHr

'

Despite maintaining close

ties

with some of the bands

Brownstown, the Bntish had no way
of gaugmg

would show them

in the next war.

m the region of

the degree of allegiance
the Natives

Although Brownstown

served as a central

still

meeting place, the Brownstown
confederacy no longer existed

in the

fonn

had, and the Indians were less
inclined to view their Bntish
Father in the
that they

had when Bntain participated

agents rarely attended the councils
that the

still

in that confederacy.

that

it

once

same manner

Consequently, British Indian

held at Brownstown, and British
officials found

only remaining Native confederacy
worthy of the name

to

be represented

Brownstown's councils was the one emerging
among Indians who dweh

ai

further west,

usually along the Wabash, Illinois, and
Mississippi Rivers, in June of 1801
Bntish agent

George Ironside infomied
council

fire,

only

this

his superiors

of a possible restoration of the Brownstown

time the proposed confederacy would
be composed of Sauks

Foxes, Potawatomis, Shawnees from the

Wabash and

&

Mississippi, and even a few

western Cherokees. The fomier Shawnee war
leader Blue Jacket, apparently envisioning
a return to the days of his past glory, worked to
bring this about.^

Although British leaders

in

Canada did not

confederacy (an indifference which contributed
this brief attempt at Indian unity in

alliance

of the future

that

to the failure

From

of Blue Jacket's scheme),

1801 foreshadowed the restored Bntish-Indian

would derive more from regions

core of the former alliance.

ties

yet seek a restored intertribal

further west

the late 1790s, British agents had

worked

with the leaders of the Three Fires, which included Potawatomis

Ironside to Claus,

and north of the

who

to

maintain

lived along

June 1801, and same to same, 12 June, 1801, CNA, RG 10, Indian AtYairs, Vol.
26,
15368-73; Ironside to Selby, 15 June 1801, CAN,
19, F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 8, 150; White, The
Middle Ground 510-11; Sueden. Blue Jacket 221-25.
1 1

MG

,

.
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Lake Michigan's southern

tributaries.^

By

1801 the Potawatomis

Chicago and Peona learned of
Amencan mtentions
appealed to

officials at

their British Father

Amherstburg

"would be

who

to erect a post at

for advice and support.

They

dwelt near

Chicago, and they

also requested that

as indulgent to us as to those
of your children

who

live

nearer [to you]."'° hi subsequent
years Potawatomi delegations
from this region

continued to appeal to their Bntish
Father
alliance obligations and their

In the

this

own proven

summer of 1 805

at

Amherstburg, making allusions

to past

loyalty.

the Potawatomis from Chicago
returned to .Amherstburg,

time accompanied by a delegation of
Sauks, Fox, and northern Ottawas.

A

Sauk

speaker opened the council, giving the
British a message from the Sioux
of the Upper
Mississippi region; a symbolic war pipe
accompanied the Sioux message. The Sioux

sought to unite

all

and they informed

of the tnbes against the encroachments of
"[t jhe
their

young wamors who
their

new white

Nation,"

Bntish Father: "Your answer will govern the
conduct of the

are anxiously waiting for

it."'

'

The Sauk speaker then added

that

confederacy "now consists of Ten Nations," and the
Potawatomis from Chicago and

Ottowas from Arbre Croche reported
to their

war

leaders,

who now

that their village chiefs

had turned over

tribal affairs

stood poised to join with the Sioux, Sauks, and the
others.

All must have been disappointed

when Thomas McKee answered two days

later.

Goods Recommended to be Given to the Indians, Fort Maiden [i.e. Amherstburg],
20 September 1797
Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File
3, 188-90; MPHC, XX; 545-47.
'°

Speech Potawatomi chief Wawickasa

CNA, RG
'

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26,

at

Amherstburg,

1

June 1801,

in Ironside to

A

meeting with the Saakies, Foxes, Northern Ottawas, Poutawatomis held
1805, ibid.. Vol. 10, 9601-02.
'

Claus

1 1

June 1801

15369.

9602-04. Also see Claus to Major James Green, 24 July 1805,
Ground, 512.
Ibid.,
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ibid.,

at

Amherstburg on the 8* June

9616, and White, The Middle

expla,ning, "[Y]our grea,
Father has strenuously

recommended peace and good

neighbourhood between the Indians
of this Country and the peoples
of the United
States."'^

The new American presence along

the Mississippi River and
at Fort Dearborn

near the mouth of the Chicago
River served to unite the tnbes
there even as
the British with an opportunity
to lead a

Amherstburg council of 1805,

McKee, informing
that

now

the

new Western Confederacy. Soon

trader Robert Forsyth of St.
Louis wrote to

the agent that anti-American
sentiment in the

Kickapoos also "did not

them."'^ The following

summer

like the

a delegation

Amherstburg, reminding the Bntish

that they

Amencans

alliance.

McKee

West was spreading and

.

visited

awaited their Father's instructions,
-^

There was

little

of a specific

could say to Native delegations seeking a
renewed British-led

This time the agent answered that he had
indeed forwarded their request from

the previous year to

McKee

Thomas

and. .were determined to stnke

pleading that "our eyes [are] always turned
towards you."'
nature that

presented

after the

of western Potawatomis again
still

it

Upper Canada's governor

at

the time

explained, "It has pleased. .the Master of Life
to
.

(i.e.

Peter Hunter), but as

remove him [Hunter] from

this

worid before he had an opportunity of sending his
directions and answer which you
expected."'^

"

A

McKee's

creative response temporarily succeeded, but the
British could not

meeting with the Saakies, Foxes, Northern Ottawas, Poutawatomis
held

June,

CNA, RG

10,

" Robert Forsyth

at

AmherstbuiE on

the

8*

Indian Affairs, Vol. 10, 9605.

to Capt.

McKee, 19 May

9598. For more on the mcreasing frequency of
Kickapoo depredanons at this time, see Arrell M. Gibson, The Kickapoos:
Lords of the Middle Bord er
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 52-57.

Speech of the Saakies and Potawatomies
Vol.

1,

1805,

at

ibid.,

Amherstburg, 28 June 1806,

CNA, RG

series A, 417.

Answer

to die

Chiefs of the Saakies and Potawatomies, 28 June 1806, Ibid., 419.
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10 Indian Affairs

de.ur
nearly

They now had a growing
Na.ive confederacy on

forever.

npe

for hos.ih.ies long
before

.he.r hands,

one

.ha.

was

any of .hen, could have
anHcpa.ed ano.hcr Anglo-

American war.
Bo.h ,hc nature and .he tim.ng
of .hese con.inued Na.ive

visi.s .o

Amhers.burg

are significan. for several
reasons. F,rs., ,hey
de„,ons.ra.ed a growing
an.i-An,encan
dispos,.ion

among

.he Na.ives .hroughou.
Illinois. Wiscons.n. and
.he Mississ.ppi Valley

long before Bn.ish leaders
.here.

As of yc.

of .hose nations

in

Upper Canada became cognizan.
of wha. was happen.ng

Br,.ain had no,

.0 .he wes.,

their bes. to discourage

done anything

and agen.s and

.0

encourage a renewed alhance
w,.h any

officers in

such an arrangement.

When

Upper Canada had

in fac.

William Claus learned

tha. .he

Dakola Sioux from the upper Mississippi
contemplated sendmg a delegation

Amherstburg

in

to

1805, the Deputy Superintendent adv.sed
them "not .0 venture a

their English Father at present.""
Leaders in

Canada and Great

done

Britain d,d not

visit .0

want any

further trouble with the Americans,
particularly after the resumption of
.heir wars against

Napoleon
Initially,

it

in

1803, only a year after the signing of the
short-lived Peace of Amiens.

was

the Indians, not the British,

American

leaders,

exaspera.ion and hos.ili.y.

however, thought

As

who

sought a renewed alliance.

that the

early as 1805, Indiana's .eni.orial Governor
William

Henry Hamson, who no doub. keenly remembered
in previous wars,

" Claus

to

Bntish were the source of Na.ive

Bri.ish involvemen. wi.h .he hidians

spoke of .he necessity of "cu..ing off .he Indians'
"communication

Pndeaux Selby,

1

February 1805,

CNA,

MG
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19,

F

1,

Claus Papers, Vol.

9. 75.

w,.h every foreign

power.-

,„

J.„e of .he foHow.ng
year, U.S. ,nd,an
agen.

WinIiam

Wens

wro.e .o Harbison, waging
Him of a grow.ng an.-Amencan
eonfederacy .ed hy
Three Fires and ins.ga.ed by
,He "pert.rba.on" and
"in.r.gues of Bri.,sh agen.s
and

.e

o.her

misehief makers.".' Already
susp,e,ous of Bn.,sh frontier

beeame eonv.need of us

his

feUow

at the root

subsequent years sueh

Jefferson,

Amencan

,

807. Coventor

cilizens, exclaiming,

Harrison's words deeply .repressed
numerous An^cncans,

In

American leaders

ex.s.enee after ,he Chesapeake
crisis in June of

Harnson pubhely warned

imagine Bnt.sh intrigue

ac.ivi.y,

many of whorr.

.ended to

of every Ind.an depredation
eommitted on the
poht,eal and mihtary leaders as

James Madison, and Andrew Jaekson
adopted

frontier.

Henry Oay, Thomas

this rhetorie in order to
justify a

forced expulsion of Bnt.sh presence
from North America. Theoretically,
once Canada
rested safely

its

m

the hands of the

frontier inhabitants.^'

new Repubhc,

the Indians

would

live

harmoniously with

Neither the Americans nor the British
fully grasped the degree

and the cause of the growing Native
discontent, but the Americans
understood
In retrospect, the Native solicitations

1

801 and

1

806 not only tend

Governor Harrison's Address

to

dimmish

to the Indiana

"^'"""^

"'"^

the credibility

Hamson, 19 June 1806, E392.
572, Indiana Historical Society.
20

to

Governor Harrison's Message

at

the least.

Amherstburg between

of American allegations of British

General Assembly, 29 July 1805, Logan
Esarey ed

^922X1" f53
W.lliam Wells

of British support

it

'

H3

HiLncal Collssion,

('"'^--P^'-

1994, William Henry Harrison Collection
Reel 2
'

to the Indiana Legislature, 17

249

August 1807,

ibid.,

I:

236.

'

n,a„ipu,a.ion

a.ong

.He ,ndia„s

ways. The Indian councils
held

dunng
a,

A^herstburg

.he Po,awa,on,is, Kickapoos.
Sauks.
mililan. confederacy

and a

.hese ea.,y ,ea., bu, are
a,so s.gnifieant in
o.he.
,nd,ca,e .ha. .he wes.en,
na.ions,

Dako.a Sioux, and Winnebagoes,
sough,

Br,.ish alHance before .he
religious revi.aliza.,on

of Tenskwa.awa, or .he Shawnee
Prophe.. and

his bro.her

his journeys .o

augmen. .he number of converts

nedghng prophcic movemen.. The
wes.en,
a

new confederacy needed only a

refused .o

minded

fulfill .his role,

fon. a

n^ovemen.

Tecu.seh had ga.ned „.uch

n,on,en.um. For example, .he
Amhers.burg councils of 1 805 and

Tecumseh began

.o

namely

806 occurred before

1

in his bro.her-s

na.ions .ha. had prev.ously
begun .o discuss

unifying agen. .o bring

.o f,-ui.,on.

,.

rema.ning non-comm,..al and
a..emp.ing

.ribes .ha, solici.ed .heir
suppor., .hese na.ions

became

When

the Bn.ish

.o placa.e .he

fertile

ground

war-

for .he

spread of .he subsequen. na.ivis.ic
relig.ous movemen., and (he Prophe.
gained n.any
conver.s from

among .hem. A

increased devotion Iha. .he

bit la.er, ,n

1

8 1 0, William

Shawnee Prophe. enjoyed among

Governor informed Secre.ary of War William
Eus.is
their lands should

favored by

all

Henry Harrison recognized

be considered

common property,

Ihe Tribes wes. of .he

.he .ribes .o .he

West The

.ha. "the Prophe.'s principle,
.ha.

is

ei.her openly

Wabash."" Like Harrison,

avowed

or seere.ly

.he Bn.ish d,d no. fully

grasp .he far-reaching ex.ent and significance
of .he religious movemen.'s impac.
the

.0

westemnalions

unlil

ISIOor 1811. Bu. by .hen

view the growing confederacy as a potential

See Bradford Perkins,

.he

British officials in

among

Canada had come

asse. in wartime, ra.her .han a peril to

The Causes of ihe War oflSI^ National Honor or National Infer^.i9
,New
York: Holt, Rmehart, and Winston, 1963), 1 16-17; Bailey, 129-36.

" Harrison

to Eustis,

~

ed..

24 December 1810, Esarey, Messai>esand
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l.ellers

I:

497.

continued peace, and while

still

cautious
unous, the
tne Brifi.h
British no longer
i

spumed Native

pleas for

support.

While several of ,he tnbes
Valley sough, British support
relations with Nattves

Much of thts

fron, lUinois. W.sconsin,

in the early

and ,he Mississippi River

years of the nineteenth
century. British

from northwest Ohio and the
Wabash Valley remained

neglect resulted from the
westward m.gration of some of
those bands, but

.he primary reason for the
diminishing ties between Britain
and

Amencan

negligible.

its

fonner

allies

was

the

policy of acculturation tha,
followed the Treaty of Greenville
and the result.ng

socal upheaval

that led ,o a revolution
in leadership with.n the
tnbal ranks.

American annuities were insufHcient

to fully sustain

The

even those Nat.ve commun.ties

that

sought acculturation, causing further
dissatisfaction. As the Indians'
impoverished
condition grew worse in the Hrst
years of the nineteenth century,
they became
increasingly disillusioned with any
leaders
the Americans.

followers

Hoof

Tecumseh and

who no

Shawnee Prophet

to benefit

by cooperating with

successfully

wooed thousands of

longer recognized the authority of
such chiefs as Little Turtle. Black

Tarhe, Five Medals, and Buckongahelas.

The open

rebellion against these traditional
leaders crystallized in the form of the

Shawnee Prophet's
the

the

who seemed

White River

nativist revilalization

in the

movement, which began with

spnngof 1805." The Master of Life warned

his visions along

the Prophet of the

Indian peoples' pending destruction if they did
not return to their pristine lifestyles that

^/,?t?''^''"',""''''

29, 33-34. Tenskwalawa's

Shawnee Prophet (Lincoln
first

visions occurred

m

&

London: Universily of Nebraska Press 1983) 28early April, 1805, near present-day Anderson,
Indiana.

251

.hey had abandoned due
,o their contac, with
whites.

was

the leadership of the
chiefs

who

An exphct

target

of this cntique

stgned the Treaty of
Greenville and favored

agncuhura, development via
govenunen.-sponsored "civUizing"
n„ssions. and who had

grown increasingly dependent
on annuity
In

obedience

to the

chiefs, depicting

Great

Spirit,

distributions f^om the
Arr,eHcan

government.-

Tenskwatawa lashed out against these
government

them as wicked

traitors

and minions of the .^ericarts.

whom

he

considered "children of the Evil
Spirit.""
Several incidents between
1806 and 1810 document the rapid
expansion of the
nativst prophetic
threat

he posed

movement and

the Prophet's

growmg

to the traditional chiefs'
standing,

the execution of four pro-American
Indians
fraternized with the

Moravian missionaries

who

to

influence ,„ tribal affairs and
the

1806 Tenskwatawa presided over

lived along the

there.

One of the

Whtte River and closely

executed, the Delaware

leader Tatapaxsit. had signed the
Treaty of Greenville and subsequently

made

further

land cessions to the Americans; like the
other prominent government chiefs.
Tatapaxsit
also favored the govermnenl's civilizing
missions.'' to 1807 the Prophet
determined that

the pro-American

Shawnee

leader Black

Hoof was

a witch, and Tenskwatawa's follovvere

assassinated two of the old chiefs villagers
from Wapakoneta." Similarly, other tribes
also conducted purges, and in 1810 the

24

Gregory Evans Dowd,

A

Wyandots executed

Spirited Resi.sfanre
,

three accused witches.

131-39,

25

Speech of La Maigouis, or the Trout, at Arbre Croche, 4
May 1807, CNA
McKee Papers, 13-15. La Maigouis acted as the Shawnee Prophet's
messenger

MG

19

F 16 Alexander

in the northern country.

A Spirited Resistance,

137; Edmunds, The Shawnee Prop het 43-46; Jay Miller
"The 1806 Purge
the Indiana Delaware," Ethnohistory
(Spnng
41(2)
1994): 254-62. For the Moravian nussionanes'
account of these executions, see Gipson, 41 1-21.

among

27

Gregory Dowd, "Thinking and Believing: Nativism and Unity

Amencan

Indian Quarterly

1

6(3)

(Summer

1

992), 320;
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Dowd,

A

in the

Ages of Pontiac and Tecumseh

Spnited Resistance 137-38.

"

including Leather Lips, a
prominent peace chief who
had also s.gned the Treaty
of
Greenville.^^

Of all

the events indicating
the shift .n

the Prophet's nativists,

Turtle, the

most powerful pro-U.

to the

followers

Wabash,

made

Little Turtle

S.

in ,808.

government
Determined

chief,

the proposed

move.- Not

respective nations and sold

all

Tenskwatawa

entourage from

if he

and his

the least bit intimidated, the
Prophet scoffed at

the "Chiefs [who] had

the Indians[']

all

Little

and Tenskwatawa near the

to prevent the Prophet's

Little Turtle threatened
to kill

and condemned

Little Turtle, the

the institutional chiefs
to

none was more important than
the bnef encounter between

Mississinewa River early

moving

power away from

Land

abandoned the

Interests

to the united States."^<>

of their

According

to

Prophet added that "his plans had been.
.santioned[sic] by the Great
.

Spint and that
him."^'

it

was not

Little Turtle's

it

power of man

to interrupt them. .nothing
.

could stop

meeting with Tenskwatawa had quite the
opposite effect from

what the older chief had
d'etau and

in the

anticipated.

It

confirmed the success of the Prophet's
coup

did nothing to slow the expansion
of the revitalization movement, which

continued to eclipse the infiuence of the
government chiefs for the next several years.

The

nativists' revolt against conventional
tribal authority reflected a

the chiefs and their followers that had been
widening for years.

For

a

list

Dowd, A

of the chiefs

who

signed the Treaty of Greenville, see

Spirited Resistance

As

MPHC, XX:

rift

between

eariy as 1801 William

416-18

Edmunds, The Shawnee Prop het 69-70. The Potawatomi
leader Fi ve
meeting with the Prophet. Also see William Wells to Henry
Dearborn, Secretary of War, 2 April 1808, Clarence E. Carter,
ed. The Territorial Pap er. c.U\..V.J.^
States, 26 Vols. (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1934-1962), VII: 541.
Medals accompanied

Wells

Same

to

to

,

138;

Little Turtle to this

Dearborn, 23 April 1808,

same, 22 April 1808,

ibid.,

ibid.,

560.

558.
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Henry Hamson noted
.heir

,ha. ,he tribes

headmen, lamenting

on the lower Wabash had
murdered a number of

that the "Ch.efs and.
.nearest relations fall
.

their [followers']

"there

is

& Kt,ives."

[s,c]

The Govemor

scarcely a Chief to be found
amongst

instab,lity

of the Nat.ve commun.ties
entailed

on the United
rap,d

Tomhawks

States,

further

them.- Hamson's
efforts to

make

under the strokes of

emphasized

attempt to ren.edy the

the Indians

more dependent

wh.ch meant an increase of Native
debts followed by a

goventment land acquisitions." However,

the

that

flu^ of treaties

that

series

of

Hamson

negotiated not only fa.led to reduce
U. S. - Indian tensions but the
agreements mtensified

Native frustration with their

Of all of Harrison's
final pact as

Negotiated

leaders.^"*

treaties

governor proved

at

Fort

Wayne

to

in the

with the Natives in Indiana Temtory,
his

be the most damaging

autumn of 1809,

Miami, Potawatomi, and Eel River nations, and

Only

it

'

- Indian

and

relations.

involved the Delaware,

entailed a land cession of nearly
three

Wabash

River, cutting an

the remaining Native territory in
Indiana and southern Illinois.

a year earlier, the Prophet and

village

U. S.

this treaty

million acres, a portion of which extended
west of the

enormous swath from

to

fifth

Tecumseh and

their followers

had moved

to the

new

of Prophetstown near the confluence of the
Wabash and Tippecanoe Rivers,

Harrison to the Secretary of War, 15 July 1801, Esarey,
Messages

& Letters

1;

29.

"

Harrison's superiors also advocated this strategy. In
a well-known letter. President Thomas
Jefferson in
1803 instnicted the Governor to "push our trading houses, and be glad
to see the good and mfluential
individuals among them run in debt, because we observe
that when these debts get beyond what the
mdividuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by
a cession of lands." Jefferson to Hamson
27
February 1803, Esarey, Messages
Letters I: 71.

&

.

For Harrison's Indian treaties, see Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian
Affairs: Laws and Treaties 2 Vols
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), II:
64-68,70-77,80-82,89-90,101-07
1

17-18- Francis

Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties, 1 16-23, 451-55, 456. For
proceedings and Indian Responses see
Esarey, Messages & Letters, I: 117-18, 121-23, 137-39, 358-78. Also
see Indiana Histoncal Societ^^ E
392. H3 1994, William Henry Hamson Collection, Reels 1-3, 10.
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argely for ,he purpose of
guard.ng ,hese very ,ands.
Turtle .ha. .he .nd.ans
intended .o uni.e a. ,he

new

In fac,

loca.ion.

Tenskwa.awa had

where ".hey wou.d .hen
be

able ,o wa.ch .he Boundry
[sie] Line be.ween
.he Indians and whi.e

White

man

pu. his foo. over

,.

.ha, .he warriors could
Easly [sie] pu.

cession under the Treaty of
Fort

Wayne of such

a large area that the

confederacy spec.ncally hoped
.o re.ain produced an
angry response
followers and led .he prophcic

spnng, while
le.ter written

in a

movemen.

heated discussion

Black

a.

by Harrison (addressed

.0 .he

missionary, Stephen Ruddell and
.hrew

he would do .he same

i.

con.inued his recrui.ing efforts
in council

chiefs thai sold

Hoofs

among

w,.h Harrison

a.

vUlage,

in.o .he fre.

,0

people-and

,f a

h„n back.- The
growing

among

.he

Prophc's

The followmg

mili.ant.

Tecumseh

na.iv.s.

angrily sna.ched a

Shawnees) from .he hands of Bap.is.

.0 Harrison ,f the Goverrtor

of the formerly pro-Arrterican Shawnees

speaking

become even more

.0

,o,d Li.rle

jom

The war leader .hen declared

,ha.

were present. Alter convincing
a few

.he ga.hering confederacy,

the Wyando.s.''

Then

Tecumseh

in la.e Angus., while

Vincennes, Tecumseh threatened "to

kill all

the

you Ihc land.""

Clearly, the Treaty of Fort

Wayne had

further impaired relations wilh
.he Indians,

and .he na.ivis.s had no inlen.ion of honoring
any agreement made by leaders

whom

they

considered to have abdicated. But .he aftemialh
of the treaty also marked a more
significan. .uniing poin. wi.hin Native politics.

35

Wells

to Dearborn,

11

represen.ed .he

moment

a.

which .he

22 April 1808, Carter, Territorial Pap ers. VII: 558.

36

Messages & Letters. I: 430; Sugden, TecumsehA f r 180-81; o?.
^^r'''"'
^_yie,
R. David
Edmunds, Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership (New
York- Harper
Colhns Publishers, 1984), 126-27; Edmunds, "A Watchful
Safeguard: Black Hoof and the Loyal
Shawnees," 172-73; Klmck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton
174-75.
.

"Tecumseh's speech
in

Vincennes, 20 or 21 August 1810, Carl F. Klmck, ed., Tecumseh:
Fact and Fiction
Early Records (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1961), 71; Esarey, MessagesALetters, 466""
at
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nat.v,st

confederacy began

to wield its

m..rmum polmcal

strength,

and the moment

at

Which the maionty of Natives
throughout southern Michigan,
Indiana, westeni Ohio,
and
IlHnois fully rejected the
authonty of the government
chiefs, giving allegiance
to the

Shawnee
fiber

brothers and the prophetic

movement on

the

Wabash. Poor

of the confederacy had been
mainly spintual, but

movement began

to also crystallize

after

and function as both a

to this time the

1809 the prophetic

political

and military

entity.

In

1810, Tecumseh, without any hereditary
authonty as a village chief, boldly
proclaimed to

Hamson,

"I

am authonzed by all

the tnbes.

..I

.

am

the head of them all."

The Shawnee

leader also explained that his
nativist followers needed to
"destroy [the] village

government] chiefs,"

order "to

let all

our affairs be transacted by
[genume]

"^^

Warriors.

Some

scholars argue that the nativist

the Treaty of Fort

point.^^

in

[i.e.

Wayne, and

However, Gregory

that

Dowd

movement became

Tecumseh eclipsed
replies that

secular and political after

his brother's authonty at this

while Tecumseh did indeed gain influence,

indicating a stronger intertnbal political
stmcture within the confederacy

of the Fort

Wayne

m the aftemiath

Treaty, this did not necessarily coincide
with a decrease of either his

brother's status or the spiritual revitalization

movement

in general.'" In fact,

Tecumseh's

increasing popularity after 1809 indicated the
growing disillusionment of the younger

wamors

with the government chiefs, and not so

much

a shift in the confederacy's

Tecumseh's speech at Vincennes, 20 or 21 August 1810, Klinck,
Tecumseh: Fact and
Esarey, Messages & Letters 465-66.

Fi rHnn
'

71-'

.

Sugden, Tecumseh:

A

Life

,

187-89; Edmunds,

Tecumseh and

Regmald Horsman, Expansion and Amencan Ind ian

the Quest for Indian Leadership

Policy. 1783-181? (East Lansing:

124-25-

Michigan State

University Press, 1967), 152-53, 166-67.

Dowd, "Thinking and Believing: Nativism and Unity
Dowd, A Spmted Resistance 139-40
.
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m the Ages of Pontiac and Tecumseh," 322-

^dcology; Tecumseh's nse
d.d not alter the Prophet's
ongn.l tenets and prophecy
that

dated from the movement's
origins on the White River.

Since the confederacy grew
out of a rel.gious rev.tahzat.on
movement,

pnncpal war

chiefs were generally
thought to possess the sp.ntual

as leaders in such a

Prophet,

who

or, at the

directly foretold the.r fate.

and secular war

More

movement,

was perhaps

chief,

very

least,

its

powers required

to act

they were loyal followers
of the

Tecumseh, while often thought of
as

the greatest proponent of
the revitali.ation

a poht.ca.

movement.

than merely possessing talents
of warfare and insp.rational
rhetoric, Tecumseh also

purportedly wielded

much

spiritual

power; those

who

followed him believed that the

Great Sp.nt and the manitous favored
the war leader. Throughout
Tecumseh's southern

journey

autumn of

in the

rituals, miracles,

1

8

1

1 ,

Creeks and Seminoles claimed

and even his immense "power

to deal

to

have witnessed his

with the evil

spirit."^'

North, the Winnebagocs also regarded
Tecumseh as an invincible war

Other important war leaders during

shamans.

Some of these

included

Main Poc and Josiah

extent Shabonee, Roundhead, and Black

y

Tustcnuckcchcc

Juniper to

Lyman

this era also

In the

leader.'*^

functioned as both war chiefs and
Francis, and perhaps to a lesser

Hawk. The Potawatomi Main Poc held

I.yman Draper, 22 Augiust 1883, Tecumseh Papers.
Draper Ms.s
Draper,
January 1882. .bid., vol. 4YY16-16.1; Dowd,
A
u,

1

Vol 4YY2- John

Spirited Re.s..t.nr.

1

Narrative of Spoon Decorah,

WHC,

197.

XllI: 459. Generations after the famed
Shawnee's death at
Moraviantown in 1813. the older Winnebagoes still spoke often
of Tecumseh, recounting h,s miraculous
Jeats. Although tecumseh's violent death
might have seemingly undermined the notion of
Iws
omnipotence, his followers did not view this as Tecumseh's loss
of power; but rather, they int.-rpreted the
event as the Creat Spirit's wrath against them for having
compromised their nativist ways The famed
Sauk leader Hlack Hawk, who allegedly saw ecumseh die, later
recalled. "As soon as the Indians
discovered that he was killed, a sudden fear came over them, and
thinking the (Jreat Spirit was angry they
fought no longer, and were quickly put to flight." See The Death
of Tecumseh: Black Hawk's Account
Tecumseh: Fact and iction 209; Fienjamin Drake, Life of Tecumseh.
and of His Hroi her the
Prophet; With a Historical Sketch of the S h awanoe Indians (Cincinnati:
E. Morgan & Co
84
reprint
New York: Arno Press, 969), 202. Today the Shawnee people remember Tecumseh as one
ol their
greatest prophets. James Howard. 211.
l

l

.

1

1
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1

signincan, sway over ,he Indians

in

Indiana and IIHno.s ,e„itories;

since his followers claimed
,ha. their leader "was
noC

by

go.

the Great Spirit and
sprang ou, of the

many

bom of a woman

ground.- As

a

feared him,

bu, ,ha, he

was

wabeno, or the most

powerful type of shaman short
of be.ng a prophet, Main Poc
allegedly could change the

weather." Although Ma,n Poc
never joined the Shawnee Prophet's
following, he invited
the Prophet,

site

1

Tecumseh, and

their entire entourage to

move from Ohio

to

what became the

of Propetstown near the conHucnce
of the Wabash and Tippecanoe
Rivets

808. At about the time that the

Indian agent Willia.n Wells
the west
.

at

Shawnee Prophet and

Fort

Wayne

his devotees

made

this

early ,n

move, U.S.

considered Main Poc "the greatest
warrior in

the pivot on which the minds
of all the Western Indians turned.
.[he] has
.

more

inlluencc than any other lnd,an."«
Thus Wells believed that the key to good
relations

between the United States and the Indians
depended on the goventmenfs dealings
with

Mam Poc, and

that

he could control the nativtsts

in the

Wabash

prophetic

movement by

controllmg Main Poc. Ultimately, the
Potawatomi wabeno became an important Brit.sh
ally

along the Detroit frontier

Among
also

know

as llildis Hadjo, led the

much of their

War of

1812.

the other key (Igures mentioned above,
the Creek prophet Josiah Francis,

1811 and 1814,

43

in the

Known

Muskogee

religious revital.^ation

movement between

as the "Redsticks," Francis's Creek followers
had initially

inspiration from

Draper's notes. 1882, taken from

Tecumseh, and these militant

Thomas

Forsyth's notes,

drawn

revivalists initiated a civil

Tecumseh Papers, Draper Mss^,

vol.

8YY54.2

44

David Edmunds. "Main Poc: Potawatomi Wabeno," in American Indian
Prop hets' R eligious Leaders
and Revitalization M ovements, ed. Clifford E. Trafzer (Sacramento. CA:
Sierra Oaks Publishing Co.,
1 986), 21-22; Edmunds, The Potaw^atomis
20.
R,

.

Wells

to Secretary

Dearborn, 7 January

of War Henry Dearborn, 20 April 1808, Carter,
1

808,

GABLA.
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Territorial

Pap ers. VII

556' Wells to

war among

the

Creek towns who did not
jo,n

revolt.- Francs, a
m.ed-blood,

their rehgious

became perhaps

the South during not only
the Creek cw.l

war but

the

also

movement and

cultural

most important Natwe
prophet

dunng

War of

the

1

when

8 1 2,

m
the

Redsticks ardently resisted
white culture and American
expansion.
In the North,

Shabonee and Roundhead both
became mystic war leaders
within

the context of Tenskwatawa's

on spintual power for

prophetic movement.

victory, and, like

Black

Hawk

The Ottawa

leader

Thames

at the

in

Shabonee

1813, inteipreted

the Native defeat at Tippecanoe
two years earlier as the will of
the Great Spint.-

Wyandot headman Roundhead,
in the

the only signer

Native resistance during the

by 1807, even before

the Prophet and his converts

1812, Roundhead, Tecumseh, and

Major

Adam Muir on

to capture Fort

Amencan

of the Treaty of Greenville

War of 1812, joined

the

moved

Main Poc, along with

The

to participate

Shawnee Prophet's movement

to Tippecanoe.^^

their

the abortive Bntish expedition
up the

Wayne. When Muir decided

relied

In

September

wamors, accompanied

Maumee

to retreat after learning

River in an attempt

of an advancing

army. Roundhead urged him and his
soldiers to continue the campaign
because

the divinations of Main Poc and other
"conjurers" portended success against
the

Amencans.^^ Furthermore, Tecumseh respected
Roundhead

9(3)

(Summer

1985): 277;

"Shabonee's Account,"

Martm,

in Battle

(Lafayette, IN: Tippecanoe

126, 134;

Dowd,

A

as the

most prominent leader

^
Spirited Resi.s tance

169^70

of Tippecanoe: Conflict of n.lh.r.c ed. Alameda
McCollough

County Histoncal Association, 1973;

fifth printing,

Sugden Tecumseh: A Life 4, 132-33; Edmunds, Tecumseh
and
For Roundhead s signature, see die Treaty of Greenville,
MPHC:
,

the One.t fnr

XX:

416.

under the Wyandot section of signatures. For Roundhead's
support of the
agamst Black Hoof s faction; 6 June 1 807, Tecumseh Papers, Draper

Mss

" Major Muir's Official

1991), 9.

.

He

TnH..n_r^^^^w|^ 95
is listed

nativists

m

as "Staye tah"

1807 see his speech

3 YY72-73.

Report of the Expedition to Fort Wayne, 30 September 1812,
Appendix I
Alexander C. Casselman, ed., Richardson's War of 1812 (TorontoHistorical Publishing Co 1902) 29899; Edmunds, "Main Poc: Potawatomi Wabeno," 29.
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in the nativis.

n,ovemen,.

A month earher a. the BriUsh-Ind.an

Genera, Isaac Brock
demonstrated his gratitude
scarier sash.

capture of Detro.t

Tecumseh by giving

to

h™ his persona,

Tecunrseh acknowledged
Roundhead's rank and prestige
by giving Brock's

sash ,0 the Wyandot, explaining
that Roundhead was "an
o,de, and.
himself."'" This cadre of
leaders tended to have

common

.

abler warrior than

goals, and they

viewed

themselves as members of a un.Hed
movement to restore a threatened culture
and
religion.

Amencan

Unlike the Native leaders
lifestyles

among

did not accept leaders

who

who sometimes

their people, the nativist

Lakes and Wabash Valley. British
(i.e.,

war chiefs of the

officials

among

the nations in the southern
Great

m Upper Canada, especially those at Fort

Amherstburg). were compelled to cultivate

have no relations

at all

with the most

vital

ties

fire,

w.th the nativist faction, or

elements in Native communities. Since
most

of these wamors had not served as
Confederacy war leaders
council

revitaiizatrion era

sought compromise and
accommodation."

After this radical shift in leadership

Maiden

acted as culture brokers for
Euro-

at the

fonner Brownslown

British attempts to restore their
former alliance involved the challenge
of

reestablishing diplomatic ties with tribes
that had ousted their institutional
chiefs.

the years

of the American Revolution through the mid-1
790s

Northwest had generally been
brought about a

where they stood with

their

all tribal factions in the

allied to Bntain, but after the revitalization

new confederacy and new sachems,
former

allies.

From
Old

movement had

British agents really did not

know

Furthermore, Whitehall's policy of

William James, A Full and Correct Account of t he Military
Occurences of the T .ate War Between Gr eat
Britam and the Umted States of Amenca 2 Vols., (London:
prmted for the author 1818) I- 291-92Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction 158-59; Edmunds, Tecumseh and the On
est for India n r,eaHer.h,n
f
ji"*^^'
1 80; Sugden, Tecumsh:
A Life 308, 447.
,

—

,

.

" Dowd,

A

Spinted Resistance 21, 183.
.
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""""" "^P"""-"' l^^-en

1

796 and

1

807, as ,„.p,e„,en,ecl by

'

«mccrs, had

'

giving Ih.u \m\ long sustained
llndsh-lndian
I

laving distanced .hcmsoivcs
from

a decade, Ur,„sh

officials,

no

charismatic moventent. Late

less than the

u,

1807,

agent

"

Ironically, while

the Prophet

was

a

involvement indicate

(i,e

Natives of Oi,io and Indiana
for more than

Amerieans, were mysflled by the
Prophet's
Claus, Deputy Superintendent
General of

that "that

Rascal the Prophet"

was a French

Claus suspected French treachery,
the Americans bcheved
that

pawn of British

AhhongI, riaus

praCce of gin-

(les.

Wdham

Bnt.sh Indmn Affans, held the op,u,on

d,as.,cally cu. the

haclly

that the

inlrigue.

misread the prophetic movement, h.s
suspicions of French

Deputy Supenntendent General had not

rumors of French invasions from the West.
Years earher, leaders

in

iuliy

dismissed

Upper Canada had

ridiculed Joseph Brant for supposedly
fabricating stories of French incursions
in order to
lui Iher his

Now

own cause and

Claus thought

influence

among

it

perhaps gain Six Nations' sovereignty

at

the

Grand

River.

best to seriously consider the plausibility
of growing French

the Indians.

^

The agent was cognizant of Napoleon's stunning

successes against the allied nations of the Third
Coalition durmg the years 1805 tlirough
1807. And, despite the fact that Nelson had previously
demolished the
Trafalgar, Claus

knew

that Britain's

continent meant that Upper

ill

enemy

fleets at

growing military commitments on the European

Canada could expect

virtually

no reinforcements from home

the event of a Franco-Indian insurrection in the Great
Lakes.

" Claus

John Johnson. Superintendent General, 2 November 1807,
161-62; Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet 63.
to

.
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CNA,

MG

19,

F

1,

Claus Papers,

9,

The mood of ,he hotheaded
Americans

,n the

wake of the Chesapeake

affair

gave

Claus an additional incentive
to begin making fnendly
overtures to the Prophet and
other
leaders associated with him.
that the naval tragedy

Han,son and

the

was somehow hnked

to

Antencans were mistaken

,n their

British-hdian dealings on the

although the incdent iron.cally
d,d precipitate closer
Bnt.sh-Ind.an

ties, th.s

behef

frontier,

came only

as a defensive measure after
hawkish Aniencan sentiments led
the countries to the

of war.'^ The changing diplomatic
climate

in the

now

fell

under the influence of the Prophet,
Tecumseh,

others. Claus,

who

Maiden, where he attempted
and

its

to

five

months during

the

first

George near

the

mouth

half of 1808 at Fort

Claus met with dozens of tadians passing
through

Amherslburg, but he most earnestly desired
to

nations

ascertam the viability of a restored Native
confederacy

fidelity to British mterests.

number of invitations

wth

Mam Poc, Roundhead, and

ordinarily maintained h,s headquarters
at Fort

of the Niagara River, spent more than

bnnk

Great Lakes compelled Claus
and his

superiors to take an assertive role
in reestablishing their
Chain of Friendshtp
that

and

Tenskwatawa

to

to

speak with the Prophet. The agent sent a

meet with him

at

Fort Maiden, and afler

receiving no response, Claus finally dispatched
Frederick Fisher, another Indian agent, to

journey

to

Prophetstown

to personally deliver the invitation."
Fisher returned with

favorable news, indicating that the Tenskwatawa
assured the British "of his fiiendship."''

53

By May,

808, Governor General Sir James Craig also viewed the French as
a significant threat See
Craig to Lieutenant Governor Francis Gore, 1 1 May
1808, MPHC, XXV: 245-46; P.R.O., CO 42/136
163-64.
1

'

'

'

Harrison's Speech to the Indiana Legislature, 17 August
1807, Esarey, Messages and Letters L 235-36,

"

Claus to Lieutenant Governor Francis Gore, 27 February 1808, MPHC,
Claus Papers, 9, 177-79; Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File

XV:

44;

CNA,

'

MG

19,

F

1

'

10, 405.

Claus to Prideaux Selby, Military Secretary, 3 May 1808, MPHC, XV:
49; Fort Maiden Archives John
Marsh Papers, File 10, 415; CNA,
19 F 1, Claus Papers, 9, 193; Edmunds, The Shawnee Prop het 7071; Edmunds, Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership 1 13-14.

MG

.
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When

,he

Shawnee Prophe.

s.iU d,d no. arrive
after

runner specificaHy informing
Tenshva.awa .ha.

by .he hand and as
their chief young

Despite

.here

wi„ be

of Claus's

an.ic,pa.ion.

C.aus sen. a Fox

[Cans] w,„ be ver, g,ad

several Na.ions wr.h

men by the hand

all

™uch

you

I

wi„ be g,ad

.o .ake

.o .ake

you

some of

also.""

efforts to

speak w.th the Prophet and to
restore close

ties

with the Natives south and
west of the Great Lakes, n does
not seem that the Prophet
visited Fort

Maiden

until after the

commencement of the War of 1 812, long

after his

mtertnbal influence had senously
diminished. Tecumseh, however,
answered Claus's
call,

and the elder brother, accompanied
by five Shawnees,

where they met with
this initial

the

Deputy Supenntendent

meeting Claus "had

at least 3

finally traveled to

for the first time in

Maiden,

mid-June 1808.

On

hours conversation with" Tecumseh,
but Claus

apparently was disappointed that the
Prophet remained absent, as the agent
never referred
to

Tecumseh by name, but merely

were struck
delegation

as "the Prophets Brother."^«

in this encounter, but both
parties

came away with

"a

handsome

brothers' recent

move

to

starvation because at the

that they

had known

Present."^^

in
58

CNA,

MG

19

F

1,

flilly reject

at

new

site the nativists

Amherstburg, 16

Claus Papers,

Claus Diary, entries for 13,

initially

approached the British with

Claus's overtures. The Shawnee

Prophetstown had brought the risk of extreme
deprivation and

in Greenville: partial

Diary of William Claus

fomial commitments

exchanged kind words, and the Shawnee

Although both the Prophet and Tecumseh
caution and reserve, they chose not to

No

9,

14, 15

May

no longer had access

annuity distributions,

1808,

MPHC,

MPHC XXIII:

Ibid., 53,

263

any of the benefits

gifts fi-om the

Shakers of

XXIII: 50. The original of this diarv

195-215.

June 1808,

to

53-54.

Turtle Creek, and stolen
produce and livestock from
white settlers.'" Wh.le far
from

representing an immediate mil.ta,^
alliance, Tecumseh's meeting
w.th Claus
the

firs,

way
in

step in reuniting Bntish
leaders with nat.vist factions

for a future partnership

diplomacy

in

m a common cause.

The meeting

nativist faction that

as a liaison

British or an

to his

meeting with Claus

American

fort."

in

credentials that led Black

1

808,

He had never

hereditary claims to leadership within
the

Tecumseh

also

opened a new phase
policy, and

it

between British officers and the

would support them.^'

Tecumseh and
Pnor

1808 was

m the North, paving the

wh.ch the Bntish ardently
pursued a wartime Indian

marked the begimting of Teeumseh's
career

m

Hoof and

the

the

Rriti.'^h

Tecumseh probably had never entered

a

signed a treaty, nor did he possess
any

Shawnee

infrastructure, a deficiency

Shawnee council

as a usurping imposter and
demagogue.^-^

at

Wapakoneta

Though he lacked

to

of

view

the proper

Regarding conditions at Prophetstown, see John
Conner's Statement before William Well, at Fort
Wayne, 18 June 1808 Shawnee File, GABLA; Harrison
to Henry Dearborn, 14 February
809 Esarey
Messa g es cS: Lette.. I: 355; Carter, lemtooaiPaEers,
VII: 640, 356; Wells to DearborZ 23
April 808
,

76

•

?^7S?^' T

75
75-76.
For the Prophet

Shawnee

Indians,

" Although

s

''^

IheMlMkGi^

relationship w.th the Shakers, see

Ohio Archaeological and Hi.stonral

J.

P.

509; Edmunds,

The Shawnee

MacLean, "Shaker Mission

Society' Puhl.c.f.nn.

nu (inn,

g^^

;.

to the

ion.)- 215.29.

can be argued that a militant BritishTndian policy
had been revived a year before this
meeting with Tecumseh, Bntish leaders understood their
own vulnerability if they did not gam the support
of the growing nativ.st movement. Once they had opened
It

Indian agents

Prophet

s

knew

that they could continue a

communication with these recalcitrants British
wartime Indian policy, explaimng Claus s anxiety over
the

disposition.

" However, Tecumseh
public speeh

m

had previously met with white leaders, including an occasion
when he made a
the courthouse at Chillicothe in September
1807, calming the citizens

allegations that Indians had committed a recent
3-8.

"

Sugden, Tecumseh:

A

murder

m western Ohio.

by refliting
See Sugden, Tecumseh:
"

A

l

ife '

Life 92-93, 96-97, 130-31.
,

As Shawnees of the Kispoko division, Tecumseh and
than Black Hook of the preeminent Mekoche division, and

Tenskwatawa held less institutional authority
war leaders were expected to defer to the prerogative of village chiefs in formal council
settings. Howard.
26-27, 108-09. For Tecumseh 's rivalry with Blackhoof and the Wapakoneta council,
see Ibid., 97, 131; Bil
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-.nK„„y

,„

„.„ w„„

whi,e officials, he sccns,
„as„, „„

f'-™- -r-'l-.
inlcn,,„io„..,f polifi. al

leaders,

and he did no, ,hn,k

who

elnefs

power.

ha,l

,

,e w.si.ed u,

,ha,

„„, ,„ „avc desired in.eririba,
or

.,y,

be free o.

d,e Americans.

facio vdlage einel „, M,e years
lollown,,,

all ,ies

who had

ll,e,r lea.lers

Willi Ihc

Unhke
cxpecl

fire

now

(he era ol lhe

all (id)al

fronl.e, policy.

cleal.n^. w,ll. ,|.c

An.encan Revoh.don,

lacdons

K, supp„,|

nalivisl elemen(s,

Fven

allies linked (o

so, Clat.s

(iiil)erl,

a ,le

Shawnees who

fel,

behayed

a goclsu.cl.

I)-.

I

In,

(

<Miiiliy

Now

oH

oHheu

an American invasion.

Ipper

I

Canada could no longer

(hey would have (o rely specifically

mainly (hose groups alienated by

I

in (he

Such

I

JnKed S(a(es

audimii ol

a laige

I

KOS, only a lew months

numhei

ol polenlial intertnhal

ecumseh. Roundhead, and Main

anticipated,

|)ai

had nearly been severed along the

(lodCJavr

W.ll, „u,sl

and the Indian Department were stunned when
more than

so lew leaders

more than anyone had

ties

was

du- liritish n.

(he, cause.

afier Claus's departure fioni that place.'''

Indian

of

An.encans, and (he fut.ue o( Ihe H.owns.own

5,000 of these Indians visited Port Maiden

certainly

ri,y

signed ,he Treaty of Greenville and
eneonraBed as.snndahon

nncerhun, Ihe Hnl.sh had hide hope ol
wanhnr,

on (he disaffecled

Na(ive

,he a

Wayne's victory and Ihe Treaty of
Greenvdle;

the linl.sl, perspective, Tecu.nscl.

allied cinels

council

,

Americans.

From
former

,o l.rd.sh or An.erican

Thns Tccumseh only beeanie

his lollowens consislcl nioslly
„| ,he poor and dispoMesscd

by

,„

he and o,he, Shawnces should
y,e

wHh

eon.pronnse.l

„.

Irk.iinll.i .itid llir

I') 2.

26.S

liculaily

when considenuf,

Maumec more

I

mm

I'oc

Aiiu-ikjii

(

was

dial Hritish-

than a decade earlier

ivil

War (New York' Alhfiieum

Although these

results

were due

restore the old alliance,

crystallization

Department's renewed

much of the Native enthusiasm
can be

of the prophetic movement,

needed food as they faced

The

in part to the Ind.a.

their first

ai.d

wmter

at

perhaps to the

efforts to

attributed to the

fact that the proselytes

Prophetstown.

potential comiections with
the nativist confederacy
also appeared especially

advantageous

to the British at^er the

onward Canadian

Chesapeake Affair

officials strove to restore an
alliance

in 1807,

and

fron. that date

with Natives living within
the

borders of the United States. But
such a delicate task had to be done
with discretion,
since Britain technically stood as
a neutral

power between

the An.erican government
and

the belligerent Indians in the Old
Northwest. Blatant Bntish activity

American

tribes could itself precipitate
another

could not send open overtures

to their

former

among

the anti-

Anglo-American war. Knowing

allied chiefs

who now

that

they

dealt with the

Americans, Claus and his staff favored opening
a dialogue with Indians who
wanted
nothing to do with the

Amencan government,

keeping the diplomacy more discreet.

Although the Amencans suspected Bntish
involvement with the Indians, Prophetstown

was so

far

removed

ft-om

both Vincennes and Fort

Wayne

that neither Harrison

nor U.

S.

agent William Wells could determine the level
of British-Indian contact.^^
In the

meantime, leaders

in

Canada pursued

a dual Indian policy,

one

constantly proclaimed neutrality and another that
prepared for war in case the

Governor General

Sir

James Craig understood

alliance, reasoning that Indians could never

sit

•
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first failed.

the crucial necessity of a British-Indian

idle in

Claus to Pndeaux Selby, Military Secretary, 18 January 1809,
5

that

warfare and would therefore be

CNA, RG

8,

Military

C

Series, Vol. 256,

"-ploy.,

ns "
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experience, a.ul
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had exagge.a.ed H„..sh .an.pu.ng

.ca..s

An.encan allega.ions

w.s

ahse.ee

My SOX

„„sc<,„d..c.

An.e.

.......u..

s.,..e ,....e,

.ec,..„ecl

.he I.,d.a„s (av„r hin,, h„. he
co.,hl

(l.ni H,.i.,sh

advantage.

A( .he

ai.e. a.. c-leve., yea,

(o, alle,.ed

Al.ho,.,.|. .he

Iroin wl.olehea.led

(

„.c.. ....s,."'

Nho„

,...s (

I

,he A,..a,e.ns unl.l .he,
H..,.sh l...he,
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I.ike Ihe lin.,sh.

Brilan. and .he

scvcc.^

pu.su.. ul sueh a d.pl...,..,..

,.o. o,.|y d.<l

well as anyone

K

...s

u.

...

agM., Ma..hew

dismissal

..J-c...'s

,1..

...

p..h,.. .>.....

Kind's „.n..lM,.p

<>r«I.c

were

....less .l....,v

of an

Ihe face

...

SOS Tecun.seh

re.iin.ed

..,

in.n.i.,e.,. crisis

conid w,>,k

.o

.I.e..

Maiden. whe, e he and dozens of chiefs,

accotnpariied by h.u.d.eds of wa.nors, lis.ened .o houis
of H,..,sh .I.e.oric regaidmg
friendship.

and

Ilam.soii
at

I

Lieu.e.ian. (iovernor (io,e perso,ially

Ins o.Iktis cliiiinrd to liavr

ippccaiioc. 7 NovciiiIh-i 1811.

fonnd

Sec Allen.

IIis

dehveied the capstone speech.

Hiilisl. iniiskrls

Maj( My

•,

and snpplies scallcicd on

Indian Allies,

1

the ...illlrlicid

17.

r>(i

( Yaij',

Io

I

raiicis

(

lorc, I.irntrnant Ciovcrno,,

Craig loGorr. 28 Deceniln-i 180/. MI'IK

Sainrlo
.lamiaiy
f.v ...
I

hr

lirsl

saiiic,

II

May

in ihid.,

I
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XXV:
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46.
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K

169-/0. Kcginaid llorsinan, M.illlirw
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Northwest. 1807-1812.

ren.ind.ng his hsteners of the
eternal bonds between
them and the King and of
past

injunes done to then, by the
Amencans. Gore also boldly
.fonned then, that the K.ng
still

held sacred "the Treaty

made

at

Fort Stanw.x

m

1

768," wh.eh had proh.b.ted
wh.te

settlement north and west of
the Oh.o R.ver.- This
prohibition had been flagrantly
violated

North,

by more than

all

the cess.ons

treaties that

allies.

thirty years

made

at the

of Amenean expansion, U.

S.

mH.tary conquests

in the

Treaty of Greenville, and the
multiple subsequent

Harrison had negotiated 7' But
Gore and his cohorts were desperate
for

Two

days

later the chiefs present

formally responded, recprocatmg
with

statements of fnendship, telling Gore
that his speech had "bnghtened
the Chain of
Friendship," and adding,

"we pray

the Great Spint to keep

,t

bnght and

lasting."^^

However, these statements were not accompanied
by any bindmg commitments.
After

all

of the public ceremonies and pleasant
exchanges during ihe Fort Maiden

council, Glaus and Elliott

Of the

met pnvately with Tecumseh and

Native leaders present, Tecumseh seems
to have

the agents and Lieutenant Governor Gore.

a handful of other

made

headmen.

the strongest impression on

The Shawnee remained

friendly but

noncommittal, stressing that the growing confederacy
on the Wabash did not "intend to
take part in the quarrels of the White People."
However,

Americans encroach on them, they are resolved
should be

in earnest

and appeared

Tecumseh affirmed

to strike,"

in sufficient force

and "if their Father the King,

they would hold

Lieutenant Governor Gore's Speech to the Western Confederacy,
Affairs, Vol.
1, 9886.

1 1

that "if the

July 1808,

fast

by Him."^^

CNA RG

10 Indian

1

" Recall that in 1793 the former Confederacy, at the urging
of Alexander McKee, unsuccessfully
demanded that the United States government recognize the Ohio River as the permanent
boundary.

" Speech of the
73

Gore

to Craig,

different Indian Nations, 13 July 1808,

27 July 1808,

ibid.,

9902.
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CNA, RG

10, Indian Affairs, Vol.

1

1,

9891.

It

seems

that

Tecumseh had achieved with regard

to the

Man Department had hoped to accomphsh w.th the
to

Bnt.sh precisely what Gore
and the

natmst

Indians: the

Shawnee clung

an official status of neutrality
for the confederacy, while
he temporized on the

possibility of a Bntish-hidian
alliance. Before he

Tecumseh

first

needed

and the Amencans.

to

little

more than

diplomatic victory

if war

If not, only then

Tecumseh happily paid
was

know

could be avoided between his
nativist followers

would

the

officials at Fort

skills.

mam purpose was to remain neutral

809, a year after his

initial

in 1794,

community

at

came away

Prophetstown. In

to "[t]he Prophet's Brother'
as "a

while strengthening the V/abash

meetings with the Indian Department
to that vicinity

and visited the Wyandots,

Fires, without stopping at the British
post.^^

plain that he did not trust the British. During one
of his early visits to

Maiden, the Shawnee headman reminded

Timbers

Shawnee scored a

man."'''*

Shawnees, and members of the Three
it

intertribal

Gore referred

Maiden, Tecumseh returned

Tecumseh made

of the Chain of Friendship, which

m which he promised nothing, gained a potential ally, and

very shrewd, intelligent

1

leader consider an alliance.

a simple statement of goodwill.
In so doing, the

a tribute to Tecumseh's diplomatic

confederacy. In

Shawnee

lip service to the restoration

with much-needed provisions for the growing

Tecumseh's

would make such a commitment,

Elliott

and Glaus of the British perfidy

and "of the number of Chiefs who

[Miami] being shut against them."'^

Two

fell in

at

Fallen

consequence of that Fort

years later during his

first

meeting with

Ibid.

Sugden, Tecumseh:

A

Life 435, n. 3.
.

76

Gore to Craig, 27 July 1808, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 11, 9902. The Indians bitterly
complained about this incident regularly. Also see Isaac Brock to Sir George Prevost, 2 December
1811,
Wood, Select British Documents I: 273; Klinck, Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction. 117.
.
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Har^son

a,

Vince^es, Tecumseh again
alluded

informed the governor

.hat the confederacy,

.o ",he treachery

w.thout developing further

Bnttsh, intended to use the
restored Brownstown council

had sold land

to the

Amencan

of rhc Bnhsh."

fire to

He

also

with the

t.es

punish those chiefs

who

govermnent. This formal council
would also seek redress

and land restoration f^om the
American govenrment for those
unauthorized sales." At
that

moment Tecumseh

skillful

diplomacy and without
Hanison's reply

Treaty of Fort

begun

sincerely believed that he could

Wayne

to

his goals through

British intervention.

Tecumseh's appeal

led to a shatp shift in the

to explain the legality

accomphsh

that the

United States should rescnd the

Shawnee's deatneanor. The govemor
had

and justice of the Unned States
govenmtenfs Indian

policy.™ After listening for more than
fifteen mtnutes. Tecumseh
could bear

he leapt

to his feet

heard."

He was

and called

Hamson

a

liar,

it

no longer;

angnly denouncing everything he had
just

furious because Harrison's legalistic
statements

made

all

it

too plain that

negotiations could never recover the lost
treaty lands, and that Harrison did
not recognize

Tecumseh's authonty as supreme among the

hidians.

Given these

facts, the

matter would

probably come to blows, though Tecumseh did
not immediately give up on defending
his
position and policies.

The following day he again

stated to Hairtson, "I

acknowledged head of all the Indians," and he concluded
by

Tecumseh's Speech
78

For U.

at

Vincennes, 20 August 1810, Esarey, Messages

am

alone the

wammg that any Amencan

&

fellers

I:

464, 466-67.

Indian policy during the Jefferson administration, see
Anthony F. C. Wallace, Jefferso n and the
Indians 220-26.
S.

'

.

Tecumseh's Speech

at

Vincennes, 20 August 1810, Esarey, Messages

270

&

Letters

.

I:

467-68.

attempts to survey or

consequences

settle the lands in

question would certainly produce "
bad

m80

Although Tecuniseh had exaggerated
"all the Indians," his

his claims to possessing sole
authonty over

remarks were not completely unfounded.^'
The British already

viewed him as the confederacy's principal
spokesperson, and by 1809 the remnants
of the

Brownstown
confederacy

council entrusted

Tecumseh with carrying

to Prophetstown.^^ This
suggests that the

the sacred belt of the old

Wyandot

leaders at

viewed Tecumseh's leadership qualifications
as preeminent among those

Brownstown

living at

Prophetstown, and that his prestige had eclipsed
that of the fornier members of
the

Brownstown
Brownstown
the

council

who had

since

made compromises with

gesture also indicated that the most influential

Wabash movement's

the Americans.

Wyandots now approved of

goals and sought to incorporate that

community

into a revived

Brownstown confederacy." The Wyandot chief Roundhead
may have been
in

The

instrumental

bringing about the Brownstown endorsement of the
nativist movement, but the

decision would have also included the approval of both

Adam Brown

and Walk

in the

Water, Brownstown 's principal village chief and war leader,
respectively.
Harrison understood the seriousness of the Wyandots' defection.
After having

been confident

Ibid.,

that they supported

American

interests,

he lamented to his superiors

that

468-69.

Certain other leaders, such as

Main Poc

for

example, would not have acquiesced

Matthew Elliott to Major Hulton, 19 May 1809, CNA,
Middle Ground 514.

RG

to

Tecuinseh's clauns.

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 3, 990;

While, The

,

Harrison to William Eustis, Secretary of War, 14 June 1810, Esarey, Messages & Letters I: 423-24.
This gesture by the Brownstown council, however, did not necessarily mean that Wyandots mtended to
become the Prophet's religious converts.
.
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"[.]he Prophet!.]

knowing .he

great advantage he

Tribe to his interests!,] attempted

significance of "the Great Belt
which

their principal village

that

it

fostered

of Detroit

they were

little

the

after

of Union between the Tribes."'^

attention to the nativist

movement, and, indeed,
to the degree

« The resistance movement's
appeal to

the

Michigan's temtorral Governor William
Hull concluded the Treaty

late ,n 1807,

which effectively expropriated an
enomious chunk of nonhwest
the

The Wyandots apparently
later troubled to learn that

Brownstown." The Treaty's

Wyandots and

they no longer

significance

Wyandots joined Tecumseh and

the Three Fires for virtually

did not fully understand the transaction,
because

was

Maiden, where William Claus informed other

84

S^bol

of Brownstown nvaled Black Hoofs
Wapakoneta

Ohio and southeast Michigan from
nothing.""

was

accommodation with whites

Wyandots grew

th,s

and has succeeded." Harrison
also reaUzed the

it

The Wyandots had previously pa,d

would denve from ga.ning over

the British,

owned any of the

tract,

not even

also not lost on the Indian Department
at

tribes

of its terms.'* While not

all

of the

most ultimately supported them.*'

Harrison to William Eustis, Secretary of War, 14
June 1810,

ibid.,

I:

423.

descriptions of Brownstown, see Jacob Visgar to William
Hull, 12 October 1807
T. Hopkins, A Mission to the Indians from the
Indian

Zlur^T^"'^'''^'^
MHHC, XL: 239-40, and Gerard
Baltimore Yearly Meeting,
86

Kappler,

II:

to Fort

Comm .i:,-P of

Wavne.

in

1

804 rPh.l.Hplph..- T. Ellwood

Zell, 1862),

102-037~

92-95; Prucha, American Indian Treaties 125-26.
.

87

88

Speech of [Wyandot] Indian Chiefs

to

Governor Hull, 30 September 1809,

Proceedings of a Private Meeting with the Shawenoes, 25 March
1808,

MPHC, XL:

ibid.,

XXV:

304-07.

242.

This was particularly so during the crucial opening phase of the war along
the Detroit frontier in August
1812. One eyewitness reported that when the war began, the entire Brownstown
commumty "evacuated
the place and crossed the [Defroit] nver to place diemselves under the
British flag." Milo M. Quaife, ed..
War on the Defroit: The Chronicles of T homas Vercheres de Boucherville and the Capitulation by
an Ohio
Volunteer (Chicago; The Lakeside Press, R. R. Donnelley
Sons Co.,
101.

&

1940), 79,

John Norton also

Wyandots of Brownstown, "[wjarriors of the best character," fought in these
two Wyandot leaders. Roundhead and Walk in the Water, were mstrumental in the

later indicated that the

skirmishes, and that

capture of Detroit. See Klinck

of the Wyandots

& Talman.

Journal of Major John Norton 300. For Governor Hull, the loss
to the British was a crushing blow, since he believed even after die war began
that they
.
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1

By

the end

onsiO,

Tecun.seh, en.bo.dened by his
support fron, ..ownstown
and

annoyed w.th .arnson, sought

a tnll Bnt.sh a.hance
fbr the

1

on the

Maumee

sixteen years earher.

adnntted to hun

'"that at first

their plan a secret

pnshed then,

they

f.

e.

Noven.her he

h.

hin.elfand

on

to the

to n,ake

Shawnee

baek"

tlieu

stole.1 th.s

at

beh from

iiativist

1

a belt

of wampun,

leaders nearly fifiy years before,

leaders

to

keep

when

th.s visit,

that the Br.t.sh

had

the British 'Maid the French

of the French and Indum War/"
Tecumseh chn.ned

to

have

h.s nation's chiefs five years
earher, a,ul he considered
hunself

the affairs

Tecumseh

808,

disaster

Hlhott and

uUended

some kuid ofavowal ofthen- uUent.ons.'Dunng

the end

now manage

summer of

wUh Matthew

h.s eonlederates]

authorized to conduct the tribe's
international diplomacy,

Warriors

tune sn.e

even fiom their [Br.t.shJ Father "
but now "Governor Harr.son
has

Teetunseh fonnally presented the
offieers w.th
given

n.et

first

this

now viewed war

cxphumng

of our Nation.""^ Unhke his

that

visits to

time did not speak of past betrayals.

"we

Maiden durmg

He and

as imminent, and they petitioned for

the

all

the

the cadre of

of the help

that

they could obtain; suddenly the prospect
of a mutually binding British alliance held
stronger appeal lor the Indians than

would rcMuun
Ibid.,

4

1

neutral.

8; ( ruikshaiik.

See Mull

it

had previously. Afier three years of remaining

to liusfs, 14 July 1812,

1 he Invasion of Canad^n nnH

David luimunds, Walk-in-the- Water

th>.

MPllC\ XL: 413-15; Same
Surren.ler of Detroit. 1812

to

^^

same, 19 July

Accoidmu

to

18P^'
R

wavered m h.s support of the British. See Edmunds
"1 ecuinseh-s Native Allies; Warriors Who
Fought (or the thrown." m War on the Great Lakes'
Essays
Conimeniorating the 75 Aiuuversarv of the Battle of .ake Fr.^
ed. W.llia.u Jeflrey Welsh ^ndD^d
Curtis Skaggs (Kent, OH
London: Kent State University Press, 1991), 65-66.
'

1

Elliott to Claus. 18

later

I

November

1810.

CNA.

MG

1

CO 42,

1

351, 40.

he Shawnees most likely received this belt from Sir William Johnson
at Detroit in the summer of 1761
during the lust general council held with the western nations alter
Biitam's occupation ot the former
French posts thioughoiit the Great Lakes.
I

Speech of Tukumthai, Brother of the Shawanoe Prophet, Fort Maiden. 15 November
1810. CNA.
CO 42. 351. 42; Klmck, ci luii seh: Fact and Fiction 79-81.
I

.
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MG

1

aloof .0
intent

Bnnsh

overtures. ,he beIHgeren,
Native coalition appeared
po.sed for

on dragging Britain

into a conflict

prematurely."

liieNoflhernand Western Re.pnn..

The period of Native

movement

a,

revitalization that

Prophetstown early

war and

ip Revi,al,..,inn

culmmated

in the n.neteenth

in the

cemury was

i^nn^

Shawnee

.ess

brothers-

evemful

for the tnbes

livtng in the northern Great
Lakes, northern Wisconsin, and
the upper Mississipp,
Valley.

These nations, specifcally the northern
Ojibwas and Ottawas, Sauks,
Menominees, and

Dakota Sioux. d,d not have

to grapple with the

same

issues faced

by

the other groups

featured in th.s study. Although
most lived within the territorial
boundanes of the United
Stales, at this po.nt they d,d not

the

Grand River. Also,

have

to

defend their sovereignty as the Stx
Nations did

the northerners had not yet
experienced

.0 the degree that those south

and Hull never attempted

of the Great Lakes had,

to negotiate

any

Wayne-s conquest of Ohio had a minimal
very few,

if any,

treaties

effect

in part

at

Amencan encroachments

because governors

Hamson

with these northern groups. Anthony

on the

tribes

of the northern Lakes, and

received American annuity distribmions.'"
Moreover, the northern

tnbes had not experienced a revolution within
their leadership ranks, and their
younger

wamors were not

faced with the painful decision of whether
to follow an upstart nativist

leader or to remain loyal to an older pro-American

accommodation. Finally, the fur trade

93

^"e"' His Majesty's Indian

in the

Allies, 116; Allen,

headman who advocated

North continued

to define British relations

The Bntish Indian Department 69-70.

94

Although the Treaty of Greenville entitled both the Ojibwa and
Ottawa nations to annuities amounting to
$1,000 per tribe, the U. S. made these payments at Detroit, and thus to those
Ojibwas and Ottawas living in
that region. By the summer of 1807 the northern Ojibwas
and Ottawas had not yet received any annuity
distributions stemming from the Treaty of Greenville. Captam
J. Dunham to William Hull, 18 June
1807

MPHC, XL:

'

143.
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'

with the tnbes there, whereas
the nativists

at

Prophetstown eschewed such
contact,

fearing both the.r resulting
economic dependence and the Master
of Life's wrath.

Of all
most

of these different regional
circumstances, the

fur trade

was possibly

the

crucial in influencing the
Indians' decisions and in shaping
their diplomacy. For

example, neither the
for the

nativists

on the Wabash nor the Indians of
the northern Lakes cared

Americans, and both had previously
fought against the "Long Knives,"
making

the nativists' added aversion to
the Americans at the time merely
a matter of degree.
fur trade, however, set these
groups apart and placed

them on divergent

paths.

By

The

the

turn of the nineteenth century,
Bntish and Canadian fur companies fiercely
competed

with one another

in the

Northwest, causing most competing interests
to either expand or

eventually merge with the competition.
The North West

Company expanded west

through northern Wisconsin, the upper
Mississippi Valley, north into Canada,
and
ultimately to the

Rocky mountains. They competed with

including the famed

Hudson Bay

partnerships such as the

Astor's American Fur

enterprise and a

several other trading interests,

number of smaller newly formed

XY Company, the Michilimackinac Company, John Jacob

Company, and

scores of private traders. Unlike the situation

nearer to Detroit and the Wabash, the northern fur interests
experienced a time of overall

growth, prosperity, and expansion during the

and the North West Company

in particular

first

decade after the Treaty of Greenville,

continued to be profitable for significantly

longer.^"'*

In the latter years

of the eighteenth century the northern Indians had grown

increasingly dependent on the trade, and the heightened competition

Davidson, 171-72; Kellogg, 238-41, 256.
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among

the rival

companies accelerated

this

process.-

By the turn of the nmeteenth

companies held a strong influence
over

their Native clients, but
this influence

condh,on s,mply imposed by the
companies.

In a sp.nt

m the fur trade viewed the relationship as more

of rec.proc.ty, Native

The Indians along

fraternized with the North

the upper Mississippi and
near

West Company's

King George and flew Union Jacks above

Amencan

officer

Zebulon Pike made

"felt indignant."'^^

this

The Company agents

Lieutenant graciously, and one of them,
distribution of flags and

their villages.

discovery

Hugh

them and

ties

and not a

their

Bntish

Lake Superior closely

Early in 1806,

dunng

when

the

his Mississippi expedition,
he

Pike encoumered treated the

Amencan

McGillis, even apologized about the

medals among the Indians, but he assured
Pike

merely symbolized commercial

participant:

and they proudly wore medals of

traders,

whom

was not a

than a business arrangement,
interpreting

the market transactions to
symbolize bonds of fnendship between
Father."^^

century, the fur

that these tokens

political alliance.^^

Pike appreciated the hospitality shown him
by the

Company agents,

but

McGillis's statements failed to convince him of the
innocence of the northern traders'
activities

among

the Indians.

The American

the hidians accorded British traders, and he

Pike found

''

it

officer

knew

had witnessed firsthand the devotion

that

it

went beyond commercial

remarkable that "the Gentlemen of the N.W.

Henry, 188; Calloway, Crown

& Calumet,

134;

Company"

ties.

contented

Gary Clayton Anderson. Kinsmen of Another K.nH 66"
'

67.

Calloway, Crown

& Calumet

.

137

Pike's journal entries for 3 January 1806, 6 February 1806,

& 10 February 1806, Jackson, The Journals
of Zebulon Montgomery Pike I: 76,92-93. Previously on this expedition Pike
met Black Hawk who
reflised to lower his village's Bntish flags at Pike's request.
See Donald E. Jackson, ed., Black Hawk: An
Autobioeraphv (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), 52.
,

99

McGillis

to Pike, 15

February 1806, Jackson, The Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike.
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I:

260.

.hcselves

,„ ,.,c

-Wilderness for

.hey imbibe for ,he Indian

and

10, ,5,

Women

see 20 years, by .he a.,achn,c„. w,„oh

Whether or no. Pike ever

these bonds of kinship, he
sensed ,ha. Briiish-lndian ,ies
h. his official report

savages"

in all

would not be

on the North West Company,
the Ueutenant

.his danger, recalling the

realized ,he exten,

of

eas.ly severed.'"'

alerted h,s superiors to

"almost unlimited tnnuenee the
traders... had acquired over
the

previous frontier struggles.

Pike's concerns were well
founded. In h,s memoirs, John
Tanner, a thirty-year

captive

among

the

Oj.bwas and Ottawas, md.cated

spontaneously persuade Indians
afler

declmmg

to take

Shawnee Prophet's

the

having infomied the Americans

Hawk's

village with

move

to the

two boatloads of goods.'^" The

of a Sioux

the western nations."'^ Both

chief,

times

Wabash, and despite

a British-employed trader

Hawk, and had worked

became

near Black

Edward La

as an associate to Robert

in the

West. Dickson,

who

the critical link in the British alliance
with

Major General Isaac Brock and

Pike's journal entry for 27 January 1806.

amved

trader in this instance,

Dickson, the most important British trader and
Indian agent
the son-in-law

at

up arms for them.'«^ Similarly,
Black Hawk,

invitation fo

when

Guthrie, had earlier befriended Black

was

could

he and his party would remain neutral,

that

enthusiastically joined the British

that traders

Sir

George Prevost, the

ibid., 84.

Anderson. Kinsmen of Another Kind 88.
in

Pike's Observations
l!

on

the North

West Company, Jackson, The Journals of Zebulon Mont gomeryPikg

180.

John Tanner. 209-10.
Jackson, Black
105

Hawk: An Autobio praphy

Kellogg, 292-300; Calloway,

58, 60, 62-64.

Crown and Calumet

Gary Anderson, "American Agents

.

134; Anderson,

vs. British Traders:
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Prelude to the

Kinsmen of Another Kind 87-88;
.

War of

1812

in the

Far West," in
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sues of „,ajor Ind,™
agencies,
.ncreas,„g

Na„ve

hopes of competing wi.„
Bri.ish trade

,„

in ,he

0,d Northwes.,

much ofihe remaining game

i.>.erac.

«an,e

,

808

push hy ,hc govemmen,
eh.ina.ed

a

penod of starvation

shortly aner their arrival
at

'

'»

with the Bntish

sttli

.his fina,

sou.h of ,he Grea, Lakes
and funher ahena.ed

Tenskwatawa-s followers, who faced
in

Cleariy, those

in the sante

on the Wabash d.d no. have
the opportunity

manner

,n

which

plentiful „, the North, tnbes
dwelling

the norther, nations d,d^

Thus they continued

to cultivate closer

to

With

on the upper Mississipp, and
northen,

Great Lakes had less reason to
consider the fur trade's potent.al
for negative

resisted the

and of

deb, and reliance on
,he American gover^nen..'"'
After ,he „,any

years of over-h„n.,ng

Prophctstown

,„.eres,s

„es with the Brit.sh. wh.le those

Americans and remained an.bivalcn,
towards

at

the Brit.sh unt.l

'

'

effects.

Prophe.stown

Tecmseh

directly petitioned their assistance
in 1810.

The
fur trade

clash of ideology between the
nativists and those tnbes linked
to the Bntish

became

increasingly manifest between 1807
and 1809. Ultimately the

northerners would have to choose between
accepting the Prophet's

contmumg

10*)

Wayne

their

commercial

ties to

white traders.

In fact, the

The Northwest Fnr Trade. 176^-1800. 104;
Thomas
Harrison, 27 February 803, Esarey,
Messages & l etter. 1:71.

al7f87lTt

^r"^'

gradually

I

n.ce,pt ot

doctrines or

Shawnee Prophet may

not

h. Stevens,

1

^

new

^creasmg.
,0

^''"'^ P""^^^-

he bumper year of

2 deers ,ns.

^''"^P-^^"

Jefferson to William Menrv
^

^'-'•""g

^-'l- between 1804

807 stands as an exception, when the Agency
recorded the
Nevertheless, w.th pr.ces at a mere $.44 per
deerskn,. the resultn.g per ca^^ta
1

fa Wayne.GatewatoftheWe.

'"^

T'^

^80
18i Camson
(
o
Orderly Bo.)ks T""'/"
1802-1813
Indian A^encY Acconnf Rook, Indiana Historical
Collections Vol
ndianapohs: Historical Bureau of the Indiana Library
(
and Historical Department
1927 rennnt

'''''''

Lltance 'l'r'
"' Calloway. "Foundations
of Sand:
58,

&

163; Calloway,

The Fur Trade and
Crown and Calumet 160
.
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British-Indian Relations.

D^'^d

1

783-18

1

A

s "

"

New

^"-"ted

ISS

157-

15

have sough,

.o

completely abolish ,he fur trade,
but he cena.nly wanted
to

m.n^.ze

control all economie transactions,
and prevent excessive Native
dependence on Euro-

-

American commodities

He knew,

for

example,

that his followers

would

still

need

European guns and powder.
However, by the time Tenskwatawa's
message spread
norther. Michigan

in

May

Shawnee's messenger had
total

1

807. an Ottawa prophet

inten^reted the

message much more

abstinence from the trade. Th,s
prophet,

insisted that h,s followers "kill

and also encouraged

warned

all

who claimed

known

as

to serve as the

stringently, calling for a

La Maigouis, or the Trout,

no more animals than are necessary

to feed

.o .he

& clothe you,"

Indians to renege on their
outstanding debts with traders.

that if .he Indians persisted in
the trade, then the Great Spirit

animals "back

Earth .ha. .hey

prevalent in the North. La Maigouis

may not come

to

saw

pnmary

this as the

to

would take the

you again."'" W,th the
evil

He

fur trade so

and agen. of cul.ural

destruction.

The Ottawa prophet's speech presented

the northern Ottawas and Ojibwas
with a

dilemma. Uncertain of the prophecy's authenticity,
some

Maigouis was

correct, then the issue

became

a question

may have

Supreme Being

in this

moderate success
the

in

spreading the revitahzation

movement spread

Prophet's tenets,

9T52-53, Tenet no.

The

fact that

case coincided with immunity from their debts

the Indians' decision easier, but whatever the
reason,

La Maigouis began

movement among

rapidly in the North, and agents of the North

Thomas Forsyth to William Clark, 15 January
9; Dowd, A Spirited Resistance 130-31.
.
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La

of what the Indians feared most:

the Master of Life's judgment or the wrath
of their creditors.

the

hesitated, but if

obedience to

may have made
to enjoy

his people.

For a time

West Company,

1827, Forsyth Papers, Draper

Mss Vol

know,,,, U,a, ,„e "Uocr.ne

m,ght even "extend

Ihc traders, an.l

commandant

..p.ojudica, ,„ ,he interest of
the Traders." feared
that

to the Saulteux

No,thwcs..- Captatn
.o the prineipal

,s.

Ottawa

J.

Dunha™,

village

Dnnham

at

& Crees,- n.ueh

northern Oj.bwa]

[,.e.,

the An,eriea„

eon„„a„dant

Arbre Croehe, denounc.ng

stendy de„,a„dcd

also d,spatched a party

that the ind.ans

of soldiers

,n

a,

tl,e

,t

farther to the

Maektnae, sent a speech

trtbe s ,ntentio„ to cheat

"Pay then, up "" ^ The

an unsuccessfnl attempt to
arrest La

Maigouis."^'

There was

l.tlle

Dunham

evolution of the revitahzation
northerners to

1

make

could have said that would have
aUered the natural

movement

or the attraction to

pilgrmiages southward to

visit the

that led

it

Shawnee

numerous

Prophet.

By August

807, just three months after La Maigouis delivered
his admonitions to the
Oltawas and

Ojibwas of northern Michigan, U.
"hulians.
.

hear the

from the Lakes near

agent William Wells

Mackmac" have passed

Shawnee Prophet. Wells added

what the Prophet

them," and

tells

them.""' American

officials at

alerted their superiors

to

W.lham

Fort

"that all the Indians

"they appear

to

Wayne

m

that

as they "(lock to"

that quarter believe in

be deff |s,c]

activity in their sectors

CNA,

to

everything

MG

among

19 F 16, Alexander

McKee

I

say to

also

the Ojibwas,

Papers, 13

This
inisspeecni
speech IS
i

McGillivray, 18 June 1807. Ontano Historical Archives
F 983 John

'^^'^^

"

mlormed Harrison

Green Bay, Chicago, and the upper Mississippi

Speech of La Ma.gouis, 4 May 1807,
also found m MPH(\ XI.: 127-33.

Duncan Mc(^illivray

that

of mcreased

•'^

wtllac

S.

46!r47 ^72

McG.ll.vray brothers, "s'ee W.

^'"^''f^'"""''

115

Captan, Dunham's Speech at Arbre Croche, 20
Straachan Papers, Reel
35, Rl.

May

1807,

Ontano

MS

116

117

Dunham
Wells

to Hull,

20

to Harrison,

May

1807, MPIIC,

1

listoncal Archives

XL: 125-26.

20 August 1807, Esarey, Messaues
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& Letters

.

L 239.

F 983 John

S,

Potawa,om.s. W.nnebagoes. and
Sauks. Charles Jouet.. agen.
"[.]he l„d,a„s are crouding
[s.e]

the

down upon us from

a.

Chicago, wanted that

Green Bay on

the

way. ,o see

.he,r

.

Shawonee.""^

The

hysteria,

though temporarily significant,
was short-hved. With the
exception

of the Winnebagoes, most of the
northern and Wisconsin tnbes
soon abandoned the

A

prophetic movement.
different infrastructure

close examination of the

from

that

Winnebago

of the other Wisconsin tnbes

society at the time reveals
a
that ultimately rejected
the

Prophet's teachings. In comparison
to the Ottawas, Ojibwas,
and Menominees, the

Wimiebagoes' government was much
more
hierarchical clan system,

organization.

Of the

ten

which served

Winnebago

centralized.

the head

clans, the

Thunder clan was most powerful, and

Thunder chief theoretically holdmg more power
than
Winnebagoes

independence longer than the other Wisconsin tnbes,

of medals and

flags as

Winnebagoes remained more
the traders with

whom

its

The head chief of the Thunder

body of counselors who ruled Wimiebago

centralized form of government enabled the

the fonn

elaborate

as the basis for their nation's
political

chiefs held significant authority over
the entire nation.

clan presided over a centralized

They maintained an

who

symbols of authority over

to

affairs,

with

the council."^ This

maintain their political

sought British recognifion in
their

own

bands. The

insular, as they did not necessarily yield
to the

wishes of

they did business on occasion. Thus, despite
commercial

ties

Charles Jouett to Secretary of War, 1 December 1807
22 August 1807, both in Carter Territorial
PaEers, VII: 496-97
472, respectively; Charles Reaume, Justice of the Peace at Green Bay
to Captain
Dunham, June, 1 807, Winnebago File, GABLA; William T. Hagan, The Sac and
Fox Indian. r>Jnm..nUniversity of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 39.

&

&

'

Manners, Customs, and International Laws of the Wm-nee-baa-goa nation
(1823), Ms/I4Me, C. C.
Trowbndge Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library. Paul Radin, The
Winnebap o
Tnbe (Washington: Thirty-Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology,
Smithsonian
Institution, 1923; reprint, Lincoln: University of Neraska Press,
1970), 1 15, 159.
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J

between the Bnt.sh and the
W.nnebagoes, the
as easily as their neighbors

who

latter

could not be manipulated
poht.ca.ly

operated on a band level.

While the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and
Menom.nees

all

n^aintained elan systen^s, none

of these nations' elans operated
as anything more than
umts of kmsh^p, and they certa.nly
did not serve as basis for a
political structure. For
mstance, none of the clan chiefs

possessed any authority over the
greater portion of the tnbe, and
despite having clans,
these tribes functioned on a
village or band level.'-

hsted the Ojibwa government as
"[rjepublican in

subordination
the

known" among

Menominees had

Winnebagoes had
counselors existed
level

more

a

its

warriors.'^'

a clan system

much more

among

of government. Like

the

An

all its

ethnographic

that

No

susceptible to the external influence of a
Euro- American

show an

initial interest in

to these other

the

not even

when

body of

on a

village and band

Menominees were much
power such

northern nations, the

Shawnee Prophet,

central

they, too, operated

the Oj ibwas and Ottawas, then, the

Furthermore, in comparison

also found that although

of the Winnebagoes, the

centralized govemment.'^^

Menominees, and

study in 1824

features," without "the least

The same study

which paralleled

field

as the Bntish.

Menominees

did not

their neighbors

were

temporarily attracted to Tenskwatawa's teaching
in 1807.'"

Kinietz, 69, 78; Danziger, 10-11.
121

122

Colonel Boyd's Account of the Chippewa, MS/I4c, Trowbridge
Papers, Burton Historical Collection.
Traditions, Manners, and

International

Laws of the

Customs of the Mun-noa-min-nee nation, and Manners, Customs and
Win-nee-baa-goa nation (1823), Ms/I4Me, ibid.

Charles Reaume, Justice of the Peace, Green Bay, to Captain Dunham, 12
June 1807, Winnebago
GABLA; Felix Keesing, The Menonu ni Indians of Wisconsin Memoirs of the American
.

Society, No. 10 (Philadelphia:

File,

Philosophical

The American Philosophical Society, 1939; reprint, New York & London:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1971), 91. Also see Tomah's speech to Tecumseh,
1810, WHC, I: 53-54
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In addhion to their tnbal
infrastructure,

Prophet for cosmological and

spiritual reasons.

Wmnebagoes

to bless warriors

Shawnee

Like the Shawnees, the
WuH^ebagoes

regarded Thunderbirds as an.ong
the most powerful

were thought

also followed the

deit.es,

and these supen.atural be.ngs

with n.ost anything requested,
especially victory

n.

war.

Powerful leaders and shamans among
the Wmnebagoes claimed

to

Thunderbirds, and the Shawnee Prophet
distributed sacred slabs

illustrating that the

be reincarnated

Thunderbirds' role was to serve as
gatekeepers to the Master of Lifc.'^"
The Prophet's

name

itself,

"Tenskwatawa," was even interpreted as
"the Open Door."'" According

Winnebago cosmology,
could

at least

if

Tenskwatawa himself were

a reincamted Thunderbird, or

converse with the Thunderbirds, then
not only was the Prophet a direct
link

to the Great Spirit, but also a
potential source

Winnebago

to

of immense power

oral tradition indicates that their
warriors

who

for

Winnebago

decided to

visit the

warriors.

Prophet

believed that they would "walk as the
thunderbirds do... .above the earth."'^'

Unlike the Winnebagoes, the other northern and
Wisconsin

away from

the Prophet by 1808.

In early

May

reported that "those Indians from Green Bay.

"appear truly ashamed of their

.

tribes

that year, U. S. agent

.are.

.

.returning

began

to drift

Charles Jouett

home," and they now

late infiituation relative to the prophet."'^^

According

to

Black Hawk, the Saiiks also generally rejected the Prophet's
overtures, and John Tanner
recalled that Tenskwatawa's "impression

124

Radm, 239. 391-92; James Howard,

was

.

among

the northern

175-76. 206. Similarly, the Winnebagoes also believed that the

secondary deities occupied the world just below the

Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet

obliterated"

(ircat Spirit's

dwelling place.

34.

Radin. 21-22.

Jouett to the Secretary of War. 2

May

1808. Carter, Territorial Papers VII: 564-65.
.
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Why the

Ojibwas.

QuUe

sudden reversal and decHne of
the

sn.ply, the Prophet eould not
provide the food and material
needs for

newcomers

,n a rap.dly

growing

intertribal society.

when new

could not be absorbed into the
nativist

communUy.-

Native suffering and restore prospenty,

of the sojourners from the North.

among

those

concluded, "At

who adhered

this

In

th.s

converts

was not

Tanner's

own

a

is

amved from

For a

good

all

of the

the North, they

man who promised
first

m.pression

end

to

in the

mn.ds

northern v.llage "famine began
to be

to the Prophet's teachings,

day he [Tenskwatawa]

North7

His closest followers usually

subsisted on near-starvation diets,
and

felt"

nativist frenzy in the

and the longtime captive

looked upon by the Indians as an
imposter

and a bad man."'^^
Tanner's observation
Prophet's followers both

is

especially significant, since

in the vicinity

negative effects of rcvitali/.ation.
recollections,

Andrew

When

history.

J.

of and

More

far

it

demonstrated

from Prophetslown experienced the

than half a century after Tanner wrote
his

Blackbird, an aging Ottawa, corroborated this

the Prophet's

that the

message came

to his people, "[a] great

in his

personal

many Ottawas

believed and went far west," Blackbird explained, in
order "to escape the habits of the

white man."
-

result.'
'

where

Of those who

The Ottawas,

was

Jackson, Black Hawk:

Edniuncis,

its

all

of them died out there" as a

the case with the other northern tribes, lived in
areas

the fur trade continued to fiourish.

advanced and ncaring

128

as

migrated west, "nearly

Had

the fur trade in the North been farther

demise, the Prophet's message would have probably held a

An Autobiography

The Shawnee Prophet 59-60,
.

.

58; John ranncr, 147.

66, 70, 76;

Wancn,

323.

John Tanner, 146-47.
Blackbird, 29-30. For a similar episode

among

the

Ojibwas see Warren, 323,

285

slrongc. appeal, ...

The

their wants.

slrcngdi o(

(l,r r(

on,>n,ie syslc,

<'"<-gh Ins c-on.aet
k.unvlcdgc. .nak.ng

A Is was

mnven.n. .oM.psC

nal.visi

Significantly,

I

„.c n.nc hcin,. the t.a.lc.s
,nc, .hen d.cnls"
needs a.u. snpp,,.,

,.>.

I,;,,!

usual w,lh „,c

to

do business w,(h

ihc-

he also can.c to v.ew win.cs as
snpono,

eas.er for

lum
,n

to reject Ihc l>,opl,efs teach.ngs.

any

.„,^,^,.^^^

d,allc„gai there.

Tanner not only p,elened

w.,1, ,hc,„,

,t

,(

„

No,,.,.

...

cncgcncy oldns

„;,de,s, but

„,

sp„

Tanner

.n,al

related,

kind. wc„l ,o ||,c „adc, s
the l),ety |s,cl had any
co„„„„n,ca.,o.,s ,o ,nakc ,o n,en
,n the first .nstance, to wh.te
n.en. The .,adc.s „d,c
csp.sed the nlea of a new ,evela.,on
of the l),v,ne w,ll. and ,l,c
.hon.h.

MM.Iy bchevnig. that
tbey won d be g.ven,

I

,1

1

c

shouM be given

,1,1

to a

poo,

Shawnee Thus was

I

co„f„„,cd

in

my

Tlu.ugh Tannei, as an lnd,an,/cd wlufe,
was pchaps qu,cke, than most

Tenskwatawa's teachings,
n role in

un.lc„„„„„j, ,hc

ofhis people

m

his peers

l>,opl,c,-s

fcadungs among othci Ojibwas.

1SS2, Oplnva Wilhan, Warren
alluded to

hoping

I'lophct.

lhal Ihc

was

a IVaud.'

of Uj.lnvas

Travelling ui a cluste, of

I

I

a,.

...cdcl

who had

In

u

.„

ISOS when „ade,

life.

Hut

,,„„p, . history

set out to visit the

so ,,,„ocs. the group canied

IMophcl could resl.uc Ihc body to

along the southwest shores of

to .eject

soon followed, and as with Tannei, the
traders played

Michael C'adottc turned back a huge pa.ty

Shawnee

inf.dchty.'^^

when

('ad,>|,c

akc Snpenor, the trader convinced them

a

dead cluM.

met the paily

lhal Ihc

Piophel

"

Several ofllic no, them tribes had ahcady begun to question
the veracity of the
Piophct's teachmg. but the most serious breach between Tenskwatawa
and Ins „o,ll,c,„
lollowers

Jolm

i

came

in the

winlci of I8()8-1S0*J

when an Ottawa band from Aibrc Croche

aiuici.

Waticn. 323; Raniow, 67; Da,i7igci. 66
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lost

fauh

hi.. This group had

in

co.e .o™

,he

sa.e

village as

La Ma.gouis.

Ottawa

,he

prophe, and U n,„s. 1,M,
consis.ed of so.e of
Tens.wa,awa. .os, devoted
dtsciples a.
.he t™e. Many of these
Ottawas and a few of the
O.bwas who had ™ade the
p.lgnntage
.0

Prophetstown

in

1808 attempted to remain on
the Wabash for the
winter, but

extraordinanly harsh weather
conditions and the lack of
food weakened the
tnhab.tants.

When

an epidemic (most hkely
inHuenza, swept through the
commun.ty,

earned away ,60 Ottawas and
Oj.bwas; very few members
of the other

Stunned

at their losses

selectively

trrbes

perished.-

and the d.sproportionate figures
of casualties, the survivmg

Ottawas and Oj.bwas became
suspicous of the Prophet.
professing

it

Shawnee holy man was

It

seemed

that either the

a fraud, or that he had
deliberately fomented the

sickness amongst them. Either
way. these northerners concluded
that

.t

was no.

,n their

best mterests to remain a,
Prophetstown and re.umed to their
villages in Mich.gan shortly
thereafter.

The breach between Tenskwatawa
and

these northern bands widened

disaffected groups decided to test
the supposed shaman. Earlier
he had

blood should ever be spilled
destroy anyone

who

at

Prophetstown and promised

defied this warning. Anxious to
determine

Ottawas and Ojibwas secretly returned
they tomahawked two unsuspecting

any

that the

afflictions attributable to

to

when

warned

the

that

no

Master of Life would

its truth,

a

war party of

Prophetstown, where, under cover of darkness,

Shawnees-a woman and

Tenskwatawa's

retaliatory

her child. Unable to detect

power, the murderers

triumphantly returned to Michigan. The brutal
expenment had succeeded; the Michigan

Edmunds, The Shawnee Pro phet, 76; White, The Middle
Ground, 513; Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life 174Matthew Elliott to Major Hulton, 19 May 1809, CNA, RG
10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 3, 990; William Wdls
to
Henry Dearborn, 31 March 1809, Shawnee File, GABLA; John
Johnston to the Prophet 3
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May

1809

Indians were convinced ,ha,
,hey had exposed a charlatan
and would have no further
contact with either the Prophet
or his revitalization movement.

messengers the following year
flatly

refused

-

summon

to

When Tenskwatawa sent

these dissidems back to
Prophetstow., they

After this schism, only a
wartime Bntish alliance could
unite the

nativist faction to the tnbes

of the northern Lakes, and the
Ojibwas, Ottawas,

Menominees, Sioux, and Sauks

all later

fought the

Amencans

as Bntish allies, not

nativists.

Shortly after the troubling incidents
along the

Wabash

between the Prophet and the northerners
nearly took a turn

in

that

1808-1809, the

split

could have ruined the

prospects of a future joint-Bntish alliance
with both groups. With their anger
not yet

appeased, the Ottawas and Ojibwas
conspired to destroy Prophetstown.
Ironically, had
not been for the intervention of the

have carried out
he put
to

it,

their plan.

"the Ottawas and

make an

sent

messages

Chippewas

[i.e

we

that, as

Ojibwas], on Lake Michigan, were preparing

Shawanoese Prophet, and

to the northern tribes "that the

protection of the U. States, and
against us."

government, the angry dissidents might

But when Michigan Governor William
Hull learned

expedition, against the

Wabash," he

Amencan

it

his people, residing

on the

Shawanoese were under

the

should consider hostilities against them, the
same as

Thus the Prophet's worst enemies—the Americans—
shielded him from

the

wrath of his former partisans, doing the British an
enormous favor in the process. Hull
sent these

messages reluctantly; the Michigan governor understood

Gayle Thorabrough,

that the Prophet's

Book o f the Indian Agency at Fort Wayne. 1809-1815 (IndianapolisIndiana Historical Society, 1961), 49-50.
ed.. Letter

135

Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 82; Harrison to the Secretary of War, 26 April
1809, Esarey, Messages
ALetters, I: 342; Same to same 26 June 1810, ibid.: 433-34.
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"object has been >o form a
comb,na.,on,

.

expressed reservations about
intervening
that

was with

.in hostility to

the U. S."'»

Hamson

also

prevent intertnbal conHicts.
eons.stent though

to

Jeffersonian peace policies.'"

The response of these western
governors

raises

some provocative

questions:

the U. S. had not protected
Prophetstown, would the vHlage
have been destroyed

making

Harri.son's 181
1

this

campaign unnecessary'/ More
important,

have affected British attempts

of the

tribes in the Great

to

to reconstruct a general
intertribal alliance

nativist coalition

1809,

what extent would

among

Lakes and the Wabash Valley on
the eve of the War of

Without the support of the

m

If

1

all

81 2^

from the Wabash, the British
pro.spects of

successfully defending Upper Canada
would have diminished significantly.
In the North, the rejection

of nativist doctrine and the continued
expansion of the

fur trade insured that Briti.sh-Indian
relations there

would continue

as they had for

decades. Unlike the capricious relations
between the Indian Department

at

Fort

Maiden

and the Prophetstown commumty, northern
Bntish-Indian relations maintained a steady
course

which

in

British leaders at Fort St. Joseph's
continued to play an assertive role in

the affairs of the Ottawas and Ojibwas.
After

1

801 British officers

continued to distribute medals and create chiefs, very

William Doyle and others had done prior
the

1

much

to the British

in the

in the

manner

North

that

Major

withdrawal from Fort Mackinac in

790s.

Doyle's successors could reduce a chief in status as well.
After Major Alexander

Campbell took command

Hull to William

at St.

Joseph's in 1806, he soon heard that an influential Ottawa

Secretary of War, 16 June 1809. Potawatomi File,
Eustis, 2 August 1809, and same to same, 20 July 1810, ibid.

Hamson

Eu.stis,

to Eustis,

28 August 1810, Esarey, Messages
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& Letters

.

I:

471.

GABLA.

Also see Hull

to

Chief from Arbre Croche,
Litt.e King, had allegedly
sen. his son .o .he
An^encans a.

Mack,nac

.0 presen. ,hen, w,.h a

Amencan." When

.he

s.nng of wampu™, i„dica..ng
.ha. .he ch.ef s ^'hean
was

0..awa headman arrived

a. S..

May

Joseph's ,„

immediacely brough. charges
agains. him. bu. .he
commandan. gave
oppor.uni.y .0 reply formally
.0 .he allega.ions

son had only given

wampum

pulling a .oo.h for him.

became so scnous

Dunham.

.0 .he

Amencan

m council.

doc.or

The chief also afHrnred

.ha. .he council

.0 .es.ify a. .he council.

a.

Li..le

Mackinac

,S07, Campbell

Krng an

Li..le

Krng explained

.ha. his

as compensa.ion for

his loyal.y ,0 .he Bn.ish.

The matter

even summoned .he American
commandan., Cap.ain

When

Cap.a.n

Dunham amved

a. S..

Joseph's, he

corrobora.ed L,..le King's defense,
explaining .ha. "he had always
unders.ood .ha. the
Li..le

King had been flnnly a..ached

amval, Major Campbell and .he

would be required

.0 .he British

government" Ye.

prior .0

Bri.ish .ribunal had already
infonned L.nle

".o re.um [his] meddals [sic]

wi.h your Presence.""' Only .he

Such an encounter goes contrary

Little

to the

King

.ha.

he

& Colours, and never more trouble us

Amencan officer's

Ottawa chief of the charge of disloyalty, and

Dunham's

testimony ul.imately cleared the

King was

fully restored.

supposedly widespread practice

in frontier

diplomacy of Indian leaders "playing off one
Euro-American power against another.
True, in

some

cases, particularly along the Detroit
frontier, Indians did possess

diplomatic leverage, but in the North the
dominance of British trade had

made

more
nations

there both economically and politically beholden
to British au.hori.ies. In .heory. Little

King should have had every

right to

have cultivated

Americans simultaneously. The chiers

)

38

Council minutes

at St. Joseph's,

20

& 21

village

May,

8 June,

Vol. 2, 689-702.

ties

with both the British and the

was simated

in

Amencan

and 19 June, 1807,

CNA, RG

tenitory, and

10 Indian ^^^''"^s,
Affairs
'
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.he BrUish had

withdrawn

fron,

Mackinac more .han a decade

Anglo-American powers were no,

earher.

Moreover. ,he

war. and Li.,le King and
his people should have

a,

enjoyed ,he rights of free passage
and neutral diplomacy between
both na.tons.
Nevertheless. Little King did not
have this liberty because he
and the Bntish had an

understanding that both parties
would work

by

the

Maumee

Britain and the

In the

in

1

794 and

Crown's alhes

1

at

particularly

at

the

1

when

807. Little

two

in the Detroit

Maiden were not

posts.

and

King may have
February

1

Maiden

to

King's ordeal

chief, just as

Maumee

Maiden

regions. British officers and Indian

and

begged

strip

the

them of their medals,

Wabash

nativists for support

also perceived the difference in attitude
toward Indians

808, barely eight months after narrowly being
cleared of

him

at St.

Joseph's, the Ottawa leader arrived at

meet with William Claus. This meeting went quite
differently than

at St. Jo.seph's.

Claus would

Ottawas' disposition

Tecumseh,

in

the

hopes of determining the

event of a British-American war. After having promised

Major Alexander Campbell and

would "always be

Little

The Deputy Superintendent General eagerly questioned

later interview

in the

whMe

to assert their

that their counten^arts at Fort

in a position to bully chiefs

the disloyalty charges brought again.st

Fort

pohcy

British officials there virtually

In

North.

there.

North British commandants and
Indian agents continued

could never carry out

in the

795 had nearly severed the Chain's
links between

authority over the Ottawas and Ojibwas,
a

after

con.tnue the sacred bonds frs,
sanctioned

Chain of Friendsh.p. Th,s saered
Cha.n had never been broken

events on the

agents

to

the council at St. Joseph's the previous spring that he

faithful to the British

Government,"
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Little

King now remained evasive

and non-committal w„h Claus
disposition, the

issue, but Little

leader they

King merely
a. St.

stated,

deemed

more

as

Little

"you

will

asked him about h,s
people's
is

smooth

know when

it

yet."

Claus pressed the

happens

""'»

Such

Joseph's mtght well have cost
the headman h,s position

who would have

Although

would

Whan the agen,

Ottawa leader repHed. "the ground

unforthcoming remarks
with the British

-

qu.ckly sought ,o replace him

at

Arbre Croche with a

loyal.

King equivocated, Claus

felt

confident that the chief and his
band

either support the Bntish or
remain neutral in the anticipated
conflict, since,

according to Claus,

Little

King intimated "the Indians [were]
decidedly opposed

Amencans."'^' Consequently, the question
of neutrality became the key issue
point,

and

Little

King considered the option of separating
himself and

to the

at that

his people

from

both the British and the Americans by joining
the Shawnee Prophet's nativist
movement.

Perhaps

Little

King's rough treatment

at the

hands of Major Campbell and his fellow

inquisitors at St. Joseph's had compelled the
chief to rethink the consequences of his
tribe's close

economic and

political ties with the Bntish.

other Ojibwas and Ottawas resolved to join the
nativists

In

at

any

case, he

and hundreds of

Prophetstown during the

winter of 1808-1809.

Although several of the northern groups had rejected
Tenskwatawa's teachings
the previous year, Little

Croche.

139

140

Some of his

Indian Council held at

St.

King remained an
followers

influential voice in his

may have been

Joseph's, 20

May

1807,

reluctant to join their chief at the

CNA, RG

Claus to Lieutenant Governor Gore, 27 February 1808,
Ibid.

Ibid
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band from Arbre

10, Indian Affau-s, Vol. 2, 699,

MPHC, XL:

44-45.

Wabash, but they acquiesced
due
Oj.bwa bands were therefore

all

to

the

Lutle K.ng's faith in the
Prophet. The Ottawa and

.ore

distraught

when

the ep.dem.c that swept

through Prophetstown that
winter not only ravaged their
Icmsmen more than any other
group, but earned off their
beloved leader
that the

Now

who had

brought them there

Ottawas from Arbre Croche and
elsewhere wanted

to destroy

No wonder

Prophetstown.

embittered against the nativ.ts,
and always hostile to the
Americans, the remnants

of Little King's band returned

to their

homes

at

Arbre Croche. Having

flirted

wuh

notions of Native revival, separatism,
and neutrality, they reentered the
only world they
really

knew, one dominated by British
trade and influence.
John Askin,

to

Jr.,

storekeeper and interpreter

have played a significant role

the

Wabash.

In a

memorial

in the return

listing his past

at

Fort

St.

Joseph

at the time,

claimed

of the disillusioned northern Indians
from

achievements

in

hopes of gaining a

promotion, Askin asserted that his contnbution
to retneving the Ottawas and
Ojibwas

was one of his most important accomplishments
while serving

Wnting

to Claus, the northern agent took
credit for "getting

the vicinity of this

in the Indian

Department.

back a number of Indians of

Country who had followed the Shawnee Prophet

& settled on the

Wabash.""*' Although an exaggeration, Askin's
claim provides valuable support for the
idea that British leaders in the North typically
thought
scale in Indian affairs, and that they viewed

anathema

143

Mattliew

to the

it

proper to intervene on a large

Tenskwatawa's prophetic movement as

northern people's lives, commerce, and culture.
However, British policy

Elliott to

Major Hulton, 19 May 1809, CNA,

144

RG

10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 3, 990.

John Askin, Jr. to William Claus, 26 December 1815, CNA.
19 F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 10, 207
Askin regarded his combined service as agent, storekeeper, and interpreter
between 1807 and 1812 as his
most important accomplishment. The Indian Department did not employ
a regular Deputy Supenntendent
at St

MG

Joseph's at that time, forcing

Askm

to hold

down

several positions simultaneously, without extra pay
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on such ma„ers differed gready
from region
Claus. a

a

Bn„sh

mechanism

official in the southenr

for Indian unity

very ttme that Askin.

in the

.o region

and

tribe .o tribe.

For example

Great Lakes, had viewed .he
nattvtst movement as

and the basis for a potential
Bn.ish-lndian alUancc

at the

North, had attempted to
dtssuade Indians from joming
the

Prophet.

Such examples of regional

differences in British-Indtan
relations between 1801

and 1812 provide important windows
into the complexities of the
history of the time.

diplomacy was never monolithic.

British

It

vaned by region and

it

always reflected the

diffenng perspectives of its participants,
based on their respective positions
hierarchy of command. Put another
way, there

was

in the

often a large gap in practice and

belief between cemral administrators
and agents living

among and even imemiarrying

with Natives.'''^

The
At

its

history of the tnbal revitahzation

zenith,

movement

Tenskwatawa's religious movement and

also

shows regional

cultural revival

diversity.

enjoyed

strongest support from the Kickapoos,
Potawatomis, and Wimiebagoes.

its

The Kickapoos

and Potawatomis, geographically located throughout
southern Michigan, northern
Indiana, and the expanse of Illinois,

fit

well within the Prophet's

main geographical

sphere of influence. The Winnebagoes appear to
be more of an aberration. This nation

Neither Gregory

Dowd's

Spirited Resistance nor Richard White's

the northern sector of Indian- White relations.

Maigouis

in 1807,

bnefly treating

Both authors allude

to

Middle Ground satisfactorily handles
the prophecy of the Ottawa La

as significant, but neither discusses the ensuing
years in the North and
why the Indians there ultimately rejected revitahzation. Instead, they leave
their readers with the
impression that the nativist ideals held finn in the North. Moreover,
neither discusses the significance of
the northern fur trade, although the fur trade's participants
resisted bodi nativism and the
it

notion of a

common

cultural

the trade

m

middle ground with the tribes of the southern Great Lakes. (White's
bnef discussion of
his fmal chapter is m a different context, one in which
the author is

extent of growing Native dependency.)
failure

of revitalization

in the North,

northern and western regions

(i.e.,

attempting to play down the
Edmunds (m The Shawnee Prop het^ discuss the
Dowd and White, Edmunds does not adequately cover the

Nor does

and

like

Wisconsin

R. David

& northern Michigan) after the Prophet's brief outburst of

popularity there in 1807.
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occupied portions of central
eastern Wisconsin, which
was situated near a major
trade
route, specifically the

Fox-Wisconsin

rivers waterway. They,

hke the. neighbors

in the

North, would have also had
substantial contact with Bntish
traders, including pnvate
entrepreneurs and to a lesser extent

Winnebagoes became
until

1811.'^^

Winnebago
under the

As

died

previously discussed, a possible
explanafion

November
1

to

81

the Prophet and his

181

1, all

movement were

of the tnbes that continued

2 did so as Bntish

allies.

It

one time been members of the Wabash

prevent that tnbe from coming

ties,

hi

any case, the Wimiebagoes

largely discredited at Tippecanoe
in

to resist

now meant
nativist

little

American expansion dunng
whether or not these

movement, and

to discern the regional differences in
British-Indian relations.

even

that the

for the Prophet's revitalization.

Once

War of

much

is

extent of Bntish economic and
political influence, while the
other northern

groups were drawn into the Bntish orbit
by trade

were ripe

him

m the fierce action against Hamson's troops on 7

tnbal structure and clan hierarchy
did

full

the

the Prophet's staunchest
supporters, and they did not
desert

many of their wamors

November

men of the North West Company. Yet

less evident

when

it

allies

became more

the

had

at

difficult

These differences became

eariy British-Indian successes at the war's
outset tended to once

again unite disaffected factions of Natives. Nevertheless,

some

traces of these

distinctions remained, and the British encountered
multiple Native responses to British

policy and actions as the war progressed.

Harrison

& Letters I: 449; Jackson, Black HawkAutobiography, 58; Gilbert, 271-72; Robert Breckinridge McAfee, History of
the Late War in the
Western Country (Lexington, KY: Worsley & Smith, 1 8 1 6; reprint, Ann Arbor, MLto

Secretary of War, 25 July 1810, Esarey, Messages

.

An

University

Microfilms,

Inc.,

1966), 34.
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EPILOGUE

REASSESSING THE CHAIN OF
FRIENDSHIP:
In

1

838,

many years

Henry Harrison completed

after the

his

wars

.812

AND BEYOND

Old Northwest had ended,
William

in the

DisSMseoiUheA^^

study, the future president
speculated as to

why

the Indians of the Northwest
had

previously clung so t.ghtly
.0 the Bntish, and he surm.sed
that His Majesty's
agents had

purchased Native loyalty with "an.s
and equipments, clothing and
trinkets." Aecord.ng
to

Hamson,

the Indians had accepted
these petty gifts from the
British because the

Nat,ves did not grasp the "envtable
distinction" between British
mie and the peace and
justice that the United States
offered

them

'

The

retired general also

pondered the

possible British motives for maintaining
close ties with the tadtans into
the I8I0s;

Harrison could only conclude that
Britain,
the United States,

them

had

"still

in sp.te

indulged the hope,

(the U. S.] to subjection."

"No

of acknowledging the independence
of

that...,t

other reason,"

would be able

Hamson mused,

the close connexion [sic] which they
[the Bntish] continued to keep

to again reduce

"can be assigned

up with

for

the tribes

within our territorial boundary, and their
constant and liberal supply ,0 them of the
means

of committing depredations upon our settlements."^
In the near half-century smce he
had
first

served as a young officer in Anthony Wayne's
Legion,

Harrison perceived the Indians and their former
British

Harrison.
' Ibid.,

A

Discourse on the Ahnneines of tlie

little

had changed

in

how

allies.'

Ohm Valley <ri.i.,„„.

Fergus Printing Co., 1838), 37.

38.

The best biography on Harrison, particularly for his later years, is
Dorothy Bumc Ooebel's William
Henry Hamson: A Political Biopraphy (Indianapolis: Historical Bureau
'

of the

Historical Department. 1926).

More

recently. Reginald
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lndi.ina Library

and

Horsnian provides a good biographical sketch with

Han^son's perception resembled

mmtary

of numerous other American
statesmen and

of Ms generation. For example,
Lewis Cass, perhaps more
than any

officers

Amencan

other

that

leader of that era,

with the Indians. Cass,

who was

condemned

the

Bnt.h government

taken prisoner by the

for

.ts

combmed Bntish-Man

captured Detroit in August
1812, subsequently served as an
aide-de-camp to
later

dunng war; he

dealmgs
force that

Hamson

then spent eighteen years as
Michigan's temtonal Governor
before

becoming Secretary of War under
President Andrew Jackson and
Secretary of State
James Buchanan's

administration.^ Like

Hamson, Cass

exploited the Natives. The Michigan
governor
British

government and

were used,

in

war

its

to fight,

Native

allies,

and in peace

believed that the Bntish had

summed up

one

as

in

the relationship between
the

which the Indians -..ere

useful,

to trade [Cass's italics]."^
Furthermore,

regarded the Bntish use of Native wartime

in

allies as tactics

tantamount

and

Cass

to terror, often

indiscrimately employed against civilians,
hi his indictment against Bntain,
he

passionately charged that

The nation which authonzes.
tribunal

.

.[an Indian alliance], should

of Chnstendom....And

which postenty

will look

the bnghtest jewel in the

Virginia

'allies,'

as the Indians

be arraigned

maybe,

it

is

at the

an alliance to

back with grief and indignation, and which will
tarnish
crown of the Defender of the Faith [italicized by
'

Gentleman

Cass]

m the Old Northwest."

ij^e2ToOv"ll5"4T'°"'

Indiana Magazine of H.^tnr;^,

vrvr

For a biography on Cass, see Andrew C. McLaughlin,
Lewis Cass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1899repnnt, New York: Chelsea House Publishers,
1980), with an introduction bv Holman Hamilton m the
*

reprinted edition.

Lewis Cass, "Service of Indians in Civilized Warfare," North
Amencan Review 24 (April 1827)- 370
For more of Cass's writmgs regarding Indians, see his "Indians
of North Amenca." North American
Rexiew 22 (January 1826): 53-119. Also, an earlier unpublished report by Cass,
dated 1815, can
m the Newberry Library's (Chicago) Ayer Manuscripts, record 601, under the title, "Report on thebe found
Formation of a System of the Regulation of Indian Affairs."
^

^

Cass, "Service of Indians in Civilized Warfare," 375.
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Cass also beheved

that

.t

was pnncipally due

to

the. deahngs

years of mten^.ttent warfare
that the Indians resisted

them/

In

denved by
the

1

1

827 Cass concluded

that "[n]ot a vestige

whh

Amencan

the Bntish

durmg

attempts to acculturate

remains of any pen^anent
advantage

the Indians" from their
years of fidehty to the Bnt.sh.^
Consequently,

820s and

1

830s, Cass

the

became one of the leadmg advocates
of the

federal

dunng

pohcy of

Indian Removal, arguing that the
scheme was the Native peoples' only
hope for survival.^

Both Hamson and Cass,

like so

many of their peers,

formulated their opinions

based on years of frontier warfare
and diplomacy dunng a penod
the Old Northwest demonstrated

maximum

resistance to

all

m which the Indians of

external influences that

threatened their lifestyles and cultural
traditions. Native defiance and
detemnnation
resisting

century,

Amencan

expansion reached

when American

its

m

zenith shortly after the turn of the
nineteenth

policy attempted to accelerate the process
of expropnating

Indian lands in Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan.
Comcidentally, the strongest intertribal
resistance to these measures occun-ed precisely

when Anglo-Amencan

relations

once

again turned sour, pnmarily between 1807 and
1812, causing the United States to believe
that the Bntish

were the actual source of Native discontent. Such
thinking on the

part

of

Cass continued to suspect Bntish intrigue at work among the
Indians well into the 1820s More
concerning his views dunng this penod can be found in his
records of personal correspondence m the
Lewis Cass Papers at the Clements Library and the Lewis Cass
Papers at the Bentley Histoncal Librai^

Though bearing

same title, these collections actually contain different sets of
correspondence- both
research facilities are located at the University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor.
the

Cass, "Service of Indians in Civilized Warfare," 369.

For Cass on Indian Removal, see Cass, "Removal of the Indians." North
Amencan Review 30 (January
1830): 62-121 (This has been repnnted by Amo Press, New York in 1975, under
the title Considerations
on the Present State of the Indians, and T heir Removal to the West of the Mississip pi )
Also, McLaughlin,
159-61; Francis Paul Prucha, Lewis Cass and American Indian Policv (Detroit: Wayne
State University
Press, 1967); Prucha,

Amencan

Acts, 1790-1834 (Cambridge,

Indian Policv in the Fonnative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercours'e
MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 246-47, 256-57.
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.he

Americans gave

among

inlluenee

Che Br.tlsh .00

^ueh

credi,;

,he tr.bes of.he Great
Lakes ,ha.

In irulh, Br,„sh-h,d,an
relations in the

complex

i,

a.u.ed
i,

Crown .,a,„eU

,ha. ,he

had enjoyed pnor .0

1

.he

794.

Northwest had a mueh richer
and more

history than either Harrison
or Cass reahV.ed. In

,

794, the old Chatn of

Friendsh,p that had onee joined
Britain ,0 the nat.ons of
the Great Lakes was
virtually

severed by Anthony Wayne's
v.e.ory over the confederated
tribes
.lefea, that

was confimted by

Fallen Timbers, a

a,

the terms of the Treaty
ofGrecnville the following year.

This ntarked the beginntng of a
twelve-year per.od of Anglo-American
cooperation

which the

trtbcs

south of the Lakes deal, more
directly with the Americans.
Only with

great dtllicuUy after

1

807 d,d the

British Indian

Department manage

to restore a

semblance of the Chain of Friendship as
a defensive measure intended

Canada from an
convinced

anticipated

American mvasion. Yet by

that Britain's ties to its

that time

to protect

secure.

In

1

fomter alhes had never been broken,
and only by

810 Kentucky leader Henry Clay and

Congress clamored

New

for an invasion

Hampshire, argued

that

be

of "War Hawks"

in

Providence would sanction such an undertaking,
bellowing,

by the regions of eternal

American

his faction

frontier

of Canada, and John Harpev, a representative
from

"The Author of Nature has marked our
the north,

Upper

American leaders were

permanently eliminating the British menace
from North America could the

made

in

limits in the south,

by the Gulf of Mexico;

a.,d

frost."'"

rhetoric aside, Britons and Indians

had always understood

their

relationship with each other quite differently. British
agents, government officials, and

Dradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United Stales. 805-1
« ? (Berkeley
Angeles: University of California Press. 1961 283-84: Speech of John
).
1

1

A. Harper,

January 1812. 12

Congress, I" session, 657, in Joseph Gales,
Vols. (Washington: Gales
Sealon, 834- 1 856).

&
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ed..

&

Los

New Hampsliire,

4

Annals ofConeress. 1789-1824 42

on

Native leaders often spoke of the
Chain of Friendship as a unique
understanding that had
existed between them, albeit
tenusously

councl

at Detroit in the

summer of

761

1

at

.

times, since Sir

By

1

792, the

WUham Johnson's mtertnbal

wamors of the Western

Confederacy, particularly those dwelling
south of the Lakes

Kekionga and the Glaize, had made

it

clear that they

in the

mtertnbal villages of

would not accept Amencan

acculturation." For Bntain to have
attempted any of the cultural reforms
that

Cass had accused them of neglecting
would have meant an end

entente. Moreover, the Indians

Brownstown councl
their lands

fire

and impose

viewed

who would

new

their

protect

Bntish Father as an

to the

allied

among

its allies

Anglo-Native

member of the

them from Amencan attempts

to

expropnate

ideologies on them. Implicit within the
Chain of Fnendship

agreement was an understanding

that Britain

would recognize and

protect Native

sovereignty for those tribes living within the
boundanes of the United States.

When
Confederacy

Britain failed in this role

in

1794-1795, numerous

dunng

the crisis and defeat of the Western

intertribal leaders in the

Ohio Valley and along the

Detroit frontier considered their Chain of Friendship
with the British broken. Blue
Jacket, the Confederacy's pnncipal leader,
relinquished his British

hoped

to replace

it

with a similar

leader, along with the majority

nothing" of their British
this triumvirate

II

was

under the American regime.'^ The Shawnee war

of Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee wamors, now "thought

allies as the Indians

of nations

Indians' trust, nor

title

this

commission and

in the

Maumee

made peace with

the United States.'^ Within

Valley, Britain never completely regained the

segment of the Chain of Friendship ever

flilly

restored.

Painted Pole's speech at the Glaize, 7 October 1792, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence

Sugden, Blue Jacket 192-98.
.
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.

I:

227.

When Bntam
in

1

negotiated Jay's Treaty with
the

783, acting independently of Native
interests-

it

Amencans

further

1794

in

^nce

agam, .

weakened any remaining

semblance of the Chain of Fnendship
with tnbes of the Ohio Valley
and southei. Great
Lakes.

When, under

American tem'tory

the terms of Jay's Treaty,
the Bntish evacuated their
posts in

in the

summer of

1796,

it

appeared that Whitehall had played
a

complicitous role in undennimng the
future integnty of indegenous
cultures south of the

Lakes by recognizing U.

The Indians

there

elements of the former

However,

all

S. suzerainty in the

remembered

Maumee

this,

Ohio country.

and only very gradually

and Wabash

tribes again gravitate

after

1808 did

towards the

British.

of the former pnncipal leaders were
gone, and by 1808 the British were

forced to seek an alhance with an
intertribal group of nativist hidians

process of staging a cultural revolt. Led
by

Tenskwatawa, the

nativists attempted to

Tecumseh and

punfy

their culture

they even encouraged the executions of those
Indians

had supported U.

S. acculturation

participating in this revitalization

his

who were

m the

chansmatic brother,

and religion, and

who were

at

times

overtly Chnstian, or

who

and land-acquisition policies." The Indians

movement would not have

tolerated British attempts to

reform them any more than they accepted American
schemes. Extreme factions of this

movement even attempted

13

Thomas Smith

to

to

compel the

Alexander McKee,

1

1

tribes living in the northern

Lakes regions

October 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Corresp ondence V:

to

1

13,

14

Although evidence suggests that Tecumseh might have opposed the
witchhunts and purges that the
Prophet and some of his followers carried out against a handflil of
pro-U. S., Chnstian Indians, Tecumseh
did threaten to kill the chiefs who made any land cessions to the
Americans. See Tecumseh's speech at
Vmcennes, 20 August 1810, Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Heiir^' Harrison
1: 466; Klinck,
Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction 71-72. Regarding the witchhunts, see Edmunds, The
Shawnee Prop het 4247; Edmunds, "The Thin Red Line: Tecumseh, the Prophet, and Shawnee Resistance,"
Tuneline
,

4(6)

(1987-88): 7-8; Edmunds, "Tecumseh, the Shawnee Prophet, and American History:
A Reassessment "
Western Historical Quarterly 14(3) 1983: 268-69; Miller, "The 1806 Purge Among the
Indiana Delaware,'
245-66. For Tecumseh's reaction to the Prophet's witchhunts see Sugden, Tecumseh:
A Life. 154, 209,
'

and Edmunds, Tecumseh and the Quest

for Indian

Leadership 85.
.
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'
•

cease tradmg with the Bntish
and to renege on their outstanding
debts.- In this Hght,

Cass's cnticisms of Bntish dealings
with the Indians appear ludicrous.
Pnor to the war

Tecumseh had made

it

clear that he did not trust the
Bntish, but he, like the Bntish,

restored the Chain of Friendship
out of necessity
British officers at

Maiden with

when

the

Shawnee leader presented

a belt that the King's agents

had given

nearly a half-century earlier.'^
Bntish relations with the nativist

remained tenuous throughout the

War of

killed (in 1813)

and the fortunes of war

shifted in favor

of the Americans.

1

8 1 2,

Wabash

and only grew worse

in the southern

In the North, Bntish-Indian relations
proved

to his

the

people

after

coalition

Tecumseh was

Lakes and the Detroit frontier

much more

stable during the interwar

penod, and thus the assessments of Cass, Harrison,
and other American leaders contam a
kernel of truth

when

applied to the continuing influence that the
Bntish enjoyed

the Ottawas, Ojibwas,

among

Menominees, Sioux, Sauk, and Fox. The continuity of
these

ties,

based primarily on trade, meant that the Chain of
Friendship had never been significantly
altered with the northern groups, and those nations
remained virtually unaffected

Anthony Wayne's conquest of the Ohio country. At Mackinac and
agents continued to exercise

much

influence

St.

by

Joseph, British

among Ottawa and Ojibwa

bands, often

creating chiefs and even issuing commissions on occasion.
Cass's assessment that the

MG

Speech of La Maigouis, the Ottawa Prophet, 4 May 1807, CNA,
19 F 16, Alexander McKee Papers,
13; MPHC, XL: 127-33. American and British assessments of the northern phase of
revitalization, are
found in Duncan McGillivray to William McGillivray, 18 June 1807, Ontario Historical
Archives, F 983,
John Strachan Papers, Reel MS 35, Rl, and Captain Dunham's Speech at Arbre Croche,
20

May

ibid.

Also,

Dunham

to

William Hull, 20

May

1807,

MPHC, XL:

1807,

iiJ

125-26.

See Speech of Tukumthai, Brother of the Shawanoe Prophet, Fort Maiden, 15 November
1810, CNA,
1
CO 42, 351, 42; Klinck, Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction 79-81. Regardmg Tecumseh's distrust of the
1

MG

British, see Lieutenant

.

Governor Francis Gore

James Craig, Governor General, 27 July 1808, CNA,
RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 1 1, 9902; Thomas Forsyth to General William Clark, 15 January 1827, Thomas
Forsyth Papers, 9T54, Draper Mss.
to Sir
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Indians were merely
'

[Cass's

italics] to

W

some

by

the

BnUsh,

'7.

.ar

tofi.Ht,

and . peace

to trad,^

extent describes the Chain of
Friendship in the North.

Yet Cass's remarks overlook the
degree of mutual reciprocity

m the northern

Bntish-Indian relations. Moreover,
the charge that the Bntish
failed to implement
cultural innovations

among

their Indian allies also
entailed a false presupposition
that

Bntain could unilaterally impose

its

ideals

on Native peoples. The

fact that the

met some of the Indians' matenal needs
-and nothing more- was the
Britain's success in maintaining

attempting to compel their

its

allies to

Crown

secret behind

enduring friendship with the northerners.
In not

make

cultural changes, Bntish agents

and traders

generally recognized the dignity and
integrity of the northern tribes
(with occasional

exceptions) while asking for virtually nothing
in return, apart from their
clients'

continued commerce and future wartime loyalty.
This can be seen in the fact that
although His Majesty's agents and officers
could never mediate a lasting peace be^;.een
the Ojibwas and Dakotas, they continued to
trade with both belligerents.

Though

enjoying their best relations with the northern Indians,
the British held only limited power

among
from

them. American officer Zebulon Pike misread the
situation

his expedition to the

upper Mississippi Valley

British inability to quell this

(in

result

made such

returned

1804-1805) bewildered by the

ongoing struggle. Pike asserted

bring a lasting peace to the area through a more powerful
British

when he

that the

United States could

show of force.

But had the

a heavy-handed attempt to pacify the distant northwestern
tribes, the

probably would have been an immediate end to the Chain of Friendship

there.

In

the end, British-Indian relations in the North proved so strong that they
weathered not

Jackson, Journals of Zebulon

Montgomery Pike

.

I:

216-17
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only

,f,c

Sioux-Ojibwa wars. bu. aiso

end the nonhcrn
as

Crown

fur ,ra.lc.

allies, an.l

from the WabasI,

,hc eflbrts

all

Consequcn.ly,

only incidentally as

,ha, ha.l

in ,hc

allies ,o

onee partieipated

by

War of

Shawnee PropLcfs
1

8 2 >hc
,

nonhcn,

naCiv.s.s to

,r,bcs louglu

Teeuntselfs „at,v,s, eoali„„„
oftribes

n, the

Shawnee Prophet's

revhalization

movement.
In evaluating Bnt.sh-Ind.an
relations, both ('ass and
tliat

the

Crown maintained

Canada's leaders had therefore misused
In truth,

larnson in.plicity assumeci

sovereignty over the Natives with which

inbes dwelling within the boundaries of
the United States

than subjects.

1

their

power

and

that

in treating the

it

dealt

even those

Whitehall and

Natives as

allies rather

although the King's ministers argued the
Crown's legal

sovereignty over Rritish North America, the
Chain of Friendship could exist only

Crown never attempted
Six Nations

at

the

to assert this

supposed

Grand River Reserve

in

right

over

its

Indian

Upper Canada attempted

allies.

Only

,f tiic

after the

to force WhitciiaH's

recognition of Native land sovereignty did the Hritish
government more clearly define

stance toward the Indians living within

Imnts. Joseph Brant and the

its

Council systematically rejected the land deeds offered

Canada, since these ultimately gave the King
Six Nations' land cessions.'^

them by

nnlitary governor of

Upper

(

to act as a

Rritish leaders in

allies,

did not concur with the notion that

and they tenaciously argued the

Moreover, by the outset of the War of 1812

Grand River Council, attempting

(hand River

determination over the distribution of

The Grand River nations

they were simullaneously British subjects and
latter status only.

final

to

(after Brant's death), the

sovereign power, informed Isaac Brock,

anada, that they would remain neutral until their land

Noon, X6-88; Weaver, 525.
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its

quest.on was sat.factonly
resolved. Less than a few
dozen warriors from the
Grand

River jomed the Bnt.h
1812,

it

United

at the

war's outset. Hence, by the

proved easier for the Bnt.h

States,

to

for. alhances w,th those tnbes

smce Bntish sovereignty was
no longer an

Here lay the dilemma, and indeed
the flaw
Bntish government had wished

same time expect Native peoples
might expect

that

by becoming

do

to

commencement of the War of

so,

,t

to accept

hvmg w,thm

issue with them.

in Cass's

argument. Even

if the

could not support acculturation
and

extended

the

Crown

the

at

sovereignty over them.

agricultural and Chnstianized,
the Indians

would

One

also

accept government sovereignty,
but such was not the case.
The Six Nations, the most
acculturated Native peoples of the
groups featured in this study, were
also the most vocal
in

claiming an autonomous

status,

independent of Whitehall. The more
John Norton

spoke of establishing a seminary and
agricultural missions, the more he
envisioned a

new,

politically independent Native

who had

criticized the British

civilization

among

among

the Natives

Crown's

allies,

community, one

distant

from British influence. Cass,

govermnent for not promoting the advancements
of

the King's Indian allies, did not

would have

seem

to grasp that

altered the unique relationship

such developments

between Britain and the

while simultaneously adding impetus to the
Indians' desire for

sovereignty. Ironically, Cass

Secretary of War to

Andrew

would

later

experience this difficulty himself, when, as

Jackson, he encountered the Cherokee situation;
despite the

advancements of Cherokee learning,

agriculture,

and Christian teaching, the Secretary

ultimately opted for removal after the United States
government denied the Cherokees a

sovereign status.'^ But the Crown's Indian policy was

much more

benign, and by the end

P^cha, Lewis Cass and American Indian Poliry 14-17. The Cherokees had
developed a centralized
national government, based on a constitution, which not only
proclaimed the Cherokee government as
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of the eighteenth cen.ury, .he
Bn.ish had already

se, as.de ,hree

Reserves

in

Upper

Canada.^"

Cass, Harrison. Clay, and other
American leaders eould no. properly
understand
British-Indian relations during the
early years of the American
failed to consider the various
tribes

Repubhc because they

and regions with which the
Bntish

dealt.

Furthermore. Americans did not
grasp that Whitehali's Ind.an
pohcy was not
that the British

govemtnenfs

foreign policy that

front.er

measures were always subject

oAcn focused on France

to

static,

and

an overarching

as the ma,n concem. Moreover,

memories of

border warfare, and more recent naval
incidents such as the Chesapeake
affair

in

June

1807, prevented American leaders, particularly
the Jeffcrsonian faction, from
discem.ng
that Britain did not desire another

American suspicions of British
agents
a

at

Maiden and elsewhere

Anglo-American

frontier intrigue

activity

among

seemed

to

After the Chesapeake cnsts.

be confirmed when the King's

earnestly attempted to restore the Chain
of Friendship as

means of protecting Upper Canada from

renewed

war.''

the Indians

anticipated

American

invasions.

was construed as offensively

Such

hostile, rather than as a

defensive measure.

The

thesis put forth in this study -that Britain's
relationship with three different

groupings of Indians of the Old Northwest and Upper
Canada evolved along separate
lines

between 1783 and 1812, and

sovereign over

that the nations

of each of those sectors responded

tribal lands, but

claimed that the Cherokee nation did not exist apart from the
land Theda
Perdue and Michael D. Green, eds., Cherokee Remo val: A Brief History
with Document. (Boston & New
York: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1995), 13-14.
20

In addition to the

21

In the incident

Chesapeake,

Grand River, these included Chenail Ecarte and

known

killing

the

Bay of Qumte.

Chesapeake affair, the HMS Leopard fired three broadsides into the USS
or wounding several of its crew, before forcibly boarding the crippled
American vessel
as the

and removing suspected British

deserters.
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.

differently to

Of the

Brmsh policy-

is

borne out by the subsequent events
of the

War of

1812.

three regions discussed, British
agents and officers expenenced
their greatest

difficulty in

mamtainmg amiable

ties

with the remnants of the nat.vist
faction from the

southern Great Lakes, those Indians
ostensibly under the leadership
of Tecumseh, the

Potawatomi chief Main Poc, and the
Wyandot leaders Roundhead and Walk-in-theWater. British officers found that they
possessed virtually no influence or
control over
these

wamors. Furthermore,

bands and tnbes

movement, and

that

tribal infrastructures

had once participated

power vacuum remained.^^ Though
they probably did not

command

the

Shawnee Prophet's

in the

after the revolution in leadership

had collapsed within the ranks of
those
revitalization

brought by Tecumseh and the Prophet
a

above-named Indian

leaders were influential,

the intertribal support that Brant, Blue
Jacket, and Little

Turtle had enjoyed from the 1770s into the
1790s.

Even Tecumseh, though popular,

not always possess the influence that the legend
suggests, and neither he nor

could prevent the Indians from ravaging the area around
Detroit

Amencans

in the

did

Roundhead

days after the

surrendered that post in August 1812. The Bntish-allied
warriors also

intimidated the Canadian populace across the Detroit River
in the Western District and

even killed and scalped a man serving

The better-documented

in

an allied Canadian militia unit."

atrocities that the Indians inflicted

upon white .\mericans

during the conflict were carried out by warriors from the southern Great
Lakes,
specifically, northern Ohio, southern

22

Roundhead was

Michigan, Indiana, and

the only nativist leader in the

War of 1812 who had

Illinois.

This stnng of

signed the Treaty of Greenville in

1795.

"

Edward Dewar to Colonel Procter, 28 August 1812, and Major P. L. Chambers to Procter 24
August 1812, Cruikshank, The Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit. 1812 173-76; Entry for 20
August 1812, Journal of Charles Askin, Wood, I: 54 1
Lieutenant

.
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2

actwhy incudes

the actions re..embered
as the Fort Dearborn
Massaere (August 1812),

Pigeon Roost Massaere
(September 1812), River Raisin
Massaere (Jai.uary 1813),

Dudley's Defeat (May 1813), and
Buffalo (December 1813);
these u.e.dents are what
shaped the Amcriean postwar
opinion, including the views
of Cass and others, when
reassessing British mvolvement
with the Indians. Yet each
instance demonstrated
little

control the British actually
exerted over the Indians south of
the Lakes.

personnel were present

and Dudley's Defeat,
attempting
death

late

to protect

m

1

8 3,

battered British

who

1

the

first

two

British soldiers

incidents, and at both the River
Raisin

were

by

killed

their

Native

allies

Bntish

Massacre

while bravely

American prisoners from Indian vengeance.^^
After Tecumseh's

when

the remnants

of his former

army eastward towards

had participated

accompanied

at

No

how

in the

the west end of

previous killings

a British expedition into

the British burned the towns of Black

nativist

confederacy had followed the

Lake Ontario, numerous warriors

the River Raisin and Dudley's
Defeat

at

American

territory

on the Niagaia

frontier.

When

Rock and Buffalo on 30 December 1813, Ottawa

leaders from southern Michigan near Detroit
began throwing live

American children

into

the names. After the Indians had burned
three children, a detachment of British
soldiers

managed

to

save the remaining American civilians, but only
after a British officer had

been shot through

his

sword arm with an arrow and

John Strachan to Thomas Jefferson, 30 January 1813,
Moral: A Canadian Chronicle (Montreal: J. Lovell,

in

a significant

William

1864), 273-85;

Procter's

Warofl812

body of cavalry had

F. Coffin,

m2_JjieJA!MancLits
Sandy Antal, A Wampum D enied:

(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 201-02; Larry L.
Nelson Men of
Patriotism, Courage,
Lnterprise!: Fort
e ms in the War of! 8
rCnninn Oh,n Daring Books 1985)
77; Casselman, Richardson's War of 1812, 153-54; Klink
Talman, Journal of Maior John Norton 32 1-'
22. John Norton ascribed the massacre of Dudley's men to "(a] Worthless
Chippawa [i.e. Ojibwa] of
Detroit having with him a number of wretches like himself" Robert
McAfee, American veteran of the War
of 1812 and early historian of that epoch, attributed this atrocity to the
Potawatomis, while claiming that

&

M

1

&

Miamis and Wyandots "were on
Americans. McAfee, 272.

the

the side of

humamty" and attempted
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to grant

mercy

to the defenseless

come

.o h,s aid.

British

and

The ep.sode once again nearly
ended

their alhes

from south of the Great Lakes

Officers of the Bntish Right
Division -the
Detroit frontier and

Upper Canada's Wester.

,he roeky relationship

"

army

that

was deployed along

Majesty's subjects of Upper Canada

if his

am.y was ever compelled

Dudley's Defeat, Procter understood what
his
in

made

British

July 1813,

when

futile attack as a

was not popular with

Procter

at the

which the

men and

to retreat.

After

River Raisin, Fort Meigs, and

commit any of their

latter

necessary "Sacnfice.

his

also

were capable of doing. At Fort

allies

the Indians refused to

a reckless frontal assault in

considered the

Hemy Procter,

would become of the Bntish forces
and His

having witnessed the carnage following
the actions

Stephenson

the

District- dreaded the
consequences of an

Indian alliance gone awry.
Their overall commander, Major
General
feared his allies' instability, and
what

between the

.

.to

forces until the

sustained severe losses, Procter

Indian Opimon."^^ Although

other officers, most shared his concerns

regarding the Indians.

At one point dunng the Right Division's
the aging Indian agent

Indians for nearly

sacrificed.""

Matthew

fifty years,

Had

Elliott,

broke into

ill-fated retreat in early

an adopted Shawnee
tears,

who had

October 1813,

lived

among the

exclaiming that "he would not stay

to

be

Procter not stopped to give battle against the pursuing
Americans in

' '""""^
of A legan County. Mirh.p .n .n tl.. ^x>,r....
'
:
r?f.Q
^ ?°
of
1840 (Niles, Michigan: Niles Mirror Office, 1889; reprint,
1839 and
Berrien Springs, Michigan^
Hardscrabble Books, 974), 5- 8. The accounts included in here
were those given by the former Ottawa
war leaders from southern Michigan -Saginaw, Noonday, and Gosa.
l

1

1

1

Procter to Sir George Prevost, 9 August 1813, Wood, II:
46; Same to same, 1 1 July 1813, ibid., 253-54
Procter's superior. Sir George Prevost, did not understand the peril
of the situation, and he scorned the

General for "having allowed the clamour of the Indian Warriors
valuable force." Prevost to Procter, 22 August 1813, ibid., 48.

to

induce you to commit a part of your

" Testimony of Lt. Colonel Augustus Warburton, 9 December 1814, Procter Court-Martial,
Office (WO) 71/243, 11. These records are also available in CNA, MG 13, WO
71/243.
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In stark contrast to those
often tense

moments

that characterized the

the region of Detroit and
the southern Great Lakes,
Bnt.sh-Indian relations

and

in the

upper Mississippi Valley
progressed

much more

greater discipline of the Indians
from the North and

alhance

m the North

smoothly. Specifically, the

West stood

When

out.

Robert

Dickson, principal Bntish agent
and trader from the upper Mississippi
region,
Detroit with hundreds of Native
reinforcements to assist Procter in the
the General descnbed

them

as "restrainable, tractable to a

m

Degree

that

amved

summer of
I

at

1813,

could not have

thought possible." But Procter feared
that after several days they
had begun to

^ow

"contaminated, by the other Indians" fi-om
the Detroit region.^' Like Procter,
John

Richardson, a "Gentleman Volunteer"
fi-om Upper Canada, also praised
Dickson and the
northwestern Indians, comparing the Sauks'
"nobleness of feature" to that of the
ancient

Romans.^^ More importantly, Richardson
related an instance
prevented a Sauk chief fi-om taking the

life

in

which Dickson

of an .American pnsoner

in order to

avenge

the death of the chiefs son." But
Richardson's stones of Amencan pnsonsers
captured

near Brownstown the previous year by tribes
from the Detroit region demonstrated that in
those instances not even the presence of a British
Indian agent nor that of army officers

could prevent the ritualized killing of pnsoners.^'^

War, Britain's Indian
traders

^'

allies fi-om the

Procter to Prevost, 9 August 1813,

Ibid.,

far

West continued

and Indian agents for leadership and guidance. These

Casselman, Richardson's

"

North and the

As they had always done

War of

Wood,

II:

44.

1812 102.
.

157-58.

Ibid., 27-31.
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prior to the

to look to their

tribes envisioned

themselves
protect

.n a syn.b.ot.c relat.onsh.p

them and provide

Sauk leader Black

m the Mississippi

Green Bay, Black

Hawk

Bntish Father, one which
would always

for their material needs.

In his autobiography, the

the British agents

wah the.

Hawk

spoke of h,s relationship with

Valley and Wisconsm. In a

meetmg with Dickson

recalled that the agent 'Vo././
not consent to

murder ^omen and chMren

[italicized

by autobiography's

editor],"

sen, tra.e men

at

to

and therefore would

not permit the King's allies to
raid defenseless settlements."
Instead, Dickson insisted
that the

Sauks and the other wester, nations
accompany the traders and Bntish

assist Procter in northern Ohio.

According

hundred warriors happily complied with

Meigs Black Hawk demonstrated

American prisoners

his

to the

Sauk

this request.

chief,

officers to

he and approximately five

FuHherBiore, while enroute to Fort

humanity by advising other

allied tnbes to treat

well, and he credited himself with
the distinction of intervening
to

end the slaughter of captive Americans

Dudley's Defeat, an honor

at

that legend has

generally bestowed upon Tecumseh.
Regardless of which chief actually stopped
the
killings at

Dudley's Defeat, Black Hawk's cooperation
with the Bntish and

for the basic

attitudes

human

dignity of his enemies

his respect

was almost diametrically opposed

of his Indian counterparts along the Detroit

frontier.^^

and Dakota Sioux of the Upper Mississippi, along with

its ties

Bntain's

to the

to the

ties to the

Sauks

Ojibwas, Ottawas,

and Mcnominees of Wisconsin and northern Michigan,
provided the necessary support

" Jackson,

"

Ibid.,

Black Hawk:

An Autobiography

.

66.

66-67.
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for the

Crown's

December

As

little

army

,o hold

key posts

in those regions until
the

Treaty of Ghent in

1814.^^

with the other groups covered
in

Upper Canada endured
their land question

still

a

this study, the

Grand River community of

wartime expenence reminiscent of their
prewar years. With

unsettled, the Six Nations officially
proclaimed neutrality at the

commencement of hostilities,
gnevances. Nevertheless,

ostensibly until the Bntish government

after the initial

urging of John Norton, most

would address

their

Bntish successes., coupled with the
relentless

wamors from

the

Grand River once again

allied

themselves

with the King's cause.^« This time, however,
they did so in hopes of receiving
future
redress from the

Crown, and with the understanding

that

it

was a matter of honor

to repel

an invader of their homeland. Unlike the
other segments of the Chain of Friendship,
the
Iroquois

at the

which was
status

on

fight to regain lost territory, but to
retain the

rightfully theirs, regardless

of how the British government perceived

again, officials in

Canada were forced

Grand River. Neither Prevost nor

Brock, could

make any promises

their

still at

in the war,

temporize with the Six Nations

it

was

essential to

keep the Six Nations

compromised with the Grand River group by allowing

them wartime autonomy and resources and eventually granting Norton

" Calloway, Crown

at

nor could they undermine the Indian

odds with Norton and elements of the Six

Nations. Nevertheless, Prevost, realizing that

employed

to

the military governor of Upper Canada, Isaac

to the Six Nations,

Department's position, which was

actively

ground

that land.

Once
the

Grand River did not

and Calumet 204; Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind 88-91
.

.

Benn, 36-53.
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a great deal

of

control over the distribution
of g,fts and

war materiel

Grand River."

at the

In essence,

Prevost had established a direct
l,nk between Norton and
the upper levels of
govemmen,

and had given the mixed-blood
leader significant control over
military resources.

Prevosfs maneuver drastically undercut
the power and inHuence of
the todian

Department

at the

Fort

George agency,

nemesis. William Glaus,

who

resisted

particularly that

of Norton's arch-nval and

Prevosfs orders throughout the war
and took every

opportunity to contmue to malign
Norton. Although Norton was eventually
shoved aside

by

h,s adversaries at the war's end
after

wartime experience demonstrated

Prevosfs

recall to

England, the Grand River's

that the British, while not prepared
to fully grant Six

Nations' demands, were in a position in
which they were compelled to compromise
w.th
Iroquois interests.

Several aspects of the Chain of Friendship
have been discussed in this study. Ties

between the British government and the Indians
of the Old Northwest and Upper Canada
between 1783 and 1812 were often tenuous, and
depending on several varying

factors,

this relationship differed widely,

such as geographical position, Native relations
with

the United States, the fur trade, Indian intertribal
relations, the degree of Native
acculturation, indigenous religious beliefs, the influence
of British Indian agents, and the
constitutional issues of Native sovereignty and legal status.

century few Americans,

if any,

grasped the reasons for the continuation of the

Friendship between Great Britain and

its

the complexities of these bonds. Perhaps

39

Ibid.,

142-43, 156-57; Klinck

& Talman,

Secretary to Lieutenant General Gordon

CNA, RG

219-20, and

in

1814,

1463-64.

ibid.,

During the nineteenth

Indian

Henry

allies,

10, Indian Affau-s, Vol. 3,

of

nor could Americans understand

Schoolcraft, ethnologist and U. S. hidian

Journal of Major John Norton Ixxviii;
.

Drummond,

Cham

March

Noah

Freer, Military

1814, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations
1299-1301. Also see Freer to Captain Lonng 9 July
1
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.

agent,

came

the closest

when,

in

1

Movements of the North Western

834, he pubhcly presented his
study on "The

Indians

Dunng

the Late

War" to

of Michigan. At the time of
his presentation several of
the Indians

war were

still

living,

and the Shawnee Prophet had
moved

to

the Histoncal Society

who had

m the

fought

an Indian reservation

m

Kansas. While erroneous in places,
Schoolcraft's study pointed out
the regional
differences between the tribes
of the Old Northwest, and

nations had rejected the teachings
of the
"the Agents of the North

it

emphasized

Shawnee Prophet. The

West Company" and Robert Dickson

that the northern

ethnologist also credited

as

key figures

in

preserving the northern alliance. Finally,
rather than condemning the
British for iheir
participation and involvement in
Native atrocities, as his countrymen

were wont

to do,

Schoolcraft pointed out that the British
had not kept their promises to their
faithful
allies.^^

The U.

S. agent,

having worked among the

tribes in northern

Michigan

for

more

than a decade, also managed to incorporate
a degree of Native perspective in
his
scholarship, and in so doing helped to pave
the

way

for further studies in British-Indian

relations such as this one.

Schoolcraft's study also hinted at a key point,
frailty.

The uncertain

brought out

in the

level

of British commitment

to their Indian allies

was

Treaty of Ghent, which did not adequately protect
Indian

This would have been forgivable

Henry

namely the Chain of Fnendship's

if British officers

ftirther

interests.

and agents had not made promises

to

R. Schoolcraft,

"Movements of the North Western Indian During the Late War " Discourse
Delivered Before die Histoncal Society of Michigan, Detroit,
1834, GABLA, Shawnee File 1803-1804Winnebago File, 1797-1806. There were also two other documents wntten
by

Amencans dunng the war
acknowledged regional groupmgs and differences between the Indians, yet
without applymg this to the
Bntish alliance. These are: Thomas Forsyth to John Gibson, 26 July
1812, Thomas Forsyth Collection
Box 134, Chicago Historical Society, and Duncan Mc Arthur, "Report on the Indian
that

Mississippi River with

McArthur Papers, Vol.

Whom the United States are Connected by Treaty," 22
1,

tribes East

March 1814 Duncan

122-32, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.

315

of the

their allies rega,.,,,,.. ,„c

,«u„a,io„ „r,|,.„

,:„„,

:
,

wlu„ wa. acnally

,„o,ni«o.i ,„

,„c.

„„li.„s

war's „u,sc,. ,„„

a, ,l,c

responses a,ul a few .|„.„es f„„„ k.y
..nu-e,. „,ake
Lieulenan. C.,l,.„e: Ro„er, Mel.„„ail.
(liiiiii]',

uho had

„„^

,^

Na.,vc

,l,c

easy u, cnjecuu-

i.

^

|H,.s,wa,

l„ i.si s,

co„„„a„„e.l B„„sh „„ves

a,

Mackinae

(lie w;ii, l;iiiK-ii(f(l,

shall l„

I

N

,l,c lalcsl

peM.ul .,r,„y

|,|,.

Uc...

k- hapless I )esl,„y
„r,|,ese .lev„le>l
l,s,e„nl ,„ o,„ so„ci,a,io„s
an.l eo„„cl,„« i„ our
p'o.n.ses

who

I

hy M.

l.o„all|

secunly

,o ,Ik „, a,„l ,l„.„

o,,,,,,

(

v ,.„ly

,o ,1,™ ,l(,er

|e.l

aiiiiiliihilion

M.

.onall ollc, e.M.,cssal Ihe sl.anu-

I

say,,,,, -I AIIU-,

wha(

I

have loW

I

„„„

a

leU ,e,a„i,„g his „alio„'s poslwa,
huMan poi.ey.

1,,-

ll,e,„ |ll,e l,Kl,a„s||,|

wha,

a

s„pe,la„ve

a„.l „„e.p,allal

they must think me."^^
Al Mackinac

wonld

m. I.mk-

assist Ihcni in

just elanns adnnlled,

Foil

MeKay

n. (he

yet reached (he

ti.

Hndsh

by Apt,

I'.arrison

Mii)oi (K-nt

Sainr to same, 4 Oclobci
Historical

Spca

(

n.(eu-sls

ii)',hls

i.ii

I

ol the

Andrew

Md )o„al!

IusI eonsideivd

peiniitted in

news

IKIS, (\,p(ain

Ik-

iian,,

(lu-

voni

niliiie.""

Al

peace of (ihcnl had not
Hnlj-ei ol the

Royal

instructed Ins interpreters to iidorni hoth the Sion.v
and the

Hnlger's emphasis] aceonnl that the

|

(()

ol yoin

Great R.

les."

nppei Mississippi Valley, where

that "it is .solely o,, ///c//

McDoiiiil!

n.lorn.al (he Indians thai the Kn,,-

make pcaee unid "youi

and no ndi nir.nnenl

Newfonndland Fencibles
Sanks

ISU, Mc Dcuall had

rcccvcnng then "oUI houndai

Conlnnied. wonld lelnse

KoIhhmmi, 22

IKl.S. ihid

.

Mi)

Srplriiilu-i

IKIS,

MIMIC. XVI

Also sir Kohcil Mrl

hui.ill

(

,'K

War

is

now

caiiial

l

)Mlri ly

Mook, ISIS. \UiiUm

ollcciuiii

h orMiDoiiall (o

llir

Indians

al

I

MirhillinKu kinac.

116

S

June

IM

I,

(

NA. M(i

1

1

CO 42,

LS7, l.S-IK

When news of the peace

on;

finally reached these distant
outposts the following

month, both officers were stunned.
The Treaty's terms called for
the restoration of ail
conquered territones. The disillusioned
McDouall could only conclude

negocators

[sic], as usual,

that "[o]ur

have been egregiously duped. ...
they have shown themselves

profoundly ignorant of the concerns
of this part of the Empire."^^

The northern and western
Indian agents at

who

hidians

Mackmac and Drummond

subsequently met with McDouall
and the

Island between 1815 and 1817

were

thunderstruck as they began to fully
grasp the implications of the peace.
In the

of 1816 the Sioux chiefs Wabisha and

wamors,

visited the

dissatisfaction.^^

A

Little

new Bntish

post at

Winnebago

leader also

summer, where he complained

summers

in

I

Drummond
made

many

saw or what

I

Island to express their

his

way

times rubbed

to the northern

Anderson

my eyes

make good on

before

I

could believe

heard." If the Bntish did not support the Indians,
Black

Scoux

1

9 E

5,

McDouall

Andrew Bulger
to Bulger, 2

Papers, File 6, pp. 505

May, 1815,

ibid.,

&5

1

[sic]

always

few consecutive

Hawk

"Instructions to Mr. Guiilory Interpreter for the Saulk
[sic] Nation," A. Bulger 8 April 1815"Instructions to Lieutenant Renville Interpreter for the

MG

that

their earlier promises,

my ears,

and cleared

agency

that "we... have

too, visited the post for a

an attempt to compel the Bntish to

exclaiming, "I

what

Crow, accompanied by four hundred

to agent T. G. ("Tige")

been deceived by you."^^ Black Hawk,

summer

Nation," A. Bulger 8 \pn\ 15

CNA

0, respectively.

573.

His Maiesty's Indian Allies, 175. At a council held at Amherstburg
on 10 June 1816, a delegation
of "Principal Chiefs" of several of the refugees residing near the Western
District claimed that the Bntish
had promised them that they "would get back agam the old French lines,"
likely meaning the Allegheny
watershed. Proceedings of a Council held at Amherstburg, 10 June
1816, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs,
Vol. 27, 16106. This, of course, was impossible by 1812, and the statement
may have been an effort on the
part of the Indians to extract more gifts from the British. More realistically,
British officers and agents may
have given the Indians hope of restoring all of their country lost since the Treaty
of Greenville in 1795.

Speech of Karamanke, Winnebago

leader,

1 1

June 1816, William

Museum, Montreal.
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McKay

Papers, File

5,

McCord

co„..nued, "your red ch.ldren.
.win be slaves .0 .he B,g
Kn.ves."

When the Sauk

.

grew aggressively angry, agen,
William McKay
Grea, Father's orders

,0

from them. The council

Hawk

obey and
is

forcefally silenced kun:
"I have your

the Indians in ,he universe
will not

all

leader

make me

Ended and you must withdraw."
These remarks

left

dev.ate

Black

"crying with rage."^^

Of all

the groups within the

-once the most

stable

Cham

segment of the

anger with the Bnt.sh after the

Cham- were

War of

1

8 1 2. This

held out hope of resisting the
Amencans.
conflict

of Fnendship, the tnbes

was

partly due to the fact that
they

The nations nearer

had either relocated or had surrendered

to the

m expressing their

most vocal

the

m the North and West

to the Detroit theater

still

of the

"Big Kmves." Tecumseh and

Roundhead were dead, and by 1816 Main Poc
was gone

as well/^ Walk-m-the-Water,

one of the few surviving chiefs of the
coalition from the southern Great
Lakes, had begun
to cooperate with the

merely returned
lose their land.

Americans much

to their farms,

But the nations

earlier.

The wamors from

the

Grand River

and with the restoration of peace, they no
longer stood
in

Wisconsin and the upper Mississippi Valley were

begimiing to expenence the pressure of an expanding
military presence
after 1815,

the

that the northern

dissatisfaction with the British

ties that

Father was far

Speeches

at

in those regions

causing more consternation for the Indians there.
Finally, however, probably

most signficant reason

symbiotic

to

stemmed

and western

tribes so ardently expressed their

fi-om their understanding

of the

familial,

had subsisted between them for so long. To these groups,

more than a mere wartime

Drummond

Island, 3

Strachan Papers, F983, Vol.

1,

August 1817,

ally,

and since the nations

CNA,

MG

19

F

29, William

Ontario Historical Society, Toronto.
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their

Bntish

in these distant

McKay Papers-

also in John

quarters had not been greatly
affected by events in ehher
1783 or 1794, they
to

experience this disappointment for
the
In truth, Bntish officials

government, earnestly desired

first

now began

time.

and military leaders, both

to protect their allies

in

Canada and

m the home

and make good on their wartime

promises. After Tecumseh's death,
the fallen wamor's sister and
Tecumseh's teen-aged
son, along with nearly

two dozen other Indians from the
Detroit region,

General Sir George Prevost

at

Quebec

in

visited

Governor

March 1814. Prevost compassionately

expressed his condolences, telling the
delegation of his sorrow upon
previously learning

of Tecumseh's death. To console the
Indians, the Governor General
reminded them
they and the Bntish shared a

common

as his children and will not forget

and his

War

cause, and that "[o]ur Great Father
considers you

you or your

Like Prevost, Bntish leaders

in

that

interests at a Peace."^*^

England, including Prime Minister Lord
Liverpool

Secretary Earl Bathurst, considered

it

a

pnonty

to negotiate a

pennanent

Indian boundary and preferably a sovereign
Native buffer state that would separate the

United States temtones from Bntain's Canadian
possessions. Furthermore, the Bntish

peace commissioners

at

Ghent exceeded

demanding an Indian buffer

state as a sine

proposal was to include nearly
in 1795,

their

all

government's instructions by boldly

qua non of any peace agreement. The

of the Indian tenitory

lost since the Greenville

and both the British and American governments would
theoretically be

prohibited from purchasing or acquiring any Indian lands from within

For Main Poc's death, see Thomas Forsyth
9T53, Draper Mss.

Speech of Sir George Prevost
Affairs, Vol. 12, 10308-12.

and

Treaty

his wife

to

boundaries.

William Clark, 15 January 1827, Thomas Forsyth Papers,

to Indian delegation at

Tecumseh's
were also present.

its

sister, still

Quebec, 15 March 1814, CNA, RG 10, Indian
very distraught, cried on this occasion. John Norton
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Such a
succeedmg.

lofty

ultimatum by the Bnt.sh
commissioners had no chance
of

Any attempt

United States

at the

to

redraw the boundary separatmg
Indian country from the

old Greenville line

than one hundred thousand
white
the

American peace

settlers.

first

In addition,

required the removal of
more

John

Qumcy Adams,

delegation, pointed out that
"[n]o European

considered the Indian nations as
Great
later told

would have

Henry Goulbum,

Bntam appeared now

a

member of

power had ever

to consider

them.- Adams

the leader of the Bnt.sh
peace commission, that to

"condemn"

so great a "territory to perpetual
barrenness and solitude [so] that a few
hundred savages

might find wild beasts

to hunt

upon

it,

from Bntons would never endure."-

met

for dinner

explained to
to a

demand

was

a species

When

the

of game law

that a nation

descended

two countries' delegations informally

on 23 August 1814, Heny Clay, another
of the Amencan commissioners,

Goulbum

that the

for the cession

Bntish proposition regarding the Indians
was "equivalent

of Boston or

New

York."^^ Consequently, the Americans

prepared to break off negotiations. Only
Clay held out hope for reaching an agreement,
but merely because he, renowned for his
gambling and card-pIaying,
British

were

their perspective

"

Entry for

Compnsms
1874-1877),

" Goulbum

certain that the

bluffing.^''

The Americans ultimately had

l^f
CNA, MG 24 A

felt

on the

traditional

the better of the argument, for they were
basing

Euro-American

legal understanding that Natives

"^"^ Goulbum

^ "^"^"'^
Earl
8,
Bathurst Papers, 192.

to Earl Bathurst,

were

same date

September 1814, in Charles Francis Adams, ed.. Memoirs of John
Quincv Ada ms
Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848 17 Vol. {Ph,u^.^r.y.,^
j b

1

Lippincott
'^"u

III:

28.

to Bathurst,

23 August 1814,

CNA,

MG 24 A 8, Bathurst Papers, 200.

Hickey, 292.
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& Co
^o.,

not sovereign over the lands
on which they hved, but merely
possessed the usufructuary
right to the

temporary use of the

proposed Indian buffer
1

land.

Americans had regarded the reg.on
of the

state as sovereign

U.

The proposal was more convenient

783.

at that

time,

it

was not

for Britain.

as if the King's ministers

Native state from British

demonstrated

S. territory ever since
the

territory.

their aversion for

Since

Peace of Pans

Bntam had ceded

were offenng

this

in

reg.on

to carve a sovereign

Certamly, the Grand River experience
had

such a concept. In any case, the

Amencans would never

agree to any compromise unless the
Bnt.sh were in a pos.t.on to forcibly
evict them from
Indian lands. Even then, the war
would probably never end.

Adams

believed that even if

the United States government agreed
to Britain's Indian proposal,
"all

government's] force, and
the

American

Goulbum

of Britain combined with

from crossing the

settlers

that the

that

line.^^

two countnes' "united

of the American population which

is

later

concluded,

"I

prevails in the breast of every
Territory; but.

.
.

there

abandon as what they.

is

.

had

till

1

would be inadequate

56

Entry for

Goulbum

" Goulbum

1

to Bathurst,

inhabitants."^^

Amazed,

idea of the fixed determination which

to extirpate the Indians

.call their natural right to

and appropriate

their

made

in

do so."" Thus, the problem stemmed

1783 of areas

September 1814, Adams, Memoirs of John Quincv Adams

to Bathurst, 16

to restrain that part

nothing which the people of America would so
reluctantly

largely from the massive land cessions

55

prevent

Westward of the Alleghany, from encroaching

came here no

American

to

this view, intimating to

upon the Indian Territory and gradually expelling the
aboriginal

Goulbum

[the U. S.

would not suffice"

Clay shared

efforts

to the

it,

its

September 1814,

25 November 1814,

CNA,
ibid.,

,

that the

III:

Americans had

28

MG 24 A 8, Earl Bathurst Papers, 213

239.
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never actually c.„u|uc,al. I„„
wl„ch

,l,cy ha<l

base,

,hcir

,„l„

,o

possess

o,. a

,„y,„ „r

COIKlllCSl.

Ka.hc, than dnna.ul.n, an
Indian
i^ntish

in

eomnnssioners

pence

talks.

perhaps a w.ser shategen.

New

to

news

at

gains

the

Imlher raising the
Indian allies.^"

ire

Onee

the l^ritish

its

no matter

to the

Ameriean pubhe,

commissioners had proposed the bulTer

eiti/ens

how

so, lirit.sh officials

were

in

no

mood

to

make any

poorly Ameriean forces had fared

contemplated

a

mind ofthe

age, the

willmgness

to accept the

Duke of Wellington. The

command, could

full

slate, the

ternto,

m

laithlul

,al

the war.

conlmual.on and an escalation ofthe war

and offered overall command of Britain's North
Ameriean forces

(he British had gained

onee President

and hatred ofthe popniaee agamst
Bntan, and the Crown's

Ameriean government and
at all,

histead.

ol ,he extravagant Rntish
proposals lor an Ind.an buflbr

he released .he substanee ol the
eonlldenfal peaee talks

Even

the

.tor.al

York, and Man.e, w.thout ment,onn,g
the Ind.ans

regions speeifieally lor Native
reserves

.lames Mad.son reee.ved

concessions

seek n.odes. ten

to.

Then the Crown nnght have
subsequently had the opt.on
ofeannarking

some of the eonquered

State,

state,

have attempted would have been

to

Wiseonsin, Mieh.gan,

hnHb

to the greatest military

"Iron Duke," though expressing his

not promise further territorial conquests
until

naval superiority on the (neat

l

akes.

Only then could he

consider moving great numbers of troops south ofthe
Lakes and dislodging the

Americans from

their

remaining

forts scattered

throughout northern Ohio

key locations

that Procter's

ol the Lakes,

Wellington firmly maintained, "you have no

former Right Division had

"r^ailcy, 149; Mickey, 291.
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failed to capture

right... to

aiul Indiana,

Without control

demand any

concession of ,crr„ory
.0

co„„„ue

Europe

,o

.0

fro,,,

A^enca."" Th. Duke's words
helped

proseeu,e ,„e war. For,„„a,e,y
for „„,h eo.

mee, the rev,ved Preneh

threa,

es,

.en,per Br,.a,„, .ea,

We„i„„o„ re.a„,ed

,„

ancr Napoleon's eseape
fron, h,s .en,p„ra,y

exile at HIba.

Wdhngton's opinion

represented only a smgle factor
.nfluene.ng Bntan. to end

hostdities in North Ameriea.
After n.ore than

continued war

w„h

the Un.ted States

Furthermore, Europe's instab.l.ty

would require add.t.onal loans and
property taxes/

at the t.n.e

United States made peaee des.rable.
Years

months of 1814, reeallmg

made

,t

two deeades of f.ghting Franee,
a

and growing European sympathy

later,

Henry Goulbum

reflected

Vienna assumed

a character

that "the discussions at

possible that there m.ght be a
renewal of hostdities in Europe

speculated upon the embarrassment
which

a,i

for the

on the

final

wh.ch

& part.es there

American war would cause

to England."^'

Therefore, Rrifsh cc.mmissioners relented
to American pressure for a
peace based on the
principle of .v/.;/„v cjuo ante helium,
a restoration of all conditions and
lemtories as they

stood prior to the war. Thus, while
officers and agents

McDouall, Bulger, Dickson, and others

all

in

North America such as

recognized the familial

believed morally bound the British to the
Chain of Friendship, the

ties that the Indians

home government.

Wellmg on

to t.ord I .vcrpool, 9 November
1814. quoted .n Ihckey. 295. Wellington's
concerns were
well founded; the naval struggle on the I,akes
would have made ,t difficult for e.thef side to gam
supremacy. By war's end. the naval race on Lake Ontario
alone entailed the construction oflhe world's
largest sailing vessels at the time. For an
excellent essay on this struggle, see C. P. Stacey,
"Naval Power
on the Lakes. I «12-I8I4." in Afkr Tippecanoe: Some Aspects of th. w.r »f . « .
i

(Last^Lansmg

&

roronto:

The Michigan

State University Press

& The

Ryerson

ed. Philip

P Mason

Press, respectively, 1963),

Harold D. Langley. 'The Quest for Peace," in War on the
Great Lakes: Rssavs romm.mnr...nf,
1
75 Anniversary of the Battle of Lake Frie eds. William Jeffrey Welsh and David
Curtis Skaggs (Kent
Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1991), 73.
^"

.

" Wilbur Devereux

Jones, ed.,

"A

British

View of the War of

1

8 1 2 and the Peace Negotiations "
'

Mississippi Valley Historical

Review 45 (1958-1959^

4Rft
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The

.hough wa„.,„g
to its

.0 help .he Indians, in ,he

European geo-political

By all
The United

States had f.led

m all of

Amencan

stalemate

at

Bnt.h

Ghent, coupled with

New

at

won

terms. In a sense,

the

it

was

Americans even regarded

troops occupied

in 1783, the

it

Andrew Jackson's

Orieans
the

in

article to the

left

postwar

myth of victory
as a second

in

1783

all

than

Erie, albeit the

in

gaining a

victor>'

Amencans

war and had compelled Bntain

Crown's Indian

his associates

over a

with the false

to agree to favorable

over again; Jeffersoman

war of independence.^^
allies

were once again
at least

left

vulnerable to American

attempted to address Native

managed

to

persuade the American commissioners

to

add an

Treaty as a token attempt to protect Native interests.
In keeping with the

principle of status

all

brilliant

territoi-y

the peace negotiations, and in place of
the ill-fated buffer state proposal,

Goulbum and

restored

much more American

January 1815,

expansion. This time, however, Bntish leaders
had
at

attempt to conquer

.ts

Americans held naval domination only
on Lake

impression that they had

concerns

mcludmg

of all the Great Lakes. Yet the
American diplomatic tnumph

seasoned Bntish amiy

As

objectives,

the peace.

of mantime nghts for which the
war was supposedly

declared, and at the war's end

vital

its

won

comissioners never compelled the
Bntish peace delegation

to address Britam's violation

vice-versa. Fmally, the

confo™

interests.

conventional standards, the
Americans had lost the war but

Canada. At Ghent

most

end shaped Bn,a,„'s fore.gn
policy to

quo ante bellum.

Article

DC of the Treaty of Ghent

theoretically

Indian "possessions, rights, and privileges" to which they
had been entitled in

the year 1811. This, however, did not guarantee the Indians
a sovereign status, and

Hickey, 298-99, 308-09.
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it

did

nothing .0 prevent the continuat.on
of a proeess of rehnquish.ng
the.r lands to the
Untted
States through a rapid
succession of treaties. Furthermore,
significant leaders

Tecumseh and other

of resistance were now gone,
and the Bnt.sh no longer
attempted

to

intervene, so nothing hindered
the accelerated process
of Amencan land acquisition.

Short of continuing the war for
struggle for

many

years ,n what prom.sed to be
a bloody, fotile

Lake Erie and northen, Ohio, Article
IX

that the British

in the

Ghent agreement was the best

could do for the Indians. g,ven the
circumstances and American

temperament.
In spite

that

of the broken promises and the

drastically reduced British h.dian
budgets

followed the war, traces of the old
Chain of Friendship remained, hidians
living

the North

still

into the 1840s,

to cross

received gifts and provisions

at

Drummond

and a number of those who remained

over each year

in order to visit their British
Father at

Rebellion of Upper Canada

m

after

of Detroit continued

Maiden, a practice

And

that

during the Mackenzie

1837-1838, Ojibwas from Lake Huron and neariy
one

hundred warriors from the Grand River turned out
to

Even Black Hawk,

and Manitoulm Islands well

in the vicinity

continued to amioy Governor Lewis Cass of
Michigan."

assist in putting

down

the revolt.^

having survived the bloody war that bears his
name, by 1833 had

seemingly forgotten about his harsh words and shouting
sprees with British agents
sixteen years earlier. In his autobiography, the

made

but few [promises] -but

we

Sauk leader

recalled that "the British

could always rely upon their word! [italicized by

Cass to John Calhoun, Secretary of War, 3 August 1819, and same to same,
8 October 1819, Bentley
Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Lewis Cass Collection, Vol.
3, 99-102 and 122-25,
resepective'ly.

^ Allen,

in

His Majesty's Indian Allies

.

1

84.
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editor]

Nevertheless, in spi.e of the
memories, the

alliances, council frres. Indian
revitali^ation
liad all passed.

Jackson, Black

A new

yea. of frontier warfare,
mUitary

movements, and

fur trade ,n the Great

era in the annals of
Canadian-hdian relations had begun.

Hawk: An Autobiography

.

60.
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